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Abstract 
Emma	Louise	Whittaker	
Transitions-felt:	William	James,	locative	narrative	and	the	multi-stable	field	of	
expanded	narrative	This	thesis	is	about	expanded	narrative,	a	new	field	of	experimental	narrative	practices	that	are	not	represented	by	single	subjects	or	by	categories	such	as	‘interactive’.	It	is	defined	by	works	that	present	a	challenge	to	the	form,	fiction	or	nonfiction,	in	terms	of	the	content,	structure,	style	of	writing	or	audience	engagement.	Extending	the	cognitive	term	‘perceptual	multistability’,	that	refers	to	switching	between	interpretations	experienced	when	we	look	at	an	ambiguous	figures,	such	as	the	Necker	cube,	this	thesis	develops	the	position	that	expanded	narrative	practices	and	specifically	locative	narrative,	a	genera	of	expanded	narrative,	hold	the	potential	to	prompt	the	experiential	effects	of	multi-stability.	The	metaphor	of	multi-stability,	introduced	here,	stands	in	for	three	aspects	of	experience:	language,	perception	and	belief.	While	ambiguity	and	misperceptions	have	been	recognised	in	the	literature	of	experiential	narrative	practices,	further	exposition	is	required.	The	thesis	asks	what	are	the	conditions	in	which	the	qualities	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	may	be	prompted	and	what	framework	usefully	articulates	the	parameters	of	experience?	Drawing	upon	the	writings	of	the	philosopher	William	James,	subsequent	pragmatists,	cognitive	neuroscience	and	narratology,	it	explores	how	a	radical	empiricist	perspective	can	inform	a	non-foundational	experiential	framework	that	questions	the	status	of	knowledge	and	the	problems	of	translation	between	experience	and	narrative	interpretation.	It	suggests	that	the	subjective	classification	of	imagined	and	perceptual	objects	can	be	affected	by	the	relations	between	the	narrative	form,	the	environment	and	the	participant’s	beliefs.	The	major	contributions	of	the	thesis	are:	(1)	the	development	of	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	that	sets	up	cross-disciplinary	parameters	for	the	thematics	of	experience	to	engage	with	the	ontological	and	epistemological	challenges	of	evaluating	and	designing	for	multistability;	(2)	a	relational	approach	to	the	interpretation	and	coding	of	participants’	feedback	of	locative	narratives;	(3)	that	is	employed	in	the	development	of	a	collection	of	speculative	strategies	for	evoking	the	effects	of	multi-stability,	based	on	the	development	of	four	published	locative	narrative	apps	and	ten	prototypes.	While	highly	contingent,	participant	introspective	accounts	of	experience	are	central	to	the	methodology	here:	the	process	of	serial	hypothesis	forming	and	the	iterative	development	of	prototypes	and	locative	narrative	case	studies.	This	research	does	not	attempt	to	draw	causal	connections	from	science	to	that	of	narrative	experience	or	vice	versa.	The	thesis	first	considers	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	and	the	semantic	and	pragmatic	framings	of	the	term	narrative	and	narratological	framings	of	language	as	multi-stable.	It	goes	on	to	examine	the	antecedent	and	coexistent	practices	of	locative	narrative.	The	epistemological	implications	for	misperception,	the	function	of	representation	and	intentionality	in	perception	are	examined	in	relation	to	the	environmentally	situated	perceptual,	interpretative,	aesthetic	and	emotional	dimensions	of	experience.	This	research	contributes	to	research	in	narrative	and	creative	practices.	It	extends	the	form	of	locative	narrative	with	the	concept	of	multi-stability	that	has	a	wider	application	with	the	field	of	expanded	narrative,	creative	practice	and	narratology.	
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Introduction	
	
 	The	common	classifications	of	narrative	as	digital,	paperback,	literary,	mass	market,	fiction,	nonfiction,	etc.,	offer	a	generally	shared	short	hand,	despite	the	contentiousness	of	their	meanings	when	the	surface	is	scratched.	However,	there	is	no	general	meaning	of	‘interactive	narrative’	and	little	consensus	either	from	users	of	the	terms	interactive	storytelling,	interactive	fiction	or	other	variants!	The	binary	opposition	implied	by	the	term	interactive	narrative	immediately	runs	into	difficulties,	what	is	non-interactive	narrative?	Where	is	the	‘interactivity’	located?	With	the	text?	The	reader?	The	platform?	The	context?	What	are	the	relationships	between	how	the	participant	feels	and	thinks,	what	they	do	‘with	the	text’,	and	the	type	of	affects	that	result?	What	makes	the	structure,	content	or	presentation	of	a	story	‘interactive’?	Does	the	form	of	the	narrative	have	to	change	during	‘use’	for	it	to	be	considered	interactive?	Definitions	and	disputes	abound	that	underplay	or	privilege	various	features	of	narrative.		
	
….low-fi	works	distributed	on	digital	platforms,	locative	narratives,	on-line	community	novels,	
pervasive	games	with	live	and	online	participants,	twitter	fiction,	VR	journalism,	transmedia	
productions,	literary	podcasts,	“puzzle	novellas”1,	role-playing	via	mobile	phones,	algorithmically	
generated	dialogue…In	a	world	filled	with	experimental	narrative	practices,	the	term	‘interactive’	often	does	not	quite	capture	the	form,	modes	or	engagement	or	subjective	experience	of	this	diversity.	Expanded	narrative	is	the	name	I	give	to	a	new	field	of	narrative	
                                                        
 
1 Simogo (2016 ) Device 6 v.1.2 [iOS & Android Application] Retrieved from: 
https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/device-6/id680366065?mt=8 
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and	practices	that	present	a	challenge	to	a	particular	form	of	storytelling,	fiction	or	nonfiction,	in	terms	of	the	content,	structure,	style	of	writing	or	the	ways	in	which	the	audience	engages.	‘Interactivity’	is	just	one	possible	challenge	to	the	form	that	an	individual	work	may	present.		This	thesis	is	concerned	with	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	and	one	of	its	forms,	‘locative	narrative’.	It	is	perhaps	around	2000,	with	the	removal	of	the	GPS	signal	denegation	approved	by	the	US	government	(U.S.	Air	Force	2013),	together	with	techniques	such	as	Wi-Fi	triangulation	and	proximity	to	sensors,	that	the	use	of	positioning	technologies	in	the	arts	is	referred	to	as	practice	in	its	own	right,	while	at	least	since	the	20th	century,	mapping	and	navigation	has	been	a	part	of	the	artist’s	tool	kit.	Ben	Russell’s	Headmap	Manifesto	(1999:	17,	28)	foretold	the	possibilities	for	“location	aware	devices”	to	create	dynamic	networks	that	could	connect	object	and	place.	He	suggested	strategies	such	as	attaching	histories	to	places	and	animating	objects	with	sound,	games	and	narrative,	leaving	notes	“without	a	visible	sign”,	binding	visual,	textual	and	oral	information	to	places	that	can	be	found	by	others,	“supplementing”	signs,	clothes	and	advertising	and	tracking	people,	animals	and	things.	Tactics,	that	he	suggested,	would	change	relations	between	physical,	digital	and	“augmented	space”,	affecting	perception	and	behaviour.		
	
A	range	of	hard	and	software	capabilities,	including	positioning	techniques	and	programmatic	triggering	of	media	files	and	sound	playback,	together	with	low-tech	props	and	tools,	have	been	utilized	in	diverse	forms	of	location-based	play,	theatrical	and	storytelling	experiences.	City	streets,	remote	landscapes	and	public	buildings	have	been	co-opted	and	transformed	by	locative	practices.	
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The	relatively	recent	history	of	‘locative	arts’	is	reflected	by	the	coining	of	the	term	‘locative	media’	attributed	to	Karlis	Kalnins	at	The	Locative	Media	Workshop,	Karosta,	Latvia	in	2003,	hosted	by	arts	collective	‘RIXC’	(Hemment	2006:	354),	(Raley	2010:	300).		Subsequently,	practitioners	and	theorists	have	investigated	the	personal	and	subjective	experience	and	also	the	socio-political	and	cultural	relations	between	mapping,	the	movement	of	data,	people,	things	(Russell	1999:	10,	27),	(Hemment	2006).	Rita	Raley	(2008:	127)	characterises	these	poles	as	“human	and	posthuman”.	Jen	Southern’s	(2016)	critical	mobilities	perspective	expands	the	scope	to	include,	
	“…situated	and	embodied,	mobile,	relational,	networked,	experimental	and	multiple	practices…”	(2016:	179)			A	range	of	terminology	have	been	used	to	describe	situated	storytelling.	Jeremy	Hight	(2006,	2)	claims	‘locative	narrative’	as	his	own,	with	reference	to	his	project	with	Jeff	Knowlton	and	Naomi	Spellman,	34	North	118	West	(2002),	an	early	example	of	the	use	of	GPS	to	trigger	historically	inspired	audio	narratives	on	portable	computers.	Hopstory	(2002),	a	collaborative	project	in	which	‘bluetooth	buttons’,	launched	audio	and	video	character	vignettes	on	personal	devices	inside	a	Dublin	hop	store,	in	a	‘day	in	the	life’	narrative,	described	by	Doyle,	Davenport	and	Mahony	(2002:	348)	as	a	“mobile	context	aware-narrative”	and	as,	“…a	story	that	responds	to	the	physical	and	social	context	of	a	mobile	user”.	Martin	Rieser	(2005:	8,	11)	describes	“spatial	narratives”	and	“locative	media	narratives”	as	storytelling	in	which	“diegetic	space”	is	“mapped”	onto	geographic	locations.	And	in	Jason	Farman’s	(2014:	4)	survey	of	the	field,	he	chooses	“mobile	media	storytelling”	to	capture	a	variety	of	practices	where	locative	media	connects	story	to	place	and	space.				
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Rita	Raley’s	vocabulary	distinguishes	an	emphasis	between	story	content	and	literature.	For	Raley,	“locative	narrative”	(2008:	126)	signifies	the	annotating	of	place	by	virtual	or	augmented	visual	displays,	such	as	games	or	tour	guides	that	include	‘story	content’,	whereas	“mobile	narratives”	(2010:	302)	specifically	concern	the	creation	of	literary	experiences.	However,	for	Brian	Greenspan	(2011:	5)	‘locative	narrative’	is	distinguished	from	other	mobile	media	projects	precisely	because	of	its	literary	dimension.	Jon	Dovey	(2016:	141),	Tom	Abba	(2016)	and	Kate	Pullinger	(2016)	use	the	term	“ambient	literature”	to	denote	a	genre	of	
writing.	Ambient	literature	is	oriented	towards	the	text,	histories	of	the	book,	the	authorial	intention	to	create	situated	literary	experiences,	with	an	emphasis	upon	interpretation	and	meaning,	rather	than	configurations	of	media	content	and	navigation	tech.	Nomenclature’s	exquisite	corpse	presents	varying	emphases	on	place,	technology,	politics,	aesthetics	and	literariness,	I	collect	them	here	under	the	genera	of	locative	narrative	and	part	of	the	family	of	expanded	narrative.			Narrative	that	is	intentionally	situated	in	the	reader’s	location	does	not	have	the	same	signification	as	eReaders	or	podcasts	that	happen	to	be	read	or	heard	in	the	park	or	on	the	bus.	While	there	is	variance	in	name	and	descriptors,	I	argue	that	locative	narratives	at	least	share	three	common	elements,	emphases	upon:	the	place	of	reading/listening/watching;	the	mode	of	interaction	or	participation;	and	movement	and	navigation.	The	medium	of	locative	narrative	therefore	involves	some	or	all	of	these	elements:		
• Narrative	that	is	site-specific	(not	a	bespoke	space,	virtual	or	physical)	
• Narrative	delivered	via	some	form	of	media	representation,	such	as,	text,	images,	video	or	sound;	
		
 
 
 
 
20 
• A	participation	mechanism	that	is	linked	to	the	structure	of	the	narrative;	
• Spatially	distributed	narrative	using	some	form	of	navigation	(maps	to	GPS).			Jason	Farman’s	(2014:	6)	framing	of	locative	narrative	situates	“mobile	media	storytelling”	in	the	deeper	histories	of	site-specific	storytelling.	Steve	Benford	and	Gabriella	Giannachi	(2011)	choose	the	lens	of	performance	and	‘virtual’,	‘mixed	reality’	and	‘hybrid’	spaces.	It	is	in	the	context	of	screen-based	media	that	Martin	Rieser	(2011:	3)	positions	narrative	practices	that	engage	“ubiquitous	interaction	technologies”,	extending	theories	of	reception	and	participation.			A	phenomenon,	often-reported	by	participants	of	expanded	and	locative	narratives,	is	perceptual-interpretative	ambiguity,	between	what	is	regarded	as	‘the	real’,	‘the	represented’	and	‘the	imagined’.	Prior	to	engaging	in	this	research	I	was	conducting	questionnaires	with	participants	of	a	murder	mystery	locative	narrative,	Cold	Case	1866	(2010),	that	I	had	collaboratively	developed.	In	addition	to	reporting	upon	the	functionality	of	the	application,	participants	frequently	mentioned	experiences	they	found	surprising	or	unexpected,	such	as	believing	the	plunge	and	splash	of	oars	was	emanating	from	rowing	boats	on	the	river,	rather	than	the	being	part	of	the	audio	track,	mistaking	recorded	footsteps	for	an	existent	person,	turning	around	to	find	no	one	there	and	talking	about	characters	as	‘actual’	suspects.	These	types	of	‘unexpected’	occurrences	can	be	described	as	categorical	confusion	between	what	is	
taken	as	existent	or	‘imagined’	objects,	or	in	some	cases,	as	cross-modal	illusions2	and	
                                                        
 
2 Cross-modal illusions refer to cases where interpretation of stimuli is affected by another sensory modality, where 
misperception may be reported.  
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misperceptions.	Participants	often	reported	that	these	types	of	experiential	strangeness	were	what	they	enjoyed	the	most,	found	engaging	at	the	time	and	were	most	memorable.		Ambiguity,	or	categorical	confusion,	can	result	when	the	borders	between	what’s	inside	and	outside	a	narrative	are	not	adequately	delineated	in	our	experience.	This	effect,	manifesting	in	a	variety	of	contexts,	has	been	highlighted	in	what	I	refer	to	as	‘blurred	theories’.	Marcus	Montola	et	al.	(2009:	xxi)	describe	pervasive	game	worlds	that	“blur	boundaries”,	extending	Katie	Salen	and	Eric	Zimmerman’s	(2004:	94)	notion	of	the	‘magic	circle’,	a	metaphor	for	the	frames	that	games	create,	after	Johan	Huizinga’s	(1955	[1938])	cultural	analysis	of	play.	Jon	Dovey	and	Constance	Fleuriot	(2011:	99)	describe	“convergences”	between	media	and	the	environment	that	can	lead	to	“magic	moments”	and	“synthetic	confusion”	in	locative	arts.	Drawing	upon	Gregory	Bateson	(1972)	and	Erving	Goffman	(1974),	Steve	Benford	et	al.	(2006:	435)	describe	“blurring	the	frame”,	that	occurs	between	‘fictional’	and	‘real’	worlds	in	hybrid	performances.		
Research	rationale		
	These	‘blurred	theories’	analyse	categorical	adherence/ambiguity	in	terms	of	the	norms	of	social	interaction	or	as	an	anomalous	affect	attributed	to	the	particular	cultural	practices	of	play	and	performance.	I	argue	that	these	phenomena	are	conceptually	and	experientially	complex	and	further	examination	and	explication	is	required.	In	this	thesis	I	argue	that	there	is	theoretical	and	practical	application	within	the	field	of	expanded	narrative,	and	particularly	for	the	practice	of	locative	narrative,	for	a	definition	of	these	phenomena	that	considers	not	just	their	affects,	but	also	a	framing	of	experience	in	terms	of	the	perceptual,	interpretative,	aesthetic	and	emotional	processes	that	operate	beneath	and	within	our	awareness.	
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The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	stands	for	three	inter-related	aspects	experience:	
• Perception	as	multi-stable	(above	and	below	conscious	awareness)	
• Language	as	multi-stable		
• Beliefs	about	what	is	real	or	true	as	multi-stable;	resting	on	a	feeling	of	rationality		
To	talk	of	the	quality	of	multi-stability	is	to	describe	a	value	in	experience	ascribed	to	an	
object,	to	talk	of	the	affect	of	multi-stability	is	to	describe	a	value	in	experience	ascribed	to	
the	experiencing	subject.			
This	thesis	addresses	the	following	questions:	
	
	 1) What	framework	of	experience	usefully	sets	the	parameters	for	articulating	the	
metaphor	of	multi-stability?	2) How	can	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	be	created	in	locative	narratives?	3) How	can	the	affect	of	metaphor	of	multi-stability	be	measured	and	interpreted?	
	The	systematic	examination	of	the	experience	of	perceptual	illusions,	under	laboratory	conditions,	is	well	documented	in	the	work	of	the	German	scientists	Gustav	Fechner	(1860),	Hermann	van	Helmholtz	(1925[1867])	and	Wilhelm	Wundt	(1863),	in	the		evolving	field	of	psychophysics	in	1860’s	and	70’s3.	While,	of	course,	the	examination	of	sensory	illusions	reaches	back	at	least	to	Aristotle	(350	B.C.E.	bk3.p1).	What	became	clear	quite	quickly,	was	
                                                        
 
3  Fechner, G. (1860) Elemente der Psychophysik, developed Weber-Fechner Law, an idea first put forward by E. H. 
Weber in 1846. It states the “relations between intensities of stimulus and intensities of sensation, and promised to 
qualify psychology (as "psychophysics") for membership in the select circle of the quantitative and experimental 
sciences.” (Perry 1935b: 3-4) William James examines a variety of Helmholtz’s conclusions in Principles of Psychology, 
for example, on hearing (1890b: 170) and Wundt’s methodology (1890a: 431). 
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that	the	form	of	locative	narrative	with	its	variety	of	elements,	(narrative,	recorded	voice,	sound,	location,	participant	interactions,	wayfinding	and	mobile	device),	would	not	lend	itself	to	positivist	empirical	measurement	of	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	multi-stability	under	controlled	conditions.	While	layers	of	complexity	could	be	removed,	what	would	be	measured	would	cease	to	be	the	same	form.4	The	reported	experiences	and	the	interpretation	of	locative	narrative	is	interesting	precisely	because	of	the	relations	between	the	different	elements	and	the	philosophical	conundrums	that	it	invites	participants	to	grapple	with,	‘How	can	we	know	what	is	existent	if	our	perception	can	be	faulty?’	‘How	do	we	differentiate	between	fact	and	fiction?’	‘To	what	extent	can	our	beliefs	be	verified	by	our	experience?’			In	the	field	of	locative	arts,	a	range	of	methods	have	been	evolved	to	develop	and	evaluate	projects.	These	fall	into	two	broad	categories	that	I	refer	to	as	‘artist	experimental’	and	‘HCI	led’,	a	third	category	combines	elements	of	both	these	approaches.	Artist	experimental	approaches	advocate	that	individual	artists	or	teams	use	an	iterative	cycle	of	development.	Broadly	informed	by	ethnographic	methods,	observation,	conversations,	and	in	some	cases	questionnaires,	are	employed	with	small	groups	of	testers.	Reflection	upon	responses	feed	into	on-going	development	of	the	project	(Dovey,	Fleuriot	and	Lingington	2012)	(Kabisch	2010).	‘HCI	lead’	approaches	in	the	locative	arts	tend	to	aim	for	the	production	of	verifiable	empirical	results.	Structured	data	collection	and	the	correlation	of	information	gathered	using	different	methods	from	movement	patterns	to	structured	interviews,	observation	and	ethnographic	methods.	Sample	sizes	tend	to	be	larger	successive	groups	(Lindt	et	al.	2006)	or	large	scale	field	trials,	with	a	100	or	more	users	(Reid	et	al	2010).	The	aim	of	this	approach	is	
                                                        
 
4 William Gaver (1993: 285) offers an algorithmic approach to measuring the perception of sounds in naturalistic 
settings.  
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to	produce	results	that	can	be	generalised	to	other	research	and	demonstrating	that	the	goals	of	the	project	have	been	met,	such	as	Reid	et	al’s	(2010:	54)	“emergence	driven	methodology”.	HCI’s	‘research	in	the	wild’	is	an	ethnographic	approach	to	developing	prototypes	and	observing	users’	interactions	in	their	own	situation	(Rogers	2011).	Benford	and	Giannachi	(2011:11)	and	Benford	et	al	(2013)	“research	in	the	wild	methodology”	combines	artist	experimental	and	HCI	approaches,	in	projects	that	are	artist-led	and	developed	and	evaluated	with	HCI	researchers.	Finished	performance	works	are	evaluated	with	a	combination	of	ethnographic	and	qualitative	research	methods,	from	which	synthesising	concepts	and	theories	are	extrapolated,	feeding	into	future	projects	that	are	led	by	artists.		Questions	can	be	given	to	locative	narrative	participants	that	may	yield	binary	responses,	
taken	as	objective	data,	‘Does	pressing	‘x’	button	cause	‘y’,	to	happen	in	‘z’	circumstances?’	Other	questions	are	taken	as	subjective,	resulting	in	qualitative	responses,	‘Is	the	game	objective	achievable?’	or	even,	‘What	was	your	experience	of	navigation	like?’	Qualitative	data	may	require	that	there	is	a	statistically	or	practically	‘sufficient’5	number	of	responses	which	are	coded	and	analysed	in	relation	to	types	and	average	responses,	e.g.	‘70%	of	respondents	found	the	game	ending	satisfying’.	The	framework	of	analysis	may	have	been	symbiotically	evolved	in	a	reciprocal	cycle	of	iterative	testing,	however	it	is	yet	another	vocabulary	from	which	‘results’,	even	if	nuanced	and	interesting,	are	a	‘description’	in	an	act	of	further	translation.	Analytical	philosophers,	such	as	the	linguistic	pragmatist	Huw	Price	(2011:	15)	question	the	possibility	of	making	‘truth	claims’	using	a	semantic	vocabulary,	or	that	we	can	claim	that	there	are	significant	word-world	relations;	and	Robert	Brandom	(2011:	9-12)	
                                                        
 
5 Grounded and qualitative research methodologies advocate that responses should be gathered until ‘saturation’ is 
reached –until no further different ‘types’ of responses are recorded.  
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rejects	that	cognitive	“practical	abilities”	(such	as	skills	and	“know-how”)	can	be	causally	explained	in	terms	of	discursive	language,	that	is	representational,	rule-based	and	normative.	Problems	of	translation	between	different	vocabularies,	are	not	easily	overcome,	even	perhaps	with	a	triangulation	of	ethnographic	methods	(Reid	et	al	2005b)	(Benford	&	Giannachi	2011:	10).		On	the	other	hand,	not	engaging	in	a	qualitative	testing	process	with	‘non-static’	objects,	those	in	which	the	‘users’	do	something	or	have	some	direct	contact,	is	a	risky	strategy	as	the	developers’	viewpoints	and	experience	is	unlikely	to	‘correspond’	exactly	with	the	range	of	users’	experiences,	resulting	in	objects	deemed	to	be	faulty	or	unsatisfactory	by	some.	A	belief	that	there	is	correspondence	between	the	content	of	experience	and	reports	of	experience	(word-world	relation6),	between	different	users’	reports	of	experience,	between	reports	of	experiences	and	their	translation	into	‘results’,	opens	up	many	epistemological	questions	(that	also	have	resonance	with	discussions	on	narrative	and	fiction,	discussed	in	chapter	5).			The	development	of	locative	narratives	comes	up	against	the	problems	of	‘establishing’	a	basic	range	of	technological	functionality	and	usability	necessary	to	satisfy	the	condition	that	‘most’	participants	can	operate	the	application,	‘to	some	extent’,	and	how	to	investigate,	measure	and	interpret	participants’	reports	of	phenomenal	experience.	Closed	questions,	such	as	‘Did	you	find	the	objects?’	can	give	one	level	of	‘data’.	Open	questions	such	as	‘What	was	your	experience	of	looking	for	the	objects	like?’	can	yield,	detailed	or	vague,	repetitious	or	surprising	alternative	viewpoints.	This	information	is	highly	variable	and	contingent	on	a	
                                                        
 
6 Huw Price’s take on the relation is discussed further in chapter 4. Hilary Putnam’s take on the relation is discussed 
further in chapter 5. 
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multitude	of	environmental,	social	and	personal	factors.	Reports	of	one	person’s	experience	one	day	is	often	different	the	next.		
	While	the	grounds	for	asserting	verified	empirical	knowledge	are	open	to	discussion,	in	a	local	and	limited	sense,	there	seems	to	be	a	practical	benefit	in	beta	testing.	However,	I	argue,	it	is	the	framing	of	experience	that	is	important	here,	not	just	in	articulating	the	concept	of	multi-
stability,	but	also	for	its	measurement	and	interpretation.	In	this	thesis	I	put	forward	an	experiential	framework	that	engages	with	the	ontological	and	epistemological	challenges	of	
multi-stability,	that	is	based	upon,	and	offers	a	new	reading	of	the	writings	of	the	late	19th	century	and	early	20th	century	psychologist,	philosopher	and	educator,	William	James.7		
	Since	the	publication	of	his	first	articles	in	the	1860’s,	William	James	has	continued	to	engage	thinkers8	on	topics	from	perception	to	epistemology	and	ontology.	James	was	interested	in	casual	explanations	of	experience;	and	the	neurophysiological	and	the	psychological	methods	employed	for	investigating	phenomena	are	a	main	focus	of	his	Principles	of	Psychology	(1890).	However,	he	is	critical	of	empiricism	for	“leaving	out”	an	account	of	the	subjective	relations	to	‘facts’,	expressed	by	language	and	logic,	arguing	that	language	itself	is	a	particular	construing	of	knowledge.	His	philosophy	of	radical	empiricism	calls	for	an	account	of	the	“conjunctive”	as	well	as	the	“disjunctive”	relations	between	things.			
                                                        
 
7 Initially I read the psychology of William James in order to develop an historical framing of cognitive psychology but 
found in his pragmatist and radical empiricist approach to psychology and philosophy many relevant tools for 
approaching questions of experience that sought to give a naturalistic account of the philosophical questions raised. 
Considering James’ philosophy in the context of pragmatism and subsequent interpretations and responses lead to 
intersections between philosophy of mind and narratology and the relations between that which is taken as the real, 
imagined, truth and fiction. 
 
8 James’ influence is outlined in chapter two. 
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“The	statement	of	fact	is	that	the	relations	between	things,	conjunctive	as	well	as	disjunctive,	are	just	as	much	matters	of	direct	particular	experience,	neither	more	so	nor	less	so,	than	the	things	themselves.”	(MT	1909:	xii)			Truth	claims	for	James	are	contingent	on	the	particular	context	of	use.	We	can	ask	Jamesian,	classical	pragmatist	questions,	‘What	are	the	practical	consequences	for	me	to	take	this	judgement	as	true?’	‘What	is	its	“cash-value’?’	‘To	what	extent	does	this	view	fit	satisfactorily	with	my	existing	ideas,	whereby	it	does	not	break	with	my	understanding	of	how	the	world	works,	but	extends	it	in	an	acceptable	way?’	A	critic’s	analysis	of	a	film	may	be	statistically	supported	by	the	opinion	of	other	critics,	but	we	do	not	necessary	need	to	give	this	type	of	knowledge,	these	beliefs,	the	status	of	being	fundamentally,	or,	unequivocally	true.	Without	reducing	empirical	data	to	subjective	opinion,	we	can	apply	James’	classical	pragmatist	analysis	in	both	cases.	Analytical	philosopher,	Bertrand	Russell	(1910:	101-102,	132)	and	a	linguistic	pragmatist	Robert	Brandom	(2011:16),	have	criticised	James	for	confusing	the	concept	of	truth	with	the	concept	of	meaning,	but	arguably	that	was	James’	point;	his	concept	of	truth	does	not	make	a	logical	identity	claim,	instead	he	makes	the	meaning	of	truth	a	value	that	is	contingent	on	the	particular	instance	of	use;	the	term	‘truth’,	for	James,	implies	the	critique	of	its	meaning	as	a	static	value.		It	is	the	value	of	belief,	I	argue	here,	after	James,	that	brings	together	rational	argument	with	feeling,	emotion	and	sentiment.	Taking	a	logical	analysis	or	rational	explanation	to	its	limits,	says	James,	reveals	that	the	belief	that	one	equivalently	satisfactory	explanation	is	better	than	another,	rests	upon	feelings,	characterised	by	an	“active	impulse”	or	“aesthetic	demands”	(James	WB	1897:	75-76);	because	there	is	no	foundational	knowledge,	only	multiple	points	of	view.	This	is	James’	insight.	Aesthetic	value	and	sentiment	play	a	role	in	what	we	perceive,	it	
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fits	with	our	expectations;	it	feels	right.	That	which	is	taken	as	true	is	a	value	ascribed	in	experience.			For	James,	epistemological,	metaphysical,	physiological	and	psychological	questions	can	only	be	addressed	inside	of	experience;	there	is	no	objective	answer	separate	from	experience;	experience	is	particular	and	circumstantial.	Brandom	(2011:	269)	argues	that	the	term	‘experience’	should	not	be	used	outside	of	talking	about	‘common	sense’	appearances,	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	imprecise	and	infers	that	experience	is	‘given’	rather	than	a	cultural-linguistic	construct.	James’	argument	for	the	irreducibility	of	experience	is	not	a	case	for	foundational	knowledge,	which	he	refutes,	rather	he	says,	we	cannot	step	outside	of	experience.	The	“experienceable	environment”	(1909	MT:	41)	is	the	medium	in	which	we	function.	Introspection	is	a	tool,	which	we	may	seek	to	verify	with	logic,	mathematics	or	the	sciences,	but	these	disciplines’	assertion	of	knowledge	can	only	be	of	limited	contextually	specific	value	too.		It	is	‘experience’	that	forms	the	basis	of	this	new	reading	of	James’	writings	I	present	here.	I	argue,	that	James’	concept	of	experience	stands	in	for	the	individual’s	relations	between	thinking	and	acting	in	the	world.	Darwin’s	theory	of	evolution,	British	empiricism,	theoretical	and	experimental	psychology,	grounded	in	neuro-physiology	and	metaphysics	and	a	psychological	approach	to	religious	experience,	can	be	seen	as	key	sources	of	James’	overarching	philosophies	of	pragmatism	and	radical	empiricism,	through	which	his	concepts	of	experience	permeate.			The	Jamesian	experiential	framework,	I	put	forward	here,	explained	in	chapter	two,	takes	a	
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thematic	approach	schematised	as	four	intersecting	thematics	of	experience:	(1)	Action,	habit,	thinking-perceiving;	(2)	The	intentional	content	of	thoughts;	(3)	Truth	and	believing;	(4)	Feeling,	affect	and	sentiment.	These	thematics	set	up	the	relations	between	thoughts	and	things	and	the	evolutionary,	environmental,	physiological,	cognitive,	emotional,	temperamental	and	aesthetic	conditions	of	operation.	The	framework	underpins	the	discussion	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	my	claim	that	multi-stability	is	a	defining	feature	of	locative	narrative	and	the	field	of	expanded	narrative.	
	
	
	
	
Methodology		How	can	the	parameters	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	be	articulated	and	its	affects	be	measured	and	interpreted?			The	development	of	a	Jamesian	experiential	framework	sets	out	the	parameters	of	the	discussion	in	which	a	dialogue	is	created	between	the	thematics	of	experience	and	that	of	narratology,	pragmatism,	philosophy	of	mind	and	contemporary	perspectives	in	cognitive	neuroscience	and	perception.	The	research	however,	does	not	attempt	to	draw	causal	connections	from	science	to	that	of	narrative	experience	or	vice	versa,	a	danger	that	Marie-Laure	Ryan	(2010:	479)	points	out,	that	cognitive	narratology,9	as	a	discipline	“squeezed”	between	speculative	practices	of	the	humanities	and	the	descriptive	practices	of	the	sciences,	can	be	subject	to	when	it	attempts	to	frame	its	speculative	descriptions	as	causal	claims.	The	
                                                        
 
9 Ryan’s (2010: 472) definition of classical narratology, is not concerned with selecting of individual features of text but 
that of “description, comparison and classification” across texts.  
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function	of	cognitive	science	in	this	research,	is	not	as	a	foundation,	but	as	starting	points	for	hypotheses	for	creating	the	affect	of	multi-stability	that	feed	into	the	design	process;	while	the	interpretation	of	experience	is	speculative	and	descriptive.				How	can	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	be	created	in	locative	narratives?		In	this	speculative	practice,	case	studies	of	locative	narrative,	together	with	participants’	accounts	of	experience,	function	as	tools	informing	further	hypotheses	and	practical-philosophical	questions	raised	by	locative	narrative.	This	is	not	a	positivist	empirical	study	of	the	experiences	of	locative	narrative.	Epistemic	word-world	problems	and	the	fallibility	of	introspection,	limit	their	potential	value	as	evidence	of	causal	explanations	of	misperception.	Introspection	cannot	tell	us	about	the	underlying	cognitive	or	neurological	basis	of	perception,	the	specific	contents	of	perception,	or	even	capture	everything	of	the	phenomenal	experience.	They	can	tell	us	something	of	the	narrativised,	subjective	experience	from	here,	as	it	appears	in	the	telling,	as	transitions-felt.			How	can	the	affect	of	metaphor	of	multi-stability	be	measured	and	interpreted?		Based	on	the	experiential	framework,	I	develop	a	relational	analytical	approach	to	the	interpretation	of	locative	narrative	experiences.	Relational	approaches	within	arts	and	cultural	practices	have	chosen	various	frames	for	their	analyses.	Nicolas	Bourriaud’s	
Relational	Aesthetics	(2002)	gives	an	historicist	account	of	social	cultural	relations	of	art	history	informed	by	the	Marxism	of	Louis	Althusser.	The	context	of	the	Jamesian	relational	approach	I	present	here,	is	that	of	pragmatisms,	of	Dewey	(1934)	and	Putnam	(1992	[1983])	
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that	emphasise	the	cognitive	dimension	of	the	environmentally,	socio-culturally	situated	individual,	and	Noë’s	(2012:	14)	relational	enactivist	approach	to	perception.	The	emphasis	upon	cognition	and	feeling	in	the	pragmatist	aesthetics	of	Shusterman	(2000)	(2011)	and	of	process,	in	the	writings	of	Massumi	(2002)	(2009)	and	Manning	(2014).		This	Jamesian	relational	analysis	is	concerned	with	identifying	the	components	of	an	experience	and	their	relative	position	to	each	other,	their	contexts	and	the	interpretative	perspectives	employed	(values	in	experience).	All	intentional	relations	involve	our	self	(even	when	written	in	the	third	person),	happening	within	a	context,	an	‘experienceable	environment’,	at	some	time	in	some	place:	the	matrix	of	‘I’,	time	and	space,	as	James	argues	(1910	[1897]:	264).	Relations	are	expressed	in	natural	language	as	thought,	writing,	speech,	symbolic	and	metalanguages.	A	taxonomy	of	relations,	detailed	in	chapter	two,	is	divided	into	five	categories:	(1)	relations	to	objects;	(2)	relations	between	objects	in	time	and	space;	(3)	relations	to	ourselves;	(4)	relations	to	feelings	and	sensations;	(5)	relations	to	values.			The	analysis	examines	relationships	between:	(1)	the	participant,	their	responses	and	the	
actions	that	result	from	partaking	in	the	narrative	in	the	particular	context	or	‘experienceable	
environment’;	(2)	modes	of	engagement	with	the	narrative	form	or	individual	work,	and	(3)	the	
interpreter-critic,	the	narrative	and	the	contexts	of	analyses	(secondary	analyses).	The	
metaphor	of	multi-stability	expresses	particular	sets	of	relations	in	experience.	This	experiential	and	relational	approach	to	interpretation	has	a	practical	application,	it	extends	locative	arts	research	methodologies	with	strategies	for	coding	and	evaluating	participants’	feedback,	given	in	interviews	or	written	accounts.	It	is	practically	applied	to	the	development	
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and	interpretation	of	locative	narratives,	illustrated	by	the	four	case-studies,	examined	in	chapters	3-5.	
	
	
Summary	of	methods	
	 1) Desk	based	research	informing	hypotheses	upon	the	effects	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-
stability.	2) Investigating	the	effects	multi-stability	through	the	collaborative10	development	of	locative	narrative	smartphone	apps	involving	an	iterative	process	of	development	and	testing	with	small	groups	of	participants	through	the	successive	production	of	prototypes.	3) Reflecting	upon	own	experience	and	creating	analyses.	4) Evaluating	participant	experience	with	semi-structured	interviews	and	open	questionnaires.	5) Classifying	reported	features	of	experience,	identifying	the	relations	in	experience	and	phenomena	reported.	6) Analysis	and	interpretation	of	reports	in	the	context	of	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	and	broader	intersecting	domains.11		7) Developing	strategies	for	producing	the	effect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	incorporating	findings	into	successive	prototypes.	
                                                        
 
10 Detailed records of the collaborative process of development of the locative narrative apps, conducted with the 
developer James Brocklehurst, are included in Appendix 1. and discussed as case studies in chapters 3-5. 
 
 
11 A dialogue is created between the Jamesian thematics of experience and contemporary perspectives in cognitive 
neuroscience, perception and philosophers within and outside the pragmatist lineage and narratology. 
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Thesis	argument	and	contribution	to	knowledge		I	argue	for	the	necessity	of	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	on	the	grounds	that:	(1)	it	identifies	historical,	theoretical	and	tacit	relations	between	practices	and	approaches	not	captured	by	single	disciplinary	categories,	such	as	‘art’,	or	‘game	studies’,	or	by	media-specific	labels	such	as	‘digital’	or	‘interactive’’;	(2)	It	is	defined	by	ideas	and	works	that	present	a	challenge	to	the	
work’s	particular	fiction	or	nonfiction	form	of	storytelling.	The	challenge	has	the	potential	to	experientially	unsettle	the	ontological	status	of	what	the	audience/reader/participant	takes	to	
be	‘real’,	represented	or	imagined	–	expressed	by	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability.		This	thesis	contributes	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	that	extends	the	observation	that	locative	narratives	can	prompt	perceptual	ambiguity.	The	explication	provides	a	cross-disciplinary	interpretation	how	multi-stability	may	present	in	experience.		The	development	of	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	sets	up	the	cross-disciplinary	parameters	for	the	thematics	of	experience.	I	argue	that	an	experiential	framework	is	necessarily	for	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	locative	narrative,	and	more	broadly	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	practices,	in	order	to	engage	with	the	ontological	and	epistemological	challenges	of	designing	for	multi-stability,	that	I	argue	is	a	key	feature	of	the	practice.	Underpinned	by	this	framework,	the	Jamesian	experiential	and	relational	approach	to	interpretation,	extends	locative	arts	research	methodologies	with	strategies	for	coding	and	evaluating	participants’	feedback	of	locative	narratives.			This	thesis	contributes	an	expanded	definition	of	locative	narrative	that	captures	its	formal	
and	experiential	narrative	complexity.	It	is	further	extended	by	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability.	
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Based	upon	the	development	of	the	four	published	locative	narrative	apps	and	ten	prototypes,	a	series	of	practical	strategies	for	creating	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	extend	the	form	of	locative	narrative,	that	has	a	wider	sphere	of	applicability	in	the	field	of	expanded	narrative.	
	
Structure	of	the	thesis		Chapter	one:	Introducing	the	Multi-Stable	Field	of	Expanded	Narrative,	asks	how	narratological	and	cognitive	framings	of	the	terms	narrative	and	interactive	narrative	function	in	the	context	of	the	widening	arena	of	storytelling	practices.	An	argument	is	made	for	a	new	field	of	fiction	and	nonfiction,	that	I	call	expanded	narrative,	defined	by	practices	that	present	a	challenge	to	a	particular	form	of	storytelling,	in	terms	of	their	content,	structure,	style	of	writing	or	modes	of	audience	engagement.	A	three	pronged	argument	for	the	notion	of	language	as	multi-stable	is	made,	drawing	on	the	writings	of	Peirce,	James,	Wittgenstein,	Jakobson	and	Barthes.	The	prefix	‘expanded’	emphases	the	subjective	experiential	dimension	of	narrative,	allowing	the	discussion	to	step	beyond	the	semantic	and	pragmatic	axis	and	the	interactive,	non-interactive	dichotomy,	and	for	a	new	definition	of	narrative	to	be	put	forward,	appropriate	to	the	particulars	of	the	field.			Chapter	two:	Introducing	the	Jamesian	Experiential	Framework	and	Jamesian	Relational	Analysis,	is	a	new	reading	of	the	philosophy	of	William	James.	It	focuses	upon	his	evolving	conceptualization	of	the	concept	of	experience,	that	I	argue	is	at	the	centre	of	his	psychology	and	his	philosophies	of	radical	empiricism	and	pragmatism.	The	different	aspects	of	James’	experience	are	schematised	here	as	four	thematics:	(1)	action,	habit,	thinking-perceiving;	(2)	the	intentional	content	of	thoughts;	(3)	truth	and	believing;	and	(4)	feeling,	affect	and	
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sentiment.	The	chapter	goes	on	to	introduce	the	Jamesian	relational	analysis	and	a	taxonomy	of	relations,	predicated	upon	the	framework.	This	analytical	approach	is	practically	applied	to	the	development	and	interpretation	of	locative	narratives,	illustrated	by	four	case-studies,	examined	in	chapters	3-5.	More	broadly,	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	underpins	the	discussion	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	the	multi-stable	field	of	expanded	narrative.	This	new	reading	of	James	is	both	novel	and	timely.	It	contributes	to	the	recent	cross-disciplinary	emphasis	upon	subjective	experience	in	the	arts,	philosophy	of	mind	and	cognitive	science	that	acknowledges	James’	antecedence.	This	framework	extends	the	application	of	James’	writing	to	conceptualization	and	analysis	to	the	field	of	expanded	narrative.					Chapter	three:	Locative	Narrative	a	Genera	of	Expanded	Narrative:	antecedent	practices	and	themes	of	locative	narrative,	diagrams	arts	and	cultural	practices,	that	I	argue,	are	antecedent	and	coexistent	with	works	of	locative	narrative.	Drawing	on	a	selection	of	locative	narratives	from	the	last	two	decades,	I	discuss	how	techniques	and	approaches	of	these	precursors	have	been	developed	and	contribute	to	the	complexity	of	the	locative	narrative	form.	I	argue	that	locative	narrative’s	formal	and	experiential	narrative	complexity	is	the	result	of:	(1)	the	authorial	intention	is	to	situate-integrate	the	story	world	within	an	existent	location;	(2)	the	structure	of	the	narrative	that	is	linked	with	the	mode	of	interaction;	(3)	media	that	is	experienced	in	relation	to	surroundings;	(4)	the	reader-audience	becomes	a	participant	whose	actions	take	place	within	the	fictional	world	and	the	existent	environment;	(5)	and	locative	narrative’s	particular	spatial-temporal	complexity	of	partaking.	I	go	onto	introduce	the	four	locative	narrative	case	studies	developed	within	this	research,	that	specifically	engage	with	the	
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metaphor	of	multi-stability.	Informed	by	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	introduced	in	chapter	2,	I	give	a	relational	analysis	of	the	locative	narrative	LociOscope,	The	Letters	(2014).				Chapter	four,	Expanded	narrative,	the	Metaphor	of	Multi-stability	and	the	Multistability	of	Perceiving	and	Misperceiving.	In	this	chapter	the	theoretical	underpinning	of	the	perceptual	aspect	of	the	metaphor	multi-stability	is	examined	and	its	implications	for	and	the	design,	development	and	interpretation	of	locative	narratives.	The	ontological	problem,	‘how	does	the	outside	‘world’	get	inside	the	‘mind’	and	the	epistemological	problem,	‘if	perception	is	interpreted	as	‘faulty’	how	do	we	know	what	is	real?’,	are	considered	in	relation	to	the	cognitive	neuro-scientific	term,	perceptual	multistability.	The	phenomena	of	illusions,	hallucinations	and	misperceptions	are	discussed	in	relation	to	scientific	naturalism	and	philosophical	framings	of	neurophysiological	processes	that	‘translate’	the	body’s	responses	to	perceptual	stimuli	into	subjective	awareness.	This	chapter	goes	on	to	look	at	how	our	relations	to	perceptual	and	imaginary	objects	can	be	affected	by	ambiguous	objects,	verbal	suggestion,	misdirection	and	environmental	conditions.	The	role	of	language	in	framing	of	subjective	and	objective	perception	in	relation	to	James’,	Wittgenstein	(2009	[1958]:	xi.	137)	and	Searle	(2015:	23)	and	classical	and	analytical	pragmatism.	I	argue,	that	drawing	upon	scientific	research	on	perception	can	usefully	inform	the	hypotheses	forming	and	speculative	strategies	for	designing	locative	narrative	to	prompt	perceptual	ambiguity.	Results	are	measured	in	terms	of	their	specifiable	practical	consequences,	in	particular	circumstances,	that	in	turn	leads	us	to	further	experimentation.	The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	is	at	the	intersection	between	‘ways	of	seeing’	and	talking.	Building	on	strategies	developed	in	the	first	locative	narrative	case	study,	The	Lost	Index,	No.2	Landscape	with	Figures,	explores	guided	imagining	and	
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fictional	places	situated	in	the	museum	environment,	together	with	a	relational	analysis	of	experience.		Chapter	five,	Encountering	the	Disappearing	Fault	Line	between	Fact	and	Fiction…,	examines	the	third	aspect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability:	Beliefs	about	what	is	real	or	true	as	multi-stable,	in	the	context	of	fiction.	James’	framing	of	truth	is	applied	to	his	few	direct	reflections	upon	literature,	explored	in	the	context	of	the	related	analyses	of	Wittgenstein,	Goodman	and	Putnam,	as	proponents	of	the	pragmatist	lineage.	The	discussion	then	broadens	to	include	the	bifurcations	in	the	status	of	fiction	and	relations	between	the	notions	of	‘reality’,	‘truth’,	‘facts’	and	‘nonfiction;	and	the	form	of	fiction,	as	a	container	of	‘truths’,	‘facts’,	‘nonfactuals’	and	‘fictions’.	The	framing	of	fiction	is	examined	as	a	way	of	speaking,	as	temporal	structure	and	
like	reality.	The	ontological	status	of	fictional	entities	is	considered	in	relation	to	framings	of	what	readers	do,	acts	of	interpretation,	pretence	and	participation.	Finally,	the	difference	between	possible	worlds	and	fictional	worlds	is	considered.	I	argue	that	James’	notion	that	we	occupy	different	worlds	is	concerned	with	environment	and	language	and	the	context	of	experience.	I	argue	that	strategies	for	altering	our	relations	to	context	can	affect	our	beliefs	and	the	truth	value	we	give	to	narrative.	The	locative	narrative	case	studies,	The	Lost	Index,	
No.2:	The	Turning	and	The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS	are	discussed	in	terms	strategies	for	playing	with	context	and	the	connections	between	story	content,	interaction	mechanisms	and	spatially	distributed	narrative,	together	with	a	relational	analysis	of	experience.		Chapter	six,	Strategies	for	Locative	Narrative	and	the	Quality	and	Affects	of	the	Metaphor	of	Multi-stability,	develops	a	Jamesian	relational	analysis	of	participants’	structure	of	experience	in	response	to	introspective	reports	of	the	prototypes	and	published	apps	presented	as	case	
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studies.	Throughout	the	research,	participants’	accounts	and	personal	observations	have	had	the	function	of	‘pumps’	for	thinking	around	the	practical-conceptual	issues	raised	by	the	practice	of	locative	narrative.	These	analyses	are	brought	together	here	and	presented	as	four	speculative	strategies	for	the	development	of	the	affect	of	multi-stability	in	locative	narratives	smartphone	apps.	I	argue,	that	while	these	strategies	have	a	media-specific	remit,	they	can	also	be	understood	as	illustrating	how	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	may	function	and	therefore	there	is	a	potential	wider	application	for	their	leitmotifs	within	the	broader	family	of	expanded	narrative	practices.	An	explanation	of	the	methods	of	the	Jamesian	relational	analysis	are	presented	and	applied	in	the	coding	of	the	introspective	reports	of	the	four	case	studies,	together	with	a	diagrammatic	representation	of	temporal	structure	of	experience	in	relation	to	belief.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	summary	of	locative	narrative	design	strategies	for	evoking	the	affects	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	with	starting	points	for	further	speculative	practice.	These	strategies	are	put	in	the	context	of	the	defining	five	defining	features	of	the	form	of	locative	narrative,	discussed	in	chapter	three,	demonstrating	the	novel	contribution	of	this	research.			
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Chapter	1	
	
Introducing	the	Multi-Stable	Field	of	Expanded	Narrative		
	
	“Things	tell	a	story.	Their	parts	hang	together	so	as	to	work	out	a	climax.	They	play	into	each	other's	hands	expressively.	Retrospectively,	we	can	see	that	altho	no	definite	purpose	presided	over	a	chain	of	events,	yet	the	events	fell	into	a	dramatic	form,	with	a	start,	a	middle,	and	a	finish.	In	point	of	fact	all	stories	end;	and	here	again	the	point	of	view	of	a	many	is	the	more	natural	one	to	take.	The	world	is	full	of	partial	stories	that	run	parallel	to	one	another,	beginning	and	ending	at	odd	times.	They	mutually	interlace	and	interfere	at	points,	but	we	cannot	unify	them	completely	in	our	minds.”		(William	James	P	1907:	143)				In	this	chapter	I	begin	by	asking	what	the	term	narrative	might	mean	for	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	in	the	context	of	narratological	and	cognitive	framings.	Narrowing	the	focus,	I	delineate	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	and	some	of	its	categories	of	practice.	The	prefix	‘expanded’	emphases	the	subjective	experiential	dimension	of	narrative,	allowing	the	discussion	to	step	beyond	the	semantic	and	pragmatic	axis	and	the	interactive,	non-interactive	dichotomy.			Expanded	narrative	practices	can	be	described	as	‘multi-stable’.	The	metaphor	of	‘multi-
stability’	has	three	aspects;	perception	as	multi-stable	(above	and	below	conscious	awareness);	language	as	multi-stable;	beliefs	about	what	is	real	or	true	as	multi-stable,	resting	upon	a	feeling	of	rationality.	The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	is	predicated	on	the	philosophy	of	William	James	and	in	chapter	two	the	theoretical	bases	are	examined	in	further	detail.	In	this	chapter,	the	notion	of	the	multi-stability	language	is	explored	in	the	context	of	perspectives	
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from	the	philosophy	of	language	and	narratology,	in	order	consider	the	implications	of	how	expanded	narrative	practices’	present	challenges	to	their	forms.			
	
Argument		In	this	chapter	I	make	a	case	for	the	field	of	expanded	narrative,	on	the	grounds	that:	(1)	it	identifies	historical,	theoretical	and	tacit	relations	between	practices	and	approaches	not	captured	by	single	disciplinary	categories,	such	as	‘art’,	or	‘game	studies’,	or	by	media-specific	labels	such	as	‘digital’	or	‘interactive’’;	(2)	While	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	is	broad	and	inclusive,	in	terms	of	the	spectrum	of	media	represented	and	intentions	and	contexts	of	the	practice	spanning	the	commercial	to	the	esoteric,	it	is	defined	by	ideas	and	works	that	present	a	challenge	to	its	particular	form	of	storytelling,	fiction	or	nonfiction.	The	challenge	has	the	potential	to	experientially	unsettle	the	ontological	status	of	what	the	audience/reader/participant	takes	to	be	‘real’,	represented	or	imagined	–	expressed	by	the	
metaphor	of	multi-stability.			
	
Interactive	narrative	and	expanded	narrative			The	label	‘interactive	narrative’	is	contentious.	Definitions	can	be	seen	to	occupy	a	spectrum,	in	the	narrow	sense	it	can	be	used	to	mean	algorithmically	generated	narrative,	more	broadly	as	choice	between	narrative	trajectories	and	in	a	general	sense,	interaction	is	used	to	refer	to	acts	of	interpretation,	readers’	responses	to	texts.	Frank	Popper	(1993:	8)	makes	a	distinction	between	“participation”	in	art	works	that	he	labels	as	“finite”,	such	as	painting	or	works	that	involve	types	of	joining	in,	such	as	touching,	moving	or	selecting,	and	that	those	that	he	exemplifies	as	involving	“interaction”,	such	as	generative	algorithms	where	there	is	a	“mutual	
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exchange	between	the	user	and	an	‘intelligent’	system”.	Richard	Walsh’s	(2011:	76)	definition	specifies	that	a	participant’s	choices	or	actions	must	have	an	effect	on	the	outcome	of	the	story	in	order	for	it	to	be	classed	as	interactive.	Interactive	stories	are	emergent,	where	interaction	means	“reciprocal	and	recursive”	and	“mutually	modifying”,	producing	“non-linear	complexity”.	The	model	of	the	“forking-path”	and	navigation	through	pre-authored	choices	such	as	offered	by	“Choose	Your	Own	Adventure”	novels,	Walsh	regards	as	“superficially	interactive	forms”.			In	Janet	Murray’s	(1997:	128)	definition	of	interactivity,	participants	should	have	“feeling	of	agency”,	their	actions	should	be	meaningful	and	they	should	receive	meaningful	responses.	However,	Murray	(1997:	129)	argues,	agency	can	also	be	experienced	in	the	ability	to	navigate	around	a	narrative	world.	Agency	“goes	beyond	participation	and	activity”,	it	has	an	aesthetic	dimension,	where	interaction	is	measured	by	the	satisfaction	experienced	by	the	participant.	We	could	ask,	how	much	more	agency	is	afforded	by	navigating	around	on-screen	game	world,	to	roaming	imaginatively	within	the	world	represented	by	a	linear	novel?	In	each	case,	the	reader	or	player	can	only	‘see’	what	is	represented	visually	or	textually	and	is	left	to	infer	or	speculate	upon	what	is	‘around	the	corner’,	that	which	is	not	presented	or	yet	to	be	explored.			For	Marie-Laure	Ryan	(2006:	99)	‘interactive’	narrative	is	the	negation	between	top-down	author/designer’s	planning	and	narrative	meaning	and	“bottom-up	input	from	the	user”.	Ryan	develops	four	strategic	forms	of	interactive	narrative.	The	“internal	mode”	refers	to	the	user’s	projection	into	the	story	world	by	identifying	with	an	agent,	the	“external	mode”	refers	to	the	user’s	situated	outside	of	the	story	world.	The	“exploratory	mode”	refers	to	the	ability	to	
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navigate	around	a	world	but	not	change	it,	whereas	the	user’s	actions	affect	which	plot	they	experience	in	the	“ontological	mode”	(Ryan	2006:	107).	The	four	combinations	of	the	modes	provide	descriptors	of	the	different	genres,	forms	and	interactivity.			Aspen	Aarseth’s	(2012:	131)	“variable	model”	of	interaction	says	both	narratives	and	games	have	“events”,	“worlds”,	“characters”,	and	“objects”	within	each	of	these	categories	there	are	degrees	and	types	of	user	interaction.	Narrative	events	have	“kernels”	that	contain	the	key	elements	of	the	narrative	and	“satellites”	which	have	additional	story	events.	Different	genres	of	narrative	and	games	have	different	balances	of	these	categories.	Some	games	have	no	key	narrative	elements,	rather	there	are	sets	of	interchangeable	narrative	parts.	Adventure	games	have	“dynamic	kernels”,	partially	interchangeable	narrative	parts.	“Fully	plotted	stories”	do	not	have	additional	story	events.	To	extrapolate	a	theory	of	narrative	coherence	on	the	basis	of	Aarseth’s	model	would	perhaps	to	say	that	there	is	a	relation	between	participant	
expectation	and	author	fulfilment.	The	particular	form,	or	genre,	of	narrative,	indicates	the	level	of	coherence	that	the	participant	may	expect.	Playing	the	narrative	driven	video	game	
Walking	Dead	(Telltale	Games	2012	-2016),	the	participant	is	likely	to	expect	both	choice	and	coherence	from	the	‘author’,	whereas	the	onus	is	upon	players	to	create	a	coherent	narrative	from	limited	“kernels”	provided	by	the	board	game	Cluedo	(Waddingtons	1949).				Arguably,	it	is	not	the	delineation	of	‘interactive’	that’s	of	primary	importance	for	these	definitions	of	interactive	narrative	and	its	variants,	but	the	framings	of	‘narrative’	and	‘story’,	on	which	they	supervene.	Two	categories	of	approaches	to	language	can	broadly	be	characterised	as	semantics	and	pragmatics.	Semantics	deals	with	the	relations	between	words	and	meaning,	and	syntax	refers	to	the	relations	between	signs,	whereas	the	domain	of	
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pragmatics	is	concerned	with	the	use	and	context	of	an	utterance.	However,	these	broad	descriptors	can	only	offer	a	vague	indication	of	their	spheres	of	interest.	The	terms	use	and	
context,	for	example,	have	different	scopes	(Korta	&	Perry	2015);	context	refers	narrowly	or	broadly	to	the	linguistic	context	of	the	speaker	and	situation	and	location	of	the	utterance.	Charles	Morris	(1938),	credited	with	introducing	the	term	pragmatics	based	upon	Peirce’s	triadic	sign	system	(Bernstein	2010:	134),	defines	pragmatics	as	“the	relation	of	signs	to	their	interpreters”,	contrasted	against	the	semantic	focus	upon	the	relation	of	signs	to	objects.			For	analytical	pragmatist,	Robert	Brandom	(2006f:	3),	the	scope	of	pragmatics	is	“to	encompass	meaning-conferring	aspects	of	use	in	general”,	that	joins	up	with	semantics;	“to	say	and	mean	something”,	that	has	semantic	relations	between	words	and	the	world.	Brandom’s	(2006f:	1)	solution	is	to	construct	a	“metavocabulary”	that	states	the	relations	between	the	meaning	of	a	particular	vocabulary	and	its	use,	from	which	a	modal	logical	vocabulary	can	be	developed.	Jacob	Mey	(2005:	463)	argues	that	an	important	insight	of	pragmatics	is	that	grammar,	syntax	and	the	meaning	of	words	does	not	necessary	reflect	what	language	“does”	in	terms	users’	“production	and	consumption”	within	the	particular	or	social	context.				Definitions	of	narrative	often	articulate	semantic	and/or	pragmatic	perspectives,	while	not	necessarily	engaging	in	formal	linguistic	pragmatics.	Semantic	approaches	to	narrative,	focus	upon	the	relation	of	words	and	how	they	obtain	their	meaning,	in	relation	to	the	system	of	language	in	which	they	operate	and	also	in	relation	to	narrative	as	a	meaning	making	systems.	Roland	Barthes’	(1977:	116)	narratology	gives	a	semantic	account	of	narrative	that	is	concerned	with	discourse,	rather	than	use.	Roman	Jakobson	(1960:	361)	too	says	the	
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logicians	concern	with	the	normative	‘word	to	world’	relation	is	outside	the	study	of	poetics	and	linguistics.	Jakobson’s	semantic	structural	analysis	has	a	“synchronic”	(1960:	362)	remit,	concerned	with	of	any	given	stage	of	the	production	of	the	text,	for	example,	the	different	rhythms	in	which	a	poem	can	be	read	are	considered	“verse	instances”,	but	not	the	intentions	involved	in	acts	of	delivery	(1960:	365).			The	Russian	Formalist’s,	influenced	by	the	linguistics	of	Ferdinand	Saussure,	developed	semantic	structural	analyses	of	literature	that	identified	the	basic	elements	of	narrative	and	the	logic	that	governs	their	configuration.	Boris	Tomashevsky’s	(1925)	article	‘Theme’,	defines	narrative	in	terms	of	fabula	(story),	the	chronological	order	of	events,	and	sjuzhet	(plot),	the	ordering	of	events	by	the	narrative’s	form.	The	‘narrative	turn’	(Kreiswirth	2008:	378)	in	the	1960’s,	associated	with	Roland	Barthes,	Claude	Bremond,	Gérard	Genette,	A.	J.	Greimas	and	Tzvetan	Todorov,	gave	a	broader	focus	to	structural	linguistic	accounts	of	narrative,	from	literature	to	the	storied	accounts	of	people	and	events	in	all	domains	of	life	and	the	cognitive	processes	associated	with	communication,	as	Ryan	also	notes	(2006:	3).			Tzvetan	Todorov’s	(2003	[1966]:	382)	defines	a	literary	work	by	the	distinction	between	“story	and	discourse”12,	after	the	Russian	formalist	fabula-sujet13.	He	draws	a	distinction	between	“sense”	and	“interpretation”,	where	sense	is	framed	in	terms	the	function	and	relations	between	parts	of	a	narrative	and	interpretation	pertains	to	the	subjective	world	of	
                                                        
 
12 Todorov (2014 [1966] 382) credits the “explicit” formulation of story and discourse to Émile Benveniste.  
 
13 Todorov published as translation of a number of Russian Formalist articles in 1965 (Théorie de la littérature, textes 
des formalistes russes) including that of Tomashevsky. There are various spellings of sujet (sjuzhet, sjužet) sujet is used 
here, as per Todorov’s article. 
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the	critic.14	Todorov	(2014	[1966]	383)	emphasises	that	the	‘story’,	evokes	“a	certain	reality	of	events”,	that	seems	to	pertain	to	past	experience,	which	is	therefore	understood	to	be	of	a	“real-life”.	Story,	he	emphasises,	is	also	the	narrating	of	the	event,	by	someone,	in	some	medium.	Therefore,	to	talk	of	‘story’	is	an	“abstraction”.	It	can’t	literally	be	separated	from	discourse,	it	is	always	a	“perceived	and	recounted	by	someone”	(2014	[1966]	384).			Definitions	of	narrative	have	subsequently	upheld	or	rejected	the	story-discourse	dichotomy,	also	expressed	as	story-plot,	story-narration	and	story-representation.	H.	Porter	Abbot	(2007:	40)	argues	that	the	story	and	its	representation	distinction	is	the	“…the	founding	insight	of	the	field	of	narratology”.	While	Hayden	White	rejects	the	story-discourse	distinction	on	the	grounds	that	the	story	is	also	telling,	as	Todorov	had	previously	asserted.		White	(1981:1)	characterises	narrative	as	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	“how	to	translate	knowing	into	telling.”		Narrative,	for	White,	is	both	story	and	discourse,	“story-discourse”.	It	is	a	“recounting”	or	“narrating”	or	“as	a	way	of	speaking	about	events”	(White	1981:	3),	distinguished	from	other	types	of	texts	by	its	grammatical	form:	the	role	of	the	pronoun	“I”,	demonstrative	pronouns,	adverbial	indicators,	such	as,	“here”,	“now”,	‘yesterday’,	‘tomorrow’	and	the	use	of	the	third	person,	all	of	which	allow	the	reader	to	identify	a	narrative	as	such.	Events	have	significance	for	each	other,	even	those	that	might	seem	disparate,	if	they	share	a	common	subject	and	belong	“to	the	same	order	of	meaning”.	This	rule,	he	argues,	creates	ontological	connections	and	allows	discrepancies	to	be	disregarded,	it	“translates	difference	into	similarity”	(White	1981:15);	it	is	at	the	end	of	a	story	that	the	structure	is	revealed,	showing	the	relations	between	story	and	plot	to	be	coherent	(1981:19).			
                                                        
14 A point similarly made by Jakobson in Style in Language (1960). The difficulty of this differentiation is discussed 
from the pragmatist anti-foundationalist perspective in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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Other	semantic	approaches	to	narrative	define	the	minimal	requirements	for	language	to	be	considered	a	narrative.	In	Introduction	to	the	Structural	Analysis	of	Narratives	(1977:	80),	Barthes,	responding	to	Russian	Formalism,	describes	the	sentence	as	forming	a	hierarchical	system	of	levels,	“phonetic,	phonological,	grammatical,	contextual”	(1977:	83),	from	which	meaning	is	built.	Discourse,	defined	as	a	set	of	sentences,	is	the	“basic	unit”	of	narrative.	
Narrative	is	defined	as	a	number	of	units	of	content.	Meaning,	the	criteria	of	a	unit,	is	determined	by	how	it	functions,	directly	within	the	plot	or	indirectly,	as	atmosphere	or	contextualising	detail.			Todorov	and	Weinstein	(1969:	70)	offer	a	“typology	of	plots”	where	the	minimal	plot	has	a	“shift”	between	two	states	of	“equilibrium”15	that	are	“similar	and	different”,	between	which	a	“period	of	imbalance	is	composed	of	a	process	of	degeneration	and	a	process	of	improvement”	(1969:	75).	Narrative	form	does	not	necessarily	require	an	extensive	series	of	events	(or	units	of	meaning).	A	proposition	with	two	clauses	may	be	sufficient	to	constitute	a	plot,	is	a	notion	expressed	in	novelist	E.	M.	Forster’s	(1955	[1927])	aphorism,	“The	king	died	and	then	the	queen	died	of	grief”.	In	their	study	of	oral	narratives,	William	Labov	&	Joshua	Waletzky	(1967)	demonstrated	the	cross-cultural	prevalence	of	a	minimal	structure	of	communicating	human	experiences,	where	“…the	order	of	narrative	clauses	matches	the	order	of	events	as	they	occurred”	(Labov	2010:	2).	Labov	defines	narrative	as	“a	way	of	recounting	past	events”,	arguably	a	version	of	‘narrative	defined	as	a	way	of	telling’.				
                                                        
 
15 Todorov (1969: 75) explains “This term “equilibrium," which I am borrowing from genetic psychology, means the 
existence of a stable but not static relation between the members of a society; it is a social law, a rule of the game, a 
particular system of exchange.”  
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The	term	‘participation’	has	been	used	in	cognitive	psychology	to	describe	the	processes	of	imaginative	construction	involved	in	engaging	with	representations.	Cognitive	psychologist,	Richard	Gerrig	(1993:	14),	extends	the	metaphor	of	reading	as	a	performance,	after	Bartlett	(1932).	Wolfgang	Iser’s	(1974:	68)	phenomenological	approach	to	literary	theory	characterises	reading	as	a	process,	after	Whitehead,	where	“dynamic	interaction	between	the	text	and	the	reader”,	itself	a	“self-regulating	system”	with	“constant	feedback”	in	the	form	of	the	reader’s	responses	to	the	text,	that	in	turn	contribute	to	interpretation.	For	Iser,	reading	“has	the	character	of	an	open-ended	situation”.	The	idea	of	a	mutually	evolving	system,	in	Iser’s	sense,	involves	the	evolving	context	in	which	the	narrative	exists,	the	reader	and	the	happening	of	interpretations.			
	In	addition	to	the	semantic	meaning	of	words,	pragmatic	concerns	of	context	and	use,	are	to	the	fore,	in	Gerrig’s	(1993)	definition	of	narrative	that	puts	forward	an	even	more	truncated	minimum	form.	A	single	noun,	for	example,	the	word	“Texas”	(1993:	4),	can	be	sufficient	to	constitute	a	narrative,	or	rather	prompt	the	experience	of	“transportation”	to	a	narrative	world.	It	is	the	consequences	of	narrative	that	are	important	for	Gerrig’s	definition.	Narrative	is	taken	as	a	metaphorical	vehicle	in	the	psychological	act	of	reading,	watching	or	listening,	where	interpretation	involves	immediate	recognition	and	the	performance	of	drawing	inferences	and	the	imaginative	“construction”	of	scenarios.			Psychologist	Jerome	Bruner	(1986:	14)	defines	stories	as	two	distinct	“landscapes”,	that	of	action,	“…agent,	intention,	goal,	situation,	instrument	something	corresponding	to	“story	grammar”.	The	other	is	“the	landscape	of	consciousness”	what	characters	“know,	think	or	feel,	or	do	not	know,	think	or	feel.”	Bruner	(1986:	17)	argues	that	while	grammaticians	deal	with	
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minimal	structures	that	are	required	for	qualification	as	a	story,	narrative	is	concerned	with	the	ways	in	which	changes	in	human	intentions	are	portrayed	and	interpreted.	Drawing	upon	studies	from	developmental	psychology,	Bruner	argues	that	an	“irreducible”	feature	of	human	behaviour	is	the	attribution	of	causation	that	extends	to	our	engagement	with	narrative.			David	Herman’s	(2002:	2)	cognitive	framing	blends	semantic	and	pragmatic	emphases.	Narrative	is	defined	as	an	account	of	what	has	happened	to	people	over	time.	He	argues	that	the	representation	of	temporal	events	introduces	“Disequilibrium”	the	portrayal	of	disruption	to	the	status	quo,	which	is	also	a	feature	of	the	reader’s	“mental	model”	of	the	“storyworld”.	He	argues,	disequilibrium,	conveys	the	“qualia”	or	subjective	quality	of	the	experience.	For	Herman,	it	is	not	the	subject	matter	that	determines	a	text	as	a	narrative	but	the	way	in	which	the	content	is	regarded.	This	definition	takes	narrative	as	a	form	of	modelling	human	interactions	with	the	world,	with	the	potential	to	affect	the	reader	in	ways	similar	to	that	depicted.		We	can	ask,	can	narrative	be	defined	as	a	mode	of	engagement	with	a	text?	Does	the	‘participant’	adopt	a	particular	attitude	towards	the	status	of	a	work	that	affects	how	they	respond?	Kendall	Walton	(1990:	202)	argues	that	the	display	of	fear	in	response	to	narrative	representations	(such	as	horror	films)	is	not	genuine	fear	on	the	grounds	that	if	we	really	experienced	fear	we	act	by	running	out	of	the	cinema.	However,	we	could	argue	after	James	(CER	1920	[1894]:	350),	that	emotions	don’t	have	a	fixed	identity,	that	there	are	similar	qualities	that	we	can	identify	in	certain	situations	but	the	total	context	that	determines	how	we	act.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	audience	members	don’t	need	to	‘make-believe’	emotions	they	can	experience	the	emotions	or	volitions	that	are	congruent	with	experiences	in	non-fictional	
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situations,	without	needing	to	act	on	them.16	There	are	clearly	differences	between	how	we	regard	and	behave	towards	fiction	and	what	we	take	to	be	news	or	an	account	of	personal	events.	While	the	subject	matter	may	be	similar,	the	form	and	framing	of	fiction	act	as	indicators	of	its	status,	signalling	the	types	of	participation	expected	from	audiences.		Ryan’s	(2006:	8)	definition	of	narrative	as,	“the	conditions	of	narrativity”	makes	narrative	a	contingent	quality.	Narrativity	has	different	modes,	"spatial",	"temporal",	"mental",	"formal”,	“pragmatic"	and	“semantic”	properties,	that	a	representation	presents	when	certain	conditions	are	met:	that	the	world	of	the	story	is	produced	through	the	actions	of	“intelligent	agents”	(human	or	aliens,	robots	or	otherwise).	Ryan	(2005:	347)	also	makes	the	story-discourse	distinction,	narrativity	is	the	discourse,	were	as	stories	are	“cognitive	constructs”	comprising	of:	(1)	a	mental	representation	of	world	with	agents	and	objects;	(2)	the	world	undergoes	changes	of	events	“not	fully	predictable”	caused	by	“accidents”	or	intentional	actions	of	agents	(although	events	not	being	fully	predictable	is	debated,	Ryan	points	out);	(3)	the	causal	events	are	linked	to	mental	states	of	characters	(emotions,	intentions).	In	this	sense,	a	mere	depiction	of	place	is	not	sufficient	to	count	as	a	narrative	but	it	can	qualify	as	such	if	it	comes	into	being	through	the	of	rational	processes	of	telling.	However,	I	argue,	that	the	reader	can	provide	both	of	Ryan’s	criteria,	they	are	the	‘intelligent	agent’	for	whom	the	represented	place	is	changing	over	time.			Ryan	(2006:	7-8)	and	Herman	(2009:	193)	argue	that	it	is	the	concept	of	the	storyworld-as-idea	that	allows,	for	example,	Middle-earth	to	be	identified	as	the	same,	or	consistent	with,	the	
                                                        
 
16 The question of distinguishing between fiction and nonfiction is discussed further in Chapter 4 of this text. 
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Middle-earth	that	features	in	J.	R.	R.	Tolkien's	books	and	also	in	Peter	Jackson’s	films.	Can	the	content	of	the	thought	(the	story)	be	separated	from	the	act	of	thinking?	The	discourse,	the	narrative	representation,	I	argue,	as	Todorov	and	White	have	pointed	out,	is	part	of	the	story,	whether	it	takes	the	form	of	a	“cognitive	construct”	(a	thought)	or	a	representation,	text,	image,	animation,	etc.	In	what	ways	is	thinking	about	the	storyworld	different	from	speaking	or	writing	down	those	same	propositions?	Ontological	differences	between	the	storyworld	and	narrative,	authorial	intent	or	differences	in	content	and/or	form	of	medium	of	thought	and	material	representation	of	the	storyworld,	or	perhaps	the	reader’s	mode	of	interpretation?	Ryan	&	Thon	(2014:	3)	argue	that	it	is	the	quality	of	narrativity	possessed	by	stories	that	allows	a	storyworld,	to	feature	in	different	media.		I	argue,	when	the	characteristics	of	a	story	(place,	characters,	events)	occur	in	different	media,	it	is	their	specifiable	content	that	we	assign	to	Middle-earth	or	Wonderland	or	the	world	of	Harry	Potter.	That	specifiable	content	is	what	a	particular	story	world	means	for	us.	The	question	becomes	a	traditional	philosophical	problem	of	substance;	what	qualities	are	essential	to	an	object’s	identity?	We	could	say,	‘we	identify	the	depiction	of	Middle-earth	as	such	because	it	appears	to	have	consistent	qualities	with	those	we	associate	with	our	prior	experiences	of	Middle	Earth,	whether	via	reading	the	books,	conversations	or	film	advertising’,	etc.	In	William	James’	(1907:	85)	terms,	there	are	only	modes	of	appearing.	A	table	has	‘brownness’	or	‘hardness’	in	the	context	in	which	it	is	experienced.	The	modes	of	
appearing	can	be	taken	as	the	‘reader-filmgoer’s’	interpretation	of	a	storyworld,	whereas	‘ways	of	telling’	emphasises	the	intended	meaning	of	the	book,	film	etc.	Some	consistent	semantic	content,	the	context	and	event	of	their	appearing,	may	be	all	the	conditions	that	are	required	for	a	story’s	world	to	be	identified	in	different	media.	
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Popper’s	and	Walsh’s	framing	of	interactive	narrative	emphasises	structural	reconfiguration,	resting	upon	a	semantic	framing	of	narrative	rather	than	pragmatic	concerns	for	the	acts	of	engagement,	interpretation	or	the	material	consequences	that	may	come	after	participation	with	a	work.	This	is	not	to	say	that	form	and	modes	of	engagement	do	not	supervene	on	one	another,	only	that	Popper	and	Walsh’s	definition	results	in	this	separation.	Murray’s	emphasis	upon	agency	as	semantic	meaning	and	aesthetic	affects,	articulates	semantic	and	pragmatic	concerns.	While	Ryan’s	quality	of	‘narrativity’	makes	interaction	a	quality.	I	propose	extending	Ryan’s	relational,	conditional	emphasis	to	a	new	definition	of	narrative	applicable	to	the	field	of	expanded	narrative,	the	umbrella	for	works	that	present	a	challenge	to	the	form:			(1)	narrative	is	defined	as	a	value	attributed	to	a	representation,	in	particular	specifiable	circumstances;	(2)	a	representation	becomes	a	narrative	when	the	relations	between	subjects	and	objects	are	articulated	in	relation	to	the	reader.		
	
A	narrative	is	an	experience	happening	for	the	reader-participant	in	which	a	representation	(an	
image/text/sound/	and/or	thought)	of	an	experience	happening	can	be	described	as	specifiable	
relations	between	a	subject	and	its	objects.					
	
Expanded	narrative		
	The	field	of	expanded	narrative	includes	fiction	and	nonfiction	works	that	present	a	challenge	
to	a	particular	form	of	storytelling,	fiction	or	nonfiction,	in	terms	of	the	story	content,	structure,	mode	of	writing	or	the	ways	in	which	the	audience	engages	with	the	work.	How	is	an	approach	to	storytelling	deemed	to	be	‘challenge’?	Works	of	expanded	narrative	tend	not	to	be	
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static	texts	that	require	sequentially	linear	acts	of	reading,	however	what	is	important	is	the	artist	or	commentator’s	arguments	that	articulate	the	‘expanded’	character	of	the	work,	rather	than	adherence	to	a	predetermined	benchmark.	Challenging	the	form	is	not	the	preserve	of	recent	artists	or	works.	Authors	and	artists	from	the	past	who	intentionally	confronted	their	readers	with	their	challenge	to	the	form,	such	as	Lawrence	Sterne	and	his	work	The	Life	and	
Opinions	of	Tristram	Shandy,	Gentleman	(1759-67)	or	epic	dramas	portrayed	in	19th	century	panoramas	that	set	out	to	amaze	audiences	with	their	illusionary	painting	and	lighting	techniques,	are	examples	here.	Antecedents	to	expanded	narrative	also	include	works,	that	from	our	21st	century	perspective,	we	may	describe	as	expanded	narratives,	although	they	were	not	necessarily	recognized	in	these	terms	as	the	time,	such	as,	medieval	marginalia.		Expanded	narrative’s	definitional	rubric	of	the	challenge	to	the	form	emphases	participant	engagement	with	narrative	that	does	not	necessitate	or	exclude	“mutual	exchange”	between	the	user	and	the	system,	or	disregard	‘static’	representations	of	a	novel	or	painting,	if	the	
challenge	to	the	form	is	focused	on	some	other	aspect	of	story	content,	structure,	mode	of	representation	(content	is	understood	here	as	an	aspect	of	form).	The	selection	from	a	pre-authored	story	trajectory	that	digital	literature,	such	as,	Jellybone	(2016)	by	Kate	Pullinger	or	literary	puzzles	such	as	Device	6	(2013)	by	Simogo,	can	be	framed	as	a	challenge	to	the	linear	text.	However,	while	navigating	around	though	a	city,	park	or	building	to	experience	a	narrative	may	be	a	challenge	to	the	linear	text,	it	does	not	necessarily	present	a	challenge	to	locative	narrative,	larp	or	pervasive	game	in	it	is	arguably	a	key	feature	of	those	forms.	While	these	modes	of	engagement	do	have	consequences	for	interpretation	and	they	may	also	result	in	actions	that	exceed	the	authors’	intentions,	such	as	players	bending	or	creating	their	own	rules	in	response	to	the	unpredictable	situation	of	a	public	space.	
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Fig. 1: Table of Expanded Narrative practices. 	
Expanded	Narrative	Practices	(Expanded	narrative	practices	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	Features	of	the	forms	can	apply	across	categories	and	in	some	cases	individual	practices	can	be	given	more	than	one	description.)	
	
Forms		 Examples	of	works	
	
Branching-paths:			The	model	of	the	branching	path,	referred	to	as	“trees”	(Bolter	1991:	107)	or	“forking	path”	(Moulthrop	1991:	125)	is	a	method	of	structuring	narrative	based	on	bifurcation	of	choice	points.	Diagrammatically,	the	narrative	may	resemble	the	veins	on	a	leaf,	dividing	and	subdividing.	Narrative	trajectories	may	be	independent	or	interconnected.	This	is	a	broad	category	that	describes	an	approach	to	narrative	
structure,	and	as	such,	encompasses	a	range	of	practices,	for	example,	role	playing	to	computer	text	adventure,	locative	narrative,	hypertext	fiction	interactive	video.	Mechanisms	for	readers’/participants’	selection	of	‘paths’	may	require	dice	rolling,	solving	puzzles,	searching	or	making	logical	or	aesthetic	choices.	
	Branching-paths	feature	in	many	forms	from	books	such	as	‘Choose	Your	Own	Adventure’	books,	written	in	the	second	person.	Structured	as	decision	trees,	readers	are	turn	to	a	page	based	on	their	choice	of	options.	Originally	conceived	by	Edward	Packard,	first	title	Sugarcane	
Island	(1976)		
Fighting	Fantasy	novels	developed	from	table-top	role	playing	Dungeons	and	
Dragons	use	a	branching	path	structure	combined	with	additional	features	such	dice	rolling	and	player	health	and	skills.	Created	by	Steve	Jackson	and	Ian	Livingstone,	first	title	The	Warlock	of	
Firetop	Mountain	(1982)		Computer	adventure	games:	
Colossal	Cave	Adventure	first	developed	in	1976	as	text	only,	by	William	Crowther.	See,	Nick	Montfort	(2005)	
Twisty	Little	Passages:	An	
Approach	to	Interactive	
Fiction.	Mass.	MIT			The	hypertext	works,	such	as:	
Victory	Garden	(1992)	by	Stuart	Moulthrop.		
	
Interactive	Storytelling	
	Computer	generated	stories	configured	from	of	pre-authored	story	events,	scenarios	or	sentences,	triggered	response	to	participant’s	actions	such	as	speaking,	writing	responses	and/or	completing	tasks.		
	
Novel	Writer	(1973)	Sheldon	Klein		
	
Façade	(2005)	Andrew	Stern	and	Michael	Mateas			
Wordsmith	AutomatedInsights	(2015,	
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Models	of	linear	narratives	developed	by	structuralist	linguists17	have	also	been	adopted	by	games	and	A.I.	developers	(Spierling	et	al	2010:	299)18.	A	linear	story	can	be	reduced	its	essential	‘events’	and	‘functions’	of	characters	within	an	event,	from	which	alternative	trajectories	can	be	devised.	The	methods	of	‘Abstraction’	and	‘Planning’	(Spierling	et	al	2010:	299)	Spierling	&	Hoffman	2010:50)	have	been	utilized	to	generate	multiple	alternative	narrative	trajectories.	‘Abstraction’	is	the	process	by	which	all	of	a	story’s	detail	and	particulars	are	removed	leaving	only	the	essential	structure	that	can	be	described	as	key	events	and	the	functions	of	the	characters.	The	‘Planning	Model’	is	the	process	of	working	out	the	structure	of	an	interactive	story	by	considering	how	an	abstracted	story	can	be	broken	into	a	series	of	nodes	that	can	be	reconfigured	in	particular	ways	by	considering	the	node’s	prerequisites,	co-requisites	and	consequences,	for	example,	when	deciding	what	a	character	may	do	next	that	makes	causal	sense	in	the	context	of	the	current	trajectory	and	the	‘state	of	the	world’.	Both	approaches,	although	differing	in	their	conceptual	framing,	conceive	of	the	narrative	as	a	number	of	sections	or	nodes	that	can	be	reconfigured	depending	on	the	predefined	rules	that	govern	the	node.			
SGAs	(story	generator	algorithms)	automated	generation	of	artefacts	created	by	computational	procedures,	e.g.	automatically	generated	fiction.	Pablo	Gervás	(2012)	credits	the	relatively	new	term,	to	Hamburg	Narratology	Research	Group,	but	traces	the	development	of	algorithm	generated	stories	to	Novel	Writer	system,	developed	by	Sheldon	Klein	(1973).		
2016)	platform	Automated	Insights			
	
Interactive	fiction		
	This	term	has	been	applied	variously	to	all	the	categories	of	expanded	narrative	in	this	table.	Here	I	use	the	term	more	specifically	to	refer	to	fiction	written	to	be	read	on	digital	devices	that	may	involve	interactive	features	such	as	hyperlinks	to	footnotes	or	additional	or	related	content	(sometimes	referred	to	also	as	Electronic	literature)		Interactive	fictional	can	refer	to	online	communally	or	co-authored	works	where	story	paragraphs	or	chapters,	sections	or	the	parts	of	particular	characters.		
	
The	Silent	History	(2012-2013)	Eli	Horowitz,	Kevin	Moffett,	Matthew	Derby,	Russell	Quinn	and	collaborators.	
	Oolipo	authoring	and	hosting	platform	for	digital	fiction	that	uses	visual	tools	to	structure	narratives.	Works	include	Jellybone	(2016)	Kate	Pullinger		
	Online	collaborative	writing,	‘wiki	novels	such	as,		
A	Million	Penguins	(2007)	Penguin,	De	Montfort	University,	Pullinger.	
                                                        
 
17 Vladimir Propp Morphology of the Folk Tale (1928) 
 
18 Structuralist approaches to narrative in the development of A.I. storytelling systems been given particular 
prominence by the current EU co-funded IRIS project in Integrating Research in Interactive Storytelling (2009-11). 
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Live-action		The	free	improvisation	of	dialogue,	actions	and	narrative	events	or	in	response	to	pre-scripted	narrative	scenarios,	e.g.	table-top-role	playing,	live	action	role	playing	(larps),	historical	re-enactment.		
	Table-top	role	playing,	such	as:	
Chainmail	(1971)	Gary	Gygax	and	Jeff	Perren	
Dungeons	and	Dragons	(1974	-)	Gary	Gygax	and	Dave	Arneson,	TSR		Larps,	such	as:		
Europa	(2001), Vestby, Norway	dir.	Eirik	Fatland	
Vampire:	the	Masquerade	(2016)	Poland,	White	Wolf	and	Dziobak	Larp	Studios		
Operation	Black	Antler	(2016)	Blast	Theory	and	Hydrocracker		
Forum	theatre,	originally	developed	by	the	Brazilian	theatre	director	Augusto	Boal.	Audience	members	to	intervene	at	key	moments	in	the	play	and	consider	alternative	choices	that	the	characters	may	make.		
	
Fictional	places:		On-screen	or	location	specific	narratives	where	story	events	are	improvised	or	encountered	in	a	particular	or	nonspecific	sequence,	such	as,	open	world	computer	games,	promenade	theatre,	theme	parks	or	locative	narrative.	
	Banksy	Dismaland	(2016), Weston-super-Mare	themepark.	Promenade	theatre/fictional	scenarios	You,	Me,	Bum,	Bum,	Train	
Sleep	No	More	(2011)	Punchdrunk,	Barrett,	F.	&	Doyle,	M.	Dirs.		VR	storytelling,	a	nascent	form	spanning	simulations,	games	and	film,	recent	examples:	
Giant	Cop	(2016-17)	Other	Ocean	for	VR	headset		Computer	generated	environments:	
Second	Life	Linden	Lab	
Minecraft	Markus	Persson	and	Jens	Bergensten,	Mojang,	4J	Studios		
	
Storied	games:		
	Puzzle	novellas,	such	as:	
Device	6	(2013)	Simogo	iPhone/iPad		
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A	varying	degree	of	narrative	content	that	may	involve	a	scenario	or	backstory	as	a	setting	for	a	game,	or	fully	developed	stories	that	has	an	equal	emphasis	as	the	game	play.	The	narrative	may	take	the	form	of	printed	text	or	non-scripted	dialogue	between	players	who	may	be	in	and	out	of	character.	Puzzle	novellas,	board	games,	open	world	video	or	narrative	driven	video	or	mobile	games.		
Lifeline…	(2015-2016)	Dave	Justus	and	3	Minute	Games	iPhone/	Apple	Watch		Board	games,	such	as:		
Cluedo	(1949)	Waddingtons	
211b	Baker	Street,	(1975)	Antler	Productions	
Pandemic	(2007)	Matt	Leacock	and	Z-Man	Games		Narrative	driven	video	games,	such	as:	
Last	of	Us	(2013,	2017)	Naughty	Dog	and	Sony	Computer	Entertainment.	
Walking	Dead	(2012	-2016)	Telltale	Games		Openworld	computer	games,	such	as:	
Dear	Esther	(2007,	2008,	2010)	Dan	Pinchbeck	and	The	Chinese	Room.	Illustrative	and	atmospheric	British	coastal	landscape	explored	from	first	person	perspective.	Fragments	of	narrative	as	text	and	voice,	sound	effects	and	transitory	orchestral	score	are	triggered.	Unspecified	goals	become	overcoming	problematic	situations,	as	if	really	lost	in	a	landscape	or	trapped	in	the	caves.	
	
	
Fragmentary	narratives:		Stories	accessed	in	parts,	delivered	via	existent	media	platforms,	such	as,	twitter	fiction	or	autobiographic	or	feigned	autobiographic	blog	posts.	
	Twitter	fiction:		#TwitterFiction		
The	Repurposed	Magical	Tent	(2012-	)	Multi-linear	Twitter	poem	by	Lytton	Smith	and	James	Brocklehurst		
	
Transmedia	fiction:		Story	content	delivered	across	different	platforms	such	as	film,	blogs,	print	media,	live	performance,	events,	e.g.	TV	series	with	backstories	‘found’	on	blogs	of	characters.			
	
The	Beast	(2001)	Microsoft	
Majestic	(2001)	Electronic	Arts	
	
Assassin's	Creed	(2007-2016)	
The	Lizzie	Bennet	Diaries	(2012-	) Hank	Green	and	Bernie	Su	
		
	
Locative	narrative:	
	
Forest	Walk	(1991)	Janet	Cardiff		
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	Narrative	written	to	be	experienced	specific	places	or	types	of	locations,	delivered	via	mobile	devices	and/or	analogue	methods.	Often	heard	on	headphones.	(Examined	further	in	chapter	2).	
Trace	(1999)	Teri	Rueb	
		Story-driven	locative	heritage	experiences,	such	as:			
34	North	118	West	(2003)	Jeremy	Hight,	Jeff	Knowlton	and	Naomi	Spellman		
Homing	(2016),	Harris	Library,	Preston	Jen	Southern	and	Sam	Thulin			Story	driven	location-based	games,	such	as:	Zombies,	Run!	(2011-)	Six	to	Start	and	Naomi	Alderman			Pervasive	games,	such	as:	
Machine	to	See	With	(2010)	Blast	Theory	
	
	
	
	
Expanded	narrative	and	multi-stability		
We	can	diagram	the	parameters	of	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	as	the	authors’	intention	to	
challenge	to	form	and	their	explicit	or	implicit	engagement	with	multi-stability.		
	
• Perception	as	multi-stable	(above	and	below	conscious	awareness)	
• Language	as	multi-stable		
• Beliefs	about	what	is	real	or	true	as	multi-stable;	resting	on	a	feeling	of	rationality		Here	the	multi-stability	of	language	is	explored	in	the	context	of	perspectives	from	the	philosophy	of	language	and	narratology.	Peirce’s	“Modality	of	the	Possible”,	James’	relations	of	concepts	and	meaning,	Wittgenstein’s	concept	of	a	“language	game”,	Roman	Jakobson’s	‘Poetic	function’	and	Roland	Barthes	‘polysemy’	are	considered	as	ideas	that	articulate	perspectives	on	the	multi-stability	of	language.		
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Language	as	multi-stable,	is	the	aspect	of	metaphor	of	multi-stability	that	refers	to	the	production	of	linguistic	uncertainty.			 1) The	multi-stability	of	language	supervenes	on	the	normative	functioning	of	language.		A	‘generally’	agreed	meaning	is	required	in	order	for	there	to	be	a	movement	between	alternate	meanings.	The	normative	functioning	of	language	can	be	described	as	having	different	modes	of	operation	as	described	by	Wittgenstein	(“language-games”),	Peirce	(truth	function,	“Modality	of	the	Possible”),	Jakcobson	(“poetic”	and	other	functions),	Barthes	(“polysemy)	that	place	different	emphasises.			Thoughts,	for	Charles	Sanders	Peirce	(1905a:	170),	are	signs	and	“mostly	of	the	nature	of	language.”	The	meaning	of	language	is	that	which	is	generally	agreed	upon,	in	the	societal	context	of	its	use.	However,	signs	are	vague.	Peirce	says,	unless	people	are	dealing	with	precise	and	abstract	languages	like	mathematics,	“their	meaning	consists	in	the	implications	and	non-implications	of	their	words”	(Peirce	1905b:	488);	implications	are	indeterminate.	Meaning	is	a	translation	of	a	proposition	in	the	forward	flow	of	translations	and	propositions	(Peirce	1905a:	173).	But	of	the	many	possible	meanings,		“Every	utterance	naturally	leaves	the	right	of	further	exposition	in	the	utterer;	therefore,	in	so	far	as	a	sign	is	indeterminate,	it	is	vague,	unless	it	is	expressly	or	by	a	well-understood	convention	rendered	general.”	(Peirce	1905b:	487-488).		To	affirm	that	something	is	a	pen	is	to	confirm	all	the	particulars	of	a	pen.	To	deny	that	something	is	a	pen	is	to	“vaguely”	deny	some,	or	all,	particulars	of	a	pen.	When	a	predicate	is	unanalyzable,	for	example	when	knowledge	or	experience	does	not	permit	it	(the	pen	often	
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leaks),	it	does	not	affect	whether	the	predicate	is	affirmed	or	denied,	it	is	an	intermediary,	“nascent”	state.			 “…there	lies	just	beneath	the	surface	of	what	is	explicitly	said,	the	idea	of	an	endless	series	of	such	intermediaries.”	(Peirce	1905b:	490-491)		To	understand	the	ultimate	nature	of	meaning	Peirce	says	you	need	to	understand	modality	and	what	it	consists.	Words	used	according	to	their	characteristic	applicability	have	the	“Modality	of	the	possible”	(Peirce	1905b:	494)	in	relation	to	what	is	known.	If	something	is	not	known	to	be	false	then	it	is	“possible”,	if	it	is	known	to	be	“true”	“it	is	more	possible”.	Merely	possible	has	a	vague	possibility.	Direct	recollection	of	the	state	of	things	is	the	most	subjective	modality,	that	of	the	“mode	of	Actuality”.	If	there	is	only	one	meaning	that	“accords”	with	alternatives	this	is	the	“mode	of	“Necessity”	(something	has	to	be	the	case).	If	there	is	indeterminate	between	possibilities	this	is	the	“mode	of	Possibility.”	It	is	this	idea	of	“intermediary	between	generality	and	vagueness”,	when	a	sentence’s	meaning	cannot	be	confirmed	in	relation	to	what	is	known,	that	there	is	the	potential	for	indeterminacy.	We	can	talk	about	the	potential	of	narrative	unsettle	the	generality	of	terms.			In	Peirce’s	framing,	the	shared	social-linguistic	context	permits	the	general	meaning	of	terms	and	also	their	vagueness.	Words	have	general	meaning	that	can	be	described	in	as	having	different	modes	of	representing	truth,	or	the	current	perceived	state	of	an	object’s	relation	to	its	context.	The	word-to-world	relation	is	a	judgement	that	is	made	about	what	is	known	in	situation	in	which	the	term	is	used.			In	Wittgenstein’s	Philosophical	Investigations,	we	share	a	public	language,	there	is	no	‘private’	language	of	thought.	Language	functions	normatively.	What	a	word	means	depends	on	its	use	
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with	a	“language-game”	(Wittgenstein	2009	[1958]:	21),	a	transaction	between	users	in	relation	to	a	number	of	contexts:	its	semantic	meaning,	the	tone	of	the	speaker,	the	situation.	It	is	not	the	truth	of	the	word	in	relation	to	the	general	meaning	that	is	important,	but	context	of	use	and	the	network	of	relations	entered	into.		The	difference	between	a	sentence	used	as	a	command,	“five	slabs!”	or	as	a	number,	“five	slabs”,	is	the	role	of	uttering	the	words	in	the	shared	“language-game”	(Wittgenstein	2009	[1958]:	21).	Words	can	be	used	in	a	number	of	ways	to	signify	different	things.	To	say	that	the	word	‘slab’	refers	to	a	building	material,	and	not	to	‘block’,	is	related	to	the	use	of	the	rest	of	the	words	“already	known”	(2009:	10).			 2) Normative	functioning	and	the	multi-stability	of	language	operate	in	relation	to	
particular	context,	be	it	on	the	page	and	the	act	of	reading,	spoken	or	observed.	There	is	a	transaction	between	users	or	between	the	text	and	the	participant.			For	Wittgenstein	(2009	[1958])	how	letters,	words	and	sentences	are	interpreted	relates	to	the	particular	language	the	speaker	has	learnt	and	associations	between	the	word	and	the	object,	and	the	intonation	and	the	object,	and	the	context	of	use.	The	symbol	‘c’	in	one	position	can	serve	as	a	letter	in	a	sequence	of	letters	or	it	can	signify	a	number	in	a	list.	The	utterance	of	one	word	“slab”	can	stand	in	for	the	whole	sentence	from	which	is	inferred	–	“bring	me	the	slab”.	The	sense	of	the	whole	and	the	“shortened	sentence”	is	the	same;	the	meaning	is	conveyed	by	their	use	and	not	by	their	individual	“verbal	expression”	(2009	[1958]:	20).	The	speakers’	tone	might	be	the	same	in	both	cases	but	the	intonation	may	be	different,	it	may	be	uttered	as	question.	Language-games	are	like	different	types	of	games,	they	do	not	have	identical	features	in	common	but	they	do	have	a	“network	of	similarities”,	“…a	complicated	network	of	similarities	overlapping	and	criss-crossing:	similarities	in	the	large	and	in	the	
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small”	(2009	[1958]:	66).	In	Wittgenstein’s	terms,	the	identity	of	words	is	not	fixed,	nor	their	relations	to	the	world,	the	emphasis	is	upon	the	context	of	use,	the	transaction	between	users	and	the	network	of	relations	the	use	of	language	enters	into.		In	‘Death	of	the	Author’	(1977:	146)	Barthes’s	writing	takes	a	more	pragmatic	turn	emphasising	the	text	as	“performative”	[utterances]	after	“Oxford	philosophy”, such	as	J.	L.	Austin	and	Wittgenstein.	The	literary	work	does	not	communicate	a	meaning	directly	from	the	author,	and	writing	itself	is	“intertexual”	–	a	composite	complied	from	a	‘storehouse	of	language’,	to	paraphrase	Peirce,19	and	its	previous	configurations.		 “…the	book	itself	is	only	a	tissue	of	signs,	an	imitation	that	is	lost,	infinitely	deferred…the	space	of	writing	is	to	be	ranged	over,	not	pierced;	writing	ceaselessly	posits	meaning	ceaselessly	to	evaporate	it,	carrying	out	a	systematic	exemption	of	meaning.”	(Barthes	1977:	147)			James	emphases	the	role	of	context	and	the	particular	use	of	language	for	interpretation	and	meaning.	Words	have	relations	to	the	rest	of	the	sentence	and	external	relations	to	the	context,	the	"experienceable	environment"	(James	MT	1909:	42fn).	The	word	‘winter’	suggests	certain	temperatures	in	a	particular	situation	but	it	cannot	guarantee	them,	the	term	must	take	account	and	in	the	context	of	sensible	facts	(P	1907:265).	Terms	guide	us	towards	what	we	may	expect,	they	are	“instruments”	but	it	is	in	the	stream	of	life,	in	the	particular	happening	of	a	context.			 3) Multi-stability	of	language	is	a	play	with	possibilities.	There	is	a	disruption	to	the	flow,	in	which	there	is	a	flip	between	the	self-referential,	an	awareness	of	the	act	of	
                                                        
 
19 Peirce’s (1905b: 498) expression is “our storehouse of knowledge” on which we base our actions. 
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interpretation,	and	the	pointing	towards	alternative	meanings.	The	double	meaning	of	words	or	expressions	does	this,	as	Jakcobson	points	out.	Multi-stability	translates	similarity	into	difference	or	from	difference	there	is	similarity.			In	Jakcobson’s	(1960:	358)	structural	analysis	of	language,	there	are	two	modes	of	verbal	behaviour	“selection”	that	is	paradigmatic	and	metaphoric,	and	“combination”	that	is	syntagmatic	and	metonymic.	“Selection”	of	words	is	based	on	equivalent	meaning,	whereas	“combination”	is	based	on	the	relation	of	one	term	to	another.	Language	has	a	range	of	different	“functions”	from	“referential”	to	“emotive”.	The	“poetic	function”	(1960:	356)	describes	the	operation	of	a	word	to	move	between	meanings	or	emphases	in	the	same	sentence.	In	the	case	of	paronomasia,	puns,	a	homophone	has	an	overt	meaning	the	syntagmatic	relation	of	words	in	the	sentence	and	its	second	meaning	that	“projects”	as	“equivalent”.	The	“poetic	function”	can	also	involve	a	play	with	phonemes,	for	example	using	assonance	to	convey	emphasis	or	infer	alternate	interpretations.	The	relations	between	words	in	the	sequence	is	not	just	one	of	contiguity,	it	is	a	“device”	for	creating	stress,	contrast,	pauses,	no	pauses,	that	can	have	sonic	affects	as	well	as	the	meaning	of	the	words.		The	poetic	function	promotes	the	materiality	of	signs,	Jakcobson	argues.	Jakcobson	(1960:	351)	acknowledges	that	his	account	of	poetics	does	not	engage	with	logicians’	objections	to	word-world	relations	or	with	the	truth-values	of	a	given	discourse,	but	this	“exceeds	the	bounds	of	poetics	and	linguistics	generally”.			Words	can	have	multiple	meanings,	James	argues,	they	are	designated	subjective	or	objective,	words	of	“elementary	sensation”–	hot,	bright,	light,	red	etc.	can	stand	for	both	qualities	and	sensations.	We	also	often	connect	a	sensation	with	an	object	from	which	it	arose,	“an	orange	
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colour”	(PP	1890a:	194)	or	a	scent	of	rose.	It	is	the	context	of	sentence	and	its	particular	conveyance	that	“name	its	delicate	idiosyncrasy.”	If	we	extract	the	subject	from	a	sentence,	we	separate	it	from	“the	act	of	knowledge”	(PP	1890a:	275).			For	Barthes,	readers’	interpretations	of	texts	are	interpretations	of	their	structure.	Some	texts	aim	to	‘anchor’	(Barthes	1977:	39)	meaning	using	captions	or	images,	while	others,	particularly	images,	maximise	the	polysemous	capacity	of	signs,	to	promote	poetic	play,	provoke	uncertainty,	anxiety	or	a	breakdown	of	order.			 “…all	images	are	polysemous;	they	imply,	underlying	their	signifiers,	a	'floating	chain'	of	signifieds,	the	reader	able	to	choose	some	and	ignore	others.	Polysemy	poses	a	question	of	meaning	and	this	question	always	comes	through	as	a	dysfunction,	even	if	this	dysfunction	is	recuperated	by	society	as	a	tragic…	or	a	poetic…game…various	techniques	are	developed	intended	to	fix	the	floating	chain	of	signifieds…”	(Barthes	1977:	35-36)			Barthes	argues	that	while	the	language	of	narrative,	distorts	temporal	structure,	it	both	multiplies	meaning	and	creates	ellipses	within	sentences	in	which	readers	“’fill	in’	narrative	space”	(Barthes	1977:	90),	an	action	that	is	central	to	Iser’s	(1978:	165)	phenomenological	account	of	reading.	Barthes	likens	the	complexity	of	narrative	structure	to	a	chart	where	units	can	be	“integrated”	in	continuous,	discontinuous	and	heterogeneous	movements	forward	or	backward.	Narrative	content	“compensates”	for	any	incomprehensibility	that	may	occur	in	complexities	between	the	levels.	The	connections	and	disconnection	in	the	narrative	structure	means	there	is	“an	incessant	play	of	potentials”	(Barthes	1977:	120).				 4) Multi-stability	of	language	draws	attention	to	the	materiality	of	signs	and	the	felt	
experience	of	interpretation.	The	translation	of	lived	experience	into	fixed	concepts	are	
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the	acts	of	mediation	that	the	performance	of	language	makes	evident,	when	we	identify	that	words	don’t	operate	as	we	expect.	Structure	meets	use;	as	James’	argues	words	are	always	exceeding	themselves,	pointing	away	to	what	the	experience	could	refer	to	and	what	is	felt,	“felt	on	the	fringe”.			James	describes	that	on	the	one	hand	concepts	are	fixed.	Names	do	not	explain	things,	they	are	only	concepts	abstracted	from	the	stream	of	life,	an	“instrument”	(SPP	1911:	90	footnotes)	that	can	guide	us	in	what	to	expect,	but	not	the	way	things	are	or	will	be.			
Meaning	is	a	felt	process,	of	a	situation	happening.	Every	word	in	the	sentence	has	a	“halo	of	obscure	relations”	(PP	1890a:	265)	with	other	words	and	things	that	may	potentially	join	the	reader’s	train	of	thought.	Relations	between	terms	contribute	to	how	they	function,	what	they	do	and	how	they	may	be	interpreted.	There	is	hardly	a	linguistic	utterance,	he	argues,	that	does	not	express	the	relation	between	objects	and	our	thought	that	we	understand	as	objective	relations	with	the	world	or	subjective	relations	to	ourselves	(PP	1890a:	245).	Meaning	is	dynamic;	it	is	felt	to	be	inappropriate	or	satisfying.		
	
Conclusion,	multi-stability	and	expanded	narrative	practices	
	What	are	the	effects	that	follow	in	our	experience	for	multi-stability	of	language	with	a	form	of	expanded	narrative?	Authors	may	seek	to	‘anchor’	(Barthes	1977:	39)	the	range	of	possible	meanings	or	choose	to	play	with	the	vagaries	of	natural	language,	creating	potentials	for	multiple	meanings.	The	multi-stability	can	have	a	functional	role,	shifting	the	of	meaning	of	a	
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term	or	discourse	in	relation	to	a	narrative’s	plot,	syntax	or	the	context	of	use	and	generating	enigmas,	posing	figurative	connections	or	casting	the	reader	as	a	protagonist.		
	
Multi-stability	can	shift	the	parameters	in	which	narrative	represents	(or	tells)	and	participants	act.	For	example,	in	Blast	Theory	and	Hydrocracker’s	participatory	theatre	
Operation	Black	Antler	(2016),	participants	are	undercover	police	informants	infiltrating	an	extremist	organisation.	The	backstory	presented	via	a	‘police’	briefing,	provided	suspects’	files,	the	basis	for	participants	to	devise	their	own	cover	stories.	The	narrative	telling	then	
shifted	from	the	author	to	that	of	the	participant	who	was	responsible	for	improvising	dialogue	and	creating	narrative	events	in	the	context	of	a	fake-actually-happening	party.		
		The	prefix	‘expanded’	embraces	works	that	present	a	challenge	to	a	particular	form	of	
storytelling,	fiction	or	nonfiction,	as	articulated	by	the	creators	or	the	commentator.	There	is	not	a	benchmark,	the	challenge	is	articulated	by	a	particular	work	in	relation	to	the	form,	content,	structure	or	mode	of	participation.	What	is	important	here	is	the	word	relation.	This	definition	of	narrative	does	not	rest	on	semantic/pragmatic	or	story/discourse	dichotomies	but	is	treated	as	a	value	in	experience,	which	is	particular	and	specifiable.	I	argue	that,	
(1)	narrative	is	defined	as	a	value	attributed	to	a	representation,	in	particular	specifiable	circumstances;	(2)	a	representation	becomes	a	narrative	when	the	relations	between	subjects	and	objects	are	articulated	in	relation	to	the	reader	or	participant.		
This	definition	aims	to	capture	the	intuition	that	narratives	express	states	of	affairs	between	objects	and	agents,	and	importantly	for	the	particular	form	of	narrative,	the	relation	that	these	affairs	have	to	the	reader-participant.	A	shopping	list	is	not	a	narrative,	if	its	author	or	
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reader	does	not	deem	it	to	be	so	and	if	no	‘theoretical’	reader/participant	has	been	considered	in	relation	to	the	story	contents.	Therefore,	if	I	am	to	discover	your	shopping	list,	
for	example,	find	it	interesting	and	consider	its	contents	in	relation	to	my	act	of	reading	it,	for	
example	my	delight/disgust	in	the	ingredients	you	list,	my	contemplation	of	trying	out	a	new	
recipe	and	my	declaring	the	shopping	list	a	work	of	expanded	narrative	and	my	act	of	
presenting	that	list	to	other	readers	as	a	narrative,	we	could	say	that	it	is	both	a	narrative	and	
an	expanded	narrative;	a	challenge	to	the	form	of	linear	novels	or	perhaps	even	cookbooks	or	diaries.	As	a	‘found	object’	it	may	lead	my	audience	to	question	its	ontological	status,	is	it	a	genuine	(real)	‘found’	shopping	list,	is	it	a	representation	of	a	found	shopping	list?	This	work	may	be	judged	as	exhibiting	a	common	feature	of	expanded	narrative	practices,	multi-
stability;	the	metaphor	that	expresses	the	potential	to	experientially	unsettle	the	ontological	
status	of	what	the	audience/reader/participant	takes	to	be	‘real’,	represented	or	imagined.	
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Lost	in	Paris		I	see	her.	Running	pausing	for	breath,	the	other	side	is	not	far	now.	Keep	going.	She	is	on	the	bridge,	glancing	down	into	the	water.	You	are	almost	opposite.	I	look	back	and	see	a	small	packet	lying	on	the	ground.	Cutting	through	the	traffic	and	picking	up	the	paper	bag	patterned	with	Eiffel	Towers.	He	takes	out	a	pen,	hastily	pushing	it	into	his	jacket	pocket.	Quickening	my	pace.	Too	late,	there’s	no	sign	of	yellow	boots	on	the	boulevard.		
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Chapter	2	
Introducing	the	Jamesian	Experiential	Framework	and	Jamesian	Relational	Analysis	
 
 
 “But	the	whole	system	of	experiences	as	they	are	immediately	given	presents	itself	as	a	quasi-chaos	through	which	one	can	pass	out	of	an	initial	term	in	many	directions	and	yet	end	in	the	same	terminus,	moving	from	next	to	next	by	a	great	many	possible	paths.”	(James	ERE	1912:	63)			Since	the	publication	of	his	first	articles	in	the	1860’s,	the	writings	of	psychologist,	philosopher	and	educator	William	James	have	engaged	thinkers	on	a	range	of	topics;	providing	inspiration	and	provocation	to	disparate	perspectives	from	behaviourism	(Holt	1914),	to	ecological	perception	(Gibson	1986	[1979]),	from	classical	pragmatism	and	analytical	philosophy	(Dewey	1934)	(Rorty	1979,	1991),	Putnam	(1992	[1983])	to	phenomenology,	art	history	(Gombrich	2002	[1959])	and	the	philosophy	of	culture	(McDermott	2007).	Around	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	a	cross-disciplinary	emphasis	upon	subjective	experience,	in	what	may	be	referred	to	as	the	‘affective	turn’	(Gregg	&	Seigworth	2010),	has	brought	further	analyses	to	his	work,	within	American	literature	(Levin	1999),	aesthetics	(Shusterman	2011),	philosophy	of	mind	(Gallagher	&	Zahavi	2008)	(Massumi	2011)	and	psychology	and	neuroscience	(Johnson	2007,	2014)	(Block	2006,	2013).		
	The	works	of	William	James,	I	argue	here,	are	a	meditation	on	the	notion	of	experience,	an	active	grappling	with	what	it	means	to	be	an	experiencing	being.	At	its	most	simplistic,	James’	concept	of	experience	stands	in	for	an	individual’s	relations	between	thinking	and	acting	in	the	world.	Darwin’s	theory	of	evolution,	British	empiricism,	theoretical	and	experimental	psychology,	grounded	in	neuro-physiology	and	metaphysics	and	a	psychological	approach	to	religious	experience,	can	be	seen	as	key	sources	of	James’	overarching	philosophies	of	
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pragmatism	and	radical	empiricism,	through	which	his	concepts	of	experience	permeate.			In	this	chapter,	four	intersecting	tenets	of	James’	thinking	are	schematised	as	thematics	of	experience:	(1)	action,	habit,	thinking-perceiving;	(2)	the	intentional	contents	of	thought;	(3)	truth	and	believing;	(4)	feeling,	affect	and	sentiment.		
	
 
Fig 1:  Diagram of four intersecting tenets of James’ thinking schematised as thematics of experience. 		They	identify	sets	of	relations	between	thoughts	and	things	and	the	evolutionary,	environmental,	physiological,	cognitive,	emotional,	temperamental	and	aesthetic	conditions	of	operation	that	delineate	the	parameters	of	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework.	The	Jamesian	relational	analysis,	predicated	upon	these	thematics,	is	introduced	at	the	end	of	the	chapter	together	with	a	taxonomy	of	relations.	This	analytical	approach	is	practically	applied	to	the	development	and	interpretation	of	locative	narratives,	illustrated	by	the	four	case-
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studies,	examined	in	chapters	3-5.	More	broadly,	the	framework	underpins	the	discussion	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability20		and	the	multi-stable	field	of	expanded	narrative.	
	
	
Action,	habit,	thinking-perceiving;		Classical	pragmatists,	particularly	William	James	and	Charles	Sanders	Peirce,	are	acknowledged	by	Heft	(2001:15),	Johnson	(2007),	Johnson	and	Rohrer	(2007)	and	others,	as	antecedents	of	contemporary	extended,	embodied	and	enactive	theories	of	cognition.	The	animal	functioning	in	relation	to	its	surrounding	environment.	Darwin’s	Theory	of	Evolution	and	comparable	evolutionary	perspectives	of	the	period,21	were	prevailing	influences	during	James’	education22	at	Harvard	in	the	1860’s.	James’	(CER	1920	[1878]:	45)	empiricist	psychology	and	physiologically	informed	philosophy,	embraces	the	view	that	a	creature’s	response	to	perceptual	stimuli	is	the	result	of	its	previous	generations’	adaptation	to	the	environment.	An	individuals’	behaviour	can	be	accounted	for	by	their	adjustment	to	the	current	and	future	demands	of	its	surrounding	environment.				
                                                        
 
20 The metaphor of ‘multi-stability’ has three aspects; perception as multi-stable (above and below conscious 
awareness); language as multi-stable; beliefs about what is real or true as multi-stable; resting on a feeling of 
rationality. 
 
21 James’ friend and contemporary, Chauncey Wright, was an early defender and promoter of Darwin in America 
around this period (Misak 2013: 16). 
 
22 James’ student and biographer, Ralph Barton Perry (1935: 209, 220) describes James’ studies under Jefferies 
Wyman the Hersey Professor of Anatomy in the Harvard Medical School where Darwin was keenly discussed among 
his contemporaries and in the following year his systematic examination of the philosophical questions of evolution 
with Louis Agassiz, Professor of Geology, under whom he studied natural history. 
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The	functioning	of	the	body	is	for	the	production	of	action.	Mental	states,	defined	as	“thoughts	and	feelings”,	(PP	1890a:	186)	are	“are	motor	in	their	consequences”	(1932	[1892]:	5)	leading	to	some	bodily	change,	if	not	obvious	movements,	then	changes	in	breathing	or	muscular	contractions.	Actions	resulting	from	nervous	system’s	responses	to	stimuli	are:	(1)	volitional	such	as	running	for	a	train;	(2)	semi-reflex,	automatic	through	habit,	such	as	using	the	hands	to	save	yourself	when	you	fall;	and	(3)	“reflex	acts”,	such	as,	the	eye	watering	to	remove	a	foreign	body	or	in	acts	of	self-preservation.	However,	the	boundary,	James	says,	is	vague,	an	animal’s	“outward	teleology”	(PP	1890a:	6-8)	may	appear	to	bring	about	an	action	because	of	its	intention	to	do	so	but	this	cannot	necessarily	be	determined	by	observation.			Drawing	upon	a	number	of	contemporary	scientists,23	James	extended	the	implications	of	‘habit’	from	physics	to	physiological	and	cognitive	functions,	including	perception,	memory	and	reasoning.	He	describes	the	physical	actions	and	reactions	of	matter	as,	forming	paths	of	discharge	(PP	1890a:	6).	When	a	psychical	action	is	repeated	energy	will	follow	the	same	path	or	it	will	make	a	new	course.	At	the	level	of	“nerve	centres”	in	the	brain	(1890a:	82),	habit	can	be	seen	as	the	repeated	paths	taken	by	nerve-currents.	A	general	condition	of	neural	activity	is	the	propensity	of	‘nerve-centres’	to	acquire	new	habits.	The	potential	to	form	new	paths	of	
                                                        
 
23 Carlos Blanco (2014: 1) notes the that sources for James’ theories of habit derive from Léon Dumont (PBC 1932 
[1892]: 135) a French psychologist after the writings of following August Comte (1798–1857) Benjamin Carpenter 
(1813–1885), an English physician, physiologist and comparative neurologist, Scottish empirical philosopher and 
psychologist Alexander Bain (1818–1903), and English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).  
 
Bain’s writings on habit, in Emotions and the Will (1876) and Senses and the Intellect (1879) influenced both Peirce 
and James (PP 1890a: 122-123). James (PP 1890b: 6, 12) cites Bain’s view that sensations do not have knowledge of 
things and that as concurring with his own view. James (PP 1890a: 245) praises Bain’s notion of the stream of thought 
in Emotions and the Will with reference to his own formulation of the stream of thought. Habit is also a central theme 
of C. S. Peirce’s philosophy. James and Peirce shared an interest in the physical ramifications of habit. This idea is 
discussed further in Appendix 2.  
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discharge	is	captured	in	James’	term	“plasticity”,	defined	as	a	material	weak	enough	to	“yield	to	influence”	while	retaining	its	material	integrity.			 “…our	first	proposition	the	following:	that	the	phenomena	of	habit	in	living	beings	are	due	to	the	plasticity	of	the	organic	materials	of	which	their	bodies	are	composed.”	(1932	[1892]:	135)				Equilibrium	in	the	structure	is	achieved	when	a	new	set	of	habits	has	been	established.		The	neural	function	of	habit	can	be	understood	when	applied	to	acquiring	a	new	skill.	When	learning	how	to	write,	James	argues,	all	the	different	aspects	of	the	task	require	consideration;	holding	the	pencil	in	the	correct	position,	placing	the	lead	on	the	page,	applying	sufficient	pressure,	etc.	With	repeated	practice,	movements	become	accurate	and	fatigue	is	diminished.	Once	the	task	has	been	initiated	by	a	‘cue’	(a	volition	or	sensation),	the	other	steps	in	the	sequence	are	recalled	as	one,	without	recourse	to	focused	attention	upon	each	step.	“Habits	depend	on	sensations	not	attended	to.”	(PBC	1932	[1892]:	141).	When	sensations	are	not	directly	attended	to,	a	“feeling	of	activity”	(PP1890a:	435)	continues	and	alerts	us,	if	for	example,	a	stitch	is	dropped	when	knitting	or	note	misplayed.		 “The	most	complex	habits…nothing	but	concatenated24	discharges	in	the	nerve-centres,	due	to	the	presence	there	of	systems	of	reflex	paths,	so	organized	as	to	wake	each	other	up	successively—the	impression	produced	by	one	muscular	contraction	serving	as	a	stimulus	to	provoke	the	next,	until	a	final	impression	inhibits	the	process	and	closes	the	chain.”	(PP	1890a:	108)			Habit	encapsulates	the	role	that	“nerve-action”	plays	in	the	continuum	of	physiological	functioning	and	thought	for	James.	More	broadly,	habits	are	physical-psychological-
                                                        
 
24 James’ use of the word concatenated to describe habit is later used extensively in his post 1900 radical empiricist 
writings to describe or experience of transitions between conjunctive and disjunctive thoughts. (My use of bold here) 
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emotional-rational	tendencies.	These	“habits	of	translation”25	grow	in	experience	and	some	new	ways	of	conceiving	patterns	and	sequences	underdoing	and	substituting	earlier	ones.	Habit,	“fixes	the	copy”	(PP	1890b:	619),	allowing	us	to	predict	what	experiences	may	come,	and	making	alternative	sequences	seem	unlikely.	James	rejects	the	“automation”	argument,	that	the	brain	and	body	is	purely	automatic	and	determined.	Consciousness	is	not	just	an	automatic	response	but	a	director	of	action,	“that	consciousness	is	at	all	times	primarily	a	selecting	agency”	(PP	1890a:	139),	a	point	he	had	already	made	in	his	article,	‘Remarks…’	(1878).		From	evolutionary	perspective,	James	understands	cognition	as	just	one	stage	in	the	execution	of	a	motor	action.	The	“essential	function”	of	cognition	is	“defining	the	direction	which	our	activity,	immediate	or	remote,	shall	take”	(1912	RE	[1897]:	84),	allowing	us	to	classify	and	systematize	and	among	the	parts	of	things	and	identify	their	relations26.	For	James	(1910	[1897]:	142)	this	teleological	position	is	not	reductive;	the	purpose	of	actions	may	rudimentary,	like	finding	shelter	or	esoteric,	such	as,	searching	for	the	meaning	of	our	existence.				Space	and	time	and	a	sense	of	self	are	cognitions’	evolutionary	evolved	modes	of	perceiving,	argues	James	(1910	[1997]:	268).	Conceptual	categories	of,	“Thing;	The	same	or	different;	Kinds;	Minds;	Bodies;	One	Time;	One	Space;	Subjects	and	attributes;	Causal	influences;	The	fancied;	The	real”	(P	1907:	173),	are	so	familiar	that	they	pervade	our	perception,	organizing	
                                                        
 
25 (PP 1890b: 619) (My bold to indicate this is a key point that is taken up in chapter two.) 
 
26 (James 1910 [1897]: 124) James makes reference in footnotes to Peirce’s ‘How to Make Our Thoughts Clear’ (1887) 
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our	innumerable	sense	impressions	into	fixed	routines.	Cognition	provides	detail	congruous	with	our	present	needs.	The	meanings	attributed	to	perceptions	and	conceptions	are	what	they	are	known-as	in	our	experiential	awareness.	They	are	constructed	and	context	dependent,	spatial,	temporal,	social,	personal	relations	to	ourselves.	However,	James	argues	(PP	1890b:	619),	that	while	the	brain	is	plastic,	there	are	some	uniform	correspondences,	fortuitous	and	casual	co-existences	of	ideas	and	the	external	world,	such	as,	fire	will	burn,	water	will	wet,	thunder	may	follow	lightning,	the	possibility	a	dog	will	bite	us.		Experience	is	the	current	situation	happening	for	the	individual	(1932	[PBC	1892:	3)	an	event	in	which	things	happen	at	the	same	place	and	time.	“The	experiencable	environment”	(MT	1909:41-42fn)	is	the	context	in	which	cognitive	processes,	such	as,	emotions,	perceptions,	memories,	volitions,	etc.,	and	their	consequences	occur.	The	body	is	at	the	centre	of	this	situation	happening,	experiencing	“the	feeling	of	activity”	(ERE	1912:	171-172),	of	change,	of	things	going	on.	“An	inner	event”	(CER	1920	[1895]:	346)	of	attention	brings	objects	before	the	mind.				Attentional	processes	discriminate	from	the	pure	chaotic	experience,	“…a	teaming	multiplicity	of	objects	and	relations…”	(PP	1890a:	224)	The	focus	of	our	attention	is	selective	and	only	some	of	what	we	notice	is	‘labelled’	as	having	certain	qualities.	Things	being	present	at	the	same	time	does	not	mean	we	will	perceive	them	together;	our	attention	must	unite	them.		
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The	first	fact	of	consciousness	is	thoughts	going	on.	Consciousness	awareness	27	is	not	simple	sensation,	it	is	a	stream	of	thought.28	James	(PP	1890a:	225)	identifies	five	characteristics	of	thought:	thoughts	(1)	“tend	to	be	part	of	personal	consciousness”,	in	the	sense	that	we	differentiate	one’s	own	thoughts	from	that	of	others’	which	we	cannot	access;	(2)	thoughts	are	changing,	they	have	duration	but	they	do	not	recur	identically;	(3)	thoughts	usually	seem	to	us	to	be	continuous;	(4)	thoughts	seem	to	“deal	with	objects”	“independent”	of	thought;	(5)	thoughts	attend	to	certain	aspects	of	objects	and	exclude	others.	There	is	no	consciousness	that	is	separate	from	content,	he	develops	in	his	later	radical	empiricist	writings	(ERE	1912:	9)	(1977	[1905]:	187).	
                                                        
 
27 James uses the word ‘consciousness’ throughout his writings to refer to a variety of ideas, such as:  
• In an early article ‘On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology’ (James 1884: 1) (1884) 
James says that consciousness is “esse to sentiri” – to be sensed – immediate awareness of 
sensation. This is arguably a subversion of Berkeley’s idealist expression: esse percipi – to be is 
to be perceived. For James, perception considers sensation in retrospect, in conscious acts that 
come after. 
• “Intelligent intelligence” attention directed towards thinking (CER 1920 [1878]: 64). 
• Automatic responses, reflex action (PP 1890a: 13-14) 
• Primary and secondary self (PP 1890a: 209-210, 233) 
• Fringe of relations (PP 1890a: 82) “Let us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe, to 
designate the influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of 
relations and objects but dimly perceived.” (PP 1890a: 258) 
• Subliminal consciousness (outside of conscious awareness) (VRE 1902: 483) 
•  “Below the level of immediate consciousness”, (VRE 1902:125), “extra-marginal” (VRE 1902: 
233). 
• ‘The knowner’ - the function of thoughts is knowing (ERE 1912 [1904]: 3) 
• “A thing known” (ERE 1912 [1904]: 10) thinking about. 
• Consciousness as a separate entity (ERE 1912 [1904]: 17) or ‘mind-stuff’ is rejected (PP 1890a: 
145). 
• There is no consciousness that is separate from content James argues in his later radical 
empiricist writings (ERE 1912: 9) (1977 [1905]: 187). 
 
28 James in Psychology, the Briefer Course (1892), his abridged and revised version of Principles, he renames the 
stream of thought chapter as ‘the stream of consciousness’. He later goes back to discussing a stream of thought in his 
1904 essay ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’, where he rejects the term consciousness as being too loaded with 
connotations, preferring to talk of thoughts.  
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Personal	identity,	consciousness	or	self,	James	says	(1907:90-91)	after	Locke,	is	just	our	memory	of	personal	history,	a	name	we	give	to	current	experiences	that	look	back	to	old	experiences	and	find	a	sense	of	“warmth”,	"'interest’	aroused,	'attention’	turned,	'eyes’	employed”	(1910	[1897]:	267).	Feelings	that	continue	to	reoccur,	that	seem	to	be	the	“nucleus	of	me”	and	are	associated	with	what	was	“mine”.	The	pen	held	is	associated	with	‘hand’	feelings’	and	attention	feelings	(ERE	1912	[1905]:	128-129).			Is	the	feeling	of	time	passing	consistent	with	‘clock	time’?	There	are	instances	of	waking	from	a	nap,	or	after	fainting,	anaesthesia	or	hypnosis,	where	there	is	no	realisation	that	time	has	passed.	When	our	attention	is	focused	on	a	particular	task	our	awareness	of	time	passing	may	be	similarly	affected.	Habitual	noises	may	not	be	heard.	Our	relations	to	things	are	different	
kinds	of	presence,	James	argues.		 “We	must	distinguish	the	kinds	of	presence.	In	some	manner	our	consciousness	is	present	to	everything	with	which	it	is	in	relation.	I	am	cognitively	present	to	Orion	whenever	I	perceive	that	constellation,	but	I	am	not	dynamically	present	there,	I	work	no	effects.	To	my	brain,	however,	I	am	dynamically	present,	inasmuch	as	my	thoughts	and	feelings	seem	to	react	upon	the	processes	thereof.”	(PP	1890a:	214)			James	(PP	1890a:	199-213)	asks	do	we	really	have	a	continuous	consciousness	of	things?		If	we	experience	misperception,	confusion	or	daydreams	our	perception	may	not	always	seem	continuous,	however,	these	mental	events	are	all	part	of	the	stream	of	thoughts	and	feelings.	Change	may	be	experienced	as	rapid	or	restful,	“Like	a	bird’s	life,	it	seems	to	be	made	of	an	
alternation	of	flights	and	perchings.”	(PP	1890a:	243)	Conscious	awareness	is	not	a	static	state	as	drink,	drugs,	illness,	sleep	and	hypnotism	can	affect	how	we	relate	to	things.	While	James	rejects	the	idea	of	an	unconscious	‘mind	stuff,’	the	notion	that	parts	of	thoughts	that	we	are	
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not	aware	of	form	a	subconscious	that	combine	to	make	a	higher	consciousness,29	he	demonstrates	that	things	can	be	outside	or	on	the	margins	of	our	awareness,30	primarily	because	our	awareness	is	coupled	with	the	attentional	system.31	Attention	creates	a	context	for	our	thoughts	and	our	experience	is	what	is	attended	to,	if	an	object	is	not	attended	to	it	can	be	in	the	perceptual	field	but	we	have	limited	or	no	awareness	of	its	presence.32			What	sensation	links	sensations	together?	James	rhetorically	asks.	His	answer	is,	experienced	
relations,	between	thoughts.	As	we	read	a	new	text	we	know	how	to	place	emphases;	we	are	habitually	familiar	with	the	grammatical	structure.	There	are	“feelings	of	tendency”	(PP	1890a:	254),	a	thought	stretches	to	fill	the	gap	towards	another,	its	relations	are	“constantly	felt	in	the	fringe”	(PP	1890a:	259).	A	new	thought	that	fits	with	the	topic,	adds	to	the	current	direct	of	our	thinking.	What	is	important	for	a	train	of	thought,	as	with	the	running	out	of	nerve	currents,	James	says,	is	for	it	to	reach	its	conclusion	–	its	meaning.	The	context	of	a	sentence	takes	the	word	in	direction	that	a	singular	word	may	not,	meaning	is	dynamic,	it	is	felt	in	the	fringe,	as	satisfying	or	unsuitable	(PP	1890a:	265).	Sense	is	dependent	upon	how	thoughts	function	in	experience,	how	they	relate	to	current	states	of	mind	and	the	self,	as	system	of	memories	and	volitions.			
                                                        
 
29 James rejects this idea, offering ten proofs, and concluding there is no experimental evidence (PP 1890a: 145).  
 
30 Many examples of this idea: Principles 1890a: 82, 256, 258-259, 264-265, 271, 275. James’ metaphor “chromatic 
fringes” of attention seems to draw upon Helmholtz’s work on Optics, the at the threshold of vision (PP 1890a: 285). 
 
31 James gives an extensive review and critique of the most recent psychophysical research in attention, including that 
by Helmholtz and Wundt Principles Vol.1 chapter 11, (PP 1890a: 411-482) and Psychology, the Briefer Course (PBC 
1892: 217-238)  
 
32 Attention and occluded vision is discussed further in chapter 4 of this text. 
		
 
 
 
 
78 
James’	evolutionary	informed	psychology	and	philosophy	emphasises	‘accidental	variation’,	Darwin’s	explanation	for	non-incremental	changes	to	physiology,	including	the	brain’s	structure.	Without	the	potential	for	alternative	possibilities,	beyond	that	which	the	particular	environmental	parameters	offer,	no	chance,	non-incremental	changes,	or	variations	in	direction	could	be	made.	This,	James	argues,	would	mean	there	could	be	no	free	will	and	consciousness	could	only	be	instrumental	and	deterministic.	However,	he	argues,	consciousness	is	not	like	this,	it	is	“intelligent	intelligence”	(CER	1920	[1878]:	64),	that	not	only	serves	purposes	but	also	declares	them.	‘Accidental	variation’	entails	the	rejection	of	the	‘mind’,	as	a	correspondence	to	an	existent	world,	and	reality	as	pre-existent	truth	that	our	perceptions-thoughts	mirror,	rather,	reality	and	truth	are	types	of	relations	in	experience.	
	
	
The	intentional	content	of	thoughts		Objects	aren’t	literally	in	the	head	and	the	construction	the	animal’s	environment	involves	neuro-physiological	processes	that	select	and	filter	stimuli,	beneath	and	within	an	individual’s	subjective	awareness.	The	world	is	present	in	the	individual’s	subjective	awareness	as	thoughts	that	are	‘intentionally’	directed	towards	objects.	The	physical	bases	and	functioning	of	intentionality	is	a	matter	of	debate	in	contemporary	cognitive	science	and	philosophy	of	mind.	James’	account	puts	that	intentionality	is	both	caused	by	stimuli	and	created	by	the	brain,	above	and	below	awareness.			The	‘I’,	‘mine’,	‘self’	or	‘point	of	view’	functions	in	relation	to	the	content	of	thought.	At	its	most	simplistic,	conscious	awareness	is	just	thought.	Thoughts	are	‘intentionally’	directed	towards	objects	present	in	the	environment,	memories	or	imaginings	(composite	memories).	What	is	
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the	structure	of	our	experience?	We	can	conceive	of	the	structure	of	our	experience	by	what	it	means	to	know	something,	the	cognitive	relation	between	the	thought	and	its	object.	After	James,	we	can	say	experience	is	the	context	connecting	the	knower	and	the	known.		 “The	experienceable	environment,	as	the	vehicle	or	medium	connecting	knower	with	known,	and	yielding	the	cognitive	relation;”	(MT	1909:	42-43	endnote)			How	do	our	thoughts	refer	to	things?	James’	(MT	1909	[1895]:	45)	describes	thoughts	as	“mentally	pointing”	towards	objects.	Pointing	towards	is	a	“commonplace	intra-experiential	relation”	(1909b:	45).	Our	thought	is	directed	towards	its	object,	the	pigeon	in	our	field	of	vision.	In	a	series	of	transitions	between	thoughts	and	physical	movements	we	can	arrive	at	the	pigeon	and	verify	our	thought	as	an	existent	object	in	the	world.	Mental	pointing	entails	the	rejection	of	what	the	concept	is	not,	pigeons	are	not	blue-tits	or	robins.			However,	the	concept	of	pigeon,	the	word	on	the	page	here,	is	present	in	its	absence,	James’	(MT	1909:	44)	describes,	after	the	German	philosopher	Franz	Brentano	(and	Scholastic	philosophy’s),	term	‘intentional	inexistence’.	While	things	before	our	eyes	can	be	known	perceptually	or	intuitively,	most	things	are	only	known	symbolically	or	representatively	“representative	knowledge”	(MT	1909:	43),	such	as	mathematical	or	philosophical	ideas	or	that	a	geographically	distant	pigeon	is	currently	sitting	on	the	Eiffel	Tower.		The	notion	of	pointing,	through	this	medium,	to	the	reality,	as	one	condition	of	our	being	said	to	know	it;”	(MT	1909:	42-43	endnote)		
	If	we	believe	there	is	an	existent	world	but	also	that	our	experiences	are	constructed,	rather	than	correspondences	to	a	‘given’	world,	how	can	two	people	know	the	same	thing?	James’	
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approach	to	this	question	is	to	consider	the	structure	of	our	experience	as	intentional	directedness:			Approaching	the	desk,	my	concept	terminates	in	my	perception	of	the	pen,	“Yes,	I	have	the	pen!”	I	pass	it	to	you.	In	the	first	instance	the	pen	is	directly	experienced,	it	is	just	that	(the	existent	world).	The	(practically	simultaneous)	retrospective	taking	and	classifying	are	independent	acts,	known	to	each	of	us	as	our	own	perception	of	the	pen.	The	conceptualisation	of	the	pen	is	a	‘subsequent	taking’	(ERE	1912:	131).	Conscious	awareness	is	not	just	being,	it	is	being	reported	on,33	says	James.			 “Before	I	can	think	you	to	mean	my	world,	you	must	affect	my	world;	before	I	can	think	you	to	mean	much	of	it,	you	must	affect	much	of	it;	and	before	I	can	be	sure	you	mean	it	as	I	do,	you	must	affect	it	just	as	I	
should	if	I	were	in	your	place.	Then	I,	your	critic,	will	gladly	believe	that	we	are	thinking,	not	only	of	the	same	reality,	but	that	we	are	thinking	it	
alike,	and	thinking	of	much	of	its	extent.”	(MT	1909	[1887]:	23-24)			Whereas,	sensory	apprehension	offers	“knowledge	as	acquaintance”	(MT	1909:	11),	perceptions	require	connections	to	be	made	between	the	sensation	and	memories	of	other	things,	for	knowledge	to	be	about.	Conceptual	knowledge,	abstract,	logical	analysis,	judgments,	propositions	function	also	offer	“knowledge	about”	when	they	are	put	to	use	(MT	1909:	14-15).	The	of	process	of	leading	is	what	is	important	here,	between	the	idea	(the	thought)	and	what	it	refers	to:		
	
                                                        
 
33 From a contemporary neuroscience perspective this is akin to what is termed a “tracking” account of perception, 
discussed in chapter 4 
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Thinking	of	the	pen	on	the	table	in	the	next	room	does	not	mark	the	paper	that	I	hold.	Now,	walking	towards	and	picking	up	the	pen,	I	press	down	and	write.	It	functions	for	me.	My	perception	of	the	pen	“hangs”	off	my	concept	of	the	pen	in	“a	concatenated	or	continuous	structure”	(MT	1909)	of	concrete	transitions	–	a	series	of	thoughts	that	point	towards	a	terminus	–	a	potential	actually	existent	pen	that	functions.	The	chain	of	experiences	or	thoughts,	are	‘ambulatory’	relations,34	they	occur	in-action,	in	the	space	and	time	that	separates	my	concept	of	the	pen	from	its	terminus	in	its	physical	counterpart.	A	perception	can	only	terminate	the	chain	of	intermediaries	from	the	concept	because	it	is	what	was	meant	by	the	concept.			However,	thoughts	may	never	get	beyond	the	virtual	stage.	“To	continue	thinking	unchallenged	
is,	ninety-nine	times	out	of	a	hundred,	our	practical	substitute	for	knowing	in	the	completed	
sense…”	(MT	1909:	115-116)	Words	can	have	mental	or	physical	substitutes	that	lead	us	to	on	to	other	ideas	or	practical	outcomes	(MT	1909:	110).	In	the	world	of	symbolic	thought,	we	can	intend,	speak	of	and	reach	conclusions.	Language	allows	us	to	know	realities	without	recourse	to	resemblance	to	it,	except	in	referring	to	a	remote	context	(MT	1909	[1887]:	30).	A	condition	of	experience	is	an	event	happening.	The	“causal	situation”	(ERE	1912:	110)	of	relations	is	an	important	factor	in	how	things	function.	As	you	drop	my	pen,	I	watch	it	roll	along	the	floor	and	slip	between	the	boards.	
	
	
	
                                                        
 
34 ‘Ambulatory’ relations discussed: James, W. (1909b) ‘One More Word About Truth’. In The Meaning of Truth. New 
York & London: Longmans, Green and Co. p.138, and James, W. (1920) ‘Remarks On Spencer’s Definition of Mind as 
Correspondence’ [1878] Collected Essays and Reviews New York & London: Longmans, Green and Co. p.60 
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Believing	and	Truth	
	The	problem	of	reporting	upon	experience:	the	natural	science	viewpoint,	says	James	(PP	1890a:	183-184),	is	that	bodies	occupy	a	real	space	in	a	real	time	and	that	the	aim	of	the	psychologist	is	to	discover	how	brain	states	‘correspond’35	with	the	outer	world,	where	‘minds’36	are	understood	to	be	objects	in	a	world	of	objects.	The	psychologist	compares	mental	states	–	a	“feeling	or	thought”	(PP	1890a:	185)	–	with	external	objects	under	certain	conditions.	It	is	believed	that	the	total	object	of	the	psychologist,	botanist	or	chemist,	is	comprised	of	the	“thought	studied”	(the	flower	is	red),	the	“thought’s	object”	(the	red	flower)	and	“the	psychologist’s	reality”	(there	is	an	external	world),	and	that	they	are	all	realities.	However,	holding	the	belief	that	subjective	and	objective	facts	can	be	reported	upon	means	that	the	psychologist	is	subject	to	particular	fallacies,	James	argues	(PP	1890a:	185).		Problems	of	translation	arise	from	symbolic	substitutions	for	phenomena	and	between	languages	and	terms.	Natural	language	can	cause	confusion	where	words	can	have	subjective	or	objective	designations;	“elementary	sensation”,	hot,	bright,	light,	etc.,	can	stand	for	both	qualities	and	sensations.	We	may	also	fix	a	sensation	to	an	object	from	which	it	arose,	a	horn	sound	(PP	1890a:	194),	a	rose	scent,	a	soft	jumper,	etc.	When	a	group	of	phenomena	are	designated	by	the	particular	term	‘warm’	we	may	assume	that	there	is	an	existent	entity,	‘warmth’,	outside	of	its	application	to	the	phenomena.	Entities	separate	from	the	identified	phenomena	can	be	overlooked,	even	they	are	an	actual	part	of	our	experience,	such	as	our	relations	to	objects	we	report	upon.	James	(PP	1890a:	196),	argues	thoughts	are	part	of	
                                                        
 
35 James’ inverted commas (PP	1890a:	183) 
 
36 James’ inverted commas - “‘Mind’, in his mouth, is only a class name for minds.” (PP	1890a:	183) 
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experience,	they	take	place	in	the	context	of	other	thoughts	that	preceded	them,	they	are	not	separate	entities	with	automatic	functions.			James’	(PP	1890a:	196)	psychological	methodology	is	predicated	on	the	key	tenets	of	his	philosophy:	(1)	that	thoughts	happen	in	succession;	(2)	thoughts	can	know	objects	in	the	world	and	these	objects	can	also	be	known	by	others;	(3)	thoughts	are	“subjective	data”;	(4)	the	relations	of	thoughts	to	the	brain	and	also	to	objects	in	world	are	the	subject	matter	of	psychology	as	a	science;	(5)	the	methods	of	introspection,	experimentation,	and	comparison,	do	not	provide	reliable	truths;	(6)	language	used	to	report	observations	is	selective,	reductive	and	inflationary;	(7)	psychologists	reports	of	subject’s	thoughts	and	their	objects	are	not	identical	with	the	subject’s	thoughts,	(‘the	psychologist’s	fallacy’).			While	categorical	selectivity	is	a	necessity,	it	does	not	capture	lived	experience.	As	such,	psychophysics	provides	more	and	more	data	that	gets	us	both	closer	and	further	away	from	lived	experience,	James	argues.	“Introspective37	Observation	is	what	we	have	to	rely	on	first	and	
foremost	and	always”	(PP	1890a:	185),	through	which	we	discover	states	of	consciousness	(thoughts	and	feelings).	As	psychological	tool,	James	makes	a	claim	for	systematising	introspection	using	empirical	methods,	however	he	does	not	say	it	becomes	objective	or	provides	objective	knowledge.	
	
                                                        
 
37 When James’ uses introspection to mean immediate ‘feltness’ he refers to its phenomenal and naïve sense, not in 
the term’s use as a psychological method, or as James says, “babies in cradles would be psychologists” (1890a: 189). 
This is the difference is between introspection as a feeling and introspection as psychological method where a body of 
introspections, that while fallible individually, they may become valid through a process of verification. 
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Reality	is	“how	it	appears”	to	us	as	‘brownness’,	‘hardness’,	‘flatness’,	etc.		However,	James	(ERE	1912:	26-27)	stresses	that	there	is	an	existent	reality	that	is	independent	of	the	thinker.	Ontologically,	reality	is	existent	for	James	but	our	experience	of	reality	as	appearance	also	makes	it	a	value	attributed	in	experience,	and	so	his	critics	accuse	him	of	solipsism,	that	he	rejects.38	This	distinction	becomes	a	‘live’	issue	if	we	invest	perceptual	experience	with	the	ability	to	‘reveal’	knowledge.	It	also	begs	the	question	of	what	knowledge	is	and	what	its	bases	may	be.	James’	rejects	the	idea	that	there	is	a	pre-existing	basis	for	knowledge.39			What	allows	us	to	say	that	say	that	the	table	is	made	of	wood	can	be	accounted	for	by	our	direct	observation,	it’s	painted	grey;	or	by	our	use	of	instruments	and	calculations;	it	has	carbon,	hydrogen	and	oxygen	atoms;	or	philosophical	explanation;	it	maintains	the	space	it	occupies.	Scientific	methods	or	phenomenal	reports	are	both	modes	of	inquiry	that	take	place	
within	our	experience,	in	which	qualities	can	be	verified	or	otherwise.	The	process	of	hypothesis	forming,	testing	and	verification	is	the	basis	of	the	scientific	method	but	it	is	also	a	description	of	how	we	operate	in	the	world,	says	James,40	applied	by	us	with	varying	degrees	of	rigor,	depending	on	the	context.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                        
 
38 “It must assume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse metaphysics can 
use it as their foundation. It certainly has no special affinity with solipsism.” (1909b: 215) 
 
39 James’ viewpoint is consistent with Linguistic pragmatists non-foundationist view in second half 20th and 21st 
century also, who argue that perceptual experience cannot be credited with revealing truths or ‘truthful knowledge’. 
Discuss further in chapter 4 of this text.   
 
40 This idea is articulated throughout James’ writings, some examples: (WTB 1910 [1897]: 24), (P 1907: 270, 273), (MT 
1909: 64), (SPP 1911: 223) 
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The	pragmatic	method		The	subtitle	of	James’s	book	Pragmatism	(1907)	is	“a	new	name	for	some	old	ways	of	thinking”.	Pragmatism,	brings	together	certain	long	existent	tendencies	in	philosophy,	it	“agrees	with	nominalism”,	a	focus	on	the	particular	facts,	“utilitarianism”,	a	concern	with	the	practical	consequences,	and	with	“positivism”	that	knowledge	should	not	rest	on	verbal	or	“metaphysical	abstractions”	(P	1907:	53-54).	James	argues,	(P	1907:	65),	pragmatism	is	against	rationalism	(by	which	he	refers	to	the	belief	that	there	are	truths	internal	to	propositions	or	mathematical	formula),	because	he	claims,	that	even	these	truths	are	found	to	be	“plastic”.			The	‘pragmatic	method’	can	be	applied	as	a	technique	for	testing	the	truth	of	propositions	and	as	a	test	for	deciding	metaphysical	disputes.	It	poses	the	question,	what	are	the	practical	consequences,	or	the	practical	benefits,	of	believing	something	(P	1907:45)	to	be	true?	“What	difference	would	it	practically	make	to	anyone	if	this	notion	rather	than	that	notion	were	true?”	(P	1907:45)	We	should	imagine	the	immediate	and	remote	practical	effects	that	would	result	–	the	sensations	the	object	would	produce	and	our	reactions	that	would	follow,	if	there	are	none,	then	the	dispute	is	idle,	James	argues.		 “But	if	you	follow	the	pragmatic	method,	you	cannot	look	on	any	such	word	as	closing	your	quest.	You	must	bring	out	of	each	word	its	practical	cash-value,	set	it	at	work	within	the	stream	of	your	experience.	It	appears	less	as	a	solution,	then,	than	as	a	program	for	more	work,	and	more	particularly	as	an	indication	of	the	ways	in	which	existing	realities	may	be	changed.	Theories	thus	become	instruments,	not	answers	to	
enigmas,	in	which	we	can	rest.”	(1907:	53)			This	is	our	“whole”	conception	of	term’s	“positive	significance”,	James	says,	“This	is	the	principle	of	Pierce,	the	principle	of	pragmatism”	(P	1907:46).	Although	James’	1898	address	
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to	the	Philosophical	Union	at	Berkeley41	(UC	1898:	287-310), attributed	the	“principle	of	pragmatism”	to	Charles	Sanders	Peirce’s	article,	‘How	to	Make	Our	Ideas	Clear’	(1878:	286-302),	James’	version	of	pragmatism	diverges	from	that	of	Peirce.			Peirce’s	(1887:	41)	early	account	of	pragmatism	can	be	summarised42	as:	(1)	testing	the	truth	of	propositions;43	(2)	prioritising	the	role	of	rational	thought,	defined	as	a	thoughts’	action	in	“the	exercise	of	volition”;	the	action	that	terms	imply	is	habit;44	(3)	users	of	a	language	understand	one	another	because	the	meaning	of	words	and	the	system	they	operate	within	functions	by	general45	agreement	within	the	societal	context;	(4)	and	the	notion	of	truth	means	an	idealized	endpoint	towards	which	evidence	will	eventually	converge,	as	agreed	by	concerned	parties	at	that	time,	although	when	truth	in	a	matter	is	reached	it	may	not	be	recognized.			James’	(1998:	291)	own	emphasis	is	not	upon	thought	as	active,	but	upon	thought	as	having	
particular	experiential	consequences	for	the	individual,	in	the	particular	circumstances	in	which	it	occurs.	In	James’	view,	these	experiential	consequences	are	not	solely	rational.	He	demurs	from	the	claim	that	there	are	final	truths,	rather	beliefs	are	true	in	particular	
                                                        
 
41 ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ (1898) the lecture in which James gives the term pragmatism has 
its first public expression. 
 
42 Peirce expands his view on the differences between his own and James’ pragmatism in Baldwin’s Philosophical 
Dictionary (1902) and develops his version of pragmatism in three articles published in The Monist between 1905-6. 
Peirce and James’ pragmatism is discussed further in Appendix 2.  
 
43 A point John Dewey (1923 [1916]: 302) has made. 
 
44 Peirce’s use of habit is consistent with James’ physiological and the psychological framing.  
 
45 Peirce in contrast to James is concerned with “generals” – not particulars, with testing the truth of propositions and 
not a theory of testing propositions or of truth itself, as John Dewey (1923 [1916]: 302) points out.  
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circumstances.	He	also	diverges	from	Peirce’s	(and	analytical	pragmatists	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century46)	differentiation	of	rational	thoughts	from	sensations.			Throughout	James	writings,	and	evident	in	articles	prior	to	his	1898	lecture,47	there	is	a	reciprocal	resonance	between	the	teleological	framing	of	cognition,	whose	purpose	is	a	future	or	potential	action,	and	the	function	of	truth.	James’	pragmatist	method	first	asserts	a	realist	stance,	that	there	is	a	world	and	minds	that	can	know	it.	Truths	operate	within	a	system	that	requires	verification	by	“sense-percepts”,	either	through	direct	contact	or	as	memories.	James	(MT	1909:	210-211)	points	out	that	his	pragmatism	emphasises	that	the	practical	outcomes	of	concepts	are	further	concepts,	not	just	actions,	“I	now	treat	concepts	as	a	co-ordinate	realm”	(MT	1909:	43	endnote).	The	consequences	for	an	idea	are	another	idea,	that	is	
potentially	verifiable	in	experience.			What	are	the	conditions	of	satisfaction	–	the	extent	to	which	new	ideas	fit	with	established	truths?	An	idea	is	true	if	fits	satisfactorily48	with	existing	ideas,	“is	true	for	just	so	much,	true	in	so	far	forth,	true	instrumentally”	(P	1907:58).	This	is	also	the	case	for	the	scientific	method,	
                                                        
 
46 This point discussed further in Appendix 2 of this text. 
 
47 ‘Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence’ (1878) and to a greater extent, ‘The Function of 
Cognition’ (1884). James details his early pragmatist ideas in Meaning of Truth (1909: 42-43 endnote) 
 
48 This is what shapes our human existence, according to the “humanistic conception”, James says. The Humanist 
approach to truth of F. S. Schiller at Oxford and John Dewey’s approach at Chicago (MT 1909: 64) closely reflected 
James’ pragmatism.  
 
“…the generalized notion of the workability of the feeling or idea as equivalent to that 
satisfactory adaptation to the particular reality, which constitutes the truth of the idea. It 
is this more generalized notion, as covering all such specifications as pointing, fitting, 
operating or resembling, that distinguishes the developed view of Dewey, Schiller48, and 
myself.” (MT 1909: 42-43 endnote) 
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as	a	process	of	observing	a	variation	from	an	established	viewpoint	that	gradually	becomes	recognized	as	superior	and	incorporated	into	exiting	knowledge,	until	the	new	idea	is	generalized	as	truth.	While	new	perspectives	may	break	with	or	add	to	older	ideas,	a	“minimum	disturbance”	to	older	ideas	allows	the	new	fact	can	be	admitted	as	the	true	one,	while	preserving	to	a	large	extent,	existing	ideas;	complete	rejection	of	the	old	would	not	allow	the	new	fact	to	accepted	as	true,	James	argues.	“To	a	certain	degree,	therefore,	everything	here	is	plastic.”	(P	1907:61)		
	
	Segueing	with	intentionality,	from	James’	(1909,	210-211)	pragmatist	perspective,	perceptions	terminate	in	existent	objects	and	concepts	can	potentially	lead,	through	a	sequence	of	thoughts	and	their	motor	consequences	and	arrive	at	the	physical	object.	This	knowledge	is	verified,	but	its	truth	value	is	limited	and	particular	to	the	context	of	its	use.			Pragmatism	as	method,	treats	beliefs	as	hypotheses	that	can	be	subjected	to	the	empirical	investigation	(P	1907,	53).	Testing	and	verification49	takes	place	within	a	particular	context	and	its	results	are	provisional	truths,	further	hypotheses.	Their	meaning	is	a	value	attributed	within	the	stream	of	experience.			 “Truth	happens	to	an	idea.	It	becomes	true,	is	made	true	by	events.	Its	verity	is	in	fact	an	event,	a	process:	the	process	namely	of	its	verifying	itself,	its	veri-fication.	Its	validity	is	the	process	of	its	valid-ation.”	(1907:	201)			
	
	
	
                                                        
 
49 Gombrich (2002 [1959]: 24) sketches the lineage of the thesis of ‘interpretation as hypothesis forming’, from Kant to 
its decedents in Popper. 
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Knowing,	believing	and	truth		
	Boundaries	between	phenomenal	experience	and	rational	argument	are	brought	into	question	when	relations	between	truth	and	belief	are	scrutinized	in	James’	writing.	In	both	domains,	the	classification	of	truth,	what	is	subjective	or	objective	is	subject	to:	(1)	the	supposition	that	evidence	for	a	belief	is	sufficiently	substantiated;	(2)	the	subjective	belief	in	objectivity;	(3)	the	relevance	or	“liveness”	of	a	belief	to	those	that	hold	it;	(4)	the	role	of	our	“passional	nature”	in	deciding	moral	decisions	and	in	analyses	more	generally;	(5)	an	active	“faith	in	fact”	that	helps	to	bring	about	its	truth.		Even	if	we	consider	a	belief	to	be	rational	and	supported	by	evidence,	sufficient	depth	of	examination	will	reveal	that	those	reasons	rest	largely	upon	suppositions	and	in	many	cases	a	belief	will	comprise	of	mixture	of	feelings	and	influences	that	are	outside	of	rational	thought.		To	say	that	a	claim	possesses	truth	is	to	say	that	you	think	that	the	claim	is	true	and	that	it	is	true	is	means	that	the	evidence	is	objective,	if	this	is	not	the	case	then	the	claim	is	not	true.	The	conviction	that	the	evidence	is	objective	is	itself	a	subjective	claim	that	is	evidenced	by	the	opinions	of	those	that	object	to	the	viewpoint	(James	1910	[1897]:	16).			There	are	“live”	and	“dead”	hypotheses;	live	a	hypothesis	“appeals	as	a	real	possibility	for	he	who	proposes	it”	(James	1910	[1897]:	2-3),	a	dead	one	does	not.	The	live	possibility	has	some	credibility,	even	if	the	individual	does	not	believe	it.	There	are	practical	outcomes	to	belief;	a	belief	means	there	is	a	tendency	for	us	to	act.	If	we	are	prepared	to	act	“irrevocably”	the	hypothesis	has	a	“maximum	of	liveness”	(James	1910	[1897]:	3)	for	us.	Therefore,	James	
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argues,	the	truth	of	a	belief	is	not	an	intrinsic	property	“…but	relations	to	the	individual	thinker.”	(James	1910	[1897]:	2-3)			James	(1910	[1897]:	11)	asks,	if	our	‘willing	nature’	(a	mixture	of	volition,	habit	fear,	hope,	prejudice	and	passion,	imitation	and	partisanship	and	the	norms	of	our	social	context)	only	has	a	bearing	on	our	beliefs	when	there	is	a	reprehensible	cause	or	moral	dilemma,	or	whether	our	‘willing	nature’	should	be	recognized	as	generally	playing	a	role	in	our	decision	making	processes.			James	takes	the	argument	a	step	further	by	stating,	“…faith	in	a	fact	can	help	create	the	fact”	(1910	[1897]:	25).	An	individual	who	achieves	their	goals	does	so	because	prior	to	their	realization	they	act	towards	them	as	live	hypotheses,	they	behave	as	if	they	were	possible	and	take	risks	for	their	beliefs	in	advance.	“His	faith	acts	on	the	powers	above	him	as	a	claim,	and	creates	its	own	verification”50	(1910	[1897]:25	-26).	The	emotion	at	the	basis	of	vetoing	a	decision	of	whether	to	believe	is	fear	in	being	duped.	To	make	the	other	choice	and	believe	is	the	hope	that	you	are	not.	Doubt	expressed	by	inaction	is	a	type	of	action	(1910	[1897]:	55).	James	concludes	we	have	freedom	to	believe	or	otherwise	in	cases	where	there	is	not	sufficient	evidence	for	either	position,	as	in	the	case	of	religion	or	free	will.		While	the	empirical	method	aims	at	the	verification	of	hypotheses,	for	James	it	is	never	a	completely	objective	process.	The	basis	of	our	knowledge,	prior	and	after	experimentation	is	privileged,	and	not	necessarily	on	rational	or	logical	grounds,	we	want	to	believe	that	our	
                                                        
 
50 We can see Peirce making a similar argument but put in a logical form, where he labels this type of belief an acritical 
inference (Peirce 1905b: 483). 
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experiments	and	studies	put	us	in	a	“better	position	towards	it”	[the	truth]	(1910	[1897]:	9-10).	Objectivity	and	subjectivity	themselves	are	potentials,	not	a	priori	truths.		After	Brentano,51	he	states	an	object	is	thought	of	twice,	as	‘that’	and	also	in	a	new	relation,	a	belief,	as	true	or	otherwise.	James	says	he	prefers	to	use	the	word	belief	rather	than	judgment.	Beliefs	help	to	constitute	our	reality	(MT	1909:	246),	but	they	are	hypotheses	with	the	potential	to	be	verified	in	experience.	Truth	is	a	belief	that	works	in	particular	circumstances.	James’	position	is	not	a	dismissal	of	the	empirical	method	rather	it	is	cautionary;	warning	of	the	error	of	certainty	and	urging	that	objective	evidence	is	only	sufficient	for	present	purposes.				
Feeling,	affections,	sentiment		
‘Appreciations’,	or	‘affections’	for	James	(1890b:	629)	are	a	broad	group	of	“elemental	mental	categories”,	“1.	Elementary	sorts	of	sensation,	and	feelings	of	personal	activity;			2.	Emotions;	desires;	instincts;	ideas	of	worth;	aesthetic	ideas;	3.	Ideas	of	time	and	space	and	number;	4.	Ideas	of	difference	and	resemblance,	and	of	their	degrees.	5.	Ideas	of	causal	dependence	among	events;	of	end	and	means;	of	subject	and	attribute.	6.	Judgments	affirming,	denying,	doubting,	supposing	any	of	the	above	ideas.	
                                                        
 
51 James describes the relation between subject and object, after Brentano in his discussion on belief in an objects’ 
existence. 
“The way in which the ideas are combined is a part of the inner constitution of the 
thought’s object or content. That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations 
between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate to subject may be one. But 
when we have got our object with its inner constitution thus defined in a proposition, then 
the question comes up regarding the object as a whole: ‘Is it a real object? is this 
proposition a true proposition or not?’ And in the answer Yes to this question lies that 
new psychic act which Brentano calls ‘judgment’, but which I prefer to call ‘belief’.” (PP 
1890b: 286-287) 
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7.	Judgments	that	the	former	judgments	logically	involve,	exclude,	or	are	indifferent	to,	each	other…All	these	mental	affections	are	ways	of	knowing	objects.”	(1890b:	629)			For	James	(P	1907:	244)	sensations	are	the	first	part	of	our	reality.	The	second,	is	the	relations	between	sensations	and	our	thoughts	of	sensations.	Some	relations	are	accidental,	such	as	the	date	and	place,	and	others	are	“fixed	and	essential”	because	the	meaning	of	the	term	means	its	relations	to	other	things,	such	as,	‘hot’	or	‘sharp’	(P	1907:	244-245).	Both	facts	and	their	relations	are	parts	of	immediate	perception.	The	third	part	of	reality,	additional	to	perception,	is	the	comparison	of	new	facts	with	“previous	truths”	(P	1907:	245).	The	names	that	we	give	sensations,	their	categorization,	our	theories	about	their	origin	and	cause,	and	their	relations	to	other	things,	can	affects	their	truth	value	in	a	particular	situation.		Sensations,	are	of	course,	fallible.	Erroneous	presentations	of	the	external	world	in	our	subjective	awareness	do	not	change	the	facts	of	movement	or	temperature,	when	the	train	appears	to	be	moving	when	it	is	stationary,	or	it	feels	cold	even	if	the	thermometer	says	it	is	not	(ERE	1912:	183).	In	our	everyday	experience,	the	differentiation	between	the	imagined	and	the	perceived	can	also	be	hard	to	determine.	Thresholds	between	the	imaginary	and	what	we	hold	to	exist	beyond	the	surface	of	the	body	may	be	difficult	to	discern,	if	sounds	for	example,	are	faint,	dim	or	confused	by	more	dominant	perceptual	cues	(PP	1890b:	70-72).	Our	hands	reach	towards	the	pond,	we	may	feel	the	water	before	our	fingertips	meet	its	surface	(PP	1890b:	70).			Our	experience	of	illusions	indicates	that	we	susceptible	to	misperception	and	misjudgement	and	that	current	external	stimuli	are	only	part	of	what	contributes	to	our	on-going	perception	
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of	the	environment.52	Even	as	we	glance	around	and	the	table	disappears	from	view	we	have	the	sense	that	“constant	‘things’”	(1907:	185)	exist.	We	have	a	sense	of	the	consistency	of	their	attributes	too,	by	which	we	measure	difference,	when	in	this	light,	we	say	the	table	isn’t	its	‘true’	colour.			We	differentiate	between	thoughts	and	things	depending	upon	how	they	potentially	function	in	experience.	Ascribing	the	category	subjective	or	objective	is	to	describe	how	things	may	act	on	other	things.	For	something	to	be	sharp	it	might	act	physically,	making	a	hole.	In	the	mind	‘sharp’	does	not	affect	its	neighbours	in	the	same	way,	it	“suffuses”	and	“interpenetrates”	(ERE	1912:140).	To	say	a	real	knife	is	sharp	is	to	say	it	has	the	potential	to	cut	other	real	things,	but	it	cannot	act	upon	my	imaginary	cheese.	An	imaginary	pen	will	only	write	on	imaginary	paper.	Imaginings,	‘non-perceptual	experiences’,	can	be	first	considered	as	subjective	in	that	they	are	“not	directly	felt	or	seen”	(ERE	1912	(1904):	16)	but	they	are	also	objective	experiences	of	present	thought.53	James	puts	that	is	there	is	a	“parallelism”	between	the	“presently	felt	and	the	remotely	thought”,54	they	are	coordinate	realms.			Emotions,	in	James’55	view,	come	after	the	reflex	response	to	external	stimuli,	however	stimuli,	reflex	actions	and	emotions	are	all	just	parts	of	the	total	experience	of	a	situation	
                                                        
 
52 James’ view is reflected by current neuroscience research, King, A. J. (2006) ‘Auditory neuroscience: activating the 
cortex without sound. Current Biology. June 6; 16 (11), R410-1. 
 
53 This echo’s Peirce’s claim in ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (Peirce 1923 [1878]: 5) 
 
54 James (ERE 1912: 18) says Hugo Münsterberg refers to imaginings as “parts of reality” in Münsterberg’s Grundziige 
der Psychologie, vol. I, [Basics Elements of Psychology] (Münsterberg 1874: 48). James accounts, “I find this objectivity 
of non-perceptual experiences, this complete parallelism in point of reality between the presently felt and the 
remotely thought, so well set forth in a page of Münsterberg's Grundziige.”	 
 
55 In ‘The Physical Basis Of Emotion’ (CER 1920 [1894]: 346) James (CER 1920 [1894]: 348) explains that the psychical 
basis of emotion is not apperception (the apprehension of a feeling by another feeling). The view that emotion as a 
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happening	(CER	1920	[1894]:	350).	While	emotions	aren’t	independent	objects	with	a	fixed	‘identity’,,	they	can	be	identified	as	having	similar	qualities	that	have	sufficient	“functional	resemblance”	for	individuals	to	compare	their	own	and	others	experiences	(1920	[1894]:	354).			Love,	anger	and	fear,	are	not	merely	affections	of	the	mind	but	also	of	the	body	(ERE	1912,	142).	We	may	feel	the	beauty	of	an	object	or	attribute	to	it	beauty.	Affect	is	ambiguous	in	terms	of	its	classifications.	I	feel	the	cold	snow	or	I	feel	that	the	snow	is	cold.	We	give	objects	and	our	feelings	attributes.	Feelings	ascribed	to	physical	objects	do	not	determine	how	they	will	act	but	they	can	“produce	immediate	bodily	affects”	(ERE	1912,	150),	such	as	an	increased	heartbeat,	quickened	breathing,	sweating,	salivating,	etc.	The	ambiguity	of	the	classification	demonstrates	introspection’s	difficulty	in	designating	objects	as	mental	or	material.		 “In	the	case	of	our	affectional	experiences	we	have	no	permanent	steadfast	purpose	obliges	us	to	be	consistent,	so	we	find	it	easy	to	let	them	float	ambiguously,	sometimes	classing	them	with	our	feelings,	sometimes	with	more	physical	realities,	according	to	caprice	or	to	the	convenience	of	the	moment…”	(ERE	1912	[1905:140-141)				The	line	between	thoughts	and	things	is	imprecise	when	our	emotions	are	added	in	experience.	Pleasure,	pain,	aesthetic	or	sentimental	adjectives	imbue	objects	with	qualities	that	can	become	synonymous	in	our	experience	(ERE	1912:	34),	(ERE	1912:	139).	I	am	curious	about	the	pen;	the	curious	pen	is	a	memento	of	our	trip	to	Paris.		
                                                        
secondary not the primary effect of a stimulus, coincides with that of his contemporary James Lange. James and Lange 
had independently published articles on this subject expressing similar views in 1884, however, James differs with 
Lange on a number of details that he outlines in this essay, including that Lange puts too much emphasis on the role 
of vascular constriction of the blood vessels in emotion. He disagrees with Lange that constriction of blood vessels in 
the face as being the “essential in feature of anger”. 
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Subjectivity	and	objectivity	denote	how	things	are	temporarily	classified,	depending	upon	how	they	act	(ERE	1912:	141).	Perceptions	usually	seem	continuous	in	our	experience,	while	concepts	are	discrete	parts	of	language	that	have	various	“meanings”,	entering	back	into	the	stream	of	experience	when	they	are	put	to	use.		There	is	no	dualism	between	mind	and	matter	the	only	difference	in	experience	is	between	“relation	and	function”.56	Our	evidence	for	there	being	a	real	world	is	by	observing,	directly	or	with	instruments	and	calculations,	how	our	different	categories	of	thought	appear	to	‘act	on	their	neighbours’	(ERE	1912:	139).	Perceptions	and	concepts	can	have	a	physical	function	and	an	inert	function,	their	relations	either	lack	“physical	interference	and	interaction”	(ERE	1912:	139-140)	or	they	have	“mutual	impenetrability”.	Imaginary	objects	act	on	other	imaginary	objects	while	emotions	seem	to	act	upon	objects,	they	“take	me	to	their	very	brink”.		 	“Ether-waves	and	your	anger,	for	example,	are	things	in	which	my	thoughts	will	never	perceptually	terminate,	but	my	concepts	of	them	lead	me	to	their	very	brink,	to	the	chromatic	fringes	and	to	the	hurtful	words	and	deeds	which	are	their	really	next	effects.”	(ERE	1912:	73)		
	
	
Reality	feeling			Appearances	of	a	hallucinatory	presence	are	often	accompanied	by	“undifferentiated	sense	of	reality”,	the	notion	that	the	reality	we	attribute	to	existent	objects	can	also	accompany	ideas	(VRE	1902:	58).	Ideas	can	appear	to	have	a	“reality-feeling”,	despite	being	vague	or	“almost	
                                                        
 
56 James rejects Galileo, Descartes, Kant and others insistence that ‘affects’ are purely mental phenomena (ERE 1912: 
147-148 footnotes), (ERE 1912:137) 
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unimaginable”.	James	likens	the	often-attributed	concreteness	of	religious	experiences	to	this	“reality	effect”,	that	objects	can	acquire	through	partaking	in	shared	space	and	time.				James	asks,	what	are	the	practical	consequences	for	something	to	be	known-as	a	religious	or	mystical	experience?	“In	what	facts	does	it	result?	What	is	its	cash-value	in	terms	of	particular	experience?”	Of	primary	importance	for	the	individual,	argues	James,	is	the	role	of	context	in	the	interpretation	(VRE	1902:	22)	and	what	is	believed	to	be	the	“consequential	fruits	in	life”	(VRE	1902:	15)	of	their	religious	experience,	rather	than	the	physical	antecedent	causation.		James	describes	our	experience	of	consciousness	as	having	two	parts:	“primary	consciousness”,	that	which	we	are	directly	aware	of;	and	“transmarginal	or	subliminal57		consciousness”,	that	which	seems	to	us	to	be	at	the	‘back	of	our	mind’,	distant	memories	thoughts	and	perceptions	on	the	periphery	of	our	awareness,	to	which	we	attribute	the	source	of	our	passions,	volitions,	hypotheses,	imaginings	and	intuitions	and	“non-rational	operations	(VRE	1902:	483).	Research	in	hypnotism	provides	a	psychological	context	for	demonstrating	that	subliminal	consciousness	is	not	diaphanous	or	esoteric58	but	a	concrete	experienceable	phenomena	(VRE	1902:	233).	Memories,	thoughts,	feelings	outside	of	the	subject’s	direct	awareness,	become	present	during	hypnosis	as	a	“conscious	fact”.	He	concludes	that	religious	
                                                        
 
57 In Principles James references research by Myers (1886) on the “subliminal” consciousness and Alfred Binet's 
Alterations of Personality (1896) 
 
58 Where as James gives the subconscious a physiological basis in Varieties and in Principles (1890) where James 
describes psychology as “the study of finite minds”, Owen Flanagan (1992: 43) points out James’ discussion diverges 
from a strictly materialist account of consciousness in his lecture ‘Human Immortality’ (James 1899 [1898]: 12), where 
he permits the possibility that some part of consciousness may continue after death. James bases this claim on the 
grounds that the brain is “productive” of thoughts and also “transmissive” of thoughts, using the metaphor of the 
prism that can transmit colours via the light that passes through it to illustrate his point (James 1899 [1898]: 14-15). 
However, James’ apparently contradictory views are not necessarily inconsistent with his pluralism, where the 
possibility of chance and genuine novelty are entertained. 
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experiences	are	a	subliminal	or	a	subconscious	“continuation”	of	our	everyday	conscious	experience.	The	notion	of	the	‘unconscious’	refers	here	to	an	object	or	concept	that	has	been	previously	experienced,	directly	or	indirectly,	but	which	the	individual	only	has	a	faint	memory	or	a	bare	awareness,	in	the	present	situation.	
	
	
Rationality	and	feeling		Rational	judgments	rest	on	the	feeling	of	certainty,	because	tracing	causes	leads	to	questions	that	cannot	be	known.	The	method	of	rationality	is	contemplation	of	phenomena	over	time.	A	thing	can	be	explained	by	looking	at	its	causes.	To	know	a	thing	to	be	able	to	predict	the	consequences	that	will	flow	from	it.	James	says,	“custom”	(we	could	use	the	word	habit	here)	performs	both	these	functions	and	can	be	seen	as	the	source	of	rationality.	But	how	do	you	
recognise	a	rational	conclusion?	By	“certain	subjective	marks”,	the	same	way	we	recognise	anything	else,	he	argues.	Rational	marks	are,		 “A	strong	feeling	of	ease,	peace,	rest,	is	one	of	them.	The	transition59	from	a	state	of	puzzle	and	perplexity	to	rational	comprehension	is	full	of	lively	relief	and	pleasure.”	(James	1910	[1897]:	63)			James	(1910	[1897]:	76-77)	argues	that	the	empiricist	school	holds	that	the	feeling	of	rationality	and	the	“feeling	of	familiarity”	are	synonyms	of	rationality.	Naturalising	his	view,	he	argues	that	physical	reactions	result	when	nerve-currents	are	discharged	and	when	there	is	resistance;	in	our	experience	we	feel	no	particular	pleasure	in	breathing	normally	but	distress	if	we	find	ourselves	unable	to	breath;	when	performing	an	action	easily	no	particular	
                                                        
 
59 Peirce articulates a similar view in ‘How to Make Ideas Clear’ – thought is one system of relations59 whose sole 
function is to resolve doubt and to produce belief; “belief is a rule for action” (1878: 41). 
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thought	seems	to	accompany	it,	whereas	if	the	physical	or	mental	task	proves	difficult	we	experience	discomfort.	Whenever	modes	of	thinking	cause	us	to	experience	a	feeling	of	“fluency”	they	“produce	a	sentiment	of	rationality”	(1910	[1897]:	62).	Rationality	can	be	defined	as	“…only	unimpeded	mental	function…”	(1910	[1897]:	75).			Rationality	transforms	the	world	of	impressions	into	a	world	of	conceptions.	The	purpose	of	rationality	is	for	handling	facts	(1910	[1897]:	70).	If	a	rational	system	of	classification	explains	the	world	and	its	relations,	our	mind	is	at	rest.	But	can	that	system	be	said	to	be	rational,	James	(1910	[1897]:	70)	asks.	If	the	system	leaves	nothing	out,	indefinitely	quenching	unease,	we	may	then	call	it	rational.	However,	when	we	are	presented	with	a	solution	our	mind	performs	by	searching	out	the	“other”	and	continues	point	towards	“the	void	beyond”,	probing	for	further	explanations	(1910	[1897]:	71).	There	is	“no	natural	bridge”	(1910	[1897]:	72)	between	an	instance	of	factual	data,	and	the	void	of	possibilities.					
Radical	empiricism		James	introduced	radical	empiricism	as	a	“philosophical	attitude”	in	the	preface	to	Will	to	
Believe	(1897).			 “I	say	‘empiricism’	because	it	is	contented	to	regard	its	most	assured	conclusions	concerning	matters	of	fact	as	hypotheses	liable	to	modification	in	the	course	of	future	experience;	and	I	say	‘radical’	because	it	treats	the	doctrine	of	monism	itself	as	an	hypothesis,	and,	unlike	so	much	of	the	halfway	empiricism	that	is	current	under	the	name	of	positivism	or	agnosticism	or	scientific	naturalism,	it	does	not	dogmatically	affirm	monism	as	something	with	which	all	experience	has	got	to	square"	(WB	1910	[1897]:	vii-viii)			
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Radical	empiricism	is	a	critique	of	scientific	method	and	an	argument	for	non-determinism.	The	empirical	method	is	extended	as	an	account	of	how	individuals	know	things	about	the	world,	as	the	process	of	serial	hypotheses	forming	that	have	the	potential	for	verification;	and	in	its	radical	ontological	extension,	questioning	the	foundational	status	of	monism.	Monism	refers	to	a	belief	that	there	is	one	substance	(either	mind	or	matter)	of	which	the	world	is	made	and	as	general	a	principle,	it	can	refer	to	the	idea	that	world	is	a	unity	from	which	parts	are	derived,	sometimes	conceived	of	as	an	Absolute,	knowing	being,	energy	or	spirit	and	sometimes	conceived	of	as	substance	or	essence.			 “…for	fluency's	sake	I	myself	spoke	early	in	this	article	of	a	stuff	of	pure	experience,	I	have	now	to	say	that	there	is	no	general	stuff	of	which	experience	at	large	is	made.		There	are	as	many	stuffs	as	there	are	'natures'	in	the	things	experienced.”	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	26)		
	I	argue	that	James’s	emphasis	in	his	philosophy	of	radical	empiricism	is	not	the	specification	of	neutral	matter,	but	the	possibility	of	the	plurality	of	stuffs;60	the	rejection	of	correspondence	theory	of	truth	and	the	assertion	of	the	constructed	nature	of	reality	in	our	experience,	a	view	that	James	referred	to	as	“radical	pluralism”	(ERE	1912:	91).61			“The	world	is	indubitably	one	if	you	look	at	it	in	one	way,	but	as	indubitably	is	it	many,	if	you	look	at	it	in	another.	It	is	both	one	and	many	let	us	adopt	a	sort	of	pluralistic	monism.”	(P	1907:	13)			
                                                        
 
60 In his assertion of pluralism is found in publication at least as early as Will to Believe (WB 1897: viii) This point is also 
noted by G. E. Myers (1986: 366) who thinks a better description is “neutral pluralist.” 
 
61 ‘Radical pluralism’ is a more accurate label, a term James used himself:  
 
“These are the main features of a philosophy of pure experience… In my own mind such a 
philosophy harmonizes best with a radical pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism, moralism 
and theism, and with the 'humanism' lately sprung upon us by the Oxford and the Chicago 
schools. I cannot, however, be sure that all these doctrines are its necessary and indispensable 
allies.” (ERE 1912: 91) 
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James’	pluralism	is	important	for	the	pragmatic	method	(that	truths	become	true,	verified	in	experience)	and	his	doctrine	of	radical	empiricism	(in	immediate	experience	things	are	just	that,	only	potentially	subject	or	object),	because	it	accommodates	the	multiple	ways	that	the	world	is	for	us.	However,	James	is	not	a	phenomenologist,	his	philosophy	is	not	just	an	account	of	how	things	appear	in	experience,	pragmatism	provides	a	method	for	how	appearances	can	be	verified,	a	verification	that	has	specifiable	and	limited	sphere	of	application.		Choosing	to	believe	in	pluralism	means	that	novelty,	chance	and	free	will	are	possible.	There	is	the	potential	to	overcome	the	disconnection	between	things	in	experience	but	this	requires	giving	up	the	logic	of	identity.	All	theories	are	“mental	modes	of	adaption	to	reality”	(P	1907:	194),	rather	than	final	answers	to	the	‘enigma’,	James	says.	By	treating	both	empirical	facts	and	monism	as	a	hypothesis,	James	questions	the	consequence	of	soft	and	hard	determinism.62	Pluralism	is	his	solution	that	leaves	the	door	open	for	chance	and	possibility.	Darwin’s	‘accidental	variation’,	as	James	argued	in	Remarks	and	Principles,	can	be	interpreted	as	evolutionary	framed	illustration	of	pluralism.	To	say	that	our	wills	are	free,	and	to	believe	it	to	be	so,	results	in	“acting	as	if	it	were	true”.63	In	James’	view	we	construct	our	reality.	Ultimately	to	believe	in	free	will	is	the	choice	of	the	individual.		
                                                        
 
62 Soft determinism refers to James’ discussion in Chapter 5 ‘The Dilemma of Determinism’ we can make be choices 
about our lives and therefore we are morally culpable but ultimately the world on a physical level is deterministic. 
James sees this view as fudge that does not have any intellectual rigor - you can’t have it both ways, he argues (James 
1910 [1897]: 166). 
 
63 James (1910 [1897]: 146) says, after the contemporary French philosopher Charles Renouvier, whom James later 
described as radical pluralist (SPP 1911:163-164). 
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Articles	written	from	1904	and	1905	expand	James’	initial	radical	empiricist	postulate64.	In	the	preface	to	The	Meaning	of	Truth	(1909),	the	remit	of	radical	empiricism	as	a	coherent	“doctrine”65.			 Radical	empiricism	consists	first	of	a	postulate,	next	of	a	statement	of	fact,	and	finally	of	a	generalized	conclusion.	The	postulate	is	that	the	only	things	that	shall	be	debatable	among	philosophers	shall	be	things	definable	in	terms	drawn	from	experience.	[Things	of	an	unexperienceable	nature	may	exist	ad	libitum,	but	they	form	no	part	of	the	material	for	philosophic	debate.]66	The	statement	of	fact	is	that	the	relations	between	things,	conjunctive	as	well	as	disjunctive,	are	just	as	much	matters	of	direct	particular	experience,	neither	more	so	nor	less	so,	than	the	things	themselves.	The	generalized	conclusion	is	that	therefore	the	parts	of	experience	hold	together	from	next	to	next	by	relations	that	are	themselves	parts	of	experience.	The	directly	apprehended	universe	needs,	in	short,	no	extraneous	trans-empirical	connective	support,	but	possesses	in	its	own	right	a	concatenated	or	continuous	structure.”	(1909b:	xii-xiii)			Radical	empiricism	is	James’	“Weltanschauung”	or	worldview,	he	tells	us	in,	‘A	World	of	Pure	Experience’	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	40).	He	compares	radical	empiricism	with	its	opposite,	rationalism,	that	holds	that	reason	and	mathematics	are	the	bases	of	knowledge	and	that	experience	is	unreliable.	British	Empiricism,	held	that	while	experience	is	unreliable,	verification	by	the	scientific	method	can	be	the	basis	for	knowledge,	but	not	certainty.	Their	nominalism	focused	on	the	particular	separate	facts	of	experience	but	their	method	is	not	
                                                        
 
64 These articles are later published posthumously as a collection Essays of Radical Empiricism (1912). Ralph Barton 
Perry, James’ former student, biographer and the collection’s editor, tells us (1912: preface) that James had already 
planned the structure of the book and made available the bound the collection the articles for students in the Harvard 
library. The final edition predominately matches that of James’ plan plus some additional articles. 
 
65 James refers to radical empiricism as a philosophical attitude in Will to Believe (WB 1897: vii) and as doctrine in 
Pragmatism (P 1907: ix) and The Meaning of Truth (MT 1909: xii), as Perry notes in his preface to Essays in Radical 
Empiricism, see note above. 
 
66 James’ square brackets. 
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taken	far	enough	in	James’	view.	It	disregards	the	connections	between	things,	taking	facts	to	be	objective	while	how	we	relate	to	things	is	discounted	as	subjective.				
Relations		Experience,	for	James,	is	being	happening.	But	being	is	not	solely	subjective.	Being	requires	a	context,	an	“experienceable	environment…a	vehicle	or	medium	connecting	knower	with	known	and	yielding	the	cognitive	relation;”	(James	1909,	41).	The	context	in	which	its	and	other	entities’	qualities	can	be	individuated	and	identifiable	(James	1909,	18-19).			‘Pure	experience’	is	the	name	James	gives	for	the	happening	of	present	experience;	we	perceive	it	retrospectively;	we	could	call	it	a	broad	category	of	being	cognizant.			 “The	instant	field	of	the	present	is	at	all	times	what	I	call	the	'pure	experience’.	It	is	only	virtually	or	potentially	either	object	or	subject	as	yet.	For	the	time	being,	it	is	plain,	unqualified	actuality,	or	existence,	a	simple	that.”	(ERE	1912:	23)67				The	instant	field	of	the	present	is	immediate,	there,	naïve	reality,	it	is	valid	and	we	act	upon	it.	“…but	the	immediate	experience	in	its	passing	is	always	'truth,	'practical	truth,	something	to	
act	on,	at	its	own	movement”	(ERE	1912:	24).	We	believe	our	experience	is	really	happening	for	us	because	of	the	practical	consequences	that	follow.	Our	current	experience	enters	into	relations	with	other	parts	of	our	experience.	These	relations	are	not	mysterious;	perceptions	and	concepts	are	distinguished	by	how	they	function	in	relation	to	other	things.	They	are	
                                                        
 
67 Also see (ERE	1912:	74)	for	this	explanation	of	pure	experience. 
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classified	in	our	experience	as	subjective	or	objective,	and	potentially,	they	are	verifiable	in	our	practical	experience.			Sensations	(how	our	body	feels	to	us),	perceptions	(experiences	we	attribute	to	our	different	sensory	modalities)	and	concepts	(thoughts	we	are	having	that	do	not	seem	to	be	independent	of	us)	are	all	thoughts	happening	to	the	individual.	James	argues,	it	is	useful	to	name	our	experience	as	it	appears	to	us,	as	‘objective’	perceptions	and	‘subjective’	ideas,	happening	in	our	heads,	but	they	are	just	labels	for	parts	of	experience.	An	object	seen	and	the	seeing	of	it	are	first	one	fact	in	the	phenomena	of	immediate	experience,	it	is	retrospectively	that	they	are	considered	as	the	thought	and	object	(MT	1909:	48-49).	A	piece	of	experience	in	one	context	is	a	thought	and	in	another,	it	is	a	thing	known	with	‘objective’	content.	A	piece	of	experience	can	be	both	‘thought	of’	and	be	‘a	thing	known’,	it	can	be	both	subjective	and	objective	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	10),	(James	1977	[1905]:	187).	Our	experience,	is	only	potentially	subjective	or	objective	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	23).			Our	experience	of	consciousness,	James	describes	as	the	‘cognitive	relation’	(PP	1890a:	216),	awareness	that	has	cognitive	and	emotional	relations	of	with	things.	When	we	wake	up	in	the	morning	we	are	often	aware	there	has	been	a	temporal	gap	between	when	we	were	last	awake.	This	disjunctive	relation	gives	way	when	we	recall	going	to	sleep	and	now	the	same	self	has	woken	up.	Conjunctive	relations	follow	in	our	stream	of	thoughts	from	one	moment	to	the	next.	When	we	try	to	imagine	another’s	sense	of	self,	or	think	precisely	from	their	perspective;	there	is	an	‘experiential	gap’,	a	disjunctive	relation.	We	can’t	quite	bridge	the	expanse	between	you	and	me.	Conjunctive	and	disjunctive	relations	“hang	together”	at	their	
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edges	in	a	“concatenated”	(ERE	1912:	107)	and	a	continuous	structure	of	transitions	in	experience.			“That	one	moment	of	it	proliferates	into	the	next	by	transitions	which,	whether	conjunctive	or	disjunctive,	continue	the	experiential	tissue…Life	is	in	the	transitions	as	much	as	in	the	terms	connected;”	(ERE	1912:	87)			James	argues	that	all	we	know	of	an	object	are	its	qualities.	Qualities	are	ideas	that	are	attributed	to	objects	in	the	processes	of	discrimination	and	comparison	(1910	[1897]:	267).	When	we	think	of	things	and	their	qualities	they	are	separate	and	discrete.	When	the	notion	of	substance	is	scrutinized	all	we	find	are	a	collection	of	qualities	clinging	together.68	How	do	qualities	adhere	if	there	is	no	underlying	substance?	While	different	explanations	have	subsequently	been	offered	for	what	unites	‘qualities’	or	‘properties’,	James	(SPP	1911:124)	understands	substance	is	a	collective	name	for	“specific	and	verifiable	connections”	that	are	extracted	from	the	mass	of	on	going	experience.					The	world	of	qualities	is	discontinuous.	Things	may	seem	continuous	by	partaking69	of	space,	time	and	ego,	the	seeing	of	a	pen,	on	the	table	at	12.00pm.	James	says	no	feeling	happens	without	occupying	space	and	time,	no	time	happens	without	the	self,	somewhere	(WB	1910	[1897]:	268).	But	these	a	priori	conjunctions	are	only	“vague	laws”	across	general	concepts	
                                                        
 
68 Substance has been framed variously (SPP 1911:124): The Substance theory of Aristotle; Descartes says that 
properties adhere because there is a substance; Locke says there is a substratum in which properties inhere but that 
categories, our boundaries between qualities are man-made and to some extent arbitrary; and Kant’s notion of a 
transcendent reality outside of experience, that James rejects. James discusses the British empiricists questioning the 
notion of substance (P 1907: 88-90), (SPP 1911: 116, 121).	
 
69 The matrix of experience: ego (that he defines as the memory of personal history), space and time are the only 
partial continuities between parts of the world (1910 [1897]: 268). “partake – in Plato's phrase” (James 1910 [1897]: 
268) 
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and	leave	the	details	of	innumerable	possibilities	unspecified.	It	is	the	fact	of	something	happening,	the	particular	real	experience	of	picking	up	the	pen	from	the	table	that	decides	between	alternatives	(1910	[1897]:	269)	that	its	yellow-brownish	ink	flows	smoothly	over	the	page…			 “Are	there	real	logically	indeterminate	possibilities	which	forbid	there	being	any	equivalent	for	the	happening	of	it	all	but	the	happening	itself?	To	such	a	way	of	thinking	the	notion	of	'partaking’	has	a	deep	and	real	significance.”	(James	1910	[1897]:	270)			To	ascribe	the	function	of	knowing	to	a	quality	or	content	of	a	feeling,	a	thought	or	an	idea,	we	need	to	believe	that	it	exists	outside,	as	well	as	inside	the	individual	subjective	experience.	It	may,	however,	still	be	a	dream,	a	fiction	or	a	misjudgement.	James’	philosophy	is	predicated	on	a	belief	in	an	existent	concrete	world	beyond	the	surface	of	the	skin,	while	the	only	warrant	we	have	for	reality	is	the	faith	of	the	inquirer	(MT	1909:	6-7).	So	the	bottom	line	for	James,	is	choosing	to	believe	in	an	existent	world	outside	of	our	heads,	and	we	generally	make	this	choice	because	it	is	practically	useful	for	us	to	do	so.	“The	critic,	reader,	or	epistemologist,	with	his	own	belief,	as	warrant	for	this	reality’s	existence;”	(MT	1909:	42-43	endnote).	The	concept	of	reality	does	not	stand	in	for	a	separate	entity,	it	is	a	quality	that	we	attribute	to	thoughts	(WB1910	[1897]:	267).	
	James’	radical	empiricist	approach	to	interpretation	and	meaning	is	to	give	an	account	of	the	
relations	between	things	and	between	things	and	us:	everything	that	is	“experienceable”	directly	or	indirectly,	using	any	manner	of	instruments	or	calculations	and	including	esoteric	
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phenomena	reported	in	experience,	but	excluding	the	transcendental70	which	is	neither	potentially	or	actually	verifiable.			There	is	hardly	a	linguistic	utterance	that	does	not	express	the	relation	between	objects	and	our	thought	that	we	understand	as	objective	relations	with	the	world	or	subjective	relations	to	ourselves	(PP	1890a:	245).	Meaning	is	not	a	static	correspondence	to	the	world,	but	a	context	specific	relation	in	experience.	Relations	between	terms	contribute	to	how	they	function	in	a	proposition	and	how	they	may	be	interpreted.	Relations	are	part	of	the	content	of	consciousness	“part	of	the	‘object’	just	as	much	as	sensations	are”	(PP	1890b:	27).	Relations	aren’t	mutually	exclusive	(ERE	1912:	110);	paper	can	be	on	and	off	the	table.	Conjunctive	relations	express	“degrees	of	intimacy”	–	to	be	‘in’	‘with’,	‘next	to’,	of	continuity	of	space,	distance	and	time	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	44).	Disjunctive	relations71,	for	James,	are	those	that	do	not	seem	to	be	continuous	with	thoughts	that	have	preceded	them.			In	the	relations	between	terms	and	the	parts	of	the	world	to	which	they	refer,	the	use	of	concepts	is	an	act	of	translation	that	leaves	out	the	movement	of	change.	Concepts	are	“discontinuous	and	fixed”	(MT	1909:	253).	A	concept	leaves	out	what	it	is	not,	whereas	in	the	perceived	flux	of	life,	experiences	co-penetrate	each	so	it	is	not	easy	to	know	what	is	included	
                                                        
 
70 What James is referring to here is postulated transcendental experiences such that which Kant asserts. 
 
71 For James, the lack of acknowledgement of disjunctive relations is problematic not just in terms of epistemology 
and ontology but also for grammatical logic indicated by the Law of Excluded Middle and the Logic of Identity. He 
offers alternative possibilities to the formulation where the particular relations of terms do not fix their identities and 
leave the potential for plurality of meanings. It can be argued James’ (ERE 1912 [1884]: 266-276) argument hints 
towards an idea of modal logic, or towards ‘deductive logic’, in Charles Sanders Peirce’s terms (1873 [1870]). 
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and	what	is	not.72	Discontinuity	is	not	removed	from	the	universe	by	systemizing	and	classifying	its	qualities	“…we	have	only	made	it	finer	grained.”			The	meanings	attributed	to	perceptions	and	conceptions	are	what	they	are	known-as.	They	are	constructed	and	context	dependent,	spatial,	temporal,	social,	personal	relations	to	ourselves.	While	an	idea	or	perception	is	not	contradicted,	it	is	potentially	or	virtually	true	(1909,	115-11).	Our	beliefs	about	how	the	world	is	may	seem	to	have	a	rational	basis,	perhaps	supported	by	evidence,	but	they	are	first	a	hypothesis,	our	faith	or	hope	in	which	may	be	driven	by	feelings	or	sentiment	(1897,	62).	That	which	is	taken	as	true	is	a	value	ascribed	in	experience	The	truth	of	an	idea	is	determined	by	conceptual	or	physical	actions	(1907,	45),	that	follow	from	it,	leading	to	further	thoughts	or	physical	activities.	Beliefs	become	true	when	they	are	verified	(1907,	206)	as	such.	Truth’s	relation	in	experience	is	as	a	value,	that	is	contingent	on	the	particular	context	of	use.	Aesthetic	value	and	sentiment	play	a	role	in	what	we	perceive	and	conceive,	fitting	with	our	expectations;	feeling	right.	It	fits	satisfactorily	with	our	existing	ideas,	extending	them	in	an	acceptable	way.	Radical	empiricism	treats	both	relations	and	terms	as	real	parts	of	experience,	but	not	in	a	rationalist	sense,	James	(ERE	1912:	44)	cautions	us,	they	have	no	special	truth-value	or	exceptional	quality.	Relations	are	not	concerned	with	the	substance	of	an	object	but	how	they	function	in	our	experience.			 “…the	knower	is	not	simply	a	mirror	floating	with	no	foot-hold	anywhere,	and	passively	reflecting	an	order	that	he	comes	upon	and	finds	simply	existing.	The	knower	is	an	actor,	and	co-efficient	of	the	truth	on	one	side,	whilst	on	the	other	he	registers	the	truth	which	he	helps	to	create.”	(James	1920	[1878]:	67)		
		
                                                        
 
72 James notes however, that the classical object-predicate structure of logic is now being challenged and that 
concepts in physics are now being considered as ways to handle reality rather than uncovering existent truth (SPP 
1911: 90 footnotes).  
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Conclusion:	The	Jamesian	experiential	framework	and	a	relational	approach	to	
expanded	narrative			In	this	chapter,	the	multiple	aspects	of	James’	framing	of	experience	from	across	his	writings	express	a	view	of	the	human	animal	as	teleological,	whose	body-brain	are	the	product	of	its	ancestors’	responses	to	the	environment	overtime.	A	body-brain	that	is	also	subject	to	accidental	variation,	nonsequential	changes,	that	James	interprets	as	the	potential	for	chance	and	novelty,	whose	connotations	are	pluralism,	non-determinism	and	free	will.	The	body-brain-awareness	is	also	responding	to	its	current	environment	adjusting	to	the	demands	of	the	situation,	above	and	below	the	level	of	awareness;	experience	is	constructed.	The	influence	of	attention	and	higher	cognitive	processes	on	perceptual	functioning	below	the	level	of	awareness	is	observable	under	circumstances	such	as	hypnotism.	The	constructed	nature	of	perception	and	thinking,	more	generally	means	that	we	cannot	have	complete	certainty	of	our	existence,	however	James	chooses	realism;	to	believe	in	a	concrete	world	that	exists	beyond	the	skin,	because	it	fits	with	what	we	intuitively	experience.	Our	awareness	about	the	world	happens	forward	and	also	in	retrospect.	Perception-conception	rides	on	a	wave-crest,	forming	hypotheses,	making	predictions	about	the	world,	that	present	in	perceptual	awareness;	while	much	of	our	experience	will	not	be	verified	as	true	or	otherwise.	We	reach	to	touch	the	water;	we	are	already	feeling	it	and	linguistically	knowing	it	before	our	skin	makes	contact	with	the	surface.			In	our	naming	and	classifying	of	things	our	thoughts	intentionally	point	towards	an	object,	the	content	of	our	thoughts,	in	relation	to	our	learnt	language	use,	our	memories	of	past	experiences	and	our	current	context.	The	line	between	rational,	evidence	based,	choices	and	aesthetics	can	become	less	distinct	when	their	bases	are	taken	to	their	limit	points,	that	
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arguably	rests	upon	a	feeling	that	the	analysis	is	correct.	Thoughts	function	in	relation	to	things,	that	we	identify	by	their	qualities.	That	is	all	we	can	know,	whether	determined	by	mathematical	modelling,	scientific	instruments	or	our	own	observations.	We	ascribe	values	to	our	thoughts.	We	can	describe	the	different	types	of	relations	between	thoughts	and	things.	While	our	naming	and	classifying	cannot	capture	fully	the	lived	experience,	they	can	function	by	guiding	us	to	towards	achieving	our	aims	within	particular	circumstances.			Here,	I	outline	the	Jamesian	relational	approach	to	an	expanded	narratology	that	situates	the	individual	reader-participant	moving	with	the	narrative	in	the	environment.	The	thematics	of	experience	set	the	frame	for	examining	the	experience	of	expanded	narrative	practices	and	specifically	locative	narrative.	The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	describes	the	inter-relations	between	three	aspects	of	experience:		
		
	
 
Fig 2:  Diagram of the four thematics of experience on which supervenes the metaphor of multi-stability, on which 
supervenes language as multi-stable  	
Thematics of 
Experience
• Action, habit, thinking-perceiving; 
• The intentional contents of thought; 
• Truth and believing; 
• Feeling, affect and sentiment.
Multi-stability
• Perception as multi-stable (above and below conscious awareness); 
• Language as multi-stable; 
• Beliefs about what is real or true as multi-stable; resting on a feeling of rationality.
Language as 
Multi-stable
• The multi-stability of language supervenes on the normative functioning of language;  
• Normative functioning and the multi-stability of language operate in relation to particular 
context;
• Multi-stability of language is a play with possibilities.
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Language	as	multi-stable,	is	the	aspect	of	metaphor	of	multi-stability	that	refers	to	the	production	of	linguistic	uncertainty,	on	the	grounds	that:		 1) The	multi-stability	of	language	supervenes	on	the	normative	functioning	of	language;			2) Normative	functioning	and	the	multi-stability	of	language	operate	in	relation	to	particular	context;	3) Multi-stability	of	language	is	a	play	with	possibilities.		In	the	last	chapter	I	defined	a	relational	definition	of	narrative	as	(1)	as	a	value	attributed	to	a	representation,	in	particular	specifiable	circumstances;	(2)	a	representation	becomes	a	narrative	when	the	relations	between	subjects	and	objects	are	articulated	in	relation	to	the	reader.		A	narrative	is	an	experience	happening	for	the	reader-participant	in	which	a	
representation	(an	image/text/sound/and/or	thought)	of	an	experience	happening	can	be	
described	as	specifiable	relations	between	a	subject	and	its	objects.	This	experiential	and	relational	approach	to	narrative	interpretation	focuses	upon	the	relations	between	(1)	the	
participant,	their	responses	and	the	actions	that	result	from	partaking	in	the	narrative	in	the	
particular	context	or	‘experienceable	environment’;	(2)	modes	of	engagement	with	the	narrative	
form	or	individual	work,	and	(3)	the	interpreter-critic,	the	narrative	and	the	contexts	of	analyses	(secondary	analyses).			An	analogy	towards	the	Jamesian	relational	analysis	put	forward	here:	We	can	imagine	we	are	taking	a	photograph	of	our	friend	in	a	winter	landscape.	The	components	are,	the	field,	tree,	sun	and	fence.	By	changing	their	relative	positions	to	the	photographer	and	therefore	to	one	another,	very	different	images	are	created.	The	relational	approach	to	expanded	narrative	is	concerned	with	describing	the	components	of	experience	and	their	relative	position	to	each	
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other,	their	contexts	and	the	interpretative	perspectives	employed,	values	in	experience;	the	analysis	examines	relationships	between	these	elements.	In	terms	of	narrative,	it	is	concerned	with	interdependence	of	semantic	sense	and	pragmatic	context	and	use.			
A	relational	taxonomy	for	describing	experience		All	intentional	relations	involve	our	self	(even	when	written	in	the	third	person)	and	they	are	happening	within	a	context,	an	‘experienceable	environment’,	at	some	time	in	some	place	–	the	matrix	of	‘I’,	time	and	space,	as	James	argues	(1910	[1897]:	264).	Relations	are	expressed	in	natural	language	as	thought,	writing,	speech,	symbolic	and	metalanguages.		Relations	to	objects	a) Relations	to	perceptual	objects	b) Relations	to	imaginary	objects	c) Relations	to	hallucinations	d) Relations	to	dreams	e) Relations	to	language	f) Relations	to	time	g) Relations	to	space		Relations	between	objects	in	time	and	space	a) Action	b) Time	c) Proximity	
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d) Distance	e) Position	f) Direction	g) Movement	h) Velocity		Relations	to	ourselves	“intelligent	intelligence”	(James	1920	[1878]:	64),	a) Relations	to	conscious	awareness:	as	vivid,	as	vague,	as	on	the	fringes	or	threshold.		b) Relations	to	the	experiences	of	perception	and	misperception	c) Relations	to	the	experience	of	imagining	d) Relations	to	action	and	volition		e) Relations	to	the	experience	of	attention		Relations	to	feelings	and	sensations	a) Relations	to	bodily	sensations	b) Relations	to	emotions	c) Relations	to	feelings	d) Relations	to	will,	volition		e) Relations	to	intuitions		Relations	to	values	a) Relations	of	presence	(to	different	worlds73)	
                                                        
 
73 James characterizes individuals’ categories of experience as “worlds”. These can be described as classes whose 
members share a logic of acting and influencing one another – the logic physics, of ethics, or of fantasy and fiction. 
Each world is real “while it is attended to” – reality is that which we take to be external to us, yet it is mutable. 
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b) Relations	to	interest	c) Relations	to	reality	d) Relations	to	hypotheses	e) Relations	to	knowledge	f) Relations	to	skill	g) Relations	to	belief	h) Relations	to	truth	i) Relations	to	beauty	(taste	as	a	weaker	form)	j) Relations	to	rationality	k) Relations	to	fiction	l) Relations	to	ethics			In	the	chapters	that	follow,	this	Jamesian	relational	taxonomy,	informed	by	the	four	parameters	of	experiential	framework,	is	applied	in	the	analysis	of	four	locative	narrative	case	studies,	together	with	participants’	reports	of	experience.						
                                                        
 
There are different worlds with different modes of existence, James tells us listing seven categories, “(1) physical 
things “as we intuitively apprehend them”, heat, colour, sound; (2) the “scientific world” of physical things; (3) “ideal 
world of relations and abstract truths”, mathematics, logical propositions, ethics, aesthetics; (4) “The world of idols of 
the tribe, illusions or prejudices common to the race”; (5) supernatural worlds of religions and mythology, of fiction 
“Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn our backs on all other worlds, and, for the time, the Ivanhoe-world remains our 
absolute reality. When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world, which reduces Ivanhoe, and 
all things connected with him, to the fictive status, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes grouped under No. 
5.” (P291-292 footnotes); (6) “Worlds of individual opinion”; (7) “The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also 
indefinitely numerous.” (James 1890b: 291-292) 
 
 “Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or another of this or of some 
similar list.” (James 1890b: 293) 
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Chapter	3	
	
Locative	Narrative,	a	Genera	of	Expanded	Narrative:	antecedent	practices	and	themes	
of	locative	narrative				 “…one	can	make	exact	experiments	upon	uniform	diagrams;	and	when	one	does	so,	one	must	keep	a	bright	lookout	for	unintended	and	unexpected	changes	thereby	brought	about	in	the	relations	of	different	significant	parts	of	the	diagram	to	one	another.	Such	operations	upon	diagrams,	whether	external	or	imaginary,	take	the	place	of	the	experiments	upon	real	things	that	one	performs	in	chemical	and	physical	research.”	(Peirce	1906:	493)	74		
	In	this	chapter	I	diagram	arts	and	cultural	practices	that	I	argue	are	antecedent	and	coexistent	with	works	of	locative	narrative.	Drawing	on	a	selection	of	locative	narratives	from	the	last	two	decades,	I	discuss	how	techniques	and	approaches	of	these	practices	have	been	adapted	and	feed	into	the	complexity	of	the	locative	narrative	form.	I	introduce	four	locative	narrative	case	studies,	developed	within	this	research,	that	specifically	engage	with	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability.	Informed	by	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework,	a	relational	analysis	of	the	locative	narrative	is	made	of	LociOscope,	The	Letters	(2014).					
Locative	narrative’s	formal	and	experiential	narrative	complexity	
	I	argue	that	locative	narrative’s	‘challenge’	to	non	spatially	situated	narrative	can	be	characterized	as	its	formal	and	experiential	narrative	complexity.	Locative	narrative	is	
                                                        
 
74 Peirce, C. S. ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’. The Monist. Vol. 16, No. 4 (October, 1906), pp. 492-546 
Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27899680Accessed: 14-03-2015 18:26 UTC 
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considered	complex	on	the	grounds	that	(1)	the	authorial	intention	is	to	situate-integrate	the	story	world	within	an	existent	location;	(2)	the	structure	of	the	narrative	is	linked	with	the	mode	of	interaction;	(3)	media	is	experienced	in	relation	to	surroundings;	(4)	the	reader-audience	becomes	a	participant	whose	actions	take	place	within	the	fictional	world	and	the	existent	environment;	(5)	the	spatial-temporal	complexity	of	partaking.	I	argue	that	while	works	of	locative	narrative	are	informed	by	practices	across	cultural	domains,	their	formal	
and	experiential	narrative	complexity	is	descriptive	of	the	practice	as	an	expanded	narrative.	
 
Fig. 2: Table of Antecedent and Coexistent Domains of Locative Narrative. 	
Antecedent	and	Coexistent	Domains	of	Locative	Narrative	(These	areas	are	clearly	not	mutually	exclusive	or	definitional,	the	purpose	of	categorisation	is	to	indicate	the	spheres	of	interest	that	intersect	with	the	form	of	locative	narrative.)		Navigation	and	Geography	
Navigation	
technologies	 From	observation	of	the	environment,	to	timekeeping,	speed	of	travel,	mapping,	compasses,	satellites	and	mobile	computing	devices.	
Mobilities,	
ecology	and	
urban	geography	 The	social	science	field	of	mobilities	is	concerned	with	the	interrelations	between	people,	objects	and	data	and	their	movement	geographically	and	spatially.	Soundwalks,	sound	pollution.	Architecture,	urban	planning	and	design,	smart	cities,	internet	of	things,	street	games.	Games	and	simulations	
Simulators	and	
virtual	
environments	 Environmental	acclimatisation,	occupational,	vehicle	and	gaming	simulators,	VR	and	navigable	screen-based	representations	of	spaces,	3D	cinema,	wearables.	
Games	 Collective	and	individual	play,	board	games,	computer,	video	and	online	games,	treasure	hunts,	geocaching,	table-top	roleplaying,	larps	and	pervasive	games	(see	table	1.	Expanded	Narrative	Practices).	History/education	
Education	and	
heritage	
interpretation	 ‘Serious	games’	(used	in	education,	or	focus	on	learning),	museum	guides	and	tour	leaders,	printed,	audio	and	digital	guides,	historical	re-enactment	and	living	history	museums.	Arts		
Literature		 Print	novels,	hypertext,	text	adventure,	interactive	fiction,	online	communally	authored	stories	and	fictional	worlds,	graphic	digital	novels,	twitter	fiction,	transmedia	stories,	A.I.	SGAs	(see	table	1.	
Expanded	Narrative	Practices,	for	more	comprehensive	list).	
Fine	art	narrative	
and	textual	
practices	 The	“dérive”	(Debord	1958)	psychogeography,	Arte	povera,	soundwalks,	installation,	live-art,	land	art,	site-specific	art,	concrete	poetry,	image-text	art,	mail	art,	performance	art.	
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Theatre	and	
performance		 Participatory	theatre,	improvisation,	promenade,	Forum	and	Invisible	theatre,	flash	mobs,	street	performance.	Psychological,	spiritual	
Guided	imaginary	
experiences		 Stage	hypnotism,	hypnotherapy,	shamanic	journeying,	meditation,	thought	experiments,	thought	provocations	and	‘mind	games’75.					
1) the	authorial	intention	is	to	situate-integrate	the	story	world	within	an	existent	
location;		
	Baudelaire’s	nineteenth	century	figure	of	the	flâneur,	the	gentleman	of	leisure,	wanders	the	streets	of	Paris,	observing	life	as	an	aesthetic	activity.	In	his	Arcades	Project,	Walter	Benjamin,	describes	the	city	as	a	theatrical	arena	for	Baudelaire’s	flâneur,	that	is,	“…now	a	landscape,	now	a	room”	(2002	[1935]:	10).		 “To	the	flâneur,	his	city	is-even	if,	like	Baudelaire,	he	happened	to	be	born	there-no	longer	native	ground.	It	represents	for	him	a	theatrical	display,	an	arena.”	(Benjamin	(2002	[1927-40,	J66a,6]	:347)				In	1955	Guy	Debord’s	writings	on	“psychogeography”	investigate	the	individual’s	relations	between	the	geographic	environment	and	their	behaviour	and	emotions.	His	methodology	was	to	turn	life	into	a	game.	Debord,	like	Benjamin	(2002	[1935]:	12),	gives	a	Marxist	critique	of	Haussmann's	redesign	of	Paris	(and	of	the	status	quo).	Debord’s	solution	to	the	‘militarized’	open	spaces	of	Paris,	is	a	“renovated	cartography”,	created	with	strategies	such	as,	superimposing	two	maps	to	remove	the	walker’s	habitual	influences.	A	year	later,	and	again	in	
                                                        
 
75 ‘Mind Games’ a practice of (non-drug induced) guided imaginary experiences developed by Robert 
Masters and Jean Houston (1972) based on research at The Foundation for Mind Research, initially 
concerned with LSD and psychedelic experiences.  
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1958	under	the	banner	of	The	Situationist	International,	the	art	movement	founded	by	Debord,	he	wrote	of	the	dérive,					 “One	of	the	basic	situationist	practices	is	the	dérive,	a	technique	of	rapid	passage	through	varied	ambiences.	Dérives	involve	playful-constructive	behavior	and	awareness	of	psychogeographical	effects,	and	are	thus	quite	different	from	the	classic	notions	of	journey	or	stroll.”	(Debord	1958)			Taken	alone	or	in	groups,	for	hour	or	days	the	dérive	through	a	city,	or	even	within	an	apartment	building,	changes	the	relation	of	the	individual	to	their	environment	to	urbanism	and	the	borders	imposed	by	architecture	and	the	state.	Debord	has	no	specific	authorial	intention	to	create	a	narrative	framework	for	wandering	or	to	situate	a	story	within	the	location,	although	walkers	may	recount	their	experiences	as	a	narrative	telling.		Psychogeography	and	the	dérive	continue	to	offer	an	inspirational	touch	point	for	coexistent	practices	of	locative	narrative;	novelists	Ian	Sinclair	and	James	Attlee	and	urban	geographers	and	artist	walkworks,	by	those	such	as	‘Mythogeographer’	Phil	Smith.	In	Misha	Myers’	locative	narrative	Way	from	Home	(2004),	asylum	seekers	and	refugees	made	maps	of	places	they	regard	as	home	and	used	them	to	them	to	navigate	around	Plymouth,	UK,	recording	their	memories	and	responses	to	their	new	environment.	Audience-participants	then	walk	these	journeys	around	the	city,	guided	by	the	audio	recordings	and	accompanied	by	a	digital	map.	The	work	questions	notions	of	territory,	place	and	the	implications	of	global	events	for	individuals.	While	this	work	is	a	psychogeographical	investigation	of	an	individual’s	emotional	and	behavioural	relations	to	their	environment,	it	is	not	an	invitation	to	wonder	freely,	in	the	sense	of	the	implied	by	the	dérive.	Creators	of	a	locative	narratives,	may	offer	a	planned	linear	route,	as	in	Way	from	Home,	or	present	the	participant	with	more	freedom	to	
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roam,	however	a	locative	narrative’s	structure	is	pre-authored,	even	if	its	story	content	is	not.	In	Blast	Theory’s	Rider	Spoke	(2007-)	cyclists	riding	at	night	are	asked	find	somewhere	to	‘hide’	their	audio	response	to	a	question,	which	they	record	via	a	mobile	computer	mounted	on	the	handle	bars.	As	they	journey	through	the	city,	alerts	are	triggered	of	nearby	‘hiding	places’	where	other	participants’	recordings	can	be	listened	to.	The	framework	in	which	these	these	‘mini’	stories	fit	is	conceived	by	the	authors,	but	any	coherence	or	overarching	narrative	is	that	of	the	participants’	personal	journey	and	their	individual	relations	to	the	nights’	events.		The	extent	to	which	a	locative	narrative’s	story	is	situated-integrated	within	a	place,	I	describe	as	occupying	a	spectrum	between,	(1)	the	temporal-spatial	coincidence	of	participant	and	place,	as	in	the	case	of	Rider	Spoke,	to	that	of	(2)	an	author	and/or	collaborators	response	to	a	location,	such	as,	Way	from	Home,	to	(3)	the	authored	‘integration’	of	the	fictional	and	existent	world	in	which	features	of	the	environment	are	given	a	fictional	significance	within	the	story.	An	example	here	be	would	be	Janet	Cardiff’s	Missing	Voice	(Case	
Study	B)	(1999),	in	which	the	voice	of	Cardiff,	as	the	female	protagonist,	guides	the	participant	via	the	recording	of	her	‘case	notes’	around	Whitechapel,	London,	that	is	refigured	as	story	world	in	Cardiff’s	detective	drama.	Restaurants,	pubs	and	tube	station	feature	as	locations	within	the	story.	Non-diegetic	music,	evocative	of	Raymond	Chandler	movies,	combines	with	ambient	sounds	recorded	in	the	location,	infusing	the	existent	world	with	the	events	and	atmosphere	of	the	narrative.			(1)	Function	of	location:	temporal-spatial	coincidence	of	participant	and	place		In	Rider	Spoke	(Blast	Theory	2007)	participants	respond	to	questions	in	a	particular	location	but	the	location	is	primarily	a	temporal-spatial	coincidence	of	participant	and	place.	This	is	
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even	more	so	the	case	for	Naomi	Alderman	and	Six	to	Start’s	Zombies	Run!	(2012-	2017),	the	literary	fitness	app	that	sets	joggers’	missions	that	can	be	run	anywhere	in	the	world.	The	environment	is	reframed	by	the	world	of	the	story,	but	that	environment	could	be	anywhere.		(2)	Function	of	location:	an	author	and/or	collaborators	response	to	a	location		Locative	narratives	in	the	middle	of	the	spectrum	include	oral	histories	situated	in	the	places	that	they	are	about.	Works	here	include	the	[Murmur]	project	by	Micallef,	Roussel,	and	Sawhney	(2002),	first	developed	for	Toronto,	followed	by	versions	in	cities	internationally.	Illustrations	of	green	ears	with	a	phone	number	attached	to	trees	or	other	objects	encouraged	passers-by	to	call,	hear	a	personal	story	or	oral	history	pertaining	to	the	particular	location,	and	leave	own	recording.	Block	of	Time:	O’Farrell	Street	(2010)	by	Krissy	Clarke,	set	in	the	Tenderloin	district	of	San	Francisco	also	used	telephone	voice-box	numbers.	Placed	on	the	floor	every	few	feet	along	the	street,	simply	signposted	by	a	balloon.	Listening	to	the	tales,	sometimes	shocking,	others	sad,	amusing	and	personal	revealed	how	their	lives	and	the	geography	of	the	street	had	changed	over	a	hundred	years.	Streetstories	a	mobile	app	by	Francesca	Panetta	and	the	Guardian	(2012),	set	in	the	Kings	Cross	area	of	London,	uses	GPS	to	trigger	personal	stories	and	historical	information	on	headphones	as	the	participant	walks.	National	Archive’s	situated	oral	histories	of	wartime	secret	service	operatives,	Spooks,	Spies	
and	Videotape	-	London’s	Secret	War	(2016)	triggers	video	interviews	with	veterans	and	archive	materials	on	smartphones	in	once	secret	locations.		Audio	guides,	handheld	playback	devices	that	inform	the	visitor	about	collections	in	their	own	language	are	ubiquitous	in	larger	museums	across	the	world.	Numbers	next	to	exhibits	are	entered	to	play	relevant	content.	Tate	Modern’s	Multimedia	Tour	(2002-3)	is	an	early	
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example	of	a	PDA	that	used	wireless	communication	to	a	central	server	to	deliver	audio	interpretation	material,	music,	on-screen	games	and	recorded	the	visitors’	feelings	in	response	to	exhibits	and	sent	materials	to	personal	email	addresses.	Locative	narratives	in	the	form	of	mobile	apps,	have	been	developed	for	use	inside	public	buildings	and	museums,	in	experimental	arts	and	research	projects,	such	as	the	REACT	hub	project,	The	Memory	of	
Theatre	(2013),	a	smart	phone	app	prototype	set	inside	Bristol	Old	Vic	theatre.	Combining	oral	histories	of	theatrical	productions,	together	with	dramatized	archive	materials,	that	were	heard	on	headphones,	triggered	by	visitor’s	positions	using	Wi-Fi	triangulation.			Antecedent	and	co-existent	practices	of	locative	narrative	are	re-enactments	and	‘living	history’	that	expresses	a	desire	for,	what	I	term,	‘experiential	authenticity’.	The	restaging	of	historical	events	has	been	performed	by	groups	and	societies	in	Britain	since	the	17th	century	(Chronis	2005).	Questions	concerning,	what	constitutes	historical	accuracy,	notions	of	authenticity	and	who	writes	history,	were	addressed	in	artist	Jeremy	Deller’s	The	Battle	of	
Orgreave	(2002),	a	re-enactment,	or	“social	history	re-lived”	(Morriss	2002)	of	clashes	between	the	police	and	striking	miners	on	18	June	1984	(Correia	2006).	The	Black	Country	Living	Museum	is	the	recreation	of	a	1930’s	village,	complete	with	industry,	transport	and	Edwardian	high	street	shops.	Visitors	in	mufti	mingle	with	the	costumed	employees	and	volunteers.	However,	while	the	sites	of	these	museums	maybe	geographically	specific,	as	
places,	they	are	arguably	closer	to	installation	art	or	TV	set	(for	which	purpose	they	are	often	hired).		(3)	Function	of	location:	the	authored	‘integration’	of	the	fictional	and	existent	world			
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The	locative	narrative	Ship	Aground	(2010)	by	Interactive	Places,	is	an	audio	story	triggered	by	GPS.	Set	on	the	windy	cliff	on	the	North	Devon	coast,	the	site	little	changed	since	the	18th	century	where	wrecking	took	place,	the	luring	of	ships	onto	rocks	in	order	to	steal	their	cargo.	The	evocative	historical	drama	explores	the	moral	dilemmas	faced	by	protagonist,	a	young	girl.	Cast	in	the	role	of	her	friend,	you	find	yourself	(aurally)	amid	a	hurrying	procession	of	villagers	making	their	way	towards	the	sea.	The	high	production	quality	binaural	sound	surrounds	you	with	moving	characters.	The	ground	seems	to	vibrate	with	the	approach	of	the	King’s	horses’.	Tension	mounts,	a	voice	shouts	and	you	feel	yourself	swinging	round	and	jumping	out	of	the	way.	Recorded	sound	effects	blend	with	location’s	ambient	sounds,	the	baa-ing	of	sheep	and	the	call	of	seagulls,	bringing	the	story	world	into	the	surrounding	environment.	At	this	end	of	spectrum	of	site-specificity	(3),	locative	narratives	that	author	the	‘integration’	of	existent	features	of	the	environment,	people	and	objects	within	the	story,	often	also	situate	fictional	things,	characters	and	events	within	the	reader’s	vicinity,	via	the	narrative	description	or	recorded	sound	or	video	images.	These	locative	narratives	are	written	to	be	experienced,	not	just	in	the	‘mind’s	eye’,	on	a	screen,	stage	or	play	space,	but	in	the	context	of	what	is	perceptually	available	in	the	world	of	the	particular	individual.			Locative	narratives	may	present	story	worlds	(1)	that	are	detailed	with	carefully	evoked	characters	and	events,	that	have	some	thematic	and	temporal	relations	that	suggest	they	are	part	of	the	same	location	as	the	listener,	such	as	Cardiff’s	Missing	Voice	(1999);	(2)	the	narrative	may	consist	of	fragmentary	comments	or	brief	anecdotes,	that	may	fit	within	logical	framework	that	specifies	their	relations	to	each	other	and	the	places,	such	as	in	Magic	in	
Modern	London	(Wellcome	Trust	2014).	The	participant	searches	London	for	where	amulets	were	once	collected	by	Edward	Lovett,	the	arrival	at	a	location	GPS	triggers	historical	
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information,	images	and	sound.	The	relation	of	the	fragments	is	that	to	a	theme;	(3)	while	in	some	locative	narratives	the	connections	may	be	more	circumstantial,	such	as	other	participants’	responses	to	a	questions	in	the	same	location	in	Hello	Lamp	Post	by	Pan	Studio	(2013,	2016).	This	work	facilitates	an	exchange	of	anonymous	text	messages	between	participants	triggered	in	relation	to	the	street	furniture,	where	there	is	a	greater	onus	upon	the	participant	to	make	connections	and	create	coherence;	Barthes	(1974:	15)	“writerly”	distinction	is	descriptive	here.	In	the	third	type	of	story	world,	I	argue,	it	is	the	participant’s	subjective	relations	to	the	narrative	pieces	that	are	emphasised,	‘what	sense	do	I	make	of	this?’	‘How	do	I	feel	about	this?’,	rather	than	absorption	in	the	story	where	its	characters	and	events	are	the	focus	of	attention.				
2) media	is	experienced	in	relation	to	surroundings;	
	The	development	of	portable	GPS	enabled	devices	with	the	capability	of	launching	of	media	files	in	response	to	specified	geographic	locations	was	carried	by	various	research	and	engineering	companies	around	the	world,	in	the	first	years	after	the	millennium.	Hewlett	Packard	Laboratories	(Stenton	et	al	2007:	98),	for	example,	developed	GPS	media	triggering	software	and	in	a	joint	research	project,	Mobile	Bristol,76	together	with	artists	and	academics	from	University	of	Bristol	and	the	Appliance	Studio.	They	created	approaches	and	purposes	for	non-specialists	to	trigger	media	files	on	commercially	available	Personal	Digital	Assistants	(PDA).	The	beta	version	of	the	resulting	user-friendly	platform,	mscapes	(2002),	was	made	available	online,	between	(2003-2010).	An	international	community	of	users	shared	their	
                                                        76	Founded	by	Hewlett	Packard	Laboratories,	the	University	of	Bristol	and	the	Appliance	Studio	http://www.watershed.co.uk/dshed/mobile-bristol (Accessed	December	2016) 
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interdisciplinary,	arts,	gaming,	performance,	educational	and	heritage	projects,	via	the	
mscapes	web	platform,	freely	available	for	those	with	compatible	hardware.	Nature	Trailer	(2003)	developed	at	Media	Lab	Europe,	Dublin,	by	Donovan,	Wood,	Davenport,	&	Strohecker	(2003:	1),	a	context	aware-story	in	which	narrative	audio	and	video	scenes	were	triggered	by	GPS	on	iPAQs	(hand	held	computer),	as	walkers	trekked	across	the	island	of	Cape	Clear,	County	Cork.	The	Locast	software	platform,	developed	by	the	Mobile	Experience	Lab	at	MIT	in	(2004)	as	Venice	tourist	guides,	similarly	tagged	GPS	coordinates	to	media	files	that	were	initially	played	on	bespoke	mobile	devices	worn	around	the	neck	and	later	the	platform	was	redeveloped	for	smartphone	apps.77		Listening	to	recorded	audio	in	specific	locations	is	a	dominant	feature	of	all	of	these	GPS	applications,	while	locative	listening	was	already	a	well	established	practice.	‘Soundwalks’,	associated	with	the	World	Soundscape	Project	(WSP)	(Schafer	1994	[1977]:	275),78	was	initiated	in	the	late	1960’s79	at	the	Sonic	Research	Studio,	Simon	Fraser	University,	Canada.	Its	initial	focus	was	upon	auditory	research	on	noise	pollution	in	Vancouver	and	its	changing	soundscape,	later	becoming	a	comparative	study	of	soundscapes	across	Canada	(1973)	and	European	cities	and	villages	(1975).	With	the	intention	of	creating	an	interdisciplinary	approach	to	acoustic	design	(Schafer	1994	[1977]:	275)	field	recordings	and	‘Sonography’,	a	soundscape	notation	and	visual	diagrams	of	the	geographic	distribution	of	sound	“events”,	
                                                        
77 The Locast platform was later developed for use on smartphones at MIT http://locast.mit.edu/ 
 78	The	World	Soundscape	Project	was	led	by	R.	Murray	Schafer,	with	contributors	that	included	Barry	Truax,	Jean	Davis,	Bruce	Davis,	Peter	Huse,	Howard	Broomfield,	and	Hildegarde	Westerkamp			79	R	Murray	Schafer	(1977:	275)	says	that	the	World	Soundscape	Project	came	into	existence	in	1971,	whereas	Barry	Truax	(http://www.sfu.ca/~truax/wsp.html)	[accessed	23.09.13]	suggests	that	its	beginnings	lay	in	initial	projects	and	Murray	Schafer’s	publications	The	New	Soundscape	(1968)	and	The	Book	of	Noise	(1971).	 
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were	produced	to	study	aural	perception,	noise	pollution	and	the	representation	of	sonic	experience	(Schafer	1994	[1977]:	275).			One	of	the	outcomes	of	the	project	was	the	development	of	soundscapes	recordings,	defined	by	Schafer	(1994	[1977]:	274)	as,		 “The	term	may	refer	to	[the	recording	of]	actual	environments,	or	to	abstract	constructions,	such	as	musical	compositions	and	tape	montages,	particularly	when	considered	as	an	environment.”			These	reconstructed	sonic	environments	are	arguably	fictional	or	fictionalized	places.	Project	member,	Barry	Truax	(2001:	65)	extends	the	definition	of	the	soundscape	to	include	the	“listener	plus	the	environment”,	an	“entire	system”.	Schafer,	Truax	and	the	WSP’s	acoustic	ecological	approach	to	sound,	frames	psychoacoustics	within	environmental	science	and	the	arts.	For	proponents	of	WSP,	soundscape	is	an	approach	to	listening	and	a	composition	of	an	environment,	actual	or	imaginary	(Truax	2001:53).	Murray	Schafer’s	(1977:	6)	research	in	acoustic	ecology	created	an	influential	taxonomy	of	the	soundscape	that	considered	the	“emotional”	and	“sonic”	properties	of	sound	for	the	production	evocative	soundscapes.	Categories	such	as	“soundmarks”	and	“signals”	highlight	the	listener’s	experience	moving	in	a	real-world	environment.			In	WSP	member,	Hildegarde	Westerkamp’s	1974	article,	‘Soundwalking’,	soundwalks	are,	
“…any	excursion	whose	main	purpose	is	listening	to	the	environment”.	It	is	an	act	of	focused	listening,	not	to	pre-recorded	sounds,	but	to	the	surroundings.	Westerkamp	suggests	this	may	be	done	alone,	with	a	friend	or	in	small	groups,	beginning	by	listening	to	the	sounds	of	the	body.	She	invites	us	to	go	on	a	soundwalk	in	Queen	Elizabeth	Park,	Vancouver.	The	article,	
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now	addressing	us	in	the	second	person,	anticipates	the	GPS	triggered	locative	narratives,	I	argue,	presenting	us	with	a	locative	narrative	as-thought-experiment.	Westerkamp,	guides	us	to	landmarks	pointing	our	features	of	the	park,	suggesting	we	look,	listen	and	touch,	as	if	we	were	actually	taking	the	walk.	She	says,	if	the	fountains	are	turned	off,	we	should	imagine	the	sound	of	the	water.	We	should	consider	which	sounds	in	the	park	most	appeal	to	us,	from	which	we	can	form	our	ideal	landscape.	Of	course	all	that	she	is	describes	is	not	available,	unless	we	actually	are	reading	the	article	in	Victoria	Park.	We	have	to	imagine	everything,	suggested	by	the	description	and	directed	by	her	instructions.		The	use	of	the	second	person,	and	description	situates	the	reader	in	the	location,	“…you	are	passing	through	wooden	
arcades…”	(Westerkamp	1974:	21).80	The	similarity	of	the	articles’	form	with	guided	visualisations	and	hypnotic	induction	scripts	is	marked,	although	no	reference	is	made	to	these	practices	by	Westerkamp.	She	invites	us	to	create	a	soundwalk,	for	aesthetic	purposes.	She	suggests	we	first	listen	to	a	landscape,	observing	rhythm	and	pitch	and	then	“create	a	dialogue”	(Westerkamp	1974:	26),	by	lifting	environmental	sounds	and	placing	them	within	our	compositions.			Michael	Bull	(2005:	343-344)	has	described	listening	to	music	on	headphones,	on	portable	devices	such	as	the	Walkman	and	iPod,	as	creating	personal	space	around	the	listener,	a	bubble	as	they	walk	through	the	city,	as	a	protagonist	in	our	own	film.	In	locative	narratives	binaural	sound	appears	‘non-diegetic’,	to	extend	the	cinema	metaphor.	It	gives	the	sense	that	sound	heard	through	headphones	appears	to	be	located	in	the	space	around	the	listener,	rather	than	in	the	head.	It	has	the	potential	to	extend	the	sense	of	naturalism	by	replicating	the	
                                                        80	Westerkamp	(1974:	21)	invites	us	to	part	take	in	other	“participatory	soundwalks”:	to	orientate	ourselves	on	a	dark	night	to	listening	to	the	sounds	of	our	body	and	the	reciprocal	sounds	of	the	body;	to	navigate	through	a	city	by	asking strangers 
for directions; to communicate with a bird by imitating its call; to find echoes in an environment.  
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localization	cues	experienced	in	real-world	environments,	an	approach	utilised	by	Cardiff	and	Bures	Miller	and	other	creators	of	locative	narrative	who	integrate	the	story	world	within	the	participant’s	environment.				
3) the	structure	of	the	narrative	is	linked	with	the	mode	of	interaction;		
	The	structure	of	the	narrative	refers	to	the	logic	of	the	order	of	events,	whereas	the	interaction	mechanism	is	concerned	with	the	ways	the	participant	engages	with	the	narrative,	such	as:	listening;	searching/discovery;	puzzle	solving;	skill/creative	challenges;	thought	experiments;	meditation;	walking/running/dancing/travelling.	The	mechanism	may,	although	not	necessarily,	relate	to	the	story’s	genre	(e.g.	a	detective	drama	is	likely	to	involve	puzzle	solving).	The	interaction	mechanism	can	have	a	number	of	implications	for	the	structure	of	the	narrative.	I	argue,	a	feature	of	locative	narrative	as	a	form,	is	the	audience’s	physical	partaking,	to	various	extents,	in	the	story	that	is	happening	in	a	particular	place	for	the	individual.	Some	locative	narratives	situate	the	stories	in	a	type	of	place	rather	than	a	single	geolocation,	such	as	Duncan	Speakman’s	Always	Something	Somewhere	Else	(2007)	that	specified	distance	from	types	of	objects,	rather	than	a	specific	place,	however	the	individual’s	experience	is	always	happening	for	them	in	a	specific	location.	Taking	part	in	a	story	means	there	is	a	spatial-temporal	relation	between	the	unfolding	of	the	narrative	and	what	the	participant	is	doing	in	relation	to	it,	whether	the	narrative	has	a	single	linear	plot	or	multiple	or	an	emergent	configuration	of	events.	If	simply	listening,	with	no	choices	involved	that	affect	the	narrative,	then	the	structure	of	the	story	is	likely	to	be	linear,	whereas	choice	requires	the	devising	of	alternative	relationships	between	events	and	the	rules	for	their	configuration.	
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	The	literal	and	imaginative	plotting	of	stories	over	geographic	areas	of	paper-based	and	oral	practices	provide	models	for	digital	wayfaring.	The	children’s	game	of	hide	and	seek,	Easter	eggs	hunts,	‘treasure	hunt’	and	the	search	for	hidden	items	have	had	many	literary	depictions,	such	as,	Robert	Louis	Stevenson’s	character	Jim	in	Treasure	Island	(1883)	searches	for	pirate’s	treasure,	where	on	a	map	where	an	‘X’	marks	the	spot.	The	reader	accompanies	Sherlock	Holmes	as	he	traverses	town	and	country	searching	for	evidence.	In	The	Railway	Children	(1905),	E.	Nesbit	portrays	an	Edwardian	paper	chase,	a	trail	across	the	landscape	where	the	terrain	becomes	the	map.	Guidebooks,	suggest	itineraries,	activities,	and	present	cultural	mores,	facts,	histories	associated	with	points	on	the	map.	In	E.	M.	Forster’s	satirical	Room	with	
a	View	(1908),	Miss	Lucy	Honeychurch	consults	her	Baedeker	for	wayfinding	and	essential	advice	for	the	English	person	abroad.	The	expert	tour	guide	leads	and	directs	their	audience’s	gaze,	while	narrativising	‘essential’	sites	of	interest.			Locative	narratives	whose	events	are	experienced	in	a	particular	sequence,	for	example,	when	delivered	as	a	single	audio	file,	are	necessarily	structurally	linear.	In	Cardiff	and	Bures	Miller’s	
Villa	Medici	Walk	(2001)	the	interaction	mechanism	involves	wearing	headphones,	and	listening	to	the	female	speaker	who	narrates	their	‘movement’	and	the	participant’s	exploration	of	the	garden.	Although	the	underlying	narrative	structure	is	linear,	it	doesn’t	preclude	a	play	with	time	and	space	within	the	writing	itself,	that	contains	accounts	of	memories	and	contemporaneous	events	that	are	set	in	other	locations.	Voicemail	recordings	of	a	man	in	what	may	be	war	zone,	are	interspersed	with	narrative	events	in	the	vicinity.		
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Locative	narratives	that	are	composed	as	a	series	of	parts	can	be	described	as	nodal.	The	medium	(voice/soundscape/screen/location),	segregation	of	narrative	content	(thematic/	events/characters/chronology)	and	quantity	of	content	within	a	node	is	determined	by	the	overarching	structure	of	the	narrative.	The	metaphor	of	the	“forking	path”	(Moulthrop	1991:125)	attests	to	the	status	ascribed	to	Borges’s	Garden	of	Forking	Paths	(1941)	by	the	Hypertext	community.	The	model	of	the	branching	path,	“forking	path”	or	“trees”	(Bolter	1991:107)	is	an	established	method	of	plotting	narrative	trajectories,	adopted	by	proponents	of	Hypertext	fiction	(Nelson	1993)	(Delany	&	Landow	1991:6),	who	in	turn	cite	Barthes	(1977)	notion	of	intertextuality	as	antecedent.	Ryan’s	(2001:	246-255)	(2006:	123)	analysis	and	diagrammatic	representations	of	interactive	narrative	structures,	broken	into	nodes	and	links	between	nodes,	demonstrates	the	range	of	configurations	adopted	by	authors	and	developers.			Nodal	narratives	can	be	structured	with	multiple	story	trajectories.	The	variables	that	describe	the	combinational	logic	of	the	nodes	can	be	temporal,	sequential	or	thematic.	They	may	effect	all	nodes	or	only	certain	classes,	for	example,	‘participants	can	only	encounter	x,	y	and	z,	character	nodes	after	they	have	heard	story	event	nodes	a,	b	and	c’.	The	structure	can	employ	various	logics	and	mechanisms,	for	example,	an	overarching	narrative	may	have	different	subplots	or	parallel	storylines	within	the	same	world.			In	Kate	Armstrong's	seminal	locative	art	work	‘PING	PsyGeoConflux’	(2003)	participants	using	mobile	phones	called	a	telephone	menu	system	and	received	a	series	of	question	to	prompt	contemplation	of	their	relations	to	the	environment	(Vancouver	and	New	York).	Their	responses	tapped	into	the	phone,	triggered	directions	to	other	locations	and	further	questions	
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and	instructions.	Here	psychogeography’s	concerns	are	to	the	fore,	and	I	suggest	this	work	can	be	read	as	the	employment	of	the	branching	narrative	structure	for	the	purpose	of	psychogeographical	thought	experiments.		In	the	locative	narrative	Machine	to	See	With	(Blast	Theory	2010)	the	drama	of	the	heist	is	staged	between	participants,	via	their	mobile	phones.	A	series	of	core	nodes,	experienced	by	all,	are	delivered	as	voicemails	that	contain	story	background,	navigation	and	instructions	for	activities.	At	set	points	in	the	sequence	of	events,	the	participant	is	asked	to	respond	to	questions	in	the	form	of	choices	presented	by	a	psychometric	test	and	to	make	various	decisions	about	what	action	they	will	pursue.	Indicating	their	choice	as	a	number	on	the	phone	results	in	the	launching	a	set	of	sub	story	nodes,	before	returning	to	the	same	core	nodes	that	all	players	experience	and	the	overarching	temporal	sequence	of	the	main	narrative	events.	Unlike	narrative	driven	video	games,	such	as,	La	Noire	(Rockstar	Games	2011)	or	Heavy	Rain	(Quantic	Dream	2010),	where	there	can	be	many	algorithmically	generated	narrative	paths	and	dialogue,	locative	narrative	is	constrained	by	the	practical	plotting	of	story,	in	terms	of	the	existent	location’s	characteristics,	distance	to	be	traversed	and	proximity	of	media	files	to	each	another,	when	triggered	by	GPS	or	beacons.			In	Teri	Rueb’s	locative	narrative	Trace	(1999)81	the	mechanism	of	the	treasure	hunt	is	repositioned.	Participants	explore	trails	in	the	Canadian	Rockies,	discovering	sound	“memorials”,	triggered	by	a	bespoke	GPS	device	carried	in	a	knapsack,	discovery,	revealing	loss	and	signifying	absence.	Returning	from	their	journeys,	participants	download	a	GPS-
                                                        	81	Teri	Rueb’s	Trace	is	updated	for	iPhone	in	2012.	
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encoded	record	of	their	walk,	listen	to	sounds	again	and	indicate	where	they	would	like	to	leave	their	own	sound	memorial.	The	narrative	is	comprised	of	discrete,	spatially	dispersed,	
parts	that	build	over	time	to	contribute	to	an	environment	that	becomes	storied.	This	approach	differs	structurally	and	temporally	from	the	distribution	of	fragments,	narrative	trajectories,	or	dialogue	from	a	pre	authored	narrative	within	a	location.	Riot!	1831	(2003)	(Reid	et	al.	2004),	a	dramatic	recreation	of	the	battle	that	took	place	in	Queens	Square,	Bristol,	allows	participants	to	walking	freely	within	the	public	space.	A	soundscape	heard	on	headphones	depicts	the	unfolding	scene,	while	the	narrative	nodes,	individual	character	vignettes,	are	triggered	by	GPS	in	any	order.		Puzzle	solving	can	also	be	utilized	as	locative	narrative	structure,	as	in	the	murder	mystery	
Cold	Case	1866	(Whittaker	&	Brocklehurst	2010).82	The	Devon	town	of	Totnes	is	the	location	of	a	Victorian	unsolved	murder	case	and	its	audio	dramatization	of	the	story	world.	Accompanied	by	the	voice	of	journalist,	heard	on	headphones,	the	participant	explores	the	town	and	its	surroundings	choosing	to	visit	locations	pertinent	to	case,	GPS	triggering	interviews	with	suspects.	Each	give	their	account	of	what	happened	on	the	night	of	the	murder,	hinting	about	who	they	accuse	and	where	they	will	find	them,	however	their	reliability	as	a	narrator	is	always	in	question.	The	participant	is	asked	to	build	a	hypothesis	about	the	identity	of	the	culprit.	When	all	of	the	clues	have	been	collected	the	final	node	takes	place	at	the	historical	location	of	the	murder	trial,	where	a	dramatic	reconstruction	is	heard.			
                                                        	82	In	collaboration	with	performing	arts	students	at	South	Devon	College	
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The	structure	and	the	interaction	mechanism	can	pose	challenges	for	sense	and	aesthetics.	That	a	narrative	is	‘coherent’	can	be	taken	as	the	expectation	that	causal	relationships	between	story	events	retain	the	logics	of	the	plot	and	that	of	the	story	world,	without	which	the	story	can	seem	implausible.	Plausibility,	as	a	criterion	for	coherence,	presents	a	number	of	questions	that	can	be	thought	of	as	internal	to	the	narrative	structure,	the	logical	connections	between	events	and	content;	and	those	external	to	the	narrative,	the	style,	the	execution	of	representation	and	its	relations	to	its	referents	in	the	world	(would	people	in	x	scenario	exhibit	these	types	of	behaviour	and	is	the	depiction	of	the	causal	relations	between	events	logically	possible	in	the	‘real	world’?).	Coherent	relations	between	the	internal	fictional-world-logic	of	the	representation	and	the	external-world-logic	can	be	a	question	of	aesthetics	or	sentiment,	the	feeling	of	coherence.	Relations	between	sentences	infer	causal	links	between	events	within	a	narrative.		
	
	
4) the	reader-audience	becomes	a	participant	whose	actions	take	place	within	the	
fictional	world	and	the	existent	environment;		I	argue	that	participation	in	locative	narrative	involves	the	situated	body	operating	within	the	environment	of	a	specific	place.	Participation	is	used	here	to	refer	to	(1)	physical	movement	through	space;	(2)	cognitive-emotional	sense	making	and	interpretation	is	linguistically,	socially-culturally	specific	(Peirce	1905a:	174);	and	(3)	participation	as	performative	engagement	(Gerrig	1993:	14),	acting	on	interpretation,	leading	to	further	thoughts,	listening,	speaking,	guided	imagining,	decision	making,	wayfaring,	puzzle-solving,	engaging	in	tasks	and	challenges,	moving,	cycling,	running,	etc.	
		
 
 
 
 
132 
Participation	can	range	from	interpretation	and	sense	making	to	co-authorship	in	cases	where	the	participant	is	asked	to	intentionally	engage	in	creating	parts	of	the	story.		Improvisation	is	central	to	the	coexistent	practice	of	larps,	described	by	Söderberg	et	al	(2004)	as,	“a	form	of	
improvisational	theatre”.	Live	action	role-playing	(LARPs	or	larps),	evolved	in	the	1970’s	(Montola	et	al	2009:	36)83	from	the	tabletop	role-playing	game,	Dungeons	and	Dragons	(Arneson	&	Gygax	1974)	and	the	war	game	Chainmail	(Gygax	and	Perren	1971).	Playing	participants,	rather	than	actors	and	spectators,	become	characters	creating	dialogue	and	taking	part	in	narrative	scenarios,	overseen	by	a	game	master/s	who	have	an	overview	of	the	story	world	and	direct	the	overarching	structure	of	narrative	events.	The	setting	for	fictional	worlds	can	be	existent	buildings	and	environments	or	bespoke	elaborately	constructed	temporary	towns.	The	LARP	Europa	(2001),84	Norway,	directed	by	Eirik	Fatland,	presented	a	dystopian	world	of	warring	Nordic	countries.	Players	were	captured,	taken	to	a	holiday	park,	assigned	as	an	immigration	reception	centre,	were	they	slept	and	prepared	food	and	“followed	
absurd	rules”	(Gräslund	2010:	107).	The	set	was	‘transparent’,	utilising	existent	objects	and	domestic	spaces,	recontextualised	within	the	narrative	scenario.			The	recounting	of	experience	by	live	action	role	players	to	each	other,	‘the	debrief’,	is	taken	to	be	an	essential	part	of	the	form	(Glade	et	al.:	1998),	(Stenros	&	Montola	2010:	67),	as	the	story	written	by	the	authors	of	the	game	is	only	experienced	in	fragments	by	an	individual	player’s	own	viewpoint	and	no	record	is	usually	made	of	improvised	dialogue	between	players.	The	
                                                        
 
83 LARPs from 1970’s occurred in the Nordic countries, UK, USA, Australia and USSR, there is no agreement on where 
the first LARP occurred (Montola et al 2009: 36).  Söderberg et al (2004) states, “During the 1980ies, LARPs was a very 
narrow sub-culture playing almost completely in the world of Tolkien fantasy. Today, especially in Scandinavia and UK, 
it is a growing popular movement for people of all ages and every game stretches the boundaries of the subjects 
explored.”  
 
84 Weltschmerz' Europa (2001) was held on February 24th- 28th February 2001, Lunde, Vestby, Norway 
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meeting	with	others	and	exchanging	accounts	of	the	event	enlarges	the	players’	awareness	of	the	written	and	emergent	narratives.	Montola,	Stenros	&	Waern	(2009:	14)	describe	the	effect	of	the	“temporal	expansion”	of	the	narrative	by	participant’	introspective	reports.	Arguably	“temporal	expansion”	can	occur	in	the	narrativisation	of	any	anticipated	or	remembered	an	event.	The	‘debrief’	has	additional	value	for	experience	design	where	reports	can	feed	into	testing	and	development	and	for	a	relational	approach	to	narrative	interpretation	that	draws	particularly	upon	multiple	participant	reports.		In	the	locative	narrative	Machine	to	See	With	(Blast	Theory	2010)	the	participant	is	cast	as	a	lead	character	in	classic	film	heist	scenario.	The	unseen	mastermind	controlling	events	communicates	with	you	only	by	voicemail	messages.	No	backstory	is	given,	popular	culture	so	steeped	in	the	conventions	of	the	genre,	it	is	assumed	that	you	will	draw	upon	your	storehouse	of	scenarios	to	perform	your	transformation	into	a	gangster.	The	use	of	the	mobile	phone	is	integrated	into	the	experience	as	a	legitimate	‘prop’	of	a	character	involved	in	a	heist.	Unlike	many	locative	narratives,	the	presence	of	the	device	is	not	incongruous	within	the	narrative	world,	nor	do	usability	issues	break	with	the	focus	on	the	story.	What	the	experience	is	like	for	the	participant	is	partially	determined	by	the	extent	instructions	are	followed,	getting	into	character,	‘playing	the	role’,	going	along	with	the	premise,	that	you	are	going	to	rob	a	high	street	bank,	and	partially	on	the	random	teaming	with	other	participants,	with	whom	cooperating	and	co-imagining	is	required.			
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The	EU	funded	project	iPerG	(2004-2008)	brought	together	a	number	of	academic	institutions	and	industrial	partners85	to	explore	the	design	and	implementation	of	mobile	situated	stories	in	the	form	of	pervasive	gaming.	Including	a	number	of	collaborations	between	the	Nottingham	Mixed	Reality	Lab	and	Blast	Theory.	In	the	analysis	of	players’	behaviour,	Vogiazou	et	al	(2007:	45)	and	Benford	et	al	(2006:	427),	argue	that	norms	are	generally	followed	by	participants,	however,	as	a	result	of	the	‘freedom’	granted	by	the	structural,	physical	and	psychological	boundaries	of	the	experience,	new	or	transgressive	acts	may	result.	In	‘Machine	to	See	With’,	for	example,	the	participant	is	asked	to	go	to	car	park	and	get	into	a	strangers	car,	an	act	that	is	outside	of	societal	conventions	for	most,	but	within	the	context	of	the	experience,86	inhibitions	are	lifted.	Of	course	we	could	argue	that	paying	for	a	ticket	that	is	supported	by	a	festival	and	various	regulated	funding	bodies	is	the	broader	context	in	which	such	decisions	are	made,	however	the	frisson	of	excitement,	as-if	I	were	transgressing	these	boundaries,	I	suggest,	is	possibly	a	factor	affecting	attitudes	and	behaviour	in	this	situation.	Vogiazou	et	al’s	(2007:	45)	“design	for	emergence”	is	an	approach	that	utilises	simple	rules	as	a	structuring	to	device	to	enable	more	“complex”	behaviours	to	evolve.	This	is	particularly	evident	where	a	number	of	participants	interact	together.	Players	of	the	game	CitiTag	engaged	in	unusual	behaviour	of	their	own	volition,	such	as	standing	with	their	hands	in	the	air	in	a	busy	street,	because	this	‘made	sense’	in	the	context	of	the	game.			
                                                        	85	Integrated	Project	on	Pervasive	Gaming	(iPerG)	EU	funded	project	(1	Sep	2004	-	31	Mar	2006)	Institutional	collaborators	included,	SICS	-	Swedish	Institute	of	Computer	Science	(coordinating	partner)	Interactive	Institute,	Play	Studio	&	Zero	Game	Studio,	University	of	Tampere	-	Hypermedia	Laboratory,	Nokia	Research,	University	of	Nottingham	-	Mixed	Reality	Labs,	Fraunhofer	Institute	FIT,	Sony	Europe,	Gotland	University,	Blast	Theory	and	It's	alive!	http://www.pervasive-gaming.org/index.php	
86 Katie	Salen	&	Eric	Zimmerman	(2004:	94)	describe	the	context	of	the	game	as	the	‘magic	circle’	were	alternative	norms	of	behaviour	may	be	permitted. 
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Participation	in	locative	narratives	involves	a	complex	set	of	relations	between	the	intersecting	contexts	in	which	the	work	operates:	the	narrative	content,	structure,	interaction	mechanism	and	the	attitude	and	focus	of	attention	of	the	participant.			
5) the	spatial-temporal	complexity	of	partaking;			Cast	as	a	character	with	a	specific	role,	or	as	an	unnamed	agent	within	the	story’s	world,	participants	move	simultaneously	in	the	physical	and	the	represented	fictional	place	that	may	spatially	extend	into	the	existent	environment.	While	a	locative	narrative	may	present	different	time	zones,	moving	between	memories	and	the	character’s	present	moment,	or	fragments	of	poetry	or	oral	histories,	they	are	events	happening	for	the	participant,	linked	by	their	awareness	of	their	physically	of	occupying	space	over	time.			I	argue	there	are	multiple	temporal-spatial	dimensions	to	locative	narratives:	events	happening	for	the	participant	in	‘real	time’;	the	chronology	of	the	story;	the	time	as	it	is	represented	within	the	narrative	as	the	present	moment	or	as	memories,	or	nested	recordings	of	past	events;	the	relationships	between	the	events	happening	for	the	participant	and	those	that	happened	in	the	story;	and	the	duration	of	the	locative	narrative	experience.	How	these	relationships	are	negotiated	are	contingent,	I	argue,	on	(1)	the	level	of	integration	of	the	narrative	and	the	place	in	which	it	takes	place	–	to	what	extent	the	depiction	of	the	story	world	is	external	to	the	participants	experience,	a	factor	noted	by	Ryan	(2006:	107);	(2)	the	style	of	the	writing	and	the	literary	techniques	employed	to	suggest	moving	back	and	forth	through	time;	and	(3)	the	narrative	structure	and	its	relationship	with	modes	of	participation,	for	example,	in	Cold	Case	1866	(Whittaker	and	Brocklehurst	2010)	the	time	scale	is	suggested	
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as	a	few	days	available	to	the	journalist	to	interview	the	suspects	prior	to	the	murder	trial,	the	duration	of	the	experience	is	determined	by	walking	speed	of	participants	and	whether	they	choose	to	listen	to	all	the	suspects	reports	in	an	hour	or	take	a	detour	and	return	to	the	story	later.				
	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
We	can	diagram	the	parameters	of	the	field	of	expanded	narrative	as	the	authors’	intention	to	
challenge	to	form	and	their	explicit	or	implicit	engagement	with	multi-stability.			In	this	chapter	I	have	diagrammed	some	of	the	arts	and	cultural	practices	that	I	argue	can	be	considered	as	antecedent	and	coexistent	with	works	of	locative	narrative,	works	whose	subjects,	methods	and	theoretical	concerns	have	feed	into	the	articulation	of	the	form.	Locative	narrative,	I	argue,	is	defined	by	the	relations	between	a	narrative	intentionally	situated	with	a	participants’	environment.	The	combination	of	these	elements	result	in	its	
formal	and	experiential	narrative	complexity.			I	argue,	it	is	the	authorial	intention	to	mediate	relations	between	the	reader	as	a	participant	and	
their	environment,	with	the	potential	for	objects,	people	and	features	from	the	physical	world	
depicted,	symbolized	or	inferred	within	the	text,	sound	or	interface,	that	is	the	challenge	that	locative	narrative	presents	to	the	form	of	the	printed	novel,	and	as	such	it	should	be	considered	an	expanded	narrative.	Locative	narratives	don’t	aim	to	detach	or	transport	the	reader	from	their	current	situation,	instead	they	fashion	it,	thematically,	historically,	atmospherically,	or	perceptually;	directing	modes	of	engagement	and	framing	interpretation	
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(locative	narrative	as	atmospheric).	The	existent	place,	supplemented	with	a	story	world	in	which	narrative	events	occur	and	the	reader	inhabits	(locative	narrative	as	local),	presents	complex	formal	possibilities	for	narrative	structure	and	story	content	(locative	narrative	as	
expanded	form).			I	argue,	that	two	additional	aspects	of	locative	narrative	are	demonstrated	by	the	case	studies,	presented	as	part	of	this	research.	I	therefore,	add	a	further	two	points	to	the	inventory	of	
formal	and	experiential	narrative	complexity:		6) Ontological	ambiguity	may	result	when	perceptual	cues	are	not	readily	attributable	to	the	existent	place	or	the	fictional	world	of	the	story;			7) The	prompting	of	experiential	and	epistemological	questions,	‘what	does	it	feel	like	to	be	a	participant	in	a	story?’	and	‘what	is	the	truth-value	we	attach	to	our	experience	when	our	actions	take	place	in	narrative	worlds?’			These	points	are	expanded	upon	below	and	in	chapter	six.	
	
	
Introducing	four	locative	narrative	case	studies		
	
LociOscope,	The	Letters.	Dartington	Hall	Gardens	(April	2014).	
	
The	Lost	Index,	No.	1:	Landscape	with	Figures.	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(November	2013).		
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The	Lost	Index,	No.	2:	The	Turning.	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(August	2014).		
The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS.	National	Museum	of	Copenhagen	and	Diesel	House	museum	(December	2015)	
	The	aim	of	this	speculative	research	is	to	explore	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	develop	strategies	for	development.	In	the	following	section	and	chapters,	the	collaborative87	iterative	processes	of	the	four	published	smartphone	apps	are	discussed	and	the	ten	prototypes	from	which	they	evolved.	The	many	subsidiary	questions	that	arose	from	this	process	are	included	in	Appendix	1.	that	details	in	a	series	of	tables	the	interrelated	aspects	of	the	development	process	of	narrative,	sound	and	participation.	Developed	in	tandem	with	these	practical	experiments,	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework	and	Jamesian	relational	approach	to	analysis	informs	the	discussion	of	process	and	resulting	locative	narratives.		The	metaphor	of	narrative	multi-stability,	emphasizes	that	the	perception	and	cognition	of	existent	objects	is	continuous	with	that	of	represented	objects	and	potentially	with	imagined	objects	too.	Playing	with	the	materials	of	the	narrative:	the	reader’s	environment;	perceptual	cues;	text;	modes	of	interaction;	and	participant’s	attitudes	towards	the	experience,	are	all	variables	that	can	affect	the	subjective	experience	and	ontological	status	of	the	narrative.	These	aspects	of	multi-stability	are	put	forward	as	strategies	in	the	development	of	locative	narrative,	and	examined	here	in	relation	to	the	four	case	studies.			
                                                        
87 Detailed records of the collaborative process conducted with the developer James Brocklehurst are included in 
appendix 1 and a descriptive summary is given in this chapter.  
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Methodology		Ten	locative	narrative	prototypes	were	developed	using	an	iterative	cycle	of	hypotheses	forming,	development	and	testing	with	developers	and	volunteer	participants,	whose	reports	where	given	in	open	questionnaires	and	semi-structured	interviews.88	Groups	of	up	to	30	participants,	aged	between	16	and	70	years	experienced	iterations	of	the	nine	locative	narrative	prototypes	and	took	part	in	individual	semi-structured	interviews.89	Experiences	relating	perceptual	ambiguity	or	misperceptions	were	noted	and	together	with	other	factors	that	affected	experience,	such	as	their	emotional	response	and	technical	functionality.	These	feed	into	the	further	development	of	hypotheses	and	testing.	These	accounts	have	been	further	coded	using	relational	taxonomy,	where	further	lines	of	inquiry	emerged	which	lead	to	the	discussion	of	the	problems	this	thesis	has	investigated.90	
                                                        
 
88 This thesis addresses the following questions: 
 
1) What framework of experience usefully sets the parameters for articulating the metaphor of multi-stability? 
2) How can the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability be created in locative narratives? 
3) How can the affect of metaphor of multi-stability be measured and interpreted? 
 
A summary of methods: 
 
1) Desk based research informing hypotheses upon affect of the metaphor of multi-stability. 
2) Investigating the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability through the collaborative development of locative 
narrative smartphone apps produced through an iterative process of development and testing with small 
groups of participants through the successive production of prototypes. 
3) Reflecting upon own experience and creating analyses. 
4) Evaluating participant experience with semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. 
5) Classifying reported features of experience, identifying the relations in experience and phenomena reported. 
6) Analysis and interpretation of reports in the context of the Jamesian experiential framework and broader 
intersecting domains.  
7) Developing strategies for producing the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability and incorporating findings 
into successive prototypes. 
 
89 Participants took part in semi-structured interviews, where their comments were recorded in written notes 
verbatim. 
 
90 The secondary research questions are detailed in the appendix, tables 1 – 25 in appendix 1. 
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	Introspection,	as	James	(1922a	[1890]:	191)	points	out,	is	after	the	event,	telling	about	the	experience	rather	than	providing	access	to	its	content.	Participant	accounts	of	experience	were	not	considered	as	statistically	verifiable	data,	but	as	memories,	reflections,	upon	the	phenomenal	experience,	told	from	a	current	vantage	point	as	partial,	particular	and	fallible.	As	‘pumps’	for	reflection	they	prompted	further	questions,	subsequent	iterations,	and	further	speculative	practice.	Acknowledging	the	variability,	contingency	and	fallibility	of	participant	reports	and	problems	of	translation	and	interpretation	of	consequences,	the	process	of	prototype	development	and	reflection	on	participant	reports	are	considered	to	have	limited	and	local	value,	specifiable	in	particular	concrete	experiences.			Narrative,	sound,	actions	and	environment	are	aspects	of	the	locative	narrative	form,	however	in	the	phenomenal	experience	of	locative	narrative	they	are	co-experienced.	Participants	listened	to	recorded	narrative	in	the	context	of	ambient	sound	accompanied	by	physical	movements,	concurrently	within	the	environment	and	the	story	world.91	These	areas	were	informed	by	primary	and	secondary	research	in	expanded	narrative	practices	and	sound	design	and	psychophysics.	Through	the	evolvement	of	prototypes,	further	clusters	of	properties	where	identified	that	motivated	new	designs	extending	from	the	initial	research	question	of	categorizing	the	types	of	phenomena	that	resulting	from	noticing,	listening	to	accounts	and	reflecting	upon	experiences	of	narrative	heard	on	headphones	in	specific	environments.				
                                                        
 
91 These reciprocal and contingent relationships are acknowledged in tables below (1-25) 
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For	James,92	serial	hypothesis	forming	and	testing	is	how	we	operate	in	the	world,	while	the	empirical	method	aims	at	the	verification	of	hypotheses,	it	is	never	a	completely	objective	process.	The	value	of	conclusions	drawn	from	experiments	are	attributed	in	experience,	ascribed	according	to	the	consequences	that	follow	from	believing	something	to	be	true	(1909b:	216).	Here	the	results	of	testing	were	determined	by	the	practical	consequences	that	follow	in	the	development	of	prototypes	leading	to	further	hypothesis	and	testing.	There	were	no	‘control’	experiences.	It	was	not	a	positivist	study,	rather	an	emergent	poetic	play	with	a	collection	of	variables	for	the	purpose	of	producing	further	speculative	practice.	
	
	
Brief	overview	of	the	testing	and	prototype	development	processes		The	prototypes,	initially	paper-based	designs	and	rudimentary	sound	files	accompanied	by	paper-based	maps,	were	followed	by	a	series	of	working	prototype	smartphone	apps.	The	coding	of	the	prototypes	and	interface	design	was	undertaken	collaboratively	with	the	software	developer	James	Brocklehurst.	The	software	was	developed93	incrementally,	in	response	to	the	findings	from	each	phase	of	testing.	These	prototypes	were	evaluated	in	relation	to	series	of	emergent	research	questions94	concerning	the	experience	of	the	locative	narrative	and	the	closely	related	issues	of	usability	and	functionality	of	the	application.			
                                                        
 
92 This idea is articulated throughout James’ writings, some examples: (WTB 1910 [1897]: 24), (P 1907: 270, 273), (MT 
1909: 64), (SPP 1911: 223) 
 
93 I proposed changes to the app and James Brocklehurst implemented the app development in Objective C for iOS. 
 
94 The secondary research questions are detailed in the appendix, tables 1 – 25 in appendix 1. 
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Testing	the	first	iterations	of	the	prototypes	involved	notes	details	about:			
• Narrative	in	relation	to	participation	design;		
• Movement	while	listening;		
• Listening	and	perception	of	the	recorded	sound	in	the	environment.			The	apps	were	initially	evaluated	in	relation	to	a	set	of	criteria	devised	for	functionality	and	usability.95	When	sufficient	functionality	was	achieved	for	volunteer	participants	to	use	the	app	unaided,	volunteers	were	asked	to	describe	their	experience	of	the	prototypes	in	semi-structured	interviews	where	they	were	asked,	‘What	was	your	experience	like?’,	‘What	was	your	experience	of	the	narrative	like?’,	‘What	was	your	experience	of	the	sound	like?’,	‘What	was	your	experience	of	using	the	app	like?’.	Initial	findings	were	cross-referenced	and	anomalies	noted.	Fixes	to	general	functionality	and	usability	issues	of	the	app	were	proposed,	as	were	the	computational	variables	that	were	discussed	with	the	developer	James	Brocklehurst.		In	the	second	stage,	small	groups	of	between	5-15	participants	tested	the	evolved	prototypes.96	Accounts	of	experiences	were	given	in	individual	semi-structured	interviews	that	were	written	down	verbatim.	They	suggested	that	perceptual	and	imaginative	experiences	were	contingent	upon	many	factors,	including	the	participant’s	opinions	on	the	
                                                        
 
95 Initial usability questions: Do the voices trigger in the predetermined locations? Do the voices triggers singularly? 
Can the correct soundscape be heard with the associated voices? Can another soundscapes be heard at the ‘edges’ of 
the zone of the triggered soundscape? To what extent are zones drifting? Can ambient sounds be heard concurrently 
with the recorded sound?  
 
96 Iterations 7-9 were tested with small groups of participants. 
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narrative	content	and	structure	and	their	attitude	towards	taking	part	in	the	experience.	Mistaking	recorded	sound	for	environmental	sounds	or	believing	that	imagined	people,	animals	or	events	to	be	veridical,	was	repeatedly	reported	and	often	associated	by	participants,	as	being	“immersed”,	“focused”	or	engaged.		Reported	categorical	descriptions	of	what	was	referred	to	as	“the	real	world”,	“the	app”	and	the	“imagined”	were	often	described	as	becoming	confused,	ambiguous,	or	uncertain.		In	response	to	the	themes	emerging	from	prototype	development	and	experimentation	with	perceptual	illusions,	three	further	models	of	the	first	app,	LociOscope,	The	Letters,	were	developed:	the	‘button	pressing	model’,	‘text	messaging	model’	and	subsequently	the	‘tracking	map	model’.	Refined	prototypes97	of	the	‘tracking	map	model’	evolved	into	the	published	‘LociOscope	model’.	Further	experimentation	took	place	by	adapting	the	‘LociOscope’	model	for	the	different	environments,	the	Plymouth	University	campus	and	The	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery.	Themes	emerging	from	accounts	of	the	phenomenal	experience	of	
LociOscope,	The	Letters	included	the	effects	of	location	on	misperception,	narrative	suggestion	and	actions.	These	became	the	foci	for	The	Lost	Index	smartphone	apps,	in	which	the	evaluation	employed	semi-structured	interviews	with	small	groups	of	5-15	and	with	larger	groups98	using	anonymous	questionnaires.			
Locative	narrative	prototypes	and	case	studies	
	
	
                                                        
 
97 Further conditions and fixes were proposed by EW and then implemented and tested with James Brocklehurst. 
 
98 The Lost Index, Game 2, The Turning, was tested with 35 participants, aged between 16-60 years. Four open 
questions asked about the experience: Can you please describe: your overall experience of the game; your experience 
of the game’s sound; your experience of the game’s story; your experience of using the application’s technology.  
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Tables	1	-	9	(see	Appendix	1.)	
	 1. The	Letters,	at	Dartington	Hall	Gardens	version	1	(scattered	voice	points)	2. The	Letters,	at	Dartington	Hall	Gardens	version	2	(button	selection)	3. The	Letters,	at	Dartington	Hall	Gardens	version	3	(SMS,	prototype)	4. LociOscope,	The	Letters,	at	Dartington	Hall	Gardens	version	4	(LociOscope	–	‘tuning	device’).	Published	iTunes	(April	2014).	5. The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University	version	5	(prototype)	6. The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	version	6	(prototype)	7. The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures	(version	1:	suggestion).	Published	iTunes	(November	2013).	8. The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	version	1	(treasure	hunt,	with	buttons)	9. The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	version	2	(treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	Published	iTunes	(August	2014).	10. The	Lost	Index	–	NATMUS	(treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth,	Copenhagen	narrative	across	two	sites,	National	Museum	of	Copenhagen	and	the	Diesel	House)	Published	iTunes	(December	2015).	
	
	
Case	study	1:	LociOscope:	The	Letters	
	
The	Letters,	at	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	Version	1:	scattered	voice	points		The	starting	point	for	the	development	of	the	first	prototype	was	an	archive	of	travel	correspondence	sent	between	two	recipients	during	January	to	April	1925.	The	letters	discuss	
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the	writers’	destinations,	their	long-distance	relationship,	the	mysterious	‘experiment’99	and	the	discovery	of	Dartington	Hall.	The	original	letters	were	forwarded	to	banks	and	hotels	and	were	often	delayed	or	arrived	out	of	sequence.	In	the	letters	the	authors	refer	to	the	fragmented	nature	of	their	communication,	reiterating	each	others’	sentences	and	questioning	the	meaning	of	phrases.	Tension	and	ambiguities	were	protracted	over	days	and	distances	travelled,	suggesting	both	temporal	and	spatial	dimensions	that	would	become	a	feature	of	the	locative	narrative.	The	letters	also	act	as	a	travel	log,	descriptions	of	Rome,	Yosemite	National	Park,	London	and	San	Francisco	harbour	intersperse	the	authors’	discussions.	The	original	letters100	were	transcribed	and	coded	by	reoccurring	themes	(friends,	places,	weather,	significant	objects).	Extracts	selected	and	used	in	the	construction	of	a	narrative	as	a	spatially	and	temporally	conversation	between	two	characters	whose	fragments	could	be	encountered	in	any	order,	with	the	exception	of	the	first	fragment	that	begins	all	participants’	experiences.			
                                                        
 
99 ‘The experiment’ was how Dorothy Whitney Straight and Leonard Elmhirst in their travel correspondence referred 
to moving to England to start an educational agricultural experiment similar to that initiated by the poet Tagore in 
India that Leonard Elmhirst had helped run in 1924.  
 
100 Forming a small part of the forms part of the Dartington Hall Trust archive, personal correspondence between 
Dorothy Whitney Straight and Leonard Elmhirst of January and March 1925, held at the Devon County Record Office 
was transcribed by myself. Permission to use the letters as part of this project was kindly granted by The Dartington 
Hall Trust. 
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Fig. 1, The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens. Initial sketches for thematic coding of archived letters. 		Evocation	of	the	world	of	the	story	became	the	initial	focus	of	the	first	prototype.101	In	the	development	of	the	narrative	there	were	two	early	concerns:	structure	and	participation	with	the	narrative.	Various	models	of	interaction	were	considered:	the	‘branching	path’	model	utilized	in	a	previous	project,102	offered	the	potential	to	create	engaging	interactive	experience	but	multiple	trajectories	can	be	unwieldy	in	terms	of	the	quantity	audio	material	
                                                        
 
101 The relationships between narrative, participation and sound design are detailed a series of tables accompanying 
each prototype.  
 
102 Whittaker, E. & Brocklehurst, J. (2010) Cold Case 1866. iphone app: iTunes.  
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and	size	of	the	location	required	to	physically	plot	trajectories.	What	I	refer	to	as	the	‘world	model’,	a	story	world	with	its	own	logic,	rules	and	attributes,	offered	an	opportunity	to	integrate	narrative	events	with	the	representation	of	travel	locations	as	fictional	places	in	sound.		Dartington	Hall	gardens,	as	discussed	in	the	authors’	letters,	is	the	site	of	the	first	prototype.	The	fictional	world	of	the	story	was	constructed	with	seven	travel	locations,	described	in	the	letters.	These	became	‘zones’,	mapped	over	25	acres	of	gardens.	In	a	novel,	readers	are	familiar	with	switching	between	locations;	in	the	story	world	of	a	locative	narrative	there	is	a	doubling	of	fictional	places	and	that	of	the	existent	location.	Questions	are	posed	about	the	spatial	and	temporal	relations	between	these	environments,	the	narrative	telling	and	the	participant’s	encounters	with	these	dimensions.			
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Fig. 2, The Letters, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’. Final plan for position of zones and voice nodes in garden. 		The	initial	practical	plotting	of	sound	files	in	the	environment	used	a	paper	map	and	MP3	files	to	align	audio	recordings	of	letter	fragments	with	areas	of	the	garden.	Drawing	upon	established	research	concerning	the	of	triggering	media	files	tagged	with	GPS	coordinates,	a	bespoke	iOS	smart	phone	app	was	collaboratively	developed	with	James	Brocklehurst,	to	enable	sound	files	to	play	automatically	when	a	participant	reached	a	particular	location.	The	aim	of	the	app	was	that	the	‘operation’	of	the	narrative	did	not	become	the	participant’s	main	activity,	distracting	their	attention	away	from	the	story	content.		
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In	the	next	iteration,	the	fictional	world	consisting	of	the	represented	travel	destinations	was	plotted	over	the	gardens.	The	specific	sites	were	selected	for	the	purposes	of	making	visual	and	sonic	connections	between	the	fictional	places	and	the	existent	locations	in	order	to	experiment	with	creating	misperceptions	between	what	was	heard	and	what	was	seen.	‘Yosemite	National	Park’	was	sited	within	the	garden’s	Redwood	trees	and	the	Italianate	design	features	of	the	garden’s	‘tilt	yard’	became	the	location	of	the	Rome	zone.	Voice	recordings103	of	58	letter	extracts	were	sited	in	natural	stopping	places,	such	as,	benches,	sculpture,	vistas,	and	grouped	within	the	location	zones.	The	aim	was	that	participants	could	take	any	route	around	the	garden	while	triggering	(heard	on	headphones)	the	soundscapes	and	the	related	letter	fragments.			
                                                        
 
103 Six voice artists were recorded. The voices of Phil Smith and Anne Kelly were selected after initial testing of the 
prototypes in response from feedback from participants. The qualities of the actors’ voices were of particular concern 
for participants who preferred voices that they considered to ‘fit’ the characters and those whom they ‘felt’ some 
connection with.   
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Fig. 3 The Letters, version 1 ‘button selection’. Location of one of the voice points in the garden. 		The	participant’s	role	was	one	of	discoverer,	‘coming	across’	sounds	of	other	places	and	‘overhearing’	on-going	conversations	as	they	walked,	from	which	an	overarching	narrative	could	be	constructed.	Reports	from	the	initial	testing	suggested	that	this	participation	mechanism	was	too	open	and	did	not	provide	sufficient	structure	for	listeners	to	assimilate	a	coherent	narrative.			
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Fig. 4 The Letters, version 1. Location of one of the voice points in the garden. 		The	GPS	accuracy	within	parts	of	the	garden	ranged	from	ten	to	forty-seven	metres.	As	a	result,	the	sound	zones	and	voices	‘drifted’	(the	shifting	of	plotted	GPS	points	due	to	signal	strength,	weather,	physical	obstructions,	etc.)	from	their	intended	sites,	affecting	the	visual	connections	between	the	virtual	sonic	locations	and	randomly	triggering	sounds	on	and	off,	as	the	participants’	position	registered	as	being	in	or	out	of	a	zone.	Several	conditions104	to	mitigate	the	problem	were	tried,	such	as	triggering	one	voice	at	a	time,	playing	to	the	end	before	a	new	voice	starting,	only	retriggering	after	ten	minutes,	etc.	Beta	testing	showed	that	
                                                        
 
104 The smartphone prototypes were developed for iPhone in Objective C for iOS. In a process of collaborative 
development, where conditions were specified by myself, and the coding was implemented by James Brocklehurst.  
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participants’	walking	speed	also	affected	the	experience.	Walking	quickly	was	reported	as	the	zone	appearing	to	travel	with	participants	like	listening	to	a	radio,	affecting	awareness	of	soundscape’s	spatial	qualities,	its	relation	to	the	letter	fragments	and	the	garden.	In	response,	a	condition	was	added	to	fade	out	sounds	when	the	participant	exited	the	story	location	that	resulted	in	the	letter	extracts	not	being	heard	in	their	entirety,	causing	unintended	fragmentation.	Testing	indicated	that	this	reduced	participants’	ability	to	make	connections	between	the	letter	sections	and	construct	an	overarching	coherence	to	the	story.	“I’m	used	to	
more	linear	stories.	If	I	could	do	it	again	I	could	work	it	out	more.”		
	 	 	 	
Fig. 5, The Letters, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’. Screenshots from app prototypes. 
 	Dynamically	responsive	binaural	sound	offered	a	potential	solution	to	the	encountered	issues	by	generating	the	effect	of	spatial	dimensions	of	the	story	locations	in	relation	to	the	individual	participant’s	movements.	However,	the	fluctuating	accuracy	of	the	GPS	meant	that	the	simulation	of	aspects	of	naturalistic	listening,	such	as	head	height,	the	direction	of	facing	and	speed	of	travel,	in	relation	to	the	inferred	sound	sources,	was	very	difficult	to	achieve	without	additional	hardware	such	as	head-mounted	devices	and	external	sensors.	Perception	
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of	sound	is	affected	by	the	direction	the	head	is	facing	in	relation	to	the	sound	source.	How	the	participant	holds	their	smartphone	does	not	necessarily	tally	with	the	direction	of	their	head.	Possible	alternative	solutions	were	to	identify	positions	of	virtual	sound	sources	plotted	in	the	existent	location	and	generate	an	algorithm	that	responds	dynamically	to	the	participant’s	movements	by	calculating	the	distance	from	the	virtual	sound	sources	and	playing	sounds	with	appropriate	intensity.	In	addition,	to	mitigate	problems	of	the	participant	turning	around	and	hearing	the	same	sound	again	sounds,	plotting	sounds	temporally	is	also	required	for	this	solution	to	function	as	required.		Experimentation	was	conducted	with	James	Brocklehurst	using	the	iPhone’s	gyroscope	and	accelerometer	to	measure	participants’	movements	from	a	fixed	point	in	the	existent	location	to	the	fixed	point	of	the	virtual	sound	source.	Sound	events	within	the	virtual	location	were	triggered	with	the	intensity	of	the	sound	increasing	with	movement	towards	the	sound	source	and	decreasing	as	they	moved.	This	method	could	not	dynamically	utilize	all	of	the	main	factors	that	influence	spatial	sound	perception	(frequency,	intensity	and	reverb)	and	could	only	respond	dynamically	to	intensity.	As	a	practical	compromise	I	incorporated	frequency	and	reverb	(non-dynamically)	in	the	post-production	of	the	sounds	in	addition	to	field	recordings	of	sounds	using	binaural	microphones.			
	
	
Composition			The	sound	design	was	devised	by	investigating	the	particular	historical	sonic	characteristics	of	the	seven	travel	destinations	in	1925.	In	the	design	of	the	Rome	soundscape,	for	example,	recent	photographs,	and	those	of	period,	indicated	the	proximity	of	the	writer’s	hotel	balcony	
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to	the	Borghese	Gardens,	Rome.	Archive	film	footage	showed	the	types	of	traffic,	horse	and	carriages,	cars,	vans,	trams	and	bicycles	and	density	of	people	on	the	streets,	from	which	sound	levels	and	characteristics	could	be	inferred.	Diagrams	of	the	actual	locations	were	made	notated	with	‘key	sounds’	or	“Soundmarks”	(Schafer’s	1994	[1977]:	6),	that	sonically	signify	a	particular	location.		A	condensed	area	of	the	travel	destination	was	transposed	spatially	onto	selected	areas	of	the	gardens.	The	represented	locations	where	plotted	temporally	with	sounds	that	occurred	for	5	-10	minutes	in	each	location.			
	
 
Fig. 6 The Letters, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’. Diagram showing spatial sound design plan for ‘Rome’ zone, 
transposed onto location in garden. 		Binaural	and	stereo	recordings	of	historical	vehicles	of	the	period	were	made	at	the	Black	Country	Living	Museum.105	Both	binaural	recordings	and	synthesized	binaural	sound	were	used	to	create	a	sense	of	the	spatial	dimensions	of	the	virtual	locations.	Listening	on	
                                                        
 
105 The recordings of the vehicles were of the period but were predominately British rather than Italian makes. 
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consumer	headphones	allow	sounds	in	the	environment	to	be	heard	concurrently	with	the	recorded	sounds.	Binaural	sounds	heard	in	the	existent	location	can	appear	to	issue	from	external	sound	sources	and	be	mistaken	for	non-recorded	sounds.				The	compositional	process	arranged	sounds	spatially	and	temporally	and	audio	strategies	for	extending	the	world	of	the	story	into	the	existent	environment	occupied	a	range	from	simulation	to	symbolism.	Sounds	pertinent	to	the	specific	locations	and	the	historical	period	were	plotted	in	three	dimensions.	Using	techniques	established	in	the	development	of	virtual	environments	(Begault	1994:	52).	Spatial	sound	was	used	to	simulate	the	localization	cues	experienced	in	the	actual	or	similar	existent	places.	Sounds	such	as	vehicles	moving	around	the	participant	on	horizontal	planes	at	varying	distances	were	combined	with	‘spot’	sounds,	such	as	a	close	or	distant	voice,	horn	or	animal	sounds.	These	were	layered	to	create	a	complex	naturalistic	environment.	Sounds	were	also	used	symbolically	to	signify	main	features	of	a	location,	such	as	a	market	square	in	Rome,	around	and	through	which	sounds	of	vehicles	and	people	moved	in	and	relation	to.	Composition	also	assembled	key	sounds	sequentially106	to	draw	attention	to	the	environment	changing	over	time.			In	between	the	location	zones	recorded	sound	ceased.	Participants	interpreted	this	to	be	a	fault	or	an	ending.	In	response,	a	continuous	ambient	sound	track	was	created	that	sampled	and	slightly	heighted	the	ambient	sounds	heard	in	the	gardens.	Maintaining	the	attributes	of	fictional	place	seemed	to	alleviate	this	issue.	
	
	
                                                        
 
106 Car engine starting up; city sounds fading out; countryside sounds fading in; car door opening. 
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Having	a	purpose		In	the	testing	process,	participants	indicated	that	they	would	prefer	some	idea	of	where	to	walk,	rather	than	wandering	around	without	a	specific	direction.	They	also	commented	that	they	experienced	a	sense	of	sounds	surrounding	them	but	they	didn’t	necessarily	know	what	parts	of	the	world	of	the	story	they	pertained	to.	As	a	solution	an	on	screen	map	was	developed	that	styled	the	existent	gardens	as	the	fictional	places	in	order	to	help	‘anchor’	(Barthes	1977:	39)	the	interpretation	of	the	sounds	and	suggest	where	to	walk.	Participants	reported	a	greater	sense	of	purpose	and	set	off	trying	to	locate	the	fictional	places	depicted	on	the	map,	however	it	partially	negated	the	effect	of	accidentally	coming	across	voices,	as	participants	soon	worked	out	that	story	fragments	were	located	in	the	fictional	places.	The	narrative	structure	in	effect	becoming	a	game	mechanism	in	which	participants	complete	(unspecified)	tasks,	of	locating	the	fictional	places	and	voices	and	actively	attempting	to	construct	the	narrative.			
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Fig. 7 The Letters, version 1. Screenshot from app prototype, showing a zone becoming active upon participant 
entering that area within the garden.  			Questions	arising	about	the	structure	of	experience:		
• When	is	the	world	of	the	story	identified	as	a	representation	that	is	separate	from	the	existent	environment?	
• When	is	the	world	of	the	story	and	the	existent	environment	identified	as	synonymous?		(A	doubling	of	presence	and	absence?)				This	prototype	experimented	with	evoking	the	world	of	the	story	using	voiced	letter	fragments	and	fictional	locations	in	spatial	sound,	triggered	by	walking.		
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See	Appendix	1.	for	Figs.	1,	2	and	3	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens:	Version	1	(‘scattered	voice	points):	Design	tables.		
	
	
Developing	the	second	prototype	of	The	Letters	-	‘button	selection’		The	second	prototype	aimed	to	investigate	the	problems	of	the	incoherent	narrative	structure	and	the	participant’s	mode	of	interaction.	The	excessive	fracturing	of	the	letter	fragments	arose	from	participants	walking	back	and	forth	between	fictional	locations.	This	meant	that	parts	of	the	same	letter	were	not	heard	as	group.	The	letter	fragments	were	separated	from	their	main	topic	and	the	contextual	signifiers,	such	as,	the	date	and	place	they	were	written.	The	chronological	‘story	time’	is	also	broken	into	smaller	chunks,	which	were	a	greater	challenge	for	participants	to	construct	as	a	narrative	sequence.			Redesigning	the	spatial	plotting	of	the	sounds	over	the	garden	aimed	to	address	this	issue.	Grouping	individual	voice-points	together	according	to	their	relevance	to	each	fictional	location	and	associated	with	a	geographical	zone	in	the	garden,	regained	some	narrative	coherence.	Groups	of	fragments	were	edited	into	seven	sound	files	that	reduced	the	potential	combinations	or	variant	trajectories	that	participants	could	make	through	the	narrative.	However,	the	benefits	of	more	closely	controlled	plotting	were	clear	relations	between	story	causes	and	effects.	Dorothy’s	description	of	driving	into	the	San	Francisco	hills	with	friends	was	followed	by	an	account	of	the	picnic,	rather	potentially	heard	in	between	her	walk	in	snowy	Yosemite	National	Park.	Experimentation	with	constraining	the	conditions	of	when	a	voice	fragment	could	be	played,	i.e.	no.	49	not	before	fragments	46	–	48	and	not	if	49	has	been	
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played,	had	a	similar	effect	to	editing	into	a	single	file	but	more	difficult	to	implement	on	the	ground	because	of	GPS	drift.		
	
 
Fig. 8 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 2 ‘button selection’. Plan for position of zones  
and voice nodes in garden. 		To	aid	navigation	and	identification	of	the	virtual	locations	an	illustrated	on-screen	map	was	developed	that	overlaid	over	the	gardens	the	soundscape	zones.	The	style	and	colours	of	the	
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design	reflected	British	industry	and	maps	of	the	early	20th	century.107	When	the	participant	was	within	a	certain	radius	of	the	zone	the	name	of	the	virtual	location	appeared	and	the	zone	area	flashed	on	the	map.	GPS	drift	meant	that	zones	triggered,	but	not	necessarily	in	place	signified	on	the	map.	In	response	the	flashing	zones	were	developed	as	buttons,	that	when	pressed	linked	to	a	historic	photograph	of	the	location	and	the	associated	soundscape	and	characters	letters’.		A	clearer	relationship	between	the	soundscape,	letters	and	the	location	within	the	garden	was	established,	but	manually	selecting	the	sounds	via	a	button	on	the	map	shifted	the	emphasis	away	from	discovery	of	an	invisible	place,	to	a	more	prosaic	experience	of	activating	an	audio	guide.	The	map’s	function	was	to	designate	the	site	of	the	fictional	location	and	to	aid	navigation	in	the	gardens,	however	participants	often	became	focused	on	attempting	to	navigate	via	the	map,	commenting	that	they	and	got	lost	easily.			
		 		 		
Fig. 9 The Letters, version 2 ‘button selection’. App screens. 
 
                                                        
 
107In response to EW’s participation design requirements James Brocklehurst created the illustration for the map 
based on early 20th century British map design and colours and integrated into the app.  
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Diagrammatically	plotting	binaural	sounds	as	a	radius	from	a	central	point	and	then	organising	these	sounds	temporally	within	a	single	sound	file	achieved	greater	control	over	the	auditory	spatial	dimensions	of	the	fictional	places.	The	layering	of	key	sounds	was	used	to	signify	the	characteristics	of	the	environment	with	subtler	ambient	sounds	such	as	voices,	footsteps,	animals	and	diegetic	music	to	provide	detail	and	texture.108		
	Thresholds	between	the	imaginary	and	what	we	hold	to	exist	and	not	exist	beyond	the	surface	of	the	body	may	be	difficult	to	discern,	William	James	argues,	if	sounds	for	example,	are	faint,	dim	or	confused	by	more	dominant	perceptual	cues	(1890b:	70-72).		The	perceivable	dimensions	of	the	fictional	locations	were	defined	by	placing	sounds	whose	sources	were	binaurally	recorded	in	locations	with	similar	reverb	at	varying	distances.	Additional	field	recordings	were	binaurally	synthesized	in	postproduction	to	emulate	these	spatial	dimensions.	In	the	opening	seconds	of	the	London	zone,	beneath	the	writer’s	hotel	window	a	car	starting	up	in	a	side	and	children’s	voices	were	heard.	In	the	same	letter	the	writer	describes	leaving	London	and	driving	through	countryside.	Recordings	that	were	made	inside	an	antique	car	surround	the	participant.	Outside	the	car,	the	occasional	song	of	a	bird	is	heard	in	nearby	woods	and	fields,	moving	forward	in	time,	the	character	is	outside	looking	at	house	he’s	interested	in	purchasing.	Although	there	is	greater	control	and	depth	achievable	in	the	layering	of	sounds	within	a	single	sound	file,	they	are	not	triggered	individually	as	participants	move	in	the	garden.	Retuning	to	the	same	zone	can	result	in	the	fictional	places	seeming	contrived	or	predictable	if	the	sequence	of	sounds	is	recognised	as	being	the	heard	
                                                        
 
108 Creating texture in soundscapes was discussed with Nick Ryan in April 2012 in relation to his compositions for the 
audio game Papa Sangre (2010).  
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before,	this	is	particularly	evident	with	impactful	sounds	such	as	the	arrival	of	the	tram.	“Some	
sounds	shattered	the	peace	and	quiet.”		Sounds	that	were	most	likely	to	occur	in	the	gardens,	such	as,	birds,	animals,	footsteps,	children	and	a	plane,	were	frequently	mentioned	by	participants	as	indistinguishable,	initially	or	persistently,	from	non-recorded	sound.	If	there	was	no	contradictory	information	or	there	was	no	expectation	to	see	the	sources	of	sounds,	misperception	of	perceptual	cues	seemed	more	likely	to	occur.	“It	was	a	strange	experience,	especially	hearing	sounds	that	you	don’t	
know	are	recorded,	like	the	birds	and	the	countryside.”		The	voices	reading	the	letter	extracts	often	connected	the	interpretation	of	the	sounds	to	their	location	and	its	particular	features.	The	interpretation	could	be	affected	if	participants	focused	on	the	soundscapes	rather	than	the	content	of	the	letters;	for	example,	one	participant	described	the	walk	through	the	snowy	Yosemite	National	Park	as	being	at	the	seaside,	“I	liked	crunching	across	the	beach.”	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	Version	2:	‘Button	selection’:	See	Appendix	1.	for	Figs.	4,	5	and	6:	Design	tables.				
Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis			While	the	mechanism	of	locating	the	soundscape	on	a	map	held	the	potential	to	engage	the	participant,	manually	selecting	to	play	the	soundscape	emphasised	the	experience’s	mediation.	We	can	analyse	this	observation	in	terms	of	relations	to	the	value	of	reality	and	
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volition	and	relations	to	proximity	of	the	story	world.	The	value	of	reality	may	be	less	likely	to	be	applied	to	the	representation	of	the	story	world,	as	an	existent	place,	even	temporally,	if	the	participant’s	attention	is	drawn	to	and	they	are	asked	to	actively	engage	in	the	process	of	mediation.	While	pressing	a	button	to	start	or	end	an	experience	that	perhaps	has	parallels	with	opening	and	closing	the	cover	of	the	book,	it	is	perhaps	the	repeated	action	of	bringing	the	world	into	being	activated	by	pressing	the	button	that	diminishes	a	sense	of	a	separate	story	world.	What	are	the	conditions	required	for	the	participant	to	have	a	sense	of	physical	proximity	to	the	world	of	the	story?	What	are	relations	that	need	to	be	brought	to	the	fore	in	order	for	the	story	world	to	seem	as	if	it	has	own	existence,	that	exists	outside	of	the	participant’s	act	of	will?		In	The	Letters	the	narrative	moves	between	a	number	of	locations,	view	points	and	temporal	shifts,	for	example,	in	the	London	zone	the	writer	is	in	the	hotel	room,	inside	a	car	and	then	walking	in	a	garden.	While	a	reader	or	filmgoer	may	easily	move	between	narrative	situations	they	usually	maintain	a	fixed	position	in	their	chair.	Character’s	changes	of	perspective	and	location	are	experienced	in	relation	to	changing	spaces	within	the	existent	environment,	potentially	drawing	attention	to	their	mediation.	A	coherent	rationale	within	the	narrative	for	participant’s	movements	may	have	a	bearing	on	participant’s	engagement.	Reality,	James	(1890b:	311)	says,	is	a	belief	that	is	relative	to	particular	circumstances.	What	is	believed	to	be	real	depends	upon	our	relations	to	that	object	and	their	particulars:	our	attention	to	the	object,	it’s	vividness,	the	sensations	and	emotions	we	connect	to	it,	it	congruence	with	the	system	of	objects	and	their	relations.	Relations	to	proximity	between	the	participant	the	story	world	and	to	the	physical	location	can	activate	beliefs	about	the	reality	as	a	value	ascribed	in	experience.			
		
 
 
 
 
164 
However	naturalistic	the	soundscape	may	be,	the	locative	narrative	is	likely	to	be	perceived	as	a	mediated	artefact.	Naturalistic	sound	recorded	on	location	includes	a	complex	array	of	sounds	that	occur	simultaneously	within	a	given	place	and	time	period.	However,	clear	individuated	sounds,	used	metaphorically	or	metonymically,	such	as	a	creaking	door,	wind	whistling	through	trees,	etc.,	as	per	the	conventions	of	film,	radio	drama	or	even	documentary,	can	make	sounds	seem	realistic,	the	value	of	reality	is	given	to	the	experience	(perhaps	because	the	value	of	reality	has	already	been	given	to	those	sounds	by	the	listener	in	relation	to	other	media,	such	as	film).			
Relations	to	imagining,	volition,	emotion	and	action:	Participants	who	reported	their	readiness	to	engage	in	imagining,	the	adoption	of	the	supposition,	as	if	they	could	really	hear	voices	and	uncover	places	from	the	past,	also	reported	misperceptions	and	connected	the	descriptions	within	the	letters	to	the	content	of	the	sonic	locations.	A	relation	to	desire	to	imagine,	that	lead	to	acting	as-if.		
	
Developing	the	third	prototype	of	The	Letters,	‘text	messages’		The	third	prototype109	focused	upon	changing	the	narrative	framing	to	implement	a	different	participation	design	and	mode	of	engagement,	in	order	to	integrate	the	finding	of	the	fictional	locations	into	the	interaction	design.	Apparently	tucked	into	pages	of	a	second-hand	book,	a	
                                                        
 
109 This prototype was partially realized using sample sections of the narrative and sound. The idea of non-playing 
characters communicating with participants was explored further in the Lost Index collect of apps, as below.  
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friend	tells	you	about	their	discovery	of	list	of	mysterious	numbers	that	they	later	find	to	be	GPS	
coordinates	pertaining	to	Dartington	Hall	Gardens.			The	idea	was	for	the	participant	was	to	locate	the	coordinates	and	discover	their	significance.	They	were	to	be	revealed	as	coded	letter	fragments	that	can	only	be	downloaded	at	specific	geographic	locations.	Participants	needed	to	work	out	the	puzzle	of	the	letters	and	find	out	whether	their	friend	knows	more	about	the	encoded	letters	and	the	historical	locations	than	they	are	saying.	Are	you	being	used	in	some	covert	intelligence	operation,	or	is	this	really	a	
chance	discovery?	An	anagram	finally	leads	to	ruined	church	tower	in	the	garden	that	was	used	for	radio	communications	during	WW2.					
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Fig. 10 The Letters, version 3 ‘text messages’. Screenshots from app prototype of initial screen simulating a text 
notification, simulated message from fictional character and simulation of ‘scanner app’ being downloaded to 
participant’s phone. 	
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Fig. 11 The Letters, version 3 ‘text messages’. Screenshot from app prototype showing simulated ‘scanner app’. 
 	The	interaction	design	involves	the	participant	receiving	a	series	of	(apparently	real)	text	messages	that	provide	clues	and	GPS	coordinates	that	can	be	visited	within	the	grounds.	A	GPS	locator	app	is	downloaded	onto	the	phone	and	the	participant	uses	it	as	a	device	to	navigate	around	the	gardens.	This	alternative	method	of	navigation	elevates	the	necessity	for	a	map	and	issues	of	drift	by	using	the	activity	of	lining	up	the	coordinates	with	those	on	screen.	When	the	coordinates	are	matched	the	letter	fragments	are	heard.	The	letters,	once	found,	can	be	replayed	by	selecting	the	coordinates	from	a	list,	to	aid	puzzle	solving.	The	voice	recordings	are	utilized	with	additional	text	messaging	sounds	to	add	realism.		
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Fig. 12 The Letters, version 3 ‘text messages’. Diagram of interaction mechanism. 	See	Appendix	1.	for	Figs.	7,	8	and	9	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	Version	3:	Text	Messages:	Design	tables.		
	
	
Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis	
	
	The	new	narrative	framing	turned	The	Letters	into	a	game	that	provided	a	clear	role	for	the	participant	(relations	to	action)	and	a	rationale	for	the	letters	within	the	location	(relations	to	
rationality).	Issues	of	drift,	navigation	and	triggering	are	overcome	(relations	to	rationality,	
relations	to	proximity	of	the	participant	to	the	story	world).			
GPS	NO	1 GPS	NO	2
You	investigate	the	GPS	points
Interactions	You	receive	a	text	friend	from	London	who	discovers	the	GPS	points
GPS	NO	3 GPS	NO	4
Location	2Location	1Location	3 Location	4
Task	A2Task	A1Task	A3 TaskA4
Task	B1 Task	B2Task	B3 Task	B4	
Ending	3	You	discover	you	are	being	'played'	as	a	character	in	an	alternate	reality	game
Ending	4You	intend	to	investigate	further	 Ending	1You	are	recruited	into	the	covert	organisation
Ending	2You	are	invited	to	try	and	recruit	others	in	the	testing	process
Narrative	EventsInitial	intrigue	concerning	your	friend's	discovery
Excitement	to	Jind	out	the	meaning
Confusion	concerning	the	purpose	of	your	activities
You	begin	to	have	suspicions	about	the	real	reasons	for	your	involvement	
You	be	able	to	anticipate	reasons	but	are	unsure
Twist/s	in	the	tale,	you	accept	the	explanation	or	you	retrace	your	steps	and	engage	in	further	tasks
Sinister	or	benevolent	intentions	of	the	friendClues	
The	Letters,	Version	3
'Text	Messages'	Interaction	mechanism
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The	participation	and	interface	design	uses	a	series	of	text	messages	and	accompanying	sounds	that	are	convincing	and	build	suspense.	Here	relations	of	the	aesthetic	appearance	of	texts	to	the	value	of	reality	are	activated	and	relations	of	the	aesthetic	and	emotional	value	of	suspense.	The	text	messages	while	resembling	the	iPhone	messaging	screen,	the	participant	in	this	test	version,	was	not	able	to	text	back,	which	would	add	additional,	functionality	and	‘naturalism’	to	the	experience	relations	to	rationality	and	relations	to	volition	and	action.			This	idea	was	not	developed	beyond	the	script,	initial	prototype	and	mechanism	for	sending	‘fake’	texts	because	the	sonic	fictional	places	in	this	iteration	were	made	redundant,	although	they	could	potentially	be	worked	into	the	narrative.	The	idea	of	a	friend	contacting	the	participant	was	utilised	in	case	study	3.			
	
Developing	the	fourth	prototype	of	The	Letters,	‘LociOscope’,	published	on	iTunes	
	Building	on	the	experiments	of	the	third	prototype,	the	app	enables	the	phone	to	become	a	device	for	figuratively	‘enhancing	perception’	and	‘tuning’	into	the	past,110	by	the	means	of	a	time	travel	device	called	a	‘LociOscope’.	The	letters	become	a	(fictional)	conduit	in	this	process.	The	app’s	integrated	manual	specifies	how	the	participant	can	operate	the	device	and	frames	the	narrative,	providing	background	to	the	writers	and	the	letters.			
                                                        
 
110 Excerpt from the LociOscope manual:  
 
“The LociOscope works by amplifying the emotional resonance found in specific locations. This 
edition of the LociOScope has been calibrated to detect the imprints left behind by this 
treasured collection of letters associated with Dartington Hall Gardens. The LociOscope gives 
you access to times and situations in which these letters were written.” 
		
 
 
 
 
170 
	
		 		
Fig. 13 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from app prototype showing  
early version of voice points represented on map prototype and zones as areas of ‘disturbance’. 	Designs	for	the	LociOscope’s	interaction	design	and	style	were	sketched	to	reflect	domestic	machines	of	the	era	of	the	letters111.	Finding	entry	points	to	the	past	became	the	premise	for	participant’s	participation	in	the	gardens.	Drift	was	incorporated	into	the	experience	as	a	process	of	tuning-in,	through	movement	and	readjustment	of	the	participant’s	position.	This	prototype	used	a	refined	version	of	the	second	map.112	In	response	to	participants’	comments	for	enhanced	clarity,	colour	contrast	was	increased	and	the	entry	points	to	the	virtual	
                                                        
 
111 From sketches and design specification James Brocklehurst developed the visual appearance of the LociOscope.  
 
112 The design specifications where developed by EW in response to participants’ responses to testing. Design 
decisions were discussed with and implemented by James Brocklehurst. 
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locations	were	displayed	as	white	clouds,	alongside	illustrated	landmarks,113	in	later	iterations.	The	participant’s	position	was	tracked	and	appeared	as	a	dot	on	the	map	to	aid	navigation.	Functionality	was	also	improved	by	zoom	and	scrolling	capabilities.	Some	participants	said	they	still	found	it	difficult	to	find	their	way	around	the	garden	and	would	like	a	compass	to	be	included	in	future	updates.			Historical	photographs	of	the	travel	destinations	from	the	period	included	in	the	second	prototype	were	removed,	as	this	seemed	to	signal	the	existent	locations	absence	and	disparity	with	the	sonic	representations.	The	names	of	the	locations,	however,	were	reintroduced	onto	the	map	to	further	anchor	the	interpretation	of	the	soundscapes.		
		 		 		
Fig. 14 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from final app. The ‘LociOscope’ instruction manual. 		
                                                        
 
113 James Brocklehurst designed the landmark icons that feature on the map to aid navigation. 
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Fig. 15 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshot from final app. The ‘LociOscope’ instruction manual, 
‘LociOscope’ device and introductory instructions. 	Radio	frequency	tuning	sounds	were	used	to	signify	‘tuning-in’	to	the	past.	In	early	iterations	these	were	edited	to	the	beginning	and	ends	of	the	soundscapes.	Later	versions	included	‘clouds’	of	static	that	could	be	encountered	between	the	virtual	locations,	to	enhance	the	sense	of	affecting	the	tuning	by	positioning	the	body	in	the	optimum	site.	Dynamically	responsive	volume	was	linked	to	the	participant’s	proximity	to	the	static	‘clouds’.	As	their	proximity	to	the	geographic	position	of	the	virtual	location	increased	so	did	the	volume,	becoming	quieter	as	they	moved	away.	While	this	dynamic	feature	worked	well	with	the	static	sounds	of	the	radio	tuning,	testing	demonstrated	that	its	use	with	the	location	soundscapes	conversely	appeared	contrived	because	noticeable	changes	in	intensity	affected	all	of	the	sounds.	Key	sounds	of	vehicles	and	narration	became	too	dominant	or	too	quiet.			
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Fig. 16 The Letters, version 4, final version. Screenshots from final app. Introductory instructions and a zone being 
activated by the participant. 		
	
 
Fig. 17 The Letters, version 4, final version. Participant using the published app.  	
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Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis			The	LociOscope	device	manual	displayed	on	the	launch	of	the	app	was	used	to	frame	the	narrative.	It	suggested	how	the	participant	should	regard	the	experience	and	the	imaginative	stance	towards	the	story	(relations	to	imagining).	The	participant	was	now	given	a	specific	role	that	suggested	how	they	should	act	(relations	to	action)	and	the	nature	of	their	supposition	(relations	to	imagining)	(relations	to	belief),	as	the	protagonist,	the	operator	of	the	LociOscope,	behaving	as-if	they	could	tune	into	the	past.			Initial	versions	of	the	introductory	text	were	brief	and	deliberately	ambiguous	with	the	intention	of	prompting	an	exploratory	mode	of	engagement.	Relations	to	rationality	were	vague,	whereas	to	encourage	relations	to	hypothesis	forming,	greater	volition	was	required	for	those	unfamiliar	with	engaging	with	games	or	locative	experiences	in	this	manner.	Greater	amounts	of	background	information	and	instructions	were	included	in	later	iterations.114			See	Appendix	1	for	Figs.	10,	11	and	12	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	Version	4:	LociOscope:	Design	tables.		
	
	
Developing	the	fifth	prototype	of	‘LociOscope:	The	Letters’	for	Plymouth	University	
Campus		
                                                        
 
114 The instructions were too wordy for some and future updates will include incremental instructions as the 
participant operates the app to avoid the necessity of reading lots of text at the beginning with more detailed 
instructions available as optional windows that can be accessed via the map. Some participants also commented that 
they would like reminder instructions to appear at intervals rather than having to return to the manual. 
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What	is	the	experience	of	‘LociOscope:	The	Letters’	app	like	when	it	is	resituated	in	an	urban	location?	The	experience	of	the	relations	between	recorded	and	ambient	sounds	differed	when	sited	on	the	Plymouth	University	campus	and	city	centre.	Ambient	sounds	present	in	seven	selected	locations	included	traffic	of	varying	intensities	in	relation	to	the	proximity	of	main	roads,	crowd	sounds,	indistinct	and	distinct	voices,	low	resonant	hums	issuing	from	external	fans	on	buildings,	occasional	beeping	sounds	from	reversing	vehicles	and	the	frequent	cries	of	gulls.	The	represented	locations	that	featured	urban	soundscapes	of	Rome	and	London	seemed	congruent	in	this	setting,	even	though	the	engine	sounds	were	clearly	those	of	historic	vehicles.	The	sounds	of	contemporary	traffic	appeared	to	add	congruent	spatial	depth.			
	
 
Fig. 18 The Letters, re-sited at ‘Plymouth University’. App concept trialled at university campus.  
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	In	contrast,	soundscapes	of	rural	landscapes	that	included	woodland	birds,	insects,	wind	in	trees,	voices	in	open	spaces	such	as,	Yosemite	National	Park,	San	Franciscan	Hills	and	Dartington,	seemed	artificial	on	the	campus.	Participants	at	Dartington	frequently	highlighted	that	recorded	bird	sounds	were	indistinct	from	those	of	existent	birds.	Although	these	same	binaural	recordings	retained	some	of	their	spatial	qualities,	when	heard	on	the	university	campus,	they	did	not	seem	to	issue	from	the	surrounding	environment	and	appeared	artificial.		Different	types	of	sounds	were	masked	or	emphasized	by	the	ambient	sounds	within	the	campus	location.	The	volume	of	soundscapes	was	increased	inline	with	the	ambient	sound	levels.	Despite	this	adjustment,	the	voices	of	characters	were	frequently	occluded	by	the	voices	of	passers	by	or	sudden	activity,	the	wheeling	of	trolleys	and	chairs	scrapping	on	concrete.	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	recorded	voices	were	sufficiently	audible	it	was	necessary	to	create	a	‘bubble’	around	the	character’s	voices	and	fade	the	recorded	soundscapes	into	the	background,	reducing	their	complexity.	The	presence	of	actual	crowds	supplemented	the	spatial	qualities	of	the	recorded	crowd	scenes	enhancing	their	appearance	as	existent.	The	recorded	sound	of	an	approaching	tram,	when	heard	alongside	a	road	appeared	startlingly	realistic.	The	low	frequency	hum	and	bodily	resonance	seemed	to	actually	herald	its	arrival,	despite	its	impossibility.	The	San	Francisco	Harbour	soundscape	was	located	next	to	a	reservoir	at	the	university,	the	soundscape	was	congruous	in	this	environment.	While	visibly	without	boats	or	waves,	the	expanse	of	water	seemed	to	act	as	a	‘prop’	for	imagining,	as-if	boats	would	arrive.	In	contrast,	when	‘San	Francisco	Harbour’	was	located	next	to	a	small	fountain	in	the	Dartington	Hall	gardens,	it	was	less	suggestive,	the	watery	connection	more	symbolic	than	conceivable,	although	in	this	context	one	participant	
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commented,	“Water	dripping	from	the	fountain	added	another	layer	of	depth	to	the	sounds.”	After	initial	experimentation	the	fictional	places	were	repositioned	to	further	enhance	and	mitigate	the	affects	the	ambient	sounds	in	the	location.	Locating	the	rural	soundscapes	near	trees	or	in	the	garden,	however,	was	not	sufficient	to	mask	or	detract	from	the	hum	of	ambient	traffic	and	street	sounds.	While	the	urban	soundscapes	seem	to	perceptually	and	imaginatively	mesh	with	the	city	setting,	the	rural	soundscapes	generally	seemed	contrived.	The	overall	experience	of	The	Letters	at	Plymouth	University	was	more	akin	to	listening	to	a	radio	play	or	music	on	headphones	outside,	the	two	experiences	occurring	in	parallel.	James	(PP	1890a:	245)	says	meaning	is	not	a	static	correspondence	to	but	a	context	specific	relation	in	experience.		See	Appendix	1	for	Figs.	13.,	14,	and	15.	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	Version	4	LociOscope:	Design	tables.		
	
	
Developing	the	sixth	prototype	of	The	Letters,	‘LociOscope’	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	
and	Art	Gallery	
	Experimentation	with	re-situating	of	the	‘LociOscope’	edition	of	The	Letters,	at	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	offered	opportunities	to	consider	the	narrative,	sound	and	interaction	experiences	in	an	alternative	setting,	using	indoor	navigation	techniques.	The	floor	plan	of	the	museum	was	used	to	create	an	onscreen	map	overlaid	with	the	fictional	locations.	Each	of	the	seven	fictional	places	was	assigned	a	room	in	the	museum	of	which	it	had	some	loose	thematic	connections	with.	The	maritime	room	was	assigned	to	‘San	Francisco	Harbour’,	the	natural	history	room	to	‘Yosemite’,	Rome	to	the	neo	classical	entrance	hall.			
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Fig. 19 ‘LociOscope’ for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery. Plan for app concept trialled at Plymouth City Museum 
and Art Gallery. 	An	indoor	navigation	system	based	was	trialled115	that	was	designed	to	trigger	sound	files	in	relation	to	participants’	location	within	the	museum,	however,	in	practice,	the	Wi-Fi	signals	available	were	not	of	a	sufficient	strength	to	make	this	suitable	in	this	building.	As	a	result	manual	triggering	of	soundscapes	was	used	to	experiment	with	the	listening	experience.		The	variety	and	levels	of	low	level	sounds,	such	as,	background	music	in	the	cafe,	distant	voices,	heating	systems	and	that	of	localized	loud	sounds,	such	as,	visitor	voices,	sound	effects	within	the	museum	displays	made	the	soundscapes	confusing.	The	spatial	subtleties	of	the	binaural	sound	also	appeared	less	illusionistic,	masked	by	the	array	of	ambient	sounds.	However,	the	museum’s	‘soundscape’	did	offer	a	potential	new	medium	for	experimenting	with	shifting	perception	and	creating	narratives	with	the	museum	itself	as	a	setting.		
                                                        
 
115 SenionLab navigation software was trialled that functioned by combining the coordinates of pre-mapped paths 
around the museum with positioning data derived by fingerprinting Wi-Fi signals in conjunction with the map and 
tagged sound files. Public Wi-Fi was not installed in the museum and signals coming from offices and neighbouring 
buildings were too low to trigger sounds reliably.  
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See	Appendix	1.	for	Figs:	16,	17,	19,	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(test)	version:	Design	Table			
Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis		
	Participants’	interpretation	of	recorded	sounds	seemed	to	be	affected	by	the	environment	they	were	heard	within	(relations	to	the	value	of	reality)	(relations	to	context).	Binaural	sounds	that	were	thematically	congruent	within	the	listening	environment	were	often	considered	to	issue	from	the	existent	setting,	whereas	recorded	sounds	whose	sources	had	been	previously	considered	to	be	occurring	in	the	rural	environment	appeared	to	be	recorded	in	the	urban	location.			Turning	the	phone	into	a	device	for	tuning	into	the	past	offered	a	rationale	for	drift	(relations	
to	rationality)	and	turned	it	in	to	a	game	mechanic	(relations	to	volition	and	action).	Limited	dynamically	responsive	sound	offered	some	sense	of	control	over	the	tuning	process	(relations	to	rationality)	(relations	to	volition	and	action).		Further	experimentation	with	indoor	navigation,	integration	of	the	museum’s	sonic	qualities	with	the	sound	design	and	creating	narrative	framing	and	content	that	pertains	more	closely	to	museum,	was	explored	in	the	following	case	studies.		
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The	Feel	of	Space		Imagine	you	are	sitting	on	a	swivel	chair	in	a	small	narrow	office:	white	walls,	a	desk,	two	laptops,	and	opposite	you,	filling	one	wall	is	a	window.	Through	the	branches	of	trees,	the	concrete	surfaces	of	university	buildings	recede	into	the	middle	distance.	A	colleague	hands	you	an	Oculus	Rift	virtual	reality	headset.	It	resembles	a	scuba	mask	in	black	opaque	plastic.	You	put	it	on.			The	office	has	gone,	replaced	by	a	villa,	albeit	one	with	a	‘Disney’	aesthetic.	Your	hands,	felt	but	invisible,	fumble	for	the	laptop’s	curser	keys	that	pressing	brings	you	closer	to	the	wall	with	a	jerk.	You	turn	your	head	to	the	left	and	behind	you	see	a	staircase,	to	the	right	a	fireplace.	Ahead	there’s	a	window,	poplar	trees	in	a	sunlit	landscape	with	hills	beyond.	You	look	towards	the	open	door.	Let’s	go	outside.	You	reach	your	hands	into	the	extensive	dimensions	of	the	room	to	judge	the	distance.	There	is	no	feel	of	space	–	you	touch	into	nothing.	The	paucity	of	the	feedback	heightens	your	body’s	inefficacy.	Instinctively	you	stand	up	with	the	desire	to	‘match’	the	eye-distance	with	the	body-distance.	The	cable	pulls,	restrained	you	sit	down	and	meet	the	wave	of	nausea,	filling	movement’s	negation.				Encountering	the	representation	of	Tuscany,	mediated	via	the	Oculus,	we	experientially	grope	towards	questions	of	definition,	measuring	the	receding	boundary	of	the	perceptual	real.	Real/Reality/Imagined/Truth/Fiction		For	James	(PP	1890b:	145)	space	is	sensational	in	character.	We	have	a	bodily	sense	of	volume,	of	fullness,	of	the	extent	of	warmth,	he	tells	us.	Except	in	the	case	of	a	recollection,	space	is	immediately	apprehended,	whose	shape	is	whole	until	attention	is	directed	towards	
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it.	Thoughts,	in	processes	of	discrimination,	memory,	association,	imagination	and	time	succession	(PP	1890b:	167)	divide	it	into	different	degrees,	of	proximity,	of	depth,	of	size.	Larger	extensive	space	is	a	construction,	(PP	1890b:	183)	–	when	we	try	to	imagine	the	distance	between	places,	for	example,	from	the	Eiffel	Tower	to	the	Champs-Élysées.	Thinking	does	not	add	to	the	‘sense	data’	of	space	but	just	reconfigures	it,	James	tells	us	(PP	1890b:	145).		
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Chapter	4	
Expanded	narrative,	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	and	the	multistability	of	perceiving	
and	misperceiving			Metaphors	make	a	comparison	between	unrelated	ideas	in	order	to	say	something	that	is	common	to	both.	They	are	at	the	intersection	in	acts	of	translation,	declaring	their	hybridity	and	hiding	their	inadequacy.	If	the	bridge	they	make	has	aesthetic	value	for	us	it	seems	to	fit	and	feel	right.	This	feeling	of	satisfaction	allows	us	to	segue	to	new	ways	of	thinking,	opens	a	window	to	a	fictional	place,	now	possibly	existent.		In	this	chapter	the	theoretical	underpinning	of	the	perceptual	aspect	of	the	metaphor	multi-
stability	is	considered	and	its	implications	for	expanded	narrative	and	the	design,	development	and	interpretation	of	locative	narratives.	The	ontological	problem,	‘how	does	the	outside	‘world’	get	inside	the	‘mind’	and	the	epistemological	problem,	‘if	perception	is	interpreted	as	‘faulty’	how	do	we	know	what	is	real?’,	are	considered	in	relation	to	the	cognitive	neuro-scientific	term,	perceptual	multistability.	Historically,	illusions	have	been	the	basis	of	doubting	our	experience	and	the	value	of	knowledge	derived	from	it.	The	phenomena	of	illusions,	hallucinations	and	misperceptions	are	discussed	in	relation	to	scientific	naturalism	and	philosophical	framings	of	neurophysiological	processes	that	‘translate’	the	body’s	responses	to	perceptual	stimuli	into	subjective	awareness.			This	chapter	goes	on	to	look	at	how	our	relations	to	perceptual	and	imaginary	objects	can	be	affected	by	ambiguous	objects,	verbal	suggestion,	misdirection	and	environmental	conditions.	The	role	of	language	in	framing	of	subjective	and	objective	perception	is	considered	in	the	
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context	of	James’	argument	of	the	“typical	attitude”	(James	PP	1980b:	240)	and	Wittgenstein’s	argument	for	the	rejection	of	private	objects	and	his	explanation	of	‘seeing-as’	(Wittgenstein	2009	[1958]:	xi.	137).	A	further	comparison	is	drawn	between	James’	argument	for	direct	perception	and	intentionality	and	that	of	John	Searle	(2015:	23).	These	debates	are	examined	in	relation	to	classical	and	analytical	pragmatism	that	demonstrate,	I	argue,	the	pertinence	of	James’	writings	in	the	contemporary	context.	James’	classical	pragmatist	method	poses	the	question,	what	are	the	consequences	that	follow	from	believing	that	an	idea	is	true?	I	argue,	that	drawing	upon	scientific	research	on	perception	can	usefully	inform	the	hypotheses	forming	and	speculative	strategies	for	designing	locative	narrative	to	prompt	perceptual	ambiguity.	Results	are	measured	in	terms	of	their	specifiable	practical	consequences,	in	
particular	circumstances,	that	in	turn	leads	us	to	further	experimentation.			I	argue,	that	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	is	at	the	intersection	between	‘ways	of	seeing’	and	talking.	Building	on	strategies	to	create	the	affect	of	multi-stability	developed	in	the	first	locative	narrative	case	study,	LociOscope,	The	Letters,	the	second,	The	Lost	Index,	No.2	
Landscape	with	Figures,	is	discussed	at	the	end	of	this	chapter	together	with	a	relational	analysis	of	experience.		The	scientific	term	multistability	is	used	to	describe	the	different	subjective	perceptions	of	the	same	stimuli.			 “Multistability	occurs	when	a	single	physical	stimulus	produces	alternations	between	different	subjective	percepts…The	key	features	of	multistability	are:	(i)	stimuli	have	more	than	one	plausible	perceptual	organization;	(ii)	these	organizations	are	not	compatible	with	each	other.	We	argue	here	that	most	if	not	all	cases	of	multistability	are	based	on	competition	in	selecting	and	binding	stimulus	information.	Binding	refers	to	the	process	whereby	the	different	attributes	of	objects	
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in	the	environment,	as	represented	in	the	sensory	array,	are	bound	together	within	our	perceptual	systems,	to	provide	a	coherent	interpretation	of	the	world	around	us.”	(Schwartz,	et	al.	2012:	896)			Jean-Luc	Schwartz,	et	al	(2012:	896)	differentiates	between	multistability	as	a	description	of	
what	is	happening	for	the	perceiver,	with	that	of	the	descriptions	of	neural	mechanisms	that	describe	how	perceptual	organisation	happens.	While	the	questions	are	different	in	principle,	intention	and	attention	may	indicate	when	switching	occurs	between	percepts	and	may	also	reveal	the	neural	mechanisms	of	switching.	Denham	and	Winkler	(2012:	79)	describe	that	in	response	to	incoming	stimuli,	neuronal116	patterns	are	formed	over	time	that	enable	predictions	to	be	made	about	that	incoming	information.	Neuronal	patterns	compete	with	one	another	and	two	cannot	be	held	concurrently,	resulting	in	a	switching	between	two	alternatives.	They	argue	that	perception	is	not	necessarily	a	stable	state.	In	auditory	streaming	experiments	when	listening	to	sequences	of	pure	tones,	participants	also	experience	switching	between	interpretations,	analogous	with	the	experience	of	ambiguous	figures	such	as	the	Necker	cube	or	Rubin	vase.			 “…one	should	consider	sound	organization	in	the	brain	in	terms	of	the	continuous	discovery	of	proto-objects	(alternative	groupings)	and	ongoing	competition	between	them.”	(Denham	&	Winkler	2015:	601)			
                                                        
 
116 Stimuli received by sensory receptors as light, or the movement of air particles, are converted into short electrical 
pluses or neuronal firings as an electrical signal to the brain. These electrical pulses, pass into nerve cells (neurons) 
that are surrounded by and contain ions, electrically charged molecules. The voltage of internal and external ions is 
polarized. Stimulation of a nearby neuron changes the external charge and causes an exchange of ions with those 
inside the cell, resulting in possible outcomes: action potential, inhibitors of neural transmitters, enzyme activity or 
muscle contractions. In turn, this neuron interacts across the synapse with other cells, binding or not, with the 
receptors of other cells. Patterns of neurons, determined by the size of the neuron and the number and duration 
between firings carry particular information. Different types of neurotransmitters carry interacting patterns of 
neurons that coalesce in specific regions across the brain (Moore 2012: 38) (Society of Neuroscience 2012:	9). 
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Denham	&	Winkler’s	analysis	draws	upon	the	framework	of	Bregman’s	(1994	[1990])	
auditory	scene	analysis	that	posits	that	the	auditory	system	segregates	features	of	sound	and	creates	and	compares	schema	or	‘mental	representations’	(below	the	level	of	awareness)	over	time.			The	use	of	the	term	multistability	in	cognitive	neuroscience	is	used	to	describe	the	what	and	the	how,	using	Schwartz,	et	al’s	expression	–	the	link	between	behaviour	exhibited	in	subjective	perception	and	that	of	competition	between	patterns	of	neuronal	firings.	Experimentally	they	seem	to	be	related	but	the	evidence	is	not	yet	conclusive	(Schwartz,	et	al.	2012).	Even	when/if	the	value	of	explanatory	satisfaction	attributed	to	the	link	between	the	
what	and	the	how	occurs,	there	are	still	questions	of	the	translation	between	vocabularies	on	one	hand	and	the	framing	of	perception	on	the	other.	Contemporary	pragmatists	and	philosophers	of	mind	express	varying	positions	on	the	function	of	representation	in	perception	at	different	levels	of	cognitive	awareness,	and	also	the	extent	to	which	intentionality	is	derivative	of	linguistic	norms.		
		
Objective	and	subjective	perception	–	are	there	relations	between	causes	and	
interpretation?	
	Psychophysics117	describes	sound	as	beginning	with	a	vibrating	object	that	changes	the	pressure	in	the	medium	surrounding	it	over	time.	The	molecules	in	the	medium	compress	and	
                                                        
 
117 Psychophysics is the empirical study of the relations between a perceptual stimulus and the perceptual response. 
Psychoacoustics of hearing examines the relationships between the physical characteristics of sound and its 
perception and interpretation by listeners (Begault 1997: xii).  
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stretch	against	each	other	causing	a	mechanical,	longitudinal	wave	of	particles	moving	in	sequence.	The	movement	of	particles	moves	through	the	ear	before	entering	the	cochlea.	Hair	cells	on	the	basilar	membrane	stimulate	the	auditory	nerve	that	has	around	30,000	neurons	taking	information	to	the	central	nervous	system	(Moore	2012:	38).	We	have	no	phenomenal	
sense	of	sounds	as	waves.	Introspection	has	little	application	in	determining	the	contents	of	audition118.	
                                                        
 
The auditory perception of the position of sound in the environment involves the perception of sound localization 
cues, the Interaural Time Delay (ITD) and the Interaural Level Delay (ILD). The ITD applies to lower frequency sounds 
that bend around the head causing diffraction of sound and a time difference between the arrival at the sound at one 
ear and the arrival at the sound at another ear (<~ 1500hz for a head circumference of 21cm). The ILD applies to 
higher frequency sounds that have a smaller wavelength (above 1800hz) where the listener’s head causes a shadow 
resulting in a difference in decibel levels in each ear. This also applies to lower frequency sounds heard at close 
proximity. The localization cues allow for the perception of the sound’s positioning along the horizontal plane 
(azimuth). The morphology of the listener, the shape of the pinnae, (outer ear), their head, hair and body affects the 
time at which the sound reaches each ear. Distance from the sound source can reduce perception of ILD, making 
localization determined by level difference harder to perceive at greater distances. Each pinnae filters the sound and 
the same sound presents differently to each ear in relation to the angle of the head. This contributes to the 
perception of elevation and helps the listener to determine whether the sound is located in front or behind them 
(Moore 2012: 251) (Begault 1994:42). The head also causes ‘blind spots’ in the perception of the source location, 
known as ‘the cone of confusion’ (Moore 2012: 262). Head movements can mitigate this effect and help to establish 
the perception of the sound source on the vertical plane.  Moore suggests that the pinnae themselves modify the 
spectral cues and are important for clarifying positioning on the vertical plane 
 
118 Binaural recording techniques can mimic these cues by using a dummy head with replica ears or in-ear binaural 
mics worn by the sound recordist. The head-related-transfer-function (HRTF) gives a measurement of the “spectral 
filtering of the sound source before it reaches the ear drum” (Begault 1994:52) produced by the pinnae. The HRTF is 
unique for each listener and as a result averaged HRTF used in postproduction processing of mono recordings can only 
be approximate for the individual listener. The spectral filtering that is encoded in recordings made with in-ear 
binaural mics is specific to the recordist’s pinnae and morphology and therefore this can (to some degree) affect the 
perception of elevation and frontal and backward planes (Begault 1994:53) (Nicol 2010: 20) for other listeners.   
 
Psychoacoustics of hearing examines the relationships between the physical characteristics of sound and its 
perception and interpretation by listeners (Begault 1997: xii). The auditory perception of the position of sound in the 
environment involves the perception of sound localization cues, the Interaural Time Delay (ITD) and the Interaural 
Level Delay (ILD). The ITD applies to lower frequency sounds that bend around the head causing diffraction of sound 
and a time difference between the arrival at the sound at one ear and the arrival at the sound at another ear (<~ 
1500hz for a head circumference of 21cm). The ILD applies to higher frequency sounds that have a smaller wavelength 
(above 1800hz) where the listener’s head causes a shadow resulting in a difference in decibel levels in each ear. This 
also applies to lower frequency sounds heard at close proximity.  
 
The localization cues allow for the perception of the sound’s positioning along the horizontal plane (azimuth). The 
morphology of the listener, the shape of the pinnae, (outer ear), their head, hair and body affects the time at which 
the sound reaches each ear. Distance from the sound source can reduce perception of ILD, making localization 
determined by level difference harder to perceive at greater distances. Each pinnae filters the sound and the same 
sound presents differently to each ear in relation to the angle of the head. This contributes to the perception of 
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Perception	in	complex	environments	is	the	norm	and	our	experience	of	the	world	is	predominately	coherent.	Stein	and	Meredith	(1993:	124-136)	claim	that	integration	of	sensory	modalities	is	a	feature	of	perception	exhibited	across	species,	behaviourally	and	neurologically,	both	structurally	and	at	the	level	of	the	single	neuron.	Multisensory	neurons	synthesize	stimuli	across	sensory	modalities.	Types	of	sensory	stimuli	differ	in	terms	of	their	saliency	in	a	given	situation	(Stein	&	Meredith	1993:	123).	In	a	complex	environment	what	determines	which	stimuli	are	most	likely	to	result	in	the	particular	instance	of	neuronal	integration,	at	a	given	time	and	context,	is	their	causal,	proximal	and	temporal	relations,	rather	than	because	certain	types	of	stimuli,	such	as	vision	are	prioritized	by	the	sensory	systems.	Sounds,	for	example,	that	seem	to	be	located	in	space	together	with	a	related	visual	correlate,	are	more	likely	to	be	synthesized	in	perception.	Stein	and	Meredith	draw	this	conclusion	based	on	the	measurement	of	enhanced	or	depressed	neuronal	response	to	stimuli.			Shams	&	Kim	(2010:	269)	consider	that	multimodal	integration	occurs	across	perceptual	domains	and	also	that	the	privileging	of	one	sensory	stimuli	over	another	may	be	an	explanation	for	experiences	of	misperception.		This	is	given	as	an	explanation	for	the	‘McGurk	Effect’	(McGurk	&	MacDonald	1976).119	Stimuli	from	different	modalities	can	be	integrated,	
                                                        
elevation and helps the listener to determine whether the sound is located in front or behind them (Moore 2012: 251) 
(Begault 1994:42). The head also causes ‘blind spots’ in the perception of the source location, known as ‘the cone of 
confusion’ (Moore 2012: 262). Head movements can mitigate this effect and help to establish the perception of the 
sound source on the vertical plane.  Moore suggests that the pinnae themselves modify the spectral cues and are 
important for clarifying positioning on the vertical plane.118 
 
 
119 McGurk & MacDonald’s (1976) experiments showed that participants watching a video of mouthing lips synced 
with the sound of a similar word with a different phoneme (ba & ga) led to many of participants hearing a 
combination of the two words (da), known as the McGurk Effect, where with visual cues ‘dominate’ auditory cues. 
There are a number of individual, linguistic and environmental factors that affect cross-modal interpretation of 
stimuli, this repeatable phenomenon points towards the instability of perception. The ventriloquism effect also 
		
 
 
 
 
188 
partially	integrated	or	segregated,	according	to	the	congruence	between	the	stimuli.	This	is	predicated	upon	the	notion	of	‘inference’	where	the	nervous	system	infers	the	likelihood	of	stimuli	to	belong	to	the	same	perception	(Körding	et	al	2007:	1).			J.	J.	Gibson	argues	that	perception	or	“information	pickup”,	requires	perceptual	systems,	by	which	he	refers	to	activities	of	“…looking,	listening,	touching,	tasting,	or	sniffing…”,	situated	in	the	environment.	The	function	of	the	perceptual	system	is	to	“…orientate	to	the	environment	to	“investigate,	adjust,	optimize,	resonate,	extract	and	to	come	to	an	equilibrium”,	rather	than	individuated	senses	producing	particular	sensory	experience	(1986:	244).	Gibson	(1986:	142)	suggests	that	illusions	experienced	in	the	environment	are	the	result	of	misperceptions,	such	as	not	noticing	the	door	that’s	made	of	glass	when	we	attempt	to	go	outside.	For	Gibson,	these	types	of	misperceptions	are	of	a	different	order	to	those	of	pictorial	illusions,	on	three	counts:		
	
• “Aperture	vision”,	pictures	are	viewed	in	a	particular	way;	
• Looking	at	2D	pictures	is	not	how	we	perceive	the	environment	(pictures	have	two	types	of	surfaces	those	of	the	paper	and	those	depicted)	
• Pictorial	depictions	can	contain	impossibilities	“ecological	contradiction”,	that	do	not	occur	in	the	environment		
	When	James	writes	that	“there	is	no	intervening	mental	image”	(ERE	1912:	12),	he	is	positing	that	there	are	no	mental	‘pictures’	between	objects	and	perception.	This	presents	one	take	on	direct	realism.	In,	An	Ecological	Approach	to	Visual	Perception,	Gibson	(1986	[1977]:	244),	
                                                        
illustrates that if our attention is sufficiently focused on the dummy we perceive it to be speaking, rather than the 
performer. 
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argues	that	perception	occurs	in	an	animal	acting	in	its	surrounding	environment.	It’s	body,	head,	eyes	adjusting	as	part	of	the	perceptual	system	that	directly	perceives	invariants	and	affordances	in	the	environment.		Alva	Noë	(2012:	123)	defends	Gibson’s	position	concerning	the	role	of	action	in	perception	against	those	who	argue	that	perception	is	first	a	matter	of	categorization	and	then	a	matter	of	what	the	properties	an	object	affords.	He	states	that	categories	and	qualities	are	implicit	in	direct	perception	through	the	understanding	we	bring	to	it.	Contemporary	pragmatists	express	varying	positions	on	the	function	of	representation	in	perception	at	different	levels	of	cognitive	awareness,	and	the	extent	to	which	intentionality	is	derivative	of	linguistic	norms.		In	Descartes’	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy	([1641]	2008:	AT	1:	19)	the	narrator	starts	from	a	position	of	doubt:	Am	I	dreaming?	In	the	distance	the	tower	is	certainly	round	but	approaching	he	sees	that	it	is	square.	A	piece	of	wax	held	in	the	hand	has	definite	qualities,	yet	next	to	the	fire	its	shape	and	fragrance	are	altered.	How	can	we	trust	our	senses	when	things	have	different	‘modes’	of	appearing?	([1641]	2008:	AT	2:	32)	Immediately	felt	sensations,	he	states,	cause	nerves	to	travel	through	the	body	to	the	brain	that	are	represented	as	‘ideas’	to	the	mind.	While	we	believe	our	ideas	correspond	to	the	world	they	are	often	in	error.	Whereas	the	intellect	apprehends	ideas,	such	as	mathematics	and	geometry	as	true,	independent	of	the	thinker.	Descartes	concludes	that	the	mind	is	of	a	distinctly	different	nature	to	the	body.		From	Descartes’	dualism	is	the	view	that	our	perceptions	are	representative	and	misrepresentive	of	the	world,	and	that	the	content	of	hallucinations,	and	that	of	veridical	perception,	is	a	mind-dependent,	subjective	experience	of	reality.	These	positions,	often	
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categorized	as	‘The	Argument	from	Illusion’,	rest	upon,	A.	D.	Smith	(2002:	16)	argues,	an	erroneous	identity	claim	–	that	the	content	of	perception	and	the	content	of	subjective	experience	are	identical.	Existent	objects	are	not	literally	what	is	in	our	head,	and	empirical	science	has	framed	the	‘transformation’	from	sensory	stimuli	to	perception	in	varying	forms	of	intervening	representations,	consistent	with	the	Cartesian	dualist	‘idea’,	or	the	later	Russellian	‘sense	data’	(Russell	1910:	181).	
	
	
Perception	and	scientific	naturalism		Denham	and	Winkler’s	(2015:	601)	cognitive	neuroscience	account	of	auditory	perception	differentiates	between	the	brain’s	tracking	of	sound	features	and	the	recognition	of	patterns,	from	interpretation	and	meaning.	The	temporally	happening	environmental	context	provides	a	constraint	for	predicting	the	likely	source	of	the	sound.	For	the	sources	of	sounds	to	be	identified,	analysis	over	time	is	required.	Hearing	the	clock	strike	three	requires	the	recognition	of	a	sequence.	Associations	are	formed	between	incoming	sounds	and	the	persistent	“mental	representations”	(memories)	of	those	sounds	just	past.	The	composite	pressure	waves	in	the	ear	are	grouped	into	features,	in	order	that	they	can	be	interpreted,	in	a	process	that	Bregman	(1994:	11,	33)	characterizes	as	auditory	scene	analysis.		For	interpretation	to	be	timely,	Denham	and	Winkler	suggest	that	“perceptual	representations”	should	be	predictive	and	flexible.	Two	types	of	representations	can	be	identified	in	their	account,	current	“mental	representations”	of	auditory	features	and	those	of	existing	“schema”	–	patterns	of	features	associated	with	types	of	sound	sources	within	long-term	memories.	However,	they	(2012:	79)	argue	that	perception	is	not	necessarily	a	stable	state.	In	auditory	streaming	experiments	switching	between	interpretations	can	occur	when	listening	to	
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sequences	of	pure	tones.	This	phenomenon	known	as	multistability,	whose	function	is	posited	to	be	for	flexible	responsiveness	to	changing	environmental	conditions.		Discrimination,	reflex	actions	and	for	the	most	part	the	physical	functioning	of	our	body	occurs	below	our	level	of	awareness.	When	we	are	awake,	there	are	simultaneously	cognitive	functions	that	we	are	aware	of	and	those	that	we	are	not.	Uriah	Kreigel	(2014:	166)	says	that	the	naturalistic	account	of	perception	describes	brain	functions	that	“track”	the	environment.	Kreigel	describes	this	information	is	taken	to	be	objective	and	identical	with	the	content	of	mental	states.	Kreigel’s	‘Adverbial’	challenge	to	this	account	says	that	we	can	conceive	of	the	case	where	we	have	‘apple-ish’	experiences,	such	as	experiencing	the	taste	of	an	apple,	without	the	perceptual	experience	of	apple-like	properties	(no	apple	present).	A	brain-in-the-vat,	hypothetically,	has	experiences	of	an	apple	identical	to	that	of	a	person	tasting	an	apple,	without	the	apple’s	objective	presence	–	The	‘tracking’	account	of	intentionality	does	not	capture	the	situations	in	which	subjective	experiences	are	intentionally	directed	towards	content,	they	represent	apple-ish	features	but	they	do	not	‘track’	the	environmental	presence	of	apples.	Kreigel	cites	Putnam’s	(1975)	essay,	‘The	Meaning	of	“Meaning”’,	that	argues	that	internal	tracking	states	are	second-order	representations	of	first	order	objective	representations	of	things	in	the	world,	therefore	subjective	states	only	track	the	states	of	the	first	order	representations	of	the	environment.	Kreigel	(2014:	18)	suggests	that	a	non-reductive	account	of	intentionality	understands	objective	representation	–	‘tracking’	and	
subjective	representation	–	phenomenal	appearances,	as	different	sorts	of	representation.		
	Neuroscientist	Andy	Clark’s	connectionist	approach	takes	a	physicalist	stance	that	acknowledges	the	role	of	the	environment	in	perception,	while	rejecting	non-
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representationalism.	He	(2003:8)	argues	that	although	some	actions	and	perceptions	could	be	‘neuronally	wired’	for	“simple	automatic	routines”	in	response	to	environmental	invariants,	such	as	in	Marr’s	(1982:	32-33)	example	of	the	possibility	of	a	fly’s	wings	automatically	flapping	as	its	feet	loose	contact	with	the	ground,	they	cannot	account	for	abstract	and	imaginary	mental	images.	Clark	argues	that	it	is	hard	to	see	how	this	model	for	non-representation,	where	all	operations	are	ecologically	triggered,	could	be	scaled	up	to	account	for	human	brain	functions.			Connectionism	(2003:5-6),	for	Clark,	like	Turing’s	(1950:	433)120	approach,	describes	a	skill-based	model	of	reason	that	operates	in	an	abstract	space,	using	logical	structures	to	combine	symbols	to	produce	‘mechanical’	reason.	Association	of	ideas	takes	place	through	the	recombining	of	symbols	determined	by	the	rules	of	the	structure,	without	any	particular	sense	attributed	to	the	individual	symbols.	Rational	thought	is	mechanically	possible	through	various	types	of	‘inference’	that	consist	of	inputs	that	are	broadly	sensory	perceptions	and	outputs	that	are	broadly	motor.	The	difference	between	the	approaches,	Clark	argues,	is	that	the	Turing-Fodor	classical	model	of	reason	is	based	upon	“symbol-guided	state	transitions”	that	operate	within	a	“sequential	quasi-linguistic	system”,	whereas	from	a	connectionist	perspective	the	brain	is	understood	and	reason	is	framed	as	a	“prototype-style	knowledge	
guiding	vector-to-vector	transformations”	(Clark	2003:	8).	Both	models	see	rational	thought	
                                                        
 
120 Influenced by the formalist programme of mathematics, information processing and computational, analogies for 
the brain have been used as metaphors and also as models for brain functioning and cognition. Turing (1950) 
describes the premise of a machine that can potentially be mistaken for a human intelligence. A pre-programmed 
device operates systematically. It receives an input signal, such as light switched on or the engagement of a cog. The 
input results in a particular state – ‘cog engaged’. This state produces a predetermined output, actions or further 
states, according to its “rule book”, or system. “The internal state at any moment is determined by the last state and 
input signal.” (1950: 7).		
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and	actions	as	based	upon	the	brain	and	perceptual	system’s	ability	to	represent	the	relevant	current	state	and	perform	operations	that	relate	non-semantic	elements	to	internal	representations,	resulting	in	further	representations	and	actions.		“One	important	source	of	the	difference	lies	in	the	way	the	connectionist	system	typically	acquires	the	connection	weights	that	act	both	as	knowledge-store	and	processing-engine.	Such	weightings	are	
acquired	by	exposing	the	system	to	a	wide	range	of	exemplars	(training	instances)”	(Clark	2003:	7)		
	Clark	(2003:	18)	argues	that	emotional	responses	also	contribute	to	rational	thought,	based	on	accumulated	knowledge	of	“choosing	and	acting”.	Connectionism	puts	forward	“quick	and	dirty	heuristics	based	on	“prototype	reasoning”	with	a	second	level	“connectivity-pattern	search”	to	address	global	knowledge	searches	and	the	problem	of	abductive	reasoning	–	finding	the	best	possible	explanation	that	makes	sense	in	the	situation.	The	advantage	Clark	(2003:14)	says	is	that	abductive	reasoning	may	require	knowledge	that	is	hidden	anywhere	in	system	and	not	just	that	which	is	linked	by	syntax.	
	
	
Experience	of	perception		The	movement	between	perceptions	and	thoughts	can	be	affected	by	our	habits,	preconceptions,	misjudgements,	emotions,	environmental	conditions	and	misperceptions.	James	says	our	perception	“is	of	definite	and	probable	things”	(1890b:	82),	that	rectangular	tables	“present”	“two	obtuse	angles”	that	are	foreshortened	and	circular	rugs	as	“ellipses”,	yet	we	see	these	shapes	in	their	“normal	position”	(1890b:	239).	Of	the	many	ways	that	a	table	can	present	we	see	the	table	as	the	same	object.		
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He	argues	we	learn	to	what	“optical	‘reality’”	(PP	1890b:	240)	the	oblique	presentation	of	the	table	is.	The	law	of	economy	means	that	we	attend	to	the	“sign”	that	is	fixed,	as	table,	and	not	to	the	multiple	changeable	ways	in	which	it	presents	itself.	There	is	a	difference	between	the	optical	presentation	and	seeing	the	“sign”.	If	there	are	strong	relations	between	a	sense	perception	and	an	association	such	as	familiar	faces,	places	and	objects	then	these	are	recognised	and	named	straight	away,	James	says.	Those	sense	perceptions	that	are	ambiguous,	that	vacillate	between	one	thing	and	another,	can	only	be	described	as	the	“PROBABLE”	(1890b:	82)	thing	that	most	usually	gives	us	that	sensation.		Our	immediate	experience	of	the	world	is	one	that	appears	‘fully	rendered’,	and	within	an	expected	range,	accessible	to	us.	Kevin	O’Regan	&	Alva	Noë121	(2002:	567)	and	Noë	&	Evan	Thompson	(2004:	5)	question	whether	sensory	stimulation	and	neural	activity	is	sufficient	to	give	rise	to	perception	and	put	forward	a	sensor-motor	approach	that	describes	vision	as	an	
                                                        
 
121 Shapiro’s (2011) literature review of embodied cognition argues that classical cognitive psychology already 
acknowledges the role of body in perception and cognition, as the sensory input that results in symbolically encoded 
output. Embodied cognition, he suggests challenges the existing computational models by re-examining the intra and 
inter relationships of cognition, the body and the environment. The field of embodied cognition Shapiro argues is 
characterised by three approaches, ‘conceptualization’, ‘replacement’ and ‘constitution’. Proponents of 
‘conceptualization’, he argues, see embodied cognition as constrained and defined by the limits of the perceiver’s 
body. ‘Replacement’ refers to approaches that frame the mind-body-environment as a dynamic system of 
relationships, substituting the classical computational cognitive model of the brain. J.J. Gibson’s (1979) ecological 
approach to vision is attributed as a forerunner this position, positing causal relationships between perception, bodily 
movement and cognition.  The third conception of embodied cognition is the ‘constitution’ thesis that develops the 
existing computational model to argue that cognition extends beyond the brain and into the body as ‘extensions of 
mind’, as put forward by proponents such as Andy Clark (1997, 2008). 
 
Neuroscience research (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), (Clark 1997), (Barsalou 2009) (Gazzola & Keysers 2008) has been 
used to support the conceptualization and constitution positions of embodied cognition. Voluntary action, prior to 
performance by the body, occurs through the representation of motor and perceptual processes in neural structures 
(Decety & Stevens 2009:3). Neuronal imaging has shown that when thinking about a movement, patterns of neurons 
fire in areas of the brain associated with imagining the movement and also in areas of the brain associated with the 
performance of the motor action (Decety & Stevens 2009) (Decety et al 1994) (Rizzolatti et al 1992). These findings 
suggest that physical movement and thinking about physical movement have neurological correlates. This has 
particular relevance to the discussion of simulation, movement and the imaginary experience within virtual spaces. 
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exploratory	process	occurring	within	the	environment.	The	mistaking	of	a	virtual	environment	for	the	existent	world	is	difficult	to	achieve,	arguably	not	just	because	of	current	technical	limitations	but	our	perception	is	predicated	upon	establishing	patterns	and	differences;	as	Gibson	(1986	[1977]:	205)	122	describes,	we	perceive	invariants	in	our	environment.			As	Noë	(2004:	49)	notes,	our	field	of	vision	is	narrow	and	blurred	at	the	edges.	Turning	our	head	moves	this	focused	vision,	enabling	us	to	see	(and	hear)	more,	giving	the	impression	of	continuity.	While	these	phenomena	have	been	used	to	support	the	sceptical	argument	that	our	world	is	a	‘Grand	Illusion’,123	an	illusionary	product	of	the	brain,	Noë	(2009:	141)	(2012:	18,	29)	refutes	this	in	an	opposite	move,	saying	what	makes	the	world	seem	available	is	having	access	to	it.	Perception	is	a	matter	of	access.	Static	vision	is	limited	and	partial	but	the	movement	of	our	eyes	increases	access,	as	does	our	head	and	body.	Noë	argues	that	our	susceptibility	to	illusions	does	not	necessitate	that	there	are	perceptual	‘sense	data’,	that	are	in	turn	faulty,	or	that	our	perception	is	fundamentally	illusionary,	but	that	they	reveal	“our	context-bound	performance	limitations”	(2009:	142).	“Perceptual	consciousness”	for	Noë	(2012:	24)	is	“relational”;	it	is	a	type	of	intentional	directness	towards	objects.	Despite	this	selectivity	there	is	redundancy	in	perception.	Sensory	integration	and	amodal	functioning	place	us	in	a	perceptual	system	operating	in	the	environment	(Gibson	1986	[1977]):	205).	Covering	an	eye	will	provide	a	certain	degree	of	depth	perception	and	of	sound	localization	is	still	possible	while	covering	one	ear.		
                                                        
122 J.J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hove: Taylor & Frances, 1986 [1977], p. 205. 
 
123 The term Grand Illusion was coined by Noë, Thompson and Pessoa in 2002 
Noë (2002) ‘Is the World a Grand Illusion’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, No. 5–6, 2002, pp. 1–12 
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Attention124		The	effects	of	attention	are	to	allow	us	to	“perceive”,	“conceive”,	“distinguish”,	“remember”,	“shorten	reaction	time”	and	“analyse	and	relate	to	things”,	James	(PP	1890a:	425-426)	summarises.	Attention	creates	a	context	for	our	thoughts	and	our	perception	of	objects	is	affected	by	what	we	attend	to.	If	an	object	is	not	attended	to	it	in	can	be	in	the	perceptual	field	without	us	necessarily	having	an	awareness	of	its	presence.			
“My	experience	is	what	I	agree	to	attend	to.	Only	those	items	which	I	
notice	shape	my	mind	without	selective	interest,	experience	is	an	utter	
chaos.	Interest	alone	gives	accent	and	emphasis,	light	and	shade,	background	and	foreground	intelligible	perspective,	in	a	word.”	(PP	1890a:	402)		Citing	Helmholtz’s	(1925	[1867]:	32)	experiments	in	retinal	rivalry,	James	(PP	1890a:	421)	argues	that	one	image	is	usually	attended	to	first	then	the	other,	unless	a	specific	task	is	assigned	such	as	counting	or	observing	particular	features	that	engage	attention	in	both	simultaneously.			We	know,	contrary	to	appearances,	that	our	sensory	perception	is	selective.	Our	attention	focused	on	an	announcement	in	a	train	station	is	heard,	but	that	the	conversation	occurring	simultaneously	next	to	us	is	not.	Colin	Cherry’s	(1953)	study	of	selective	attention	describes	the	“cocktail	party	problem”	–	our	ability	to	identify	our	friend’s	voice	on	the	other	side	of	a	noisy	room.	Studies	in	change	and	inattention	blindness	demonstrate	that	we	fail	to	perceive	
                                                        
124 “Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of 
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness 
are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition 
which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state which in French is called distraction, and 
Zerstreutheit in German.” (PP James 1890a: 403-404) 
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those	things	before	our	eyes	that	our	attention	is	not	focused	upon.	Simons	&	Chabris’	(1999:	1059)	study	of	participants	counting	basketball	scores	failed	to	notice	the	individual	in	gorilla	suit	wandering	onto	the	court!		James	(1890b:	185-186)	argues	that	by	moving	our	attention	objects	come	onto	view	that	are	
fringed	with	other	objects	that	are	just	out	of	sight.			 “…these	constant	changes	every	field	of	seen	things	comes	at	last	to	be	thought	of	as	always	having	a	fringe	of	other	things	possible	to	be	seen	spreading	in	all	directions	round	about	it.”	(1890b:	186)			For	James	(1890b:	311),	reality	is	a	belief	that	is	relative	to	particular	circumstances.	What	is	taken	as	real	depends	upon	our	relations	to	that	object	and	their	particulars:	our	attention	to	the	object,	it’s	vividness,	the	sensations	and	emotions	we	connect	to	it,	it	congruence	with	the	system	of	objects	and	relations.			
Suggestion	
	
	James	(1890a:	434)	differentiates	between	“sensorial	attention”,	the	directing	of	the	sensory	organs	“whether	immediate	and	reflex,	or	derived”	and	“intellectual	attention”	“attention	to	the	idea	of	a	sensible	object”	that	involves	sensorial	attention	and	both	these	processes	are	“coexist”	in	all	attentional	acts,	directed	at	concrete	objects.		Hearing	footsteps	and	a	door	closing	can	provide	sufficient	information	to	give	us	the	impression	that	someone	has	entered	the	room,	although	until	we	turn	around	and	verify	this	assumption	it	remains	just	that.	The	potential	of	focused	attention	and	suggestion	to	prime	
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the	listener	for	perceiving	have	long	been	known	but	were	laterally	formalised	in	1855	in	psychophysical	research	conducted	by	the	Scottish	surgeon,	James	Braid	(Kilstrom,	2012:	21-22).	William	James’	own	experimental	psychological	research	described	in	The	Principles	of	
Psychology	(PP	1890:	600)	observed	that	hypnotism	involved	focused	attention	coupled	with	the	disassociation	of	background	ideas.	Recent	neuroscience	research	suggests	a	similar	interpretation.	David	Spiegel	(2012:	81)	defines	hypnosis	as	“…a	state	of	highly	focused	attention	coupled	with	reduced	peripheral	awareness.”			While	evidence	for	the	functional	brain	basis	of	a	distinctive	hypnotic	‘state’	is	debated,	the	attention	focusing	techniques	of	hypnotic	induction,	followed	by	visual	or	aural	suggestion	claims	have	been	made	that	there	is	a	“…a	top-down	resetting	of	perceptual	response…”(Hoeft,	et	al.:	2012,	p.1064)	that	can	affect	visual	(Muller	et	al.	2012:	164-9)	auditory,	somatosensory	and	pain	perception,	in	some	in	highly	hypnotizable	individuals.125	With	or	without	a	formal	hypnotic	induction,	narrative	can	become	an	evocative	imaginative	stimulus	for	directing	thoughts,	characterised	as	being	“transported”	to	narrative	worlds,	as	Richard	Gerrig’s	(1993:	5)	metaphor	expresses	in	his	psychological	study	of	reading.			
Wittgenstein	and	‘seeing-as’		
	
                                                        
 
125 Hypnotic suggestion has been interpreted as affecting attention and altering visual, auditory, somatosensory and 
pain perception (Spiegel 2008:185). The ‘Stoop Effect’ was reduced in some participants who had undergone 
experiments using hypnotic suggestion (Raz et al 2002: 1155). In recent fMRI studies (Müller et al 2012: 164) describe 
increased activation of neuronal motor imagery in participants during hypnotic suggestion. If perception can be 
affected through focused attention and suggestion, narrative experiences can potentially affect the phenomenal 
experience of represented and imagined locations. 
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Taking	the	“‘organisation’	of	a	visual	impression”	to	be	at	the	same	“level”	as	seeing	colours	and	shapes	is	taking	the	visual	impression	to	be	an	object	and	one	which	is	unstable,	“a	strangely	vacillating	object”,	says	Wittgenstein	(2009:	xi.	137).	While	James	argues	that	do	not	know	to	what	degree	concepts	affect	perception	and	to	what	extent	perceptions	affect	concepts.			 “The	universal	and	the	particular	parts	of	the	experience	are	literally	immersed	in	each	other,	and	both	are	indispensable.”	(James	SPP	1911:	107)			But	where	does	interpretation	begin	and	end?	There	is	no	strict	division	between	physical	seeing	as	objective	and	interpretation	as	subjective.	Both	framings	are	part	of	a	‘language-game’.	Wittgenstein’s	point	is	proceeded	by	James	(PP	1890a:	443),	who	says	we	only	see	what	we	“preperceive”.	Using	the	illustration	of	the	exercise	played	in	“kindergarten	instruction”,	James	describes	that	the	children	look	at	an	object,	a	“stuffed	bird”,	for	example,	and	call	out	all	the	names	of	parts	of	the	bird	they	have	already	learnt	terms	for.	It	may	take	them	along	time	to	notice	those	things	for	which	they	don’t	have	names	but	once	they	have	learnt	the	words	‘claws’	and	‘scales’	they	will	readily	recognize	them	as	part	of	the	bird	in	the	future.	“Every	perception	is	an	acquired	perception”	(James	PP	1890b:	78).				
Attitude		
	James	(PP	1890a	286)	suggests	that	objects	are	represented	to	our	self	as	a	“typical	attitude”.	When	we	describe	a	brick	as	being	darker	or	smoother	in	this	light	than	another,	we	have	in	mind	an	ideal	brick	about	which	we	make	the	judgement.		
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“The	selection	of	the	several	normal	appearances	from	out	of	the	jungle	of	our	optical	experiences,	to	serve	as	the	real	sights	of	which	we	shall	think,	is	psychologically	a	parallel	phenomenon	to	the	habit	of	thinking	in	words,	and	has	a	like	use.	Both	are	substitutions	of	terms	few	and	fixed	for	terms	manifold	and	vague.”	(James	PP	1980b:	240)			Wittgenstein	argues,	if	we	see	an	ambiguous	duck-rabbit	figure	as	a	rabbit,	we	can	reproduce	colours	and	shapes	in	a	drawing	and	say	this	is	what	we	see.	We	can	also	point	to	other	pictures	of	rabbits	and	say	this	also	what	we	see.	There	is	a	comparison	between	the	concepts	of	the	visual	contents	and	what	we	interpret	them	to	be.	“‘Seeing-as…’	is	not	part	of	the	perception”,	it	is	additional;	“…it	is	like	seeing	and	not	like	seeing”	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	137).	Perceiving	a	representation	of	a	fictional	place	as	existent	is	‘continuous	seeing’.	If	verisimilitude	is	disrupted,	a	different	aspect	“lights	up”	and	the	representation	is	seen	differently.		The	situation	is	often	reversed	in	the	experience	of	many	forms	of	narrative.	The	participant	begins	from	the	position	of	‘seeing-as’,	they	know	the	experience	is	mediated.	Arguably	in	a	process	of	becoming	engaged	in	the	narrative	‘seeing-as’	becomes	the	continuous	seeing	of	an	aspect.	For	James	and	Wittgenstein,	sensation	and	perception	are	mediated	below	the	level	of	awareness,	“seeing-as”,	is	an	addition	layer	of	interpretation.			
	
Framing	subjective	and	objective	perception		The	tone	of	voice	or	gesture	can	indicate	an	object	“becoming”	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	209)	an	aspect	of	appearing,	“as	if”	the	object	had	changed,	‘Ah!	I	see	the	rabbit	now’.	We	suddenly	see	
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an	object	as	a	certain	aspect,	where	the	idea	comes	“into	contact”	and	remains	for	“some	time”	with	the	“visual	impression”	(2009:	xi.	211).			 	“…it	is	as	if	an	idea	came	into	contact,	and	for	some	time	remained	in	contact,	with	the	visual	impression.”	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	211)			Wittgenstein	(2009:	xi.	214-19)	urges	us	to	reject	our	report	of	“this”,	as	our	“private	object”.	Perception,	he	says,	is	constantly	changing	but	we	do	not	remember	our	experience	in	this	way.	How	can	a	“conceptual	boundary”	be	drawn	between	different	perceived	aspects	of	
seeing	a	triangle	as	an	arrow,	a	kite	or	a	sail?	How	can	the	word	“felt”	mean	an	atmosphere	sensed	or	a	material	handled?		 “One	kind	of	aspect	might	be	called	‘organisational	aspects’.	When	the	aspect	changes,	parts	of	the	picture	belong	together	which	before	they	did	not.”	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	221)			When	we	see	a	different	aspect	of	an	image,	its	different	parts	“belong	together”126	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	221)	in	a	way	that	they	did	not	before,	as	when	we	see	the	duck	picture	as	a	rabbit	picture,	the	back	of	the	duck’s	head	becomes	the	rabbit’s	mouth.	But	in	order	to	see	the	image	as	a	duck	or	a	rabbit,	Wittgenstein	(2009:	xi.	222)	argues	we	first	need	those	concepts.	Having	certain	concepts	such	as	duck	or	rabbit	make	the	individual	capable	of	“doing”	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	223)	something,	to	report	their	experience	as.	This	type	of	concept	is	different	from	that	of	toothache	that	does	not	require	that	we	can	do	something,	he	claims.	We	can	comprehend	a	picture	of	an	animal	as	having	a	certain	posture	(Wittgenstein	2009:	xi.	225)	without	having	learned	a	specific	concept	to	describe	it.	The	comprehension	is	itself	part	of	a	language-game,	it	is	not	a	private	language	of	recognition.	Seeing	ambiguous	
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figures	as	depicting	things	in	different	ways	is	a	conceptual	rather	a	causal	problem	(2009:	xi.	183).		Ned	Block	(2003:	6)	(2010:	41)	argues	that	there	is	more	to	subjective	experience	than	the	representational	content	of	direct	awareness	and	on	these	grounds	he	critiques	both	direct	and	indirect	perception.	He	questions	whether	all	subjective	experience	is	solely	constituted	by	direct	perceptual	content.	He	argues	that	some	indeterminacy	in	perceptual	content	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	representational	content	but	those	changes	need	not	“correspond	with	the	phenomenal	experience	or	qualia.”	(2010:	24)	Block	draws	his	conclusions	from	empirical	experimental	evidence;	we	can	stare	with	fixed	eyes	at	an	object	but	move	our	attention	around	and	experience	different	phenomenal	properties,	changes	in	the	object’s	size,	shape,	intensity	and	viewpoint,	or	hear	the	same	sound	in	different	contexts	and	perceive	it	to	have	varying	intensities,	depending	upon	where	attention	is	focused,	but	that	these	changes	do	not	seem	to	be	“in	the	world”	(Block	2010:	53).	Block	notes	that	James	(PP	1890a:	426)	makes	a	related	observation,	our	feeling	of	attention	may	change	but	it	doesn’t	affect	that	we	“perceive	and	conceive	the	object	as	the	same”.			Block	argues	that	“representational	content”	is	vague	in	order	to	cope	with	“shifting	attention”	(2010:	55-56)	while	the	subjective	experience,	qualia	–	“mental	paint”	–	generally	appears	non-illusionary,	vivid,	and	timely.	Block	(2003:	167)	argues	against	the	strictly	functionalist	view,	putting	that	because	stimuli	“cause”	a	perceptual	experience	that	does	not	mean	stimuli	“constitute”	perceptual	experience	(2003:	23).	He	argues	that	perception	presents	qualities	not	concepts	of	qualities,	qualia	are	not	intentional,	functional	or	only	thoughts;	although	linguistic	philosophers	may	argue	that	you	cannot	separate	even	the	
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phenomenal	feeling	from	public	objects.	Wittgenstein	(2009	[1958]	viii.	57)	suggests,	that	even	if	we	don’t	know	the	name	of	a	feeling	we	use	normative	terms	to	describe	it.	In	Hilary	Putnam’s	(2013:	201)	recent	view	he	dismisses	his	earlier	linguistic	rejection	of	qualia,	agreeing	with	Block’s	naturalist	case	for	private	subjective	experiences,	defining	qualia	as	“non-conceptual	internal	states”	supported	by	the	experimental	evidence.				A	bush	can	change	its	shape	in	the	wind	but	we	do	not	specifically	label	its	different	shapes,	although	we	perceptually	register	them.	Are	there	phenomenal	properties	of	these	different	shapes?	Is	the	subjective	experience	tied	to	reflexive	awareness?	Does	perceptual	content	that	we	have	no	subjective	awareness	of,	such	as	in	cases	of	change	blindness,	have	a	phenomenal	character?				
Searle’s	account	of	direct	perception	and	intentionality		For	John	R.	Searle	(2015:	23)	‘The	Argument	from	Illusion’	and	‘The	Argument	from	Science’	rest	on	the	same	fallacy,	that	both	veridical	experience	and	hallucination	have	a	common	element	–	an	identical	subjective	experience,	awareness	of	“something”.	127	While	in	the	case	of	the	hallucination	awareness	is	of	a	mental	object,	the	erroneous	conclusion	is	drawn	that	both	veridical	perception	and	hallucinations	are	representations,	‘ideas’	or	‘sense-data’.	On	these	accounts	perceptual	experience	is	taken	to	be	a	subjective	experience	of	reality	resulting	in	the	question,	‘how	it	is	possible	for	objective	facts	to	be	known?’	potentially	leading	to	sceptical	conclusions.		Searle’s	alternative	view	suggests	that	objects	cause	
                                                        
 
127 What Searle refers to as “the Bad Argument in the history of Western epistemology” (2015: 23) 
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perceptual	experiences	and	their	subjective	intentional	content.	Perceptual	experiences	are	therefore	“casually	self-reflexive”	(Searle	2015:	5,	22),	allowing	for	a	naturalistic	account	of	perceptual	processes	that	involve	representation	between	the	brain’s	objective	tracking	of	the	environment	and	subjective	reporting	on	the	experience.			Searle	(2015:	76)	rejects	that	the	term	‘qualia’	is	required	on	the	grounds	that	all	conscious	experience	is	qualitative.	He	characterizes	perception	as	both	unconscious	and	conscious	subjective	intentional	experience,	distinguishing	between	ontological	objectivity	–	those	things	that	exist,	such	as	mountains	and	tables	and	ontological	subjectivity,	and	those	things	that	only	exist	for	the	animal,	such	as	pains	or	feelings	(Searle	2015:	14).	In	doing	so	he	classifies	epistemological	objectivity	as	knowledge	claims	that	can	be	verified	and	epistemological	subjectivity	as	those	that	are	a	matter	of	opinion.	He	(2015:	14)	argues	that	intentionality	is	central	to	an	account	of	perception	but	rejects	that	this	should	be	framed	as	the	brain	representing	physical	objects,	rather,	for	Searle,	perception	is	a	direct	presentation.			Searle’s	(2015:	24)	remedy	is	the	specification	of	what	is	meant	by	awareness.	Perception	involves	the	objective	awareness	of	an	object,	a	pen,	and	the	reporting	on	the	experience	–	the	
subjective	awareness	of	how	the	pen	looks	or	feels.	The	first	is	an	intentional	relation	between	the	perceiver	and	the	object	–	the	table	whose	existence	causes	the	“conditions	of	satisfaction”	of	the	perception.128	The	second	is	a	subjective	experience	of	feeling	the	table,	an	awareness	of	“identity”129	or	reflexive	awareness	of	the	experience.	In	the	case	of	veridical	perception,	
                                                        
 
128 For Searle (2015: 5, 41) Perceptual experiences “require reference to the experience itself`” – they are “casually 
self reflexive.” “Perceptual experiences are direct presentations of their conditions of satisfaction, and they are 
experienced as caused by their conditions of satisfaction.” 
 
129 Searle is using identity in the sense that the object and the sensation are taken to be the same. (2015: 24) 
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the	object	and	the	sensation	of	the	object	are	identical.	In	the	case	of	a	hallucination,	the	subjective	experience	has	intentional	content	but	it	does	not	have	an	intentional	object	(Searle	2015:	25).		Searle	(2015:	74,	90)	takes	“all	perception”	to	be	a	presentation	of	a	particular	instance	of	an	object:	the	paper	on	the	desk	can	appear	white	and	in	the	afternoon	yellow.	Illusions,	he	says	after	Wittgenstein	(1958:	Part	II,	xi,	194e),	are	a	particular	presentation	of	an	object,	“seeing-as”;	from	this	perspective	perception	is	a	representation.	However,	existent	objects	directly	
cause	objective	perception	and	the	subjective	reference	to	the	experience	itself	–	its	intentional	content.	On	Searle’s	account,	intentionality	is	caused	by	how	the	world	presents;	“a	direction	of	fit”	–	the	world	matches	what	is	believed;	and	it	has	“conditions	of	satisfaction”	(Searle	2015:	35,	57);	intentionality	contains	the	propositional	content	of	the	perception.	Intentional	states,	such	as	beliefs	and	desires	“determine	states	of	satisfaction”	in	the	context	of	a	“Network”	of	beliefs	and	desires.	This	is	also	the	case	for	perception	–	to	see	the	pen	as	a	rollerball,	a	“Network”	of	“Background	abilities”	are	required	for	intentionality	to	function	(Searle	2015:	12,	36).	
	In	experience,	when	the	table	is	correctly	perceived,	who	can	tell	which	parts	of	the	experience	is	sensation	and	which	are	ideas,	James	(2005	[1905]:	59)	asks?	The	extended	and	the	non-extended	fuse	together.	Whereas	Searle	says,	perception	has	a	world	to	mind	direction	of	fit,	the	perception	directly	causes	the	intentional	content.	Searle	then	goes	on	to	say	that	the	subjective	experience	is	a	mind	to	world	fit.	They	are	both	descriptions	of	direct	perception,	causing	subjective	intentionality.	Searle’s	account	of	intentionality	is	more	specific	
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in	the	differentiation	between	two	directions	of	fit,	as	Henry	Jackman	(1998:	161-162)	observes.	
	
	
An	analogy	towards	direct	perception	
	Two	problems:	The	ontological	problem	–	how	does	the	outside	‘world’	get	inside	the	‘mind’;	the	epistemological	problem	–	as	perception	is	interpreted	as	‘faulty’	how	do	we	know	what	is	real?	
	If	we	take	James,130	and	Searle’s	positions	that	perception	is	direct,	it	requires,	at	a	level	of	description	below	appearances,	that	we	reject	Cartesian	dualism	of	mind	and	body	and	that	of	the	brain	and	the	world.	We	can	think	of	pan	of	water.	As	the	water	boils	steam	rises.	We	do	not	say	that	the	steam	represents	the	water	in	its	new	state	or	that	a	butterfly	represents	the	caterpillar,	in	each	case	the	form	is	different	but	the	later	state	is	directly	the	result	of	the	former.	The	bell	clapper	hitting	the	side	of	the	bell	causes	the	movement	of	air	particles	in	a	mechanical	wave	that	passes	into	the	listener’s	outer	ear	into	fluid	in	the	middle	ear,	stimulating	hairs	and	causing	the	release	of	chemical	neurotransmitters	that	move	nerve	signals	along	to	the	auditory	nerve	to	the	auditory	cortex.	The	rate	of	change,	between	features	of	the	sound	(frequency,	intensity	and	pitch	and	proximity),	in	the	form	of	a	pattern	of	nerve	impulses,	is	matched	with	previous	pattern	schema.	The	sound	produced	by	its	source	
the	bell,	we	label	as	such	because	of	the	material	processes	by	which	we	come	to	say	we	
experience	the	bell.	The	bell	is	only	a	bell	when	our	objective	processes	of	perception	cause	
                                                        
 
130 James (1899: 14) at times leaves this position open and consistent with his pluralist philosophy contemplates the 
potential for mind to live on beyond death. 
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higher	level	cognitive	processes	to	be	directed	towards	the	object	leading	to	our	subjective	experience	where	we	can	talk	about	perception’s	object	and	content.	As	James	says,	our	experience	is	only	potentially	or	virtually	subjective	or	objective.	Perception	is	the	directly	caused	series	of	processes,	not	an	unmediated	correspondence	of	objects	in	the	world,	because	the	processes	happening	in	which	we	perceive,	monitor,	measure,	calculate	and	analyse	and	interpret	it,	is	what	we	know	it	to	be,	as	subjectively	reported	upon.					We	differentiate	between	types	of	knowledge	–	that	which	we	label	as	concrete	facts	and	that	which	we	say	are	imagined,	on	the	grounds	that	there	are	specifiable	qualitative	and	functional	differences	pertaining	to	particular	environmental	and	temporal	contexts:	James	posits	that	the	imagined	experience	is	less	vivid	in	contrast	to	the	world	around	you;	it	also	does	not	function	in	the	same	way	–	the	imagined	apple	can	only	be	bitten	by	an	imagined	mouth.			Denham	and	Winkler’s	representational	way	of	talking	about	the	auditory	system	gives	an	account	of	a	process	of	pattern	recognition.	Verification	of	these	claims	can	be	made,	in	James’	terms,	according	to	the	practical	benefits	that	are	deemed	to	be	its	consequences,	this	does	not	equate	to	epistemological	certainty	of	course.	Arguably	a	hallucination	of	an	object	(no	physical	object	present)	could	be	accounted	for	by	the	recall	of	‘pattern	schema’	posited	in	Denham	and	Winkler	neuroscience	account	of	auditory	perception	–	therefore	Kriegel’s	‘objective’	and	‘subjective’	types	of	representation	can	be	taken	as	continuous,	one	informing	the	other.	This	idea	dovetails	with	James’	account	of	perception	as	potentially	objective	or	subjective	–	the	objective	experience	of	stimuli	is	the	result	of	prior	experiences.	We	have	
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subjective	awareness	of	the	objective	sound	of	the	bell	and	we	can	have	a	bell-like	experience	in	volitional	recall	of	the	bell	that	has	recourse	to	objective	pattern	schema.				
	
The	problem	of	translation		
	James	repeatedly	uses	the	term	substitution	to	describe	how	language,	concepts	or	theories	substitute	and	“transform”	(SPP	1911:	185)	or	“translate”	experience	(PU	1909:	217).	Concepts	are	substitutes,	not	mirrors	of	realities.	James	(1912:	176)	asks	what	are	the	practical	consequences	of	particular	propositional	substitutions?	
	Nelson	Goodman	(1978:	92)	gives	the	example	of	a	psychophysical	experiment	where	an	observer	is	asked	to	report	how	many	flashes	of	light	they	see.	There	are	a	number	of	ambiguous	factors	that	the	observer	has	to	negotiate,	do	they	report	that	they	see	one	flash	when	they	know	there	to	be	two	closely	spaced	or	do	they	report	the	apparent	motion	that	they	see?	If	the	observer	is	given	a	“vocabulary”	that	specifies	how	they	should	report	their	observation	that	as	a	phenomenal	or	perceptual	observation	it	makes	the	conclusions	about	relations	between	the	physical	and	the	real	“pointless”,	he	says.	By	requiring	an	observer	to	use	a	particular	vocabulary	involves	a	“fashioning	of	facts”	that	makes	“any	identification”	between	the	physical,	real,	perceptual	and	the	apparent	highly	contingent.	Goodman	(1978:	93)	makes	the	point	we	cannot	say	what	is	necessarily	true	but	only	specify	the	frame	of	reference	in	which	the	descriptions	we	use	operate	within.	We	can	only	say	what	is	fact	and	what	is	fiction	in	terms	of	the	frames	of	reference	in	which	the	descriptions	we	use	operate.		Goodman	(1978:	93)	says	“…meanings	vanishes	into	certain	relationships	between	terms…”	and	therefore	facts	are	reduced	to	relations	in	which	translation	“routinely”	occurs.	
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				 “Worlds	are	made	by	making	such	versions	with	words,	numerals,	pictures,	sounds,	or	other	symbols	of	any	kind	in	any	medium;	and	the	comparative	study	of	these	versions	and	visions	and	of	their	making	is	what	I	call	a	critique	of	worldmaking.”	(1978:	94)			Rorty	(1979:	203	fn)	makes	the	observation	that	in	the	translation	between	theories	from	the	natural	sciences	to	intentional	language	–	“I	do	not	see	how	we	can	tell	when	we	have	stopped	describing	and	started	correlating	descriptions.”	Rorty	(1979:	205,	208)	argues	that	the	choice	of	vocabularies	is	a	difference	in	focus	or	scale	of	applicability,	rather	than	an	ontological	difference.	Different	vocabularies	can	have	different	spheres	of	application.	While	‘truth-functional	language’	(logic)	can	describe	the	universal,	intentional	language	can	describe	some	particular	parts	of	the	world,	such	as	feelings	and	beliefs	and	other	vocabularies	such	as	literary	theory,	political	theory,	history,	etc.	can	describe	other	parts	of	the	world.		The	challenge,	Brandom	(2006:	4)	explains,	is	to	show	how	target	vocabularies	can	be	reconstructed	from	the	base	vocabularies.	What	is	the	criterion	of	adequacy,	co-reference	or	supervenience?		 “…the	biggest	thing	that	ever	happened	to	it	[classical	analytical	philosophy]—is	the	pragmatist	challenge	to	it	that	was	mounted	during	the	middle	years	of	the	twentieth	century.	Generically,	this	movement	of	thought	amounts	to	a	displacement	from	the	center	of	philosophical	attention	of	the	notion	of	meaning	in	favor	of	that	of	use:	in	suitably	broad	senses	of	those	terms,	replacing	concern	with	semantics	by	concern	with	pragmatics.	The	towering	figure	behind	this	conceptual	sea-change	is,	of	course,	Wittgenstein.”	(2006:5)			Wilfred	Sellars,	position	is	that	empirical	base	vocabularies	are	not	autonomous	and	require	inference;	reference	to	natural	or	other	vocabularies	that	surrounds	the	use	of	base	language	
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(Brandon	2006:5).		While	Sellars	argues	that	phenomenal	vocabulary	is	also	not	autonomous	because	in	order	to	say	that	something	looks	‘red’	requires	the	proviso	that	circumstances	remain	the	same	in	order	to	say	it	looks	‘red’	while	making	the	statement	of	looking	red	provisional,	in	the	case	that	thing	may	not	stay	the	same.	For	Brandom,	if	this	description	of	phenomenal	language	is	correct	then	phenomenal	language	is	not	pragmatically	autonomous	–	it	is	part	of	a	wider	language	game,	it	cannot	be	said	that	something	looks	‘red’	without	understanding	what	‘red’	is.		‘Looks’	is	dependent	on	‘is’.	To	talk	about	how	something	looks	or	feels	(the	target	vocabulary)	rests	upon	the	base	vocabulary.	
	
Talking	of	the	auditory	system	as	a	process	of	pattern	recognition	is	an	objective	naturalist	characterisation	of	perception	–	that	our	experience	of	the	world	is	of	existent	objects	that	we	have	perceptual	access	to	via	representations.	On	this	view,	physical	objects	are	ontologically	distinct	from	concepts.	Empirical	verification	of	scientific	claims	requires	that	objects	exist	and	that	science	can	access	those	objects.	Linguistic	pragmatists	critique	the	epistemological	basis	of	objective	naturalism.	Huw	Price	(2004:	78)	and	Robert	Brandom	(2011:	12,	26)	reject	that	perceptual	experience	can	give	us	immediate	and	unprivileged	access	to	‘facts’,	‘data’	–	knowledge	of	the	world.			Huw	Price	(2004:	5)	questions	the	basis	of	scientific	naturalism	arguing	for	a	distinction	between	‘subject	naturalism’	–	the	view	that	we	are	natural	creatures,	from	‘object	naturalism’	–	the	view	that	there	are	natural	objects	that	science	can	study.	He	asks	if	reality	is	natural	how	do	you	distinguish	between	natural	and	non-natural	objects?	Ethics,	mathematics,	interpretation	and	meaning	are	often	taken	to	be	non-natural,	whereas	scientific	data	is	taken	to	be	natural	–	the	‘facts’	that	knowledge	rests	upon?	Price	(2004:	7-8)	
		
 
 
 
 
211 
argues	that	these	problems	“originate”	from	questions	around	language	and	its	use,	the	privileging	facts	and	data	by	designating	them	as	objectively	natural;	it	is	a	problem	of	
placement	–	how	we	assign	an	object	to	be	natural	or	otherwise.	The	“material	conception”	places	objects	by	assigning	them	terms	–	‘wood’	is	terminologically	distinguished	as	a	natural	object,	whereas	the	concept	of	‘quality’	is	terminologically	distinguished	as	a	non-natural.	The	
“linguistic	conception”	of	placement	says	“linguistic	behaviour”	rather	than	ontological	differences	determine	the	assignment	of	objects	as	natural	or	otherwise.			The	“representationalist	assumption”	Price	says,	is	framing	the	problem	as	a	“shift”	from	the	term	to	its	content	–	seeing	that	a	term	as	being	directed	towards,	standing	for	or	representing	something	that	is	a	non-linguistic	‘Given’131,	Price	argues.	To	say	that	a	table	is	
                                                        
 
131 Wilfred Sellars (1963: 128) draws attention to the assumptions, he says, that sense datum theories distinguish 
between the ‘sense-content’ and the relational act of sensing. He says those that hold this view commonly take 
‘sense-content’ (that which is perceived) to be the foundation of non-inferential empirical knowledge, while 
simultaneously holding the contradictory position that it is (unreliable) secondary qualities – ‘particulars’ – that are 
actually sensed, while non-inferential facts are not taken to be particulars. Sellars questions that either sense-data or 
non-inferential facts can either constitute, or be the foundations of knowledge. Sellars (1963: 161) says that 
sensations may be essential in forming associative connections with the concepts of the particulars of objects, 
however, red can be causally mediated by sensations of red, without the mistaken idea that the what is denoted by 
red are “really sensations” rather than “red physical objects”. What is denoted by red is the red object, not sensations. 
 
According to Sellars there is no pre-conceptual or pre-lingusitic knowledge. To have a concept of having a thought 
requires the linguistic concept of having a thought. Sellars questions that we have knowledge of the world because we 
have sensations and thoughts or that we have private concepts thoughts or sensations. Sellars (1963: 177) argues that 
to align awareness of thoughts with sensations is wrong. Instead he puts forward “…a modified form of the view that 
thoughts are linguistic episodes.” ‘The Myth of the Given’ is replaced with ‘The Myth of Jones’.  Sellars’s ‘The Myth of 
Jones’ separates “inner episodes” into two categories, thoughts and sensations. Where his model of inner thoughts is 
that which results from public language (1963: 187). In Sellar’s account thought comes before language so the 
individual does not know they are thinking until the thoughts are expressed in concepts – knowing requires concepts 
that are ‘public knowledge’ from language that is socially constructed.  
 
“My myth [of Jones] has shown that the fact that language is essentially an intersubjective 
achievement, and is learned in intersubjective contexts – a fact rightly stressed in modern 
psychologies of language, thus by B.F. Skinner, and by certain philosophers, e.g. Carnap, 
Wittgenstein – is compatible with the "privacy" of "innerepisodes." (Sellar’s 1963: 189) 
 
Sellar’s (1963: 170) echoes Peirce and Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning and the general – language acquires its 
meaning through its general shared usage. Knowledge for Sellars is not foundational, resting upon physical objects or 
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brown	is	to	make	a	truth	claim	about	the	table,	if	the	table	is	brown.	The	‘object	naturalist’	assumes	that	sentence	refers	to	a	non-linguistic	referent.	Price	(2004:	8)	rejects	there	is	a	“ladder”	leading	from	a	term	to	a	non-linguistic	object	and	also	Quine’s	view	there	is	a	“semantic	ascent”	from	an	utterance	to	the	object	to	which	the	sentence	refers.	Price	says	this	is	a	fallacy;	both	a	sentence,	and	the	object	to	which	it	refers,	are	just	different	“modes”	of	talking.	However,	for	an	‘object	naturalist’,	a	sentence	must	take	the	referent	to	be	non-linguistic	in	order	that	real	objects	to	exist	outside	of	language.132		There	is	a	discussion	on	both	sides	of	this	argument	a	path	that	leads	to	questions	of	translation	–	if	we	specify	our	account	of	the	world	linguistically	we	are	using	a	particular	‘vocabulary’	whose	base	language	–	subjective	accounts	of	experience	or	observational	reports	of	secondary	qualities,	in	Brandom’s	(2011:	86)	terms,	is	not	equivocal	with	the	target	language	–	the	translation	to	primary	qualities	or	theoretical	languages.	The	‘vocabularies’133	we	use	to	describe	observations,	whether	in	semantic-functional	terms,	or	natural	language	is	normative,	part	of	language	game.			Brandom	(2011:	12,	26)	does	not	see	a	conflict	with	scientific	explanations	of	representation	that	are	‘subpersonal’	–	cognitive	processes	that	occur	beneath	the	level	of	awareness.	He	distinguishes	between	these	‘causal’	representations	and	those	of	‘practical’	intentionality	–	
                                                        
sense-data, nor he says, conceived after Hegel as circular, but a “…it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any 
claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.” (1963: 170) 
 
132 But arguably this is a linguistic construing of the problem. Alternatively, by choosing to take the view that language 
as referential makes an ontological assertion that there are objects that function in the world, that distinguishes them 
from thoughts about objects or terms. This does not mean we cannot also agree with the linguistic argument that our 
awareness is mediated through language. 
 
133 Brandom (2011: 116) reminds us this is Rorty’s term. 
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(linguistic)	abilities	that	are	skill-based	adaptations	to	the	environment,	which	are	implicit	in	‘discursive’	intentionality	–	‘normative’	rule-based	representations	with	propositional	content	that	occur	at	the	‘personal’	level.	The	association	between	meaning	and	terms	in	natural	language	is	subject	to	its	use.	However,	Brandom	(2011:	116)	argues	that	translation	is	not	a	case	of	moving	from	a	normative	“meaning”	to	its	expression	as	a	“belief”.	Both	aspects	of	“discursive	activity”,	the	normative	language	that	mediates	our	perceptual	experience	and	the	use	of	language,	involve	applying	conceptual	norms	and	putting	in	place	new	concepts,	“every	concept	develops	its	content.”	(2011:	117).134	Judgements	in	the	form	of	propositions	are	basis	of	“discursive	practice”,	of	rationality	–	in	Brandom’s	(2011:	30)	mantra,	the	capability	of	“giving	and	asking	for	reasons”.	An	implication	for	Brandom	(2011:	160)	is	the	movement	from	an	emphasis	of	semantic	meaning	of	a	vocabulary,	to	the	pragmatic	concern	with	use,	and	the	role	of	Wittgenstein135	in	articulating	this	transition.			Brandom	(2011:	55)	argues	that	while	the	classical	pragmatists	acknowledge	the	normative	function	of	language136	they,	“…do	not	share	the…concern	with	language,	and	with	the	
discontinuities	with	nature	that	it	establishes	and	enforces.”	For	Brandom	(2011:198)	that	sensory	perception,	intentionality	and	language	can	have	transparent	meaning,	that	it	can	represent	the	world	he	rejects,	after	Rorty	and	Sellars,	leads	him	to	also	reject	the	idea	of	
                                                        
 
134 While Brandom (2011: 55) acknowledges a comparison can be drawn with Derrida’s theory of differénce, the 
deferment of meaning from signifier to signifier, he stresses (2011: 205) for the [linguistic] pragmatist perspective, the 
emphasis, is not on terms, but upon “declarative sentences”. 
 
135 Rorty (1979), Brandon (2011: 160), and many others, cite Wittgenstein’s role in the subsequent philosophical 
emphasis from meaning to (pragmatic) use. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein (2009: x. 90-94) shows 
reporting is normative use of language is a kind of “language-game” learnt as children. Semantic meaning isn’t 
sufficient; it is in the use of words and the context of utterance that meaning is inferred. Discussed further in Chapter 
3, 4 and 5 of this text.  
 
136 This point is evident in Peirce’s (1905b: 494) notion of general concepts. 
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experience.	It	is	the	experiential	dimension	of	judgement	that	Brandom	and	the	linguistic	pragmatists	reject,	while	James	takes	the	experiential	dimension	to	be	central,	while	neither	side	accepts	the	notion	of	the	‘given’.						Here	I	summarise	the	reasons	that	classical	and	contemporary	pragmatists	consider	experience	to	be	mediated	at	different	levels	of	perception	and	cognition:137	
	 1. There	is	discrimination	between	surfaces	or	between	parts	of	the	world,	such	as	sound	frequencies	occurring	within	unfolding	events.	The	manner	of	discrimination	is	determined	by	the	structure	of	the	brain	that	has	evolved	to	identify	difference	in,	proximity,	temporality,	light,	weight,	between	edges	and	solids	etc.	2. Awareness	of	the	environment	is	the	attentional	system’s	discrimination	between	the	contents	of	events.	3. Proprioception	(Goldman	2012:	71),	for	example,	can	be	seen	as	a	type	of	internal	representational	awareness	of	our	body’s	position	in	proximity	to	other	objects.		4. When	we	observe	how	we	feel	or	what	we	perceive	we	do	not	have	direct	access	the	world	or	to	the	processes	that	transform	our	bodily	interactions	with	the	world	into	perceptions	and	thoughts.	5. Awareness	of	self	and	thinking	is	not	a	private	language.	Thought	occurs	within	public	language	–	that	a	species	evolved	and	with	human	disposition	to	learn	the	particular	language	of	our	social	cultural	context.	(some	see	level	3	and	4	as	one).	
                                                        
 
137 Not all ‘varieties’ of pragmatists put forward all these levels of mediation 
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6. When	we	report	our	subjective	experience	we	can	only	talk	of	the	portion	of	bodily	experience	that	we	have	access	to.	
	
	
An	argument	for	considering	naturalistic	causal	explanations	for	experiences		While	there	are	problems	of	translation	between	talking	about	different	levels	of	representation	that	may	occur	between	stimuli	and	experience,	and	translation	between	explanations,	we	can	make	Jamesian	classical	pragmatist	case	for	talking	about	experience,	rather	than	making	truth	claims.	James’	ambulatory	theory	of	reality	as	“an	ideal	limit”	(MT	1909:	158),	the	intellectual	and	practical	(sensory	perceptions)	termini	that	our	thoughts	have	lead	us	to,	and	continue	to	lead	us,	through	successive	thoughts.	Each	terminus	is	provisional	because	we	are	rarely	satisfied	and	go	on	looking	for	an	ultimately	satisfying	terminus	or	ultimate	reality.	A	true	idea	is	one	that	we	consider	to	be	real,	one	that	most	closely	touches	the	terminus,	in	the	present	circumstances.	It	is	one	that	has	practical	consequences	in	the	current	situation.	A	case	is	made	for	drawing	upon	scientific	research	to	inform	the	speculative	practice	and	experimentation	of	locative	narrative,	not	because	the	outcome	will	be	verified	but	because	it	leads	us	usefully,	in	specifiable	terms,	to	further	experimentation.		
	
	
Creating	illusions	and	evoking	misperceptions	and	perceptual	ambiguity	
		Locative	narrative	can	be	interrogated	as	a	site	where	the	fallibility	of	perception	becomes	evident.	Perceptual	rupture	and	discontinuity,	is	experienced	when	a	participant	experiences	ambiguity	or	becomes	aware	that	their	perception	seems	‘faulty’.	The	introduction	of	
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conflicting	sensory	stimuli	may	prompt	misperceptions	and	a	belief	that	the	imagined	has	occurred.	The	perceptual	aspect	of	the	metaphor	multi-stability	here	invokes	the	Jamesian	relational	analysis:	relations	to	attention,	relations	to:	perceptual	objects,	imaginary	objects,	to	
the	experiences	of	perception	and	misperception	to	surprize	and	relations	to	the	values	of	belief	and	reality.		William	Gaver	(1993:	287)	says	in	our	“everyday	listening”	experience	we	may	not	see	the	source	of	a	sound	but	we	hear	it	directly,	cemented	with	the	acoustic	qualities	afforded	by	environment.	The	sound	of	the	car	is	often	believed	to	be	evidence	for	a	car,	account	Nudds	&	O’Callaghan	(2009:12).	Arguably	the	role	of	belief	is	important	in	creating	fictional	places	in	sound.	That	which	is	seen	(with	the	exception	of	hallucinations),	terminates	in	its	referent,	while	it	is	not	necessary	to	witness	the	source	of	a	sound	that	can	remain	unverified,	accepted	as	as	existent,	unless	there	is	evidence	to	the	contrary.		In	the	test	iteration	of	LociOscope:	The	Letters,	situated	in	at	the	university	and	city	centre,	the	‘Rome’	binaural	soundscape	featured	the	low	rumbling	of	an	approaching	1920’s138	tram,	that	triggered	nearby	a	main	road.	Despite	the	lack	of	trams	in	Plymouth	the	sound	was	not	incongruous	next	to	the	voluminous	traffic.	When	the	same	soundscape	was	situated	not	far	away	in	a	pedestrian	area,	conversely	it	appeared	as	a	recording,	without	the	corroborating	ambient	sound	or	visual	correlates.	Useful	parallels	can	perhaps	be	drawn	with	Meredith	and	Stein’s	(1993:	123)	and	Calvert’s	(2001:	1111)	analysis	of	multimodal	integration,	that	argues	that	when	different	sensory	stimuli	share	the	same	proximity	sensory	integration	occurs	
                                                        
 
138 The binaural field recording was made at the West Country Living Museum, Dudley, West Midlands. 
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(recorded	tram	sound	and	visual	and	auditory	noise	of	the	traffic).	The	tram	observation	indicated	that	making	recordings	of	sounds	congruent	with	the	existent	environment	might	result	in	the	listener	assuming	that	they	were	issuing	from	the	surroundings,	or	create	ambiguity	around	their	source.		
	
	
Case	study	2:	The	Lost	Index,	No.1:		Landscape	with	Figures		Developing	the	seventh	prototype,	The	Lost	Index,	No.1:		Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1:	Suggestion.	Published	on	iTunes.		Building	on	the	sound,	narrative	and	interaction	design	experiments	in	case	study	one	that	explored	the	affects	of	multi-stability	in	the	formal	garden	setting,	in	the	futuristic	locative	narrative,	The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	the	structure	of	the	interaction,	narrative	and	sound	aimed	to	directly	integrate	the	museum	setting	into	the	experience.	The	interaction	mechanism	utilised	a	memory	game	and	a	guided	imaginary	journey	into	a	painting	to	a	fictional	place.			Your	phone	rings…	“Listen	we	haven’t	got	long,	you	need	to	hear	this…sometime	ago	you	were	a	
volunteer	in	an	experiment	to	become	a	human	hard-drive…	information	was	stored	in	your	
memory…while	you	have	no	recollection	of	this	event	the	material	now	needs	to	be	retrieved…it	
is	a	painless	procedure…For	the	good	of	others	and	yourself,	follow	these	instructions…”139	You	make	your	way	to	a	gallery	on	the	first	floor.	You	stand	in	the	corner	of	the	room	and	look	
                                                        
 
139 Excerpt from the script of Landscape with Figures. 
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down	at	your	phone.	First	you	notice	your	image	reflected	on	the	screen,	and	then	another	face	emerges.	Looking	up,	you	are	standing	in	front	of	a	landscape	painting.	The	voice	on	the	phone	again…‘You	are	going	on	a	journey’…	your	gaze	is	directed	from	the	gilt	frame	to	the	foreground…You	are	on	the	path.	A	dog	barks	at	your	feet…geese	fly	low	towards	the	river…other	travellers	walking	ahead…passing	onwards,	and	arriving	at	the	entrance	to	the	church,	you	twist	the	handle	and	enter	the	tower…The	heavy	door	closes	behind	you…Eyes	adjusting	to	the	dim	interior,	you	begin	to	climb	…Reaching	a	room	you	enter…On	the	floor	there’s	a	box…You	lift	the	lid	and	reach	inside…‘What	do	you	find?’	There	seems	to	be	something	else	inside…Retracing	your	journey	through	the	landscape	you	come	to	the	beginning	and	step	out	of	the	frame.	You	are	back	in	the	gallery.	Looking	at	the	phone	screen	you	are	prompted	to	input	the	data	retrieved	from	your	memory.		The	structure	of	the	experience	has	four	phases:	entering	the	museum	launching	the	app	and	receiving	a	phone	call	that	sets	the	scene	of	the	story;	walking	up	to	a	gallery	on	the	first	floor,	indicating	arrival	on	the	phone;	receiving	a	second	phone	call	that	gives	further	story	content	and	instigates	a	concentration	exercise	using	the	reflective	surface	of	the	phone	screen	and	emerging	graphics;	standing	in	front	of	a	landscape	painting	that	becomes	the	setting	of	a	narrative	and	a	guided	imaginary	experience	which	turns	into	a	memory	game;	and	finally	‘returning’	to	the	gallery	and	inputting	the	answers	into	the	phone.		Participants	are	given	verbal	instruction	to	go	to	a	gallery	on	the	first	floor	and	stand	in	front	of	a	painting,	Landscape	with	Figures	(c1660)	by	Salomon	van	Ruysdael.	Indicating	when	they	
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have	found	the	painting	by	pressing	a	button	on	the	phone.140	This	action	triggers	another	phone	call,	a	short	while	after,	in	which	a	voice	asks	the	participant	to	concentrate	on	their	phone	screen.	At	first	participants	see	a	reflection	of	their	own	face	and	then	the	outline	of	another	face	gradually	appears	(an	animation),	replacing	their	reflection.	The	aim	is	to	focus	the	participant’s	attention	and	encouraging	concentration,	after	which	they	are	given	the	instruction	to	imagine	that	they	are	that	person	on	the	screen,	look	up	at	the	painting	
Landscape	with	Figures	where	they	are	going	on	a	journey…					
	 	 	
 
Fig. 20 The Lost Index, No. 1: Landscape with Figures, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, 
‘suggestion’. Screenshots from the final app. 		
                                                        
 
140 Tapping a button on the phone to indicate location has been used as a positioning technique in a number of 
locative arts projects, an early example is Kate Armstrong’s PING (2003). 
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The	phone	call	from	the	‘secret	agent’	moves	from	addressing	the	participant	in	the	first	person,	to	the	second.	Short,	simple,	often	declarative	sentences	suggest	what	the	person	sees,	thinks	and	feels,	akin	the	style	of	‘Choose	Your	Own	Adventure’	and	computer	‘text	adventures’.141	Using	with	very	few	adjectives	the	dialogue	creates	ellipses,	for	the	participant	to	fill-in	with	their	own	experience	to	encourage	their	supposition	of	as-if,	“You	were	one	of	
these	volunteers.	Please	follow	these	simple	instructions...”		The	sentence	structure	of	the	nested	narrative	moving	into	the	painting	is	informed	by	hypnosis	induction	scripts	(Weitzenhoffer,	Hilgard	&	Kihlstrom	1996:	8),	with	the	aim	of	focusing	the	participant’s	attention	and	guiding	the	imaginary	transformation	into	the	character	in	the	story.	The	script	in	no	way	attempts	to	hypnotise142	the	participant.	It	does	not	mention	relaxation,	drowsiness	or	sleep.	In	this	form	narrative	suggestions	were	used	to	prompt	thoughts	of	the	world	of	the	story	and	its	fictional	places.	The	authoritative	voice	on	the	phone	describes	the	scene	in	the	painting	and	presents	the	participant	as	travelling	along	the	path,	passing	the	people	and	animals	and	arriving	at	a	church	in	the	distance.	It	suggests	the	types	of	things	that	may	be	heard	or	felt,	such	as,	“…you	see	a	woman	greeting	a	neighbour	“…you	hear	voices	on	the	road	ahead…”			Arriving	at	the	church,	the	voice	on	the	phone,	invites	the	participant	to	enter	the	tower	(in	their	imagination)	and	climb	the	steps.	‘Arriving’	at	a	room	on	the	first	floor,	they	are	directed	to	go	inside	and	see	a	box	on	the	floor,	open	its	lid	and	look	inside.	Description	is	minimal	to	
                                                        
 
141 Computer adventure games, first developed in 1975 as text only, by Will Crowther, (Montfort 2005: 10)  
 
142 Spiegel (2008:181) describes hypnosis as “…a state of highly focused attention coupled with reduced peripheral 
awareness.”.  
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prompt	the	‘filling-in’	of	the	details	with	their	own	thoughts.	Reaching	inside	the	box,	participants	are	asked	to	think	about	what	is	in	the	box.	They	are	asked	to	retrieve	an	object	and	also	a	piece	of	paper	that	has	a	five-digit	number	written	on	it.	They	are	told	that	each	digit	represents	the	groups	of	people	they	passed	on	their	journey.	The	story	continues	to	describe	the	participant	leaving	the	room	and	retracing	their	journey	along	the	path,	meeting	again	the	people	and	animals	that	they	had	passed	earlier,	providing	a	second	chance	to	work	out	the	number	puzzle.	Reaching	the	end	of	the	path,	they	are	asked	to	step	out	of	the	painting	and	‘return’	to	the	museum	room.	The	app	now	triggers	a	screen	that	has	the	appearance	of	an	index	with	a	space	for	registering	the	number	and	the	name	of	the	object	‘seen’	in	the	box.			
  		
Fig. 21 The Lost Index, No. 1: Landscape with Figures, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, 
‘suggestion’. Screenshots from the final app. 
 	Each	digit	of	the	answer	to	the	number	puzzle	was	a	separate	variable	that	was	stored	as	a	constant	within	the	application.	This	was	compared	against	the	number	input	by	the	user.	If	the	number	inputted	is	correct	then	the	number	turns	green,	and	red	if	wrong,	allowing	
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further	guesses.	The	imagined	object	was	accepted	regardless	of	what	is	entered.	Correct	inputting	of	the	whole	number	was	required	for	the	‘retrieval	process’	(and	the	game)	to	be	‘successfully’	completed,	triggering	the	on-screen	message	that	their	memory	data	had	been	accepted.	If	any	of	the	four	digits	were	incorrect,	the	message	was	displayed	that	retrieval	was	unsuccessful	on	this	occasion,	with	the	opportunity	restart.	The	experience	takes	around	ten	minutes.			The	app143	was	designed	to	have	a	‘filmic	science-fiction	military’	appearance.	It	has	four	screens:	“incoming	call”,	“pulsating	graphic”,	“image	of	a	face”,	“data	entry	screen”.	The	sound	file	for	the	phone	call	was	triggered	by	launching	the	app.	Navigation	in	the	museum	was	delivered	via	simple	instructions:	“go	up	to	the	first	floor”,	“find	the	room	named	the	Cottonian	
Collection”,	“find	the	painting	called	‘Landscape	with	Figures’	in	the	right	hand	corner.”	Tapping	the	screen	was	integrated	into	the	story,	‘when	you	arrive	at	the	painting’,	triggering	the	next	sound	file.	When	participants	had	found	the	painting	they	pressed	the	screen	again	triggering	the	third	sound	file	and	the	image	of	the	emerging	face	that	was	accompanied	by	the	‘journey’	sound	file.			The	sound	begins	with	the	vibrating	and	ringing	of	an	incoming	phone	call	and	an	on-screen	request	to	put	on	headphones.	Drawing	upon	findings	from	The	Letters,	the	game	used	binaural	sound	and	integrated	recordings	of	ambient	sounds	and	acoustic	qualities	of	the	relevant	rooms	in	the	museum	within	each	of	the	compositions.	Binaural	recordings	of	the	entrance	hall,	including	approaching	footsteps,	were	heard	concurrently	with	the	phone	call.	
                                                        
 
143 The coding of the app and the interface was designed in collaboration with James Brocklehurst. EW described the 
mechanism, requirements and appearance for each stage that was implemented and designed by JB. 
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The	recorded	binaural	sound	was	intensified	the	ambient	sounds	in	each	of	the	featured	locations.	The	voice	on	the	phone	had	an	authoritative	tone,	in	keeping	with	the	secret	service	character.	It	was	recorded	in	small	room	with	a	distinctly	different	reverb	to	the	entrance	hall	and	layered	behind	the	voice,	treated	with	a	reduced	frequency	band	filter	to	intensify	the	illusion	of	a	real	phone	call.	The	sounds	of	the	journey	through	the	scene	in	the	painting	were	binaurally	recorded	in	a	rural	location	and	layered	with	key	sounds	of	the	horse	and	cart,	birds	and	animals,	people	and	animals.	The	sounds	inside	the	church	were	also	binaurally	recorded	on-location.	“The	sound	was	also	great,	really	set	the	scene,	and	sounded	odd,	like	
there	were	people	behind	you!”	
	The	participant	encounters	a	number	of	intersecting	contexts.	The	existent	museum	is	the	place	where	the	experience	takes	place.	Launching	the	app	and	putting	on	headphones	signals	that	it	is	‘non-serious’,	in	Searle’s	(1975:	320)	terms.	The	graphical	interface	declares	the	science	fiction	genre.	Fictional	places	are	intersecting	and	nested:	the	museum	is	recast	as	a	covert	location	of	unknown	agents;	the	phone	rings,	a	voice	emits	from	an	unspecified	office;	a	landscape	depicted	in	a	painting	is	the	setting	for	the	action,	moving	beyond	the	visual	depiction,	the	story	moves	into	the	church	tower.	The	participant	has	varying	relations	to	these	contexts.	The	sociocultural	mores	and	behaviourial	norms	of	the	museum	are	reassigned	by	the	expectations	of	game	play.	Answering	the	phone,	listening	and	following	directions	are	enacted	as	part	of	the	story.	Simply	walking	through	the	museum	becomes	a	performance	in	the	narrative.		
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Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis			The	techniques	of	integrating	the	museum	with	the	narrative	through	the	device	of	the	phone	call,	placing	the	participant	as	the	central	protagonist	and	layering	of	the	ambient	sound	with	the	imaginary	soundscapes,	were	to	some	extent	successful	in	situating	the	narrative	within	the	museum.	The	participation	mechanism	was	coherent	within	the	narrative	and	simple	to	operate,	enabling	participants	to	easily	locate	the	painting	and	trigger	the	sounds.	We	can	analyse	the	object	of	the	phone	that	was	continuous	within	the	story	world	as	outside	in	terms	of	the	value	of	reality	participants	attributed	to	it.	While	the	phone	call’s	functionality	operates	in	relations	to	rationality,	the	content	of	the	call,	the	science	fiction	backstory	and	introduction	to	the	participant’s	role	within	the	narrative,	function	in	terms	of	its	relations	to	
the	imaginary	and	the	value	of	reality	attributed	to	the	narrative	in	the	context	of	the	experience.	Participants’	aesthetic	judgements	about	sci-fi	generally	and	the	execution	of	this	particular	narrative,	with	relations	to	emotions	and	the	value	of	taste;	beauty	are	part	of	the	matrix	of	relations	that	describe	the	structure	of	participants’	experience.				Guided	imagining	is	distinct	from	simply	listening	to	a	story	as	the	participant	is	asked	to	specifically	imagine	that	they	are	undertaking	the	actions	(relations	to	the	experience	of	
imagining)	for	which	greater	concentration	may	be	necessary	(relations	to	volition)	(relations	
to	imaginary	objects).	The	emerging	graphic	of	a	wireframe	face	on	the	phone	screen,	used	to	as	an	attention	focusing	technique,	was	reported	by	some	participants	as	enhancing	concentration	and	reducing	distraction	from	the	activities	of	others	in	the	gallery	(relations	to	
attention)	(relations	to	volition	and	action)	(relations	to	perceptual	objects).	The	initial	version	of	the	emerging	face	appearing	on	the	phone	was	reported	as	not	sufficiently	distinctive	or	interesting	to	fulfil	the	intended	purpose	for	some	participants.	A	new	version	was	developed	
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that	combined	colours	of	the	painting	with	an	androgynous	photographic	image	(relations	to	
self)	(value	of	reality)	(value	of	taste;	beauty).			The	narrative	premise,	structure,	language	and	mode	of	delivery	of	Lost	Index,	No.1	was	reported	as	evocative	for	many	(relations	to	imaginary	objects)	(relations	to	language)	(relations	to	volition	and	action).	While	the	steeple	is	depicted	in	the	painting,	the	narrative	and	soundscape	evokes	the	interior	of	the	church	tower	which	is	not.	James	(PP	1890a:	214)	says	when	our	attention	is	focused	on	particular	task	it	can	change	our	sense	of	time,	and	our	relations	to	things	can	have	different	types	of	presence	for	us.	For	those	who	reported	their	attention	was	directed	towards	the	painting,	‘walking	along	the	path	as	it	moved	toward	the	church	in	the	distance	had	the	potential	to	affect	relations	to	perceptual	and	imaginary	objects.	Thoughts	of	the	discrepancy	between	the	small	painted	rectangle	and	that	of	our	body,	which	is	manifestly	of	a	different	nature,	may	be	temporally	deferred.		What	we	take	to	be	veridical	or	describe	as	imaginary	may	be	vague	or	distinct,	what	is	talked	of	as	real	and	as	imagined	
may	become	ambiguous	or	confused.	Objective	and	subjective	spaces	flip	and	interpenetrate,	but	the	imagined	will	not	function	in	the	real	world.	“I	really	imagined	what	was	in	the	box”.	The	lack	of	a	visible	correlate	and	contradiction	with	the	scene	depicted,	diminished	engagement	for	other	participants,	who	reported	they	found	it	difficult	to	imagine	what	was	not	directly	visible,	or	switch	between	using	the	stimulus	of	the	painting	to	another	mode	of	engagement.	“I	liked	looking	at	the	painting	in	detail	and	listening	to	the	sounds	and	people	
talking.”		“I	couldn’t	imagine	inside	the	church	as	much.”	Here	we	can	describe	the	interaction	between	two	sets	of	relations	to	perceptual	objects	and	relations	to	imaginary	object	that	function	in	relation	to	volition	and	action	and	values	of	belief	and	reality.		
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A	willingness	to	engage	and	focus	attention	(relations	to	volition	and	action)	is	cited	as	a	prerequisite	for	participants	of	hypnotic	induction	and	suggestion	(Spiegel	2008:	181)	(McConkey	2008:	54).	Deliberate	intention,	effort	and	also	the	environmental	conditions	to	focus	their	attention	may	also	be	necessary	for	participants	to	engage	in	guided	imagining.	Those	who	report,	“I	just	don’t	like	this	kind	of	thing.”	“It’s	not	for	me.	I	can’t	be	bothered	with	
it”	and	reject	the	narrative	premise,	the	goals,	or	the	mode	of	engagement,	did	not	become	interested.	These	participants	also	reported	that	they	couldn’t	imagine	‘as-if’	they	were	in	the	landscape,	even	when	they	reported	experiencing	audio	misperceptions,	such	as	describing	
feeling	like	there	was	someone	behind	them	when	they	heard	footsteps.	Misperception	does	not	function	in	relation	to	volition,	as	Denham	and	Winkler	(2012:	79)	have	argued	about	perceptual	multistability,	demonstrated	by	the	switching	between	the	interpretation	of	objects,	such	as	the	Necker	cube.			It	is	perhaps	the	‘willingness	to	make-believe’,	to	paraphrase	both	James	(1897:	2)	and	Walton	(1996:	19).	Concentration	(relations	to	attention),	interaction	(relations	to	action)	and	supposition	(relations	to	imagining)	(value	of	belief),	are	the	combination	of	relations	and	values	that	also	are	present	in	other	expanded	narrative	practices,	such	as	performance	making,	gaming	and	role-play.	Relations	to	belief	and	relations	to	the	experience	of	imagining	
relations	to	emotions	and	volitional	acts	of	hypotheses	forming	are	central	to	the	subjective	experience	of	Landscape	with	Figures.	“It	was	spooky	being	told	what	to	do	and	unnerving	to	be	
lead.”	“It	was	like	going	on	a	journey	but	I	didn’t	know	where	I	was	going.”			Instructions	for	this	locative	narrative	were	integrated	into	the	story,	via	the	phone	calls,	but	for	some	participants,	further	explanation	and	recapping	was	requested	(relations	to	
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rationality).	The	memory	game	was	reported	as	too	difficult	for	many	(relations	to	rationality)	
(relations	to	volition)	(relations	to	imagining)	and	a	simpler	memory	game	that	has	a	greater	impact	on	the	development	of	the	narrative	and	game	outcome	may	have	led	to	greater	engagement.		“I	went	to	the	church	but	I	did	not	understand	how	to	find	the	number.”		The	development	of	devices	to	focus	participant	attention	and	the	relationships	between	imaginative	engagement,	narrative	suggestion	and	contradictory	perceptual	cues	offered	further	areas	for	experimentation	in	the	next	prototype.		See	Appendix	1	for	Figs.	19,	20,	21The	Lost	Index,	No.	2:	Landscape	with	Figures,	Version	1:	Suggestion.	Published.	iTunes:	Design	Tables.		 	
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Chapter	5	
Encountering	the	disappearing	fault	line	between	fact	and	fiction…			This	chapter	considers	James’	framing	of	truth	in	relation	to	his	few	direct	reflections	upon	literature,	examined	in	the	context	of	related	views	of	Wittgenstein,	Nelson	Goodman	and	Hilary	Putnam,	that	can	be	taken	as	proponents	of	the	pragmatist	lineage	and	can	be	seen	as	responses	to	James’	account	of	experience.	The	discussion	then	broadens	to	other	philosophers	of	narrative	to	consider	specific	bifurcations	in	the	status	of	fiction	–	relations	between	the	notions	of	‘reality’,	‘truth’,	‘facts’	and	‘nonfiction;	and	the	form	of	fiction,	as	a	container	of	‘truths’,	‘facts’,	‘nonfactuals’	and	‘fictions’.		For	James,	a	thought’s	reference	to	an	object	occurs	in	the	medium	of	an	‘experienceable	environment’	and	is	a	condition	of	it	being	known;	what	something	is	known-as	refers	to	how	it	functions	in	a	particular	context	and	the	consequences	that	follow.	I	argue	that	acts	of	interpretation	are	context	dependent	descriptions	that	enclose	ways	of	classifying	and	ways	of	
talking.	For	James,	whether	fiction	or	nonfiction	is	asserted	to	be	the	case,	is	dependent	upon	context	of	the	percipient,	while	Wittgenstein,	Goodman	and	Putnam	prioritise	the	analysis	of	linguistic,	institutional	and	logical	structures	above	that	of	the	individual’s	experience.		I	will	extend	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	further	to	the	idea	of	belief,	in	accordance	with	James,	who	says,	that	which	we	take	to	be	rational,	ultimately	rests	upon	a	feeling	of	rationality,	as	there	is	no	pre-existent	truth.	James	argues	that	if	the	value	of	truth	is	constrained	to	particular	circumstances,	our	beliefs	can	have	practical	application.	The	
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malleability	of	our	beliefs	is	what,	it	is	argued	here,	narratives	trade	upon,	by	creating	contexts	and	directing	our	thoughts.		In	a	Jamesian	pragmatist	vein	I	then	ask,	what	are	the	practical	consequences	of	these	descriptions	for	the	experiencing	of	fictional	places?	What	further	concepts	do	they	carry	us	on	to?	What	questions	may	be	usefully	posed	in	the	design	of	locative	narrative?				Discussions	of	fiction	and	literature	by	James	are	primarily	used	as	illustrations	for	broader	ideas.	Nevertheless,	these	illustrations	are	interesting	in	this	context	because	they	enfold	narrative	into	the	axes	of	James’	thought:	the	evolutionary	evolved	structure	of	the	brain,	and	its	response-creation	of	experience	in	the	context	of	the	‘experienceable	environment’.	These	illustrations	demonstrate	the	following	ideas:		 1) Words	can	have	a	“reality	feeling”	2) Fiction	and	its	correspondence/or	lack	of	correspondence	with	reality	3) Worlds	as	categories	to	which	we	assign	parts	of	our	experience		
	
	
Words	can	have	a	“reality-feeling”			In	‘The	Function	of	Cognition’	James	(MT	1909	[1884]:	25)	says	we	ascribe	to	those	things	that	seem	to	act	in	our	world,	such	as	others	going	about	the	world,	as	part	of	our	reality	and	not	as	products	of	our	mind.	Words	do	not	function	as	mental	copies	of	their	referents,	however	they	can	produce	the	subjective	sense	of	them	“…endued	with	the	feeling	of	familiarity	and	reality”	(MT	1909	[1884]:	31-32).	The	consequence	of	this	feeling	is	
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metonymic	–	the	referents	belong	to	a	world	that	is	existent,	that	if	we	could	just	squint	a	little	harder	its	world	would	come	into	view.			 “I	am	sure	that	my	own	current	thinking	has	words	which	are	made	intelligible	by	being	referred	to	some	reality	that	lies	beyond	the	horizon	of	direct	consciousness,	and	of	which	I	am	only	aware	as	of	a	terminal	more	existing	in	a	certain	direction,	to	which	the	words	might	lead	but	do	not	lead	yet.	The	subject	or	topic	of	the	words	is	usually	something	towards	which	I	mentally	seem	to	pitch	them	in	a	backward	way,	almost	as	I	might	jerk	my	thumb	over	my	shoulder	to	point	at	something,	without	looking	round,	if	I	were	only	entirely	sure	that	it	was	there.	The	upshot,	or	conclusion,	of	the	words	is	something	towards	which	I	seem	to	incline	my	head	forwards,	as	if	giving	assent	to	its	existence,	tho	all	my	mind’s	eye	catches	sight	of	may	be	some	tatter	of	an	image	connected	with	it,	which	tatter,	however,	if	only	endued	with	the	feeling	of	familiarity	and	reality,	makes	me	feel	that	the	whole	to	which	it	belongs	is	rational	and	real,	and	fit	to	be	let	pass.”	(James	MT	1909:	31-32)			James	says	we	incline	our	heads,	as	if	towards	the	reality	that	the	words	may	lead	us	and	that	in	“our	mind’s	eye”	we	might	catch	a	“tatter	of	an	image	connected	to	it…”	Words	can	have	a	‘reality	feeling’.	That	thoughts	of	things	not	present	can	feel	real,	is	connected	here	to	the	evocative	potential	of	language.	James	also	uses	the	phrase,	“reality-feeling”	(VRE	1902:	56-58),	to	refer	to	a	phenomenal	quality	of	hallucinations	and	religious	experiences.	For	James,	on	the	one	hand	reality	refers	to	what	is	existent,	and	on	the	other	it	is	a	value	that	we	ascribe	to	experience	that	is	like.	Reality	is	our	“warrant”	(MT	1909:	6)	for	calling	a	feeling	cognition,	says	James,	but	the	only	warrant	we	have	for	reality	is	the	faith	of	the	inquirer,	or	in	other	words,	the	belief	that	an	instance	of	external	reality	is	predicated	on	belief	in	existent	reality.	
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Fiction	and	its	correspondence/or	lack	of	correspondence	to	reality	
	James	argues	that	it	is	difficult	to	believe	practically	in	solipsism,	in	our	everyday	experience	we	seem	to	splash	in	the	same	water	and	play	the	same	games.	However,	he	says,	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	worlds	described	in	poetry	and	fiction.	While	readers’	ideas	of	Scott’s	literary	figure	of	Ivanhoe	may	“resemble”	one	another,	they	know	he	is	not	real	because	one	reader’s	imaginings	do	not	act	upon	another’s	(MT	1909	[1887]:	26-27).	James	uses	this	example	of	reading	about	fictional	characters	to	illustrate	how	we	can	experientially	distinguish	between	the	real	and	the	imagined.	Here	he	asserts	that	for	something	to	be	real	it	must	resemble	and	operate	upon	a	reality.144	In	the	republication	of	this	essay,	‘The	Function	of	Cognition’,	in	The	
Meaning	of	Truth	(MT	1909:	42-43	endnote),	James	seeks	to	improve	upon	what	he	sees	as	the	“defects”	of	his	account	of	reality.	In	the	endnotes,145	he	stresses	that	resemblance	between	a	thought	and	what	is	taken	to	be	the	existent	world,	is	no	longer	a	necessary	condition	of	its	reality.	As	he	had	previously	argued	in	Principles	(PP	1890b:	72),	the	brain	does	not	simply	reflect	the	environment;	it	inhabits	and	creates	it.	Reality	therefore,	cannot	be	said	to	be	a	copy	of	or	a	correspondence	to	the	world.	A	feeling	or	concept	potentially	terminates	in	the	actual	object	to	which	it	refers.	Here	James	(MT	1909:	42-43	endnote)	emphasizes	that	concepts	are	a	“co-ordinate	realm”	with	percepts.	As	he	expresses	in	his	explicitly	radical	empiricist	writings,	concepts	are	real,	in	the	sense	that	everything	experienceable	is	real	(ERE	1912:	159).	It	is	in	our	unfolding	experience	that	thoughts	are	taken	as	a	perception	or	an	idea.	In	this	sense	experience	is	prior	to	language,	not	because	it	is	
                                                        
 
144 “The feeling of q knows whatever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly operates on. If it resemble 
without operating, it is a dream; if it operate without resembling, it is an error.” (MT 1909 [1887]: 28) 
 
145 James’ endnotes are discussed at greater length in chapter 1 of this text, ‘James and Experience’.  
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a	kind	of	essential	substance	or	unmediated	mode	of	existence,	but	because	‘experience’	describes	awareness	of	the	happening	of	events.				
	When	I	read	to	you	from	a	book	I	utter	sounds,	he	says.	The	sounds	are	your	percepts	too	and	act	to	prompt	feelings	for	us	both.	You	assume	that	my	feelings	resemble	yours,	although	this	is	something	that	we	can	never	be	sure	of,	while	we	hold	the	“hypothesis”	that	“the	book	is	one	book	felt	in	both	our	worlds”	(MT	1909:	37).	While	we	may	share	realities	there	is	divergence	in	the	exact	nature	of	our	individual	perceptions	and	still	more	so	in	the	comparative	understanding	of	concepts	and	each	other’s	emotions	(MT	1909:	38).			For	James,	truth	is	a	belief	attributed	in	experience,	whereas	reality	is	what	we	experience;	“Realities	are	not	true,	they	are;	and	beliefs	are	true	of	them.”	(MT	1909:	196).	However,	the	object	that	is	real	is	the	object	believed	in.	Reality	is	what	it	is	believed	to	be	so.	(MT	1909:	236).	Reality	is	also	the	potentially	real;	you	hold	the	belief	that	the	room	on	the	other	side	of	the	door	is	your	dining	room,	says	James,	it	is	only	potentially	a	dining	room	for	you	until	experience	confirms	it	to	be	true.	In	the	same	way	we	can	have	the	hypothesis	that	the	sides	of	a	triangle	are	the	same	length.	We	can	measure	them	and	see	if	the	idea	is	true.		 “So	far	as	reality	means	experienceable	reality,	both	it	and	the	truths	men	gain	about	it	are	everlastingly	in	process	of	mutation	–	mutation	towards	a	definite	goal,	it	may	be	–	but	still	mutation.”	(P	1907:	224-225)			James	extends	the	pragmatic	method	of	establishing	the	truth	of	propositions	to	refer	to	metaphysical	questions	within	his	‘doctrine’	of	radical	empiricism.	Truth	is	a	type	of	relation	to	things;	it	is	not	a	static	quality	of	an	object	or	a	property	of	a	fact.	What	we	believe	to	be	true	is	what	functions	for	us,	there	are	practical	or	conceptual	consequences	that	follow	from	
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our	interpretation.	For	James	truths	are	beliefs	and	ideas	become	true	through	a	process	of	verification	between	the	thought	of	an	object	and	the	potential	for	it	to	be	terminated	in	the	actual	object	to	which	it	refers.		The	relationship	between	the	knower	and	the	known	is	a	union	of	continuous	transition	that	derives	worth	from	their	practical	outcome	(MT	1909:	108).		 	“If	a	term	or	a	hypothesis	has	any	consequences	in	life,	it	can	be	said	to	have	meaning.	“If	that	meaning	“works”	[i.e.	it	leads	us	practically	or	conceptually	to	a	point	where	the	idea	terminates	and	satisfactorily	fits	with	previous	truths]	it	will	have	some	truth	that	ought	to	be	held	to	through	all	possible	reformulations…”(James	1907:	270)			The	perception	of	the	object	verifies	the	concept	of	the	object.	The	concept’s	practical	function	is	to	know	the	object.	It	is	proved	to	be	true	by	the	perception’s	existence.	The	existence	of	the	percept,	that	follows	from	a	chain	of	intermediaries	“creates	the	function”	of	knowing	the	concept	(1909b:	109).	A	perception	can	only	terminate	the	chain	of	intermediaries	from	the	concept	because	it	is	what	was	meant	by	the	concept,	a	different	tower	to	that	of	the	Eiffel	Tower	could	not	be	said	to	be	the	concept	of	the	Eiffel	Tower.		To	describe	reality	without	account	of	the	subjective	experience	“would	be	something	like	offering	a	printed	bill	of	fare	as	the	equivalent	for	a	solid	meal.”	(1902:	499-500)	
	
	
	
Worlds	as	categories	to	which	we	assign	parts	of	our	experience		
	James	says	that	we	assign	objects	in	our	experience	to	different	categories	or	“worlds”,	the	physical	world	of	heat,	colour	or	sound,	for	example;	the	worlds	of	scientific	of	laws;	of	mathematics,	logic,	ethics,	aesthetics;	of	common	beliefs	and	prejudices;	of	supernatural	
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beliefs,	religion,	or	fictions;	of	individual	opinion;	or	of	madness	or	vagary.	Assignment	maybe	immediate	or	delayed	but	is	dependent	upon	our	current	perspective	and	point	of	view.		 “Each	world	whilst	it	is	attended	to	is	real	after	its	own	fashion;	only	the	reality	lapses	with	the	attention.”	(1890b:	293)			One	context	may	become	more	dominant	in	our	experience.	But	if	there	were	no	perceptual	world	that	seemed	“‘stronger’	and	genuinely	‘outer’”,	James	says,	then	our	imaginings	would	not	seem	“weak	and	inner	in	comparison”	(1912:	21)	and	they	would	be	our	belief	and	our	reality,	as	can	happen	in	our	dreams	and	daydreams	if	perceptions	do	not	intervene.		The	real	is	generally	referred	to	as	existential	existence,	while	the	imaginary	is	taken	to	be	an	attributive	judgement,	however,	both	these	judgments	are	different	types	of	“relation	to	ourselves"	(James	PP	1890b:	290	footnotes).	That	which	we	designate	as	real	occupies	real	space	for	us	along	with	other	“reals”	–	"the	space	related	to	other	reals".	Interestingly,	James	notes	that	this	synthesis	of	an	object’s	existence	and	its	physical	proximity	is	reflected	in	the	‘ex’	in	the	English	word	existence’	and	‘da’	in	the	German	word	and	dasein.	To	say	the	candle	exists,	he	says,	is	equivalent	of	saying	“The	candle	is	over	there”,	language	makes	existence	concrete	and	spatial.	It	is	a	“practical	relation”	to	ourselves.	James	(1890b:	296)	says	that	the	belief	that	an	object	is	real	is	unlike	other	predicates	assigned	to	an	object	intellectually	or	apprehended	sensibly	because	belief	that	an	object	is	real	resides	in	us	and	not	the	object.146	In	order	to	say	something	about	an	object’s	existence	it	is	necessary	to	establish	relations	between	it	and	other	things,	or	between	it	and	us.	“‘Stepping	outside’”	is	necessary	for	
                                                        
146 Here in a rare concurrence with Kant, James (1890b:	296)	says to say something is real does not add anything to a 
term. 
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relations	to	“confer	reality”	on	a	term	–	by	which	James	means	that	the	truth	value	is	not	intrinsic	to	a	term,	it	is	conditional	and	constructed.	This	account	of	reality	arguably	anticipates	deflationary	theory	of	truth.147			For	James	truth	is	a	belief	attributed	in	experience	whereas	reality	is	what	we	experience,	“Realities	are	not	true,	they	are;	and	beliefs	are	true	of	them.”	(1909b:	196).	However,	the	object	that	is	real	is	the	object	believed	in.	Reality	from	James’s	classical	pragmatist	position	is	what	at	the	particular	moment	is	believed	in.	(1909b:	236)	“Sometimes	the	reality	is	a	concrete	sensible	presence”	(1909b:	236).	The	process	of	experience	means	that	what	is	considered	to	be	real	is	“continually	superseded”	by	those	deemed	to	be	more	satisfactory	to	believe	in	and	that	an	absolute	reality	appears	as	a	boundary	–	a	belief	in	a	final	limit	(1909a:	239).		 “Cognitively	we	thus	live	under	a	sort	of	rule	of	three:	as	our	private	concepts	represent	the	sense	–	objects	to	which	they	lead	us,	these	being	public	realities	independent	of	the	individual,	so	these	sense-realities	may,	in	turn,	represent	realities	of	a	hypersensible	order,	electrons,	mind-stuff,	God,	or	what	not,	existing	independently	of	all	human	thinkers.”	(1909a:	239)			Henry	Jackman	(1998:	155)	argues	that	by	seeing	James’	account	of	truth	in	the	context	of	account	of	intentionality	it	is	possible	to	understand	how	subjective	elements	of	his	account	of	truth	are	compatible	with	his	Commonsense	realism.	Jackman	(1998:	156)	makes	the	point	that	separating	beliefs,	ideas	and	utterances	is	important	for	the	pragmatist	and	for	James,148	
                                                        
 
147 Michael Dummett (1959) traces the origins of the deflationary account to Frege. Dummett, M. (1959). 
‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 59: 141–162 Frege, G. (1977 [1918]). ‘Thoughts’. In. Frege, G. 
Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
148 Jackman (1998: 156) cites James’ description of propositions as “mongrel curs that have no real place between 
realities on the one hand and the beliefs on the other.” (1909 MT: 305). 
		
 
 
 
 
236 
and	the	problem	with	truths	framed	as	propositions	is	that	they	do	not	fit	with	“realities”	or	“beliefs”	but	they	present	ideas	as	being	both.	As	Jackman	(1998:	156)	illustrates,	the	proposition,	‘the	belief	that	the	snow	is	white’,	treats	belief	as	if	it	already	has	an	interpretation,	making	a	pragmatic	account	of	truth	impossible	in	terms	of	a	process	of	verification	that	truths	on	James’s	account	requires,	whereas,	James’	designation	of	a	proposition	as	true	or	false	has	two	parts:	how	a	sentence	is	interpreted	and	the	conditions	in	which	that	interpretation	is	made	true.	James’	concept	of	truth	is	about	meaning	and	how	thought	is	directed	towards	an	object,	rather	than	what	makes	a	property	of	a	judgment	about	a	pre-interpreted	proposition	assertible.	I	add	to	Jackman’s	analysis,	that	for	James	(1909:	42	end	notes),	the	assignment	of	the	value	of	truth	occurs	within	an	interpretation	of	the	particular	occurring	context.			Bertrand	Russell	(1910:	101-103)	accused	James	of	subjectivism,	of	holding	a	concept	of	truth	that	says	if	it	is	in	our	interests	to	say	it	is	true	–	that	a	circle	is	square,	for	example,	then	it	is	true,	when	this	is	statement	is	obviously	false.	James	does	not	make	this	claim	however,	he	says	that	in	our	particular	unfolding	situation	we	interpret	propositions	as	true	or	false	and	an	idea	is	designated	as	true	in	terms	of	the	consequences	that	follow	from	that	assignment	–	arguably	there	are	no	practical	consequences	that	follow	from	asserting	that	circles	are	square	if	my	calculations	do	not	concur	with	yours	or	asserting	that	water	is	dry	when	paddling	with	our	shoes	on	means	our	feet	get	wet.149	Saying	that	‘snow	is	white’	functions	for	us	in	in	the	process	in	which	you	select	the	‘snow-coloured’	paint	or	we	point	at	the	same	icy	precipitation	and	agree	that	it	is	white,	and	we	might	refine	our	claim	and	say	that	it	has	a	bluish	tinge	in	the	morning	light.	
                                                        
149 (James MT 1909: 193-194). 
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Wittgenstein			 1) Seeing-as,	attitudes	to	experiences	and	forgetting	2) Context	dependent	concepts	3) Reporting	beliefs	and	truth	of	propositions	as	language-games		
Seeing-as,	attitudes	to	experiences	and	forgetting		Wittgenstein	(2009	[1958]:	xi.	190-192,	205)	says	the	difference	between	seeing	and	knowing	is	the	“treating”	of	the	visual	experience	by	acting	in	certain	ways:	an	immediate	declaration,	‘There	is	a	path!’	–	“seeing”	–	and	‘I	see	a	path	on	the	map’	–	“seen	as”,	the	difference	between	knowing	and	reading.	Cases	of	seeing	are	‘attitudes’	to	experiences,	ways	of	‘treating’	something.	To	ask	if	a	visual	experience	is	“genuine”,	is	a	problem	of	language,	the	“way"	concepts	describe	the	experience.	Our	expectations	affect	what	we	see	(2009:	xi.	196,	197,	198),	we	may	“view”	a	picture	“as”	the	pen	it	represents,	or	we	may	not	treat	the	picture	in	this	way	and	see	it	instead	as	a	picture	of	a	pen.	Seeing	as,	is	a	way	the	reader	“…copes	with	conceptual	unclarities”	(2009:	xi.	202).			“Seeing-as”	(2009:	xi.	199)	can	occur	when	we	are	engaged	in	looking	at	a	painting.	It	is	an	attitude	that	is	temporary	and	context	dependent.	Children,	Wittgenstein	(2009:	xi.	205)	says,	can	“weave”	a	“piece	of	fancy	around”	and	see	an	object	as	something	else.	Children	may	“forget”	the	object	is	a	chest	and	see	it	“as”	a	house.	Does	that	mean	it	is	also	correct	to	say	‘they	see	it	as	a	house?’,	he	asks	rhetorically.	When	does	seeing	as	become	seeing?	When	does	fancy	tip-over	into	belief?	
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Context	dependent	concepts		Wittgenstein	suggests	(2009:	ix.	70,	ix.	75)	that	uttering	the	name	of	a	colour	can	be	a	description	in	a	particular	context,	such	as	in	the	act	of	looking	around	a	room.	The	meaning	of	“I’m	afraid”	is	dependent	upon	the	context	in	which	it	is	uttered,	not	just	upon	the	tone	of	voice.	To	reflect	on	what	we	mean	by	uttering,	“I	am	afraid”,	is	a	“supplementary”	(2009:	ix.	76)	description,	says	Wittgenstein.	To	explain	what	fear	means	is	to	“act	fear”	(2009:	ix.	77).	Russell	B.	Goodman	(2002:	119-120)	points	out	that	James’	stress	upon	context	is	that	which	frames	the	psychological	experience,	whereas	for	Wittgenstein	context	is	not	what	enters	into	the	individual’s	stream	of	thought	but	the	“institutions	and	practices”	of	language	use.				For	Wittgenstein,	concepts	have	elastic	boundaries	whose	perimeters	are	context	dependent.	‘Happy’	can	be	applied	to	the	expression	on	the	face	of	a	stick	figure	and	to	that	of	a	human	being,	and	while	being	related,	they	do	not	have	the	same	meaning	(2009:	xi.	227).	Language	used	metaphorically	bears	a	similar,	but	not	identical	meaning	in	its	unfamiliar	context,	as	do	anthropomorphised	objects	whose	characteristics	have	a	similar	meaning	but	are	not	the	same;	The	sardonic	tower	waits	aloof	for	your	arrival	and	declaration,	“It	is	round!”’			
Reporting	beliefs	and	the	truth	of	propositions	as	language-games		Wittgenstein	(2009:	x.	90-94)	categories	beliefs	as	states	of	mind,	(‘I	believe	brown	ink	is	better	than	black’),	they	can	also	be	types	of	sense	impressions,	(‘I	believe	this	ink	looks	more	black	than	brown’).	However,	he	says,	while	sensory	impressions	are	mistrusted,	the	beliefs	are	not,	if	they	are	mistrusted,	belief	is	the	wrong	term	to	describe	the	state	of	mind.	
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Reporting	is	a	kind	of	“language-game”.	The	utterance	‘I	believe…’	informs	listeners	about	the	speaker	and	not	the	subject	matter.	A	person’s	belief,	is	a	state	of	mind,	and	revealed	by	their	behaviour	and	words.	To	know	what	one	believes	oneself	requires	listening	to	what	one	says	and	by	drawing	inferences	from	it,	in	the	same	way	as	we	might	attend	to	what	someone	else	says.	Our	“attitude”	(2009:	x.	102-103)	to	our	own	beliefs	is	different	from	that	of	our	regard	to	others’	beliefs.	We	can	judge	our	words	to	mean	one	belief	while	at	the	same	time	holding	another	view.		We	call	something	a	proposition	in	our	language	if	we	“apply	the	calculus	of	truth	functions	to	it”	(2009:	136).	The	concept	of	truth	“engages”	with	the	proposition.	What	is	‘true’	or	‘false’	are	“treated	as	belonging”	to	the	proposition	and	are	determined	in	part	by	the	grammatical	rules	of	the	particular	language	and	by	the	use	of	each	sign	in	a	particular	language-game.	The	concept	of	writing,	“fits”	with	the	concept	of	pen.	In	the	semantic	sense	we	can	ask	if	a	proposition	is	true	by	asking	if	a	subject	“fits”	(2009:	137)	with	the	proposition	–	does	the	number	‘7’	fit	with	the	series	of	numbers	‘1	to	6’	that	precede	it?	However,	Wittgenstein	(2009:	139)	says,	there	are	two	different	ways	of	understanding	the	meaning	of	a	word	“fits”:	its	semantic	interpretation	and	also	the	particular	“use”	of	the	word.	We	can	see	continuities	with	James’	notion	of	truth	here	–	the	happening	of	the	unfolding	situation	is	where	concepts	are	designated	as	true	or	false	and	an	idea	is	designated	as	true	in	terms	of	the	consequences	that	follow	from	that	assignment.	Wittgenstein	(2009:	vi.	36)	too	argues	that	knowing	how	to	play	chess	is	being	able	to	demonstrate	this	ability.	A	feeling	of	knowing	is	not	the	same	as	ability.	
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Nelson	Goodman		
	 1) Frames	of	reference	are	systems	of	description.	There	is	no	direct	translation;	our	knowledge	is	descriptions	of	descriptions	–	worlds.		2) There	is	no	foundational	knowledge,	or	essential	substances.	What	we	can	know	is	how	things	function.		3) The	making	of	worlds	is	from	other	worlds,	involving	composition,	decomposition,	deletion,	supplementation,	weighing,	ordering	and	distortion.		
	
Frames	of	reference	are	systems	of	description.	There	is	no	direct	translation;	our	
knowledge	is	descriptions	of	descriptions	–	worlds	
	Nelson	Goodman	describes	his	approach	as	a	radical	relativist,	tracing	the	lineage	of	his	ideas	through	Kant	to	C.	I.	Lewis,	whose	own	teachers	included	William	James	and	Joshua	Royce	(Misak	2013:	211).150	Goodman	(1978:	2)	asks	how	can	two	apparently	contradictory	true	statements,	‘the	sun	moves’	and	‘the	sun	does	not	move’	be	true?	He	says	they	do	not	have	truth-values,	as	they	are	incomplete	elliptical	statements,	they	obtain	a	truth-value	within	a	particular	frame	of	reference.		The	relevance	of	a	frame	of	reference	is	less	the	particularities	of	the	described,	than	the	“systems	of	description”	in	which	a	particular	frame	of	reference	“belongs”.	We	cannot	describe	a	statement	outside	of	a	frame	of	reference,	outside	of	a	system	of	description,	we	can	only	describe	“worlds”	(1978:	3).	“We	are	confined	to	ways	of	describing	whatever	is	described.”	Goodman	(1978:	3)	
                                                        
 
150 Cheryl Misak (2013: 211) puts that there is no reason to believe that Goodman read the classical pragmatists 
directly but that his pragmatism, it can be surmised came through his teacher C.I Lewis. 
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There	is	no	foundational	knowledge,	or	essential	substances.	What	we	can	know	is	how	
things	function.			Goodman	(1978:	6)	says,	after	Gombrich	(2012	[1959]:	12)	there	is	no	‘innocent	eye’	(or	given).	While	he	takes	foundational	knowledge	and	the	notion	of	essential	substances	to	be	a	“false	hope”,	he	asserts	in	an	overtly	pragmatist	sentiment,	that	what	can	be	said	is	how	things	function.	Stuff	–	waves,	mass,	phenomena	of	all	types	are	is	made	along	with	the	linguistic	worlds	already	made.	Making	and	the	description	of	worlds	is	“remaking”.151	Rather,	he	says,	(1978:	7)	the	questions	should	be	“...how	worlds	are	made,	tested,	and	known?”	What	are	the	“relationships	among	worlds”	and	what	are	the	processes	involved?				
The	making	of	worlds	is	from	other	worlds,	involving	composition,	decomposition,	
deletion,	supplementation,	weighing,	ordering	and	distortion		Much	“worldmaking”	Goodman	(1978:	7-8)	argues,	takes	place	in	the	categorising	and	re-categorising,	the	making	of	parts	and	wholes.	This	process	usually	occurs	with	the	“application	of	labels”,	linguistic	naming	and	describing,	in	the	form	of	words,	gestures	and	pictures,	“temporally	diverse	events”	(1978:	9)	are	brought	together	under	one	name	and	“identified”	as	subject	or	object.	Eating	various	foods,	for	example,	are	separated	into	fruits	or	breakfast	or	raw	or	healthy.	Worlds	can	be	transferred	into	different	modes	–	a	name	for	a	taste	predicate	can	be	transferred	in	a	sound.	Here	connections	can	be	made	with	James’	
                                                        
 
151 Wittgenstein (2009: 23) makes a similar point, speaking occurs within “language-games”. 
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(1912:	23)152	radical	empiricist	argument,	that	it	is	thoughts	that	are	“talked	of”	as	existent	objects	or	thoughts	about	objects	(subject	and	object),	and	James’	(1909	PU:	235)153	argument	that	theories	chop	up	the	world	into	parts.		“Worldmaking”	(Goodman	1978:	7-16)	involves	the	processes	of:	“Composition	and	Decomposition”,	naming	and	categorising;	“Weighing”	–	relating	how	the	classes	are	sorted	differently	in	different	worlds;	“Ordering”	entities	into	classes,	that	may	be	the	same	as	one	description	but	in	another	the	sequence	varies	and	as	a	result	so	does	the	emphasis;	“Deletion	and	Supplementation”	occurs	in	“making	one	world	out	of	another”,	in	the	re-categorisation	at	various	levels	of	perceiving,	conceptualising	and	remembering;	Description	involves	subtracting	and	adding	to	what	is	described	in	one	instance	and	as	a	result	“Deformation”	occurs	in	its	remaking.	In	all	domains	of	life,	from	the	arts	to	science,	deletion	and	supplementation	occurs.			 “Replacement	of	a	so-called	analog	by	a	so-called	digital	system	through	the	articulation	of	separate	steps	involves	deletion:	for	example,	to	use	a	digital	thermometer	with	readings	in	tenths	of	a	degree	is	to	recognize	no	temperature	as	lying	between	90	and	90.1	degree.”	(Goodman	1978:	15)			
                                                        
 
152 “Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i.e., 
talked-of, twice…” (1912: 23) 
 
153 Abstract concepts are only “snap-shots” (1909a: 235) taken from our experience and while useful they have no 
value in themselves. 
 
“…so the system grows completer, and new reality, as it comes, gets named after and 
conceptually strung upon this or that element of it which we have already established. The 
immutability of such an abstract system is its great practical merit; the same identical 
terms and relations in it can always be recovered and referred to change itself is just such 
an unalterable concept.” (James A Pluralistic Universe 1909: 235) 
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In	an	echo	of	James,	Goodman	(1978:	18)	we	have	many	different	realities	–	different	worlds,	depending	upon	our	present	purposes.	What	is	true	of	reality	is	also	the	case	with	knowledge	–	our	knowledge	is	of	different	kinds	of	worlds.	
	
	
Hilary	Putman			 1) There	can	be	no	“same	meaning”	between	text	or	data	and	its	interpretation	–	interpretation	is	emphasised	here,	rather	than	meaning.	2) Assertability	–	what	is	said	to	be	the	case	–	is	not	solely	internal	to	semantic	logic	of	the	language	but	dependent	upon	the	interpreter’s	interests	and	the	context.	3) Interpretation	as	correlation.	
	
	
There	can	be	no	“same	meaning”	between	text	or	data	and	its	interpretation	–	
interpretation	rather	than	meaning	
	After	Quine’s	(1951,	60)	“attack”	on	general	rules	of	assertability,	Putnam	(1992	[1983]:	77)	also	rejects	that	sentences	can	be	taken	to	have	the	“same	meaning”.	Talk	he	argues	should	be	of	interpretation	rather	than	meaning.	Assertions	are	context	dependent	and	meaning	is	relative	to	a	particular	interpretation,	or	the	“rules	of	translation”	in	Quine’s	(1951:	26)	terminology.		 	“Assertibility,	to	the	extent	that	it	is	rational,	is	pragmatic	and	depends	on	the	entire	context.”	(Putnam	1992	[1983]:	77)	
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Assertability	–	what	is	said	to	be	the	case	–	is	not	solely	internal	to	semantic	logic	of	the	
language	but	dependent	upon	the	interpreter’s	interests	and	the	context	
	Putnam’s	(1992	[1983]:	78)	use	of	“entire”	context	is	important	here	because	it	makes	meaning	a	one	off,	there	is	no	identical	encounter	with	a	sentence.	In	response	to	the	question,	how	can	it	be	the	case	that	the	author	or	others	interpret	a	sentence	in	the	same	way,	Quine’s	response	is	that	the	interpretation	of	a	sentence	is	relative	to	the	particular	language	and	the	truth	conditions	that	are	contained	within	the	linguistic	form	of	a	sentence;	“is	snow	white?”	–	“if	and	only	if	snow	is	white”.154	Putnam	questions	how	it	is	possible	that	Quine’s	response,	that	posits	a	logic	that	is	internal	to	the	proposition,	can	offer	objective	criteria	for	truth	conditions.	Here	Putnam	draws	a	comparison	with	relativist	deconstructive	literary	theory,	whom,	he	says,	faces	the	same	criticism,	how	can	a	relativist	theory	be	more	objective	than	the	other	theories	that	it	critiques?			
Interpretation	as	correlation		Putnam’s	(1992	[1983]:	78)	response	is	to	say,	in	accordance	with	Quine,	that	there	are	no	semantic	rules	that	can	determine	the	“same	meaning”	and	that	talk	should	be	of	interpretation,	but	against	Quine’s	(1970:	3)	view,	that	interpretation	is	indeterminate.	Instead	Putnam’s	response	is	that	there	are	differences	between	interpretations	and	interpretation	can	be	“correct”	and	“relevant”	to	particular	contexts.	Putnam	rejects	that	this	viewpoint	leads	to	total	subjectivism,	that	the	“interests”	of	the	individual	would	make	an	
                                                        
 
154 Putnam draws from Quine’s example in Quine, W. V. (1970) Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. p.3 
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interpretation	correct	(a	similar	criticism	levelled	at	William	James	by	Bertrand	Russell	in	response	to	his	pragmatism).	Putnam	(1992	[1983]:	79)	argues	that	individuals’	“interests”	do	not	all	have	the	same	value:	an	individual	may	be	“deluded”	or	“silly”.	A	rational	interpretation	is	not	the	only	interpretation,	nor	can	a	sentence	be	taken	outside	of	the	context	of	use,	rather	after	Quine,	Putnam	says,	interpretation	is	a	“correlation”	between	the	author’s	sentences	with	those	of	the	current	interpreter	and	their	attendant	assumptions	about	the	context	of	the	author’s	sentences.		Putnam	(1992	[1983]:	80-81)	argues	that	interpretation	of	a	literary	text	goes	beyond	the	question,	"What	is	the	meaning	(truth-conditions)	associated	with	this	line?"	however,	there	is	no	practical	difference	between	a	close	account	of	a	text	and	critical	evaluation,	both	are	interpretations	according	to	the	interests	of	the	individual.		The	difficulty	of	differentiating	between	the	objective	and	the	subjective	is	that	words	do	not	correspond	to	mind	independent	facts	and	concepts	do	not	necessarily	refer	to	external	things	“…concepts	are	(at	least	in	part)	abilities	and	not	occurrences”	(1981:	16).	Putnam	(1981:	22)	says	it	is	a	fallacy	that	because	we	use	words	and	can	intend	a	particular	meaning	that	our	intention	determines	what	words	mean.	Two	people	can	use	the	word	‘I’	and	refer	to	two	different	selves.	“The	mental	state	by	itself,	in	isolation	from	the	whole	situation,	does	not	fix	the	reference.”	(1981:	23)		James’	pragmatist	conception	of	truth	rejects	‘causal’	accounts	and	seeks	to	modify	the	correspondence	theories	by	taking	truth	as	a	value	ascribed	in	experience,	a	sequence	of	specifiable	transitions	between	thoughts,	that	potentially	terminate	in	the	objects	to	which	
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they	refer.	As	such,	James’	account	of	truth	can	be	taken	as	a	process	of	interpretation	that	takes	place	within	the	medium	of	the	“experienceable	environment”.	James	had	characterized	individuals’	categories	of	experience	“worlds”,	classes	whose	members	share	a	logic	of	acting	and	influencing	one	another:	the	logic	physics,	of	ethics,	or	of	fantasy	and	fiction.	Each	world	is	real	“while	it	is	attended	to”,	reality	is	that	which	we	take	to	be	external	to	us,	yet	it	is	mutable.	For	James,	experience	is	always	mediated	by	the	structure	of	the	brain,	our	prior	experience	and	sensations	are	as	close	as	we	get	to	immediate	experience,	although	in	recognizing	them	our	concepts	act	as	substitutes	for	reality	(1909	PU:	271-272).	Goodman’s	‘worlds’	are	further	removed	from	a	notion	of	contact	with	reality.	They	can	offer	a	description	whose	frame	of	reference	is	its	self	a	description.	Fiction	and	facts	are	both	descriptions,	made	and	remade.	Wittgenstein’s	(2009:	244)	sensations	are	words	learnt	as	children;	names	that	“replace"	tears	or	toe	contacting	with	a	stone.155	In	our	“attitudes”	towards	things,	we	‘see	as’	–	a	duck	or	a	rabbit.	We	peer	into	the	wardrobe,	as	if	a	portal	to	a	distant	land.	We	can	perhaps	note	too,	that	there	is	a	difference	between	attitudes	that	are	habitual	and	those	that	are	intentional-volitional.	Putnam’s	reader	of	a	fictional	text	cannot	derive	the	“same	meaning”	as	the	author	or	their	neighbour,	their	translations	are	all	interpretations	but	they	can	have	correlations	with	one	another.	For	James	the	flux	of	experience	always	supersedes	the	translation.		
                                                        
 
155 James makes a similar point: 
 
“…thought proper must  have had an exclusively practical use. Men classed their origin of 
sensations, substituting concepts for them, in order to 'work them for utility what they 
were worth,' and to prepare for what might lie ahead. Class-names suggest consequences 
that have attached themselves on other occasions to other members of the class — 
consequences which the present percept will also probably or certainly show.” 
 (James SP 1911: 63)   
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Approaches	to	fiction		
	
	 (1) Fiction	as	a	way	of	speaking		Peter	Lamarque	(2010:	2)	frames	the	debate	between	classifying	the	relations	between	truth	and	fiction	in	terms	of	truth	and	value	and	the	value	of	truth	for	literature,	rather	than	truth	and	facts.	The	problem	for	Lamarque	is	there	not	one	conception	of	truth	or	of	fiction	(2010:	5),	poetic	truth	is	not	propositional	or	scientific	truth.	For	Nelson	Goodman	(1978:	18)	fiction	and	nonfiction	can	be	classified	as	types	of	discourse,	‘ways	of	talking’.	Worlds	are	made	by	what	is	said.	The	relation	of	truth	to	fiction	is	what	is	“said	literally”	and	taken	literally,	although	what	is	said	can	also	be	metaphorical,	and	metaphorical	truths	and	what	is	said	can	be	shown,	gestured	and	demonstrated.	What	is	said	may	be	literally	false	but	convey	a	broader	truth.			 “In	a	scientific	treatise,	literal	truth	counts	most;	but	in	a	poem	or	novel	metaphorical	or	allegorical	truth	may	matter	more,	for	even	a	literally	false	statement	may	be	metaphorically	true	and	may	mark	or	make	new	associations	and	discriminations,	change	emphases,	effect	exclusions	and	additions.”	(Goodman	1978:	18)		
	The	different	categories	of	discourse	“confer”	reality	or	fiction	on	what	is	said.	Hayden	White	(1981:19)	says	history	is	taken	as	the	“discourse	of	the	real”,	as	opposed	to	the	“discourse	of	the	imaginary”	or	“the	discourse	of	desire”.”	(White	1981:19).	Narrativity	connects	the	real	with	the	true.	White	takes	narrativity	(story-discourse)	as	a	way	of	telling	events.	The	way	of	
speaking	is	distinguished	by	particular	grammatical	forms	and	the	role	of	the	pronoun	“I”,	demonstrative	pronouns,	adverbial	indicators	such	as	“here”,	now”,	yesterday,	tomorrow	and	
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the	use	of	the	third	person.	For	White,	there	is	no	problem	for	the	status	of	content,	classified	as	real	or	imaginary,	in	fictional	narratives.	The	discourse	can	“speak	for	themselves”,	whereas	real	events	should	not	speak,	“they	should	not	pose	as	tellers”.	It	is	when	real	events	are	given	the	form	a	story,	classification	is	made	problematic,	says	White	(1981:4).	The	role	of	phone	calls	in	the	The	Lost	Index	apps	moves	from	telling,	to	events	occurring.	The	phone	call	is	happening	in	the	experience;	it	is	not	being	told.		Kendall	Walton	(1990:98-99)	distances	the	discussion	of	fiction	with	that	of	truth	and	reality,	suggesting	that	even	young	children	can	usually	“intuitively”	distinguish	between	stories	and	reality.	However,	he	acknowledges	that	the	both	the	fictional	language	and	that	pertaining	to	reality	are	both	[Wittgensteinian]	“language	games”,	and	that	reality,	taken	as	a	construct,	is	another	form	of	fiction.	It	is	the	way	discourse	is	performed	by	the	make-believer,	rather	than	the	author,	that	differentiates	stories	from	reality.	“Fiction	and	nonfiction	differ	more	on	pragmatic	rather	than	semantic	grounds.”	(Walton	1990:	76)	The	question	for	Walton	is	how	we	specify	the	qualities	of	these	types	of	discourse.		
	 (2) Between	telling	and	temporal	structure		Goodman	(1981:	110)	differentiates	between	the	order	of	telling	and	the	sequence	of	events	in	a	story.	Events	in	a	story	can	be	reordered	in	the	telling	without	affecting	the	comprehension	of	the	sequence	of	events	(The	woman	in	the	yellow	boots	ran	over	the	bridge.	The	pen	was	dropped	on	the	bridge).	The	causal	relations	can	be	inferred	even	without	verbal	devices	employing	changes	in	tense	and	terms	such	as	‘before’,	‘then’,	‘after’.	White	(1981:19)	argues	it	is	at	the	end	of	a	story	that	the	structure	within	events	(plot	and	
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story	relations)	is	revealed	that	makes	their	occurrence	coherent.	An	account	of	historical	events,	in	White’s	terms,	can	only	be	considered	true	if	it	is	possible	for	there	to	be	other	sequences	of	events,	from	which	the	true	sequence	can	be	distinguished.	Conversely,	it	is	this	potential	for	reordering	that	also	makes	the	authenticity	of	historical	accounts	questionable.	The	form	is	what	confers	reality.	Goodman	(1981:	111)	says	that	while	a	psychologist’s	report	can	read	as	a	narrative	when	ordered	chronologically	as	a	history	of	events,	when	reordered	as	types	of	symptoms	the	account	becomes	an	analysis	rather	than	a	narrative.			 “Actually,	although	every	narrative	will	survive	some	reordering,	not	every	narrative	will	survive	every	reordering.	Some	stories	when	considered	in	certain	ways	are	not	stories	but	studies.”	(Goodman	1981:	111)			The	act	of	making	choices	in	a	locative	narrative	or	pervasive	game	has	the	effect	of	configuring	the	plot	in	particular	direction.	Should	I	avoid	that	individual	in	the	black	shirt	that	is	apparently	an	enemy	agent	and	risk	running	out	of	time?	The	decisions	are	factual	occurrences	in	fictional	scenario.	The	narrative	structure	has	two	levels	of	causation:	the	decisions	made	on	the	fly	and	the	authorial	composition	that	orchestrates	when	decisions	will	be	presented	to	the	participant.			 (3) Fiction	as	like	reality		In	Jerome	Bruner’s	(1986)	discussion	of	the	relation	of	pragmatism	to	narrative	argues	that	narrative	thinking	“precludes	verification	on	the	basis	of	their	reality	or	meaning”	because	narrative	is	more	concerned	with	verisimilitude	as	‘truth-likeness’	than	with	verifiable	facts.		In	doing	so	he	(1986:	11)	differentiates	arguments	from	stories;	arguments	try	to	convince	us	
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of	their	truth,	that	may	be	empirically	verified,	whereas,	stories	try	to	convince	of	us	their	truth	likeness	or	verisimilitude	(he	does	not	hold	that	in	this	sense	stories	are	abstractions	of	arguments).	However,	I	argue	that	James’	theory	of	truth	is	concerned	with	the	particular	coherence	of	facts	in	the	context	of	the	individual’s	existing	knowledge	and	the	currently	
happening	situation.	James	(1890b:	293)	makes	provision	for	the	possibility	of	facts	operating	as	truth	within	a	novel	or	imagined	scenarios.	The	imagining	of	a	horse	with	wings	works	in	the	context	of	a	narrative	but	not	in	relation	to	the	actual	living	horse	in	the	stable.	Wings	are	true	in	relation	to	the	particular	world	they	refer	to.	Can	it	be	said	that	they	have	internal	coherence	within	its	world?			 (4) Ontological	status	of	fictional	entities	
	What	are	the	relations	between	reader	and	a	participant’s	attribution	of	truth	and	fiction	and	ontological	questions	of	existence?	We	can	put	the	question	of	existence	of	fictional	entities	in	a	logical	form:	‘does	this	entity	have	x	properties	that	all	entities	in	the	class	‘real’	have?’	Fictional	entities	in	locative	narrative	may	have	the	same	qualities	as	real	entities,	if	bystanders	and	other	players	are	taken	as	the	characters	in	the	story.		White	(1981:15)	argues	that	a	set	of	events	in	a	narrative	is	understood	as	having	significance	for	each	other,	they	“belonging	to	the	same	order	of	meaning”.		A	rule	is	required	that	creates	ontological	connections	and	disregards	discrepancies,	that	“translates	difference	into	similarity”,	“a	subject	common	to	all	referents”.		
	Marie-Laure	Ryan’s	(1980:	418)	“principle	of	minimal	departure”	says	we	ascribe	fictional	worlds	to	be	as	close	as	possible	to	our	own	world.	Fictional	characters	exist	within	their	own	
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world	and	we	assign	truth-values	as	we	would	do	in	our	world,	based	on	the	information	that	we	have	from	the	text,	therefore	settling	the	ontological	status	of	fictional	characters.	We	assume	characters	to	be	human	beings	like	us,	unless	we	are	informed	otherwise.	While	genre	tells	us	“approximately”	(1980:	415)	what	parts	of	real	world	will	be	shared	with	the	fictional	world.	‘The	principle	of	minimal	departure’	operates	on	whole	classes	rather	than	independent	objects,	and	from	part	to	wholes	and	vice	versa,	so	if	a	horse	is	mentioned	in	the	narrative	the	reader	takes	it	that	the	fictional	world	to	be	like	their	real	world,	that	the	horse	has	legs	and	that	animals	generally	exist	within	the	fictional	world.156		We	can	apply	James’	(1890b:	290	footnotes)	question	to	the	ontological	status	of	fiction,	‘does	this	entity	exist	in	the	same	space	with	the	other	“reals”?’			 (5) Pretence	theories	–	what	the	author	does		John	Searle	(1969:	16),	after	J.	L.	Austin	(1962),	take	utterances	as	the	minimal	unit	of	communication	and	the	conditions	under	which	“situated”	linguistic	communication	is	successful.	In	How	to	do	Things	with	Words	Austin	(1962:	2-8)	distinguishes	between	utterances	that	are	“constative”,	those	that	are	measured	by	truth	or	falsity	and	those	that	are	“performative”	–	that	produce	action.	Performative	utterances,	“I	give”,	“I	declare”,	“I	bet”,	“I	
                                                        
 
156 This point is close to Peirce’s argument for characterising our beliefs about existents. If a belief is determinate its 
characteristics inhere within it or is predicated of it or its negative. To affirm that something is a pen is to confirm all 
the particulars of a pen. To deny that something is a pen is to “vaguely” deny some, or all, particulars of a pen. When a 
predicate is unanalyzable, for example when knowledge or experience does not permit it (the pen often leaks), it does 
not affect whether the predicate is affirmed or denied, it is an intermediary, “nascent” state. In cases where there is a 
definite division “or borderline” between affirming and denying the predicate then the concepts of determination, 
generality, and vagueness, “re-appear” (Peirce 1905b: 490).   
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name”,	are	not	descriptive	and	do	not	report	on	events,	they	change	something	in	the	situation,	they	produce	action.	Success	of	an	utterance	is	determined	by	“conditions	to	be	satisfied”	(1962:	14-15).	There	is	a	conventional	procedure	of	a	conventional	effect,	in	particular	circumstances,	particular	procedures	are	invoked,	the	procedure	is	“executed	by	all	participants	both	correctly	and…completely”,	the	procedure	is,	“…for	use	by	persons	having	certain	thoughts	or	feelings”	and	those	performing	the	utterance	have	those	thoughts	and	that	some	consequences	may	follow	and	there	is	an	intention	for	that	conduct.	Austin	defines	“perlocutionary	acts”	as	utterances	that	bring	something	about	or	achieve	something	by	saying	it.	In	The	Lost	Index:	Landscape	with	Figures,	the	status	of	‘you’	is	important.	It	turns	fictional	statements	into	declarative	performative	utterances,	“You	are	going	on		a	journey”.		In	Searle’s	(1975)	application	of	speech	act	theory	to	the	analysis	fiction	he	compares	a	newspaper	report	with	an	excerpt	from	the	novel	The	Red	and	the	Green	by	Iris	Murdoch.	He	states	that	the	journalist	making	a	type	of	illocutionary	act	conforms	to	specific	“semantic	and	pragmatic	rules…”		“(1)	The	essential	rule:	the	maker	of	an	assertion	commits	himself	to	the	truth	of	the	expressed	proposition.		(2)	The	preparatory	rules:	the	speaker	must	be	in	a	position	to	provide	evidence	or	reasons	for	the	truth	of	the	expressed	proposition.		(3)	The	expressed	proposition	must	not	be	obviously	true	to	both	the	speaker	and	the	hearer	in	the	context	of	utterance.		(4)	The	sincerity	rule:	the	speaker	commits	himself	to	a	belief	in	the	truths	of	a	proposition.”	(Searle	1975:	322)		For	Searle,	the	nonfiction	is	“serious”,	in	terms	of	following	the	rules	applicable	to	assertions,	and	fiction	is	“nonserious”;	the	journalist	must	commit	to	these	rules	whereas	the	fictional	writer	has	no	commitment	to	fulfil	these	rules	(Searle	1975:	323).	He	dismisses	the	
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explanation	that	there	are	different	classes	of	illocutionary	acts,	sentences	of	fact	and	fiction	perform	the	same	speech	acts	on	the	grounds	that	words	have	"normal	meanings"(1975:	324).	For	Searle,	the	emphasis	is	primarily	upon	what	the	speakers	(authors)	do,	they	“pretend”.		Not	in	the	sense	of	deception,	he	emphasises,	rather	in	the	sense	of	“as-if	one	were	doing	or	being	the	thing”.	
	Stanley	Fish	(1980:	1022)	argues	that	it	is	“shared	pretense”	between	parties	that	have	“discourse	agreements”	that	indicate	what	can	be	spoken	of	as	fact	and	therefore	all	discourse	is	“serious”,	rather	than	‘serious'	or	‘nonserious’.	It	is	fiction,	from	this	position,	that	instigates	the	type	of	reality.		Marie-Laure	Ryan	(1980:	407)	asks	where	is	the	‘I’	or	other	personal	pronoun	located?	In	the	case	of	counterfactual	statement,	‘I	could	have	found	a	different	pen’,	the	utterance	is	the	viewpoint	of	the	author	and	expresses	a	possible	other	world	where	another	pen	was	found.	In	the	case	of	the	fictionalised	narrator,	‘I’	is	the	viewpoint	of	the	character.	They	are	fictional	and	so	is	the	counterfactual	statement	that	they	express.	Ryan	(1980:	414)	argues	that	fiction	is	“an	act	of	impersonation”	by	the	author	of	a	character	and	reader’s	job	is	working	out	what	is	real	“in	the	world	of	the	impersonated	speaker”.	For	a	character	to	express	a	counterfactual	statement	within	a	fictional	world,	it	is	“fiction	within	fiction,	of	recurrent	impersonation”.	Unlike	in	the	case	of	nonfactuals	that	have	“markers	of	irreality”	(Ryan	1980:	410),	for	example,	the	pen	began	to	move	across	the	page	by	itself,	in	which	the	viewpoint	is	expressed	from	the	real	world	to	that	of	a	different	world.			
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Ryan	(1980:	410)	says	it	is	not	simply	the	case	that	some	objects	are	existent	and	others	are	not	because	real	facts	can	appear	in	fictional	settings,	rather,	non-existent	objects	can	be	defined	by	being	members	of	a	set	where	they	have	the	value	true	and	in	which	the	actual	world	is	not	a	member.		 “I	call	an	object	x	unreal	when	the	actual	world	is	not	a	member	of	the	set	of	worlds	for	which	the	proposition	'x	exists'	takes	the	value	true.”	(Ryan	1980:	410).			Ryan	(1980:	413)	makes	the	point	that	for	Searle	the	most	basic	act	of	communication	is	a	speech	act	and	that	to	retain	the	“unity”	of	the	utterance,	that	it	comes	from	one	speaker,	means	attributing	both	the	serious	and	the	“nonserious”	utterances	to	the	character,	and	not	partially	to	the	author	and	partially	to	the	character.	The	differences	therefore,	between	what	is	taken	to	be	fact	or	fiction,	cannot	be	differentiated	by	the	“serious”	(author-speech)	and	the	“nonserious”	(character-speech).	Ryan	(1980:	413)	says	Searle’s	(1975)	account	neglects	the	idea	of	an	alternate	possible	world.		 “By	combining	the	notion	of	impersonation	with	the	notion	of	alternate	world,	and	by	assuming	that	alternate	worlds	may	present	various	degrees	of	overlap	with	the	real	world,	we	can	avoid	the	difficulties	of	Searle's	analysis.”	(Ryan	1980:	413)			The	idea	of	the	actual	world	is	for	the	reader	the	one	to	which	they	belong.	The	label	“actual	world”	is	“relative”,	for	Ryan	(1980:	414).	The	fictional	world	is	one	defined	by	propositions	that	are	attributed	as	true	in	the	world	of	“impersonated	speaker”.	The	impersonated	speaker	is	often	sufficient	to	guarantee	the	truth-value	however	this	is	not	necessarily	straightforward.	Ryan	(1980:	414)	argues	the	role	of	the	reader	is	to	work	out	which	facts	are	true	within	the	fictional	world	and	those	that	have	the	status	of	possible	worlds,	of	characters’	counterfactual	statements,	their	dreams	and	imaginings,	and	fantasies	of	unreliable	narrators.		
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Ryan	(1980:	419)	divides	the	category	of	impersonation	between	“'impersonating	oneself”	and	“'impersonating	somebody	else’”,	identified	by	personal	pronouns	‘I’	and	‘you’.	Ryan	gives	as	an	example,	that	if	we	talk	to	plants,	we	are	imagining	fictional	world	were	plants	understand	language,	however	the	inferred	personal	pronoun	acts	in	impersonating	oneself	in	the	alternative	world	where	plants	understand,	rather	than	impersonating	ourselves	as	another	character.				Amie	L.	Thomasson	(2015:	255)	says	the	problem	of	the	relation	of	truth	and	fiction	is	frequently	framed	as	a	debate	between	the	anti-realists,	who	consider	truths	in	fiction	to	be	pretend	or	make-believe	and	true	only	within	the	story,	and	the	realists	who	argue	that	there	are	truths	in	fiction	that	are	literally	true	and	truth	is	not	predicated	on	existence,	such	as	the	truth	that	Sherlock	Holmes	is	a	detective.	The	“artifactual”	theory	of	fiction	put	forward	by	Thomasson	(1999)	says	that	fiction	has	internal	truths,	ideas	that	are	true	internally	to	the	text,	to	world	of	the	story,	(in	the	way	that	laws,	philosophical	ideas	have	internal	truths)	and	external	truths,	that	do	not	involve	pretence	and	pertain	to	contexts	external	to	[and	continuous	with]	the	fiction,	such	as	the	The	Eiffel	Tower	is	in	Paris.	Thomasson	(2015:	259)	extends	this	idea	by	saying	characters	are	fictional	not	just	because	they	are	abstract	entities	
“like”	fictional	works	but	because	in	order	for	a	fictional	character	to	be	considered	as	such,	an	author	must	use	them	in	“a	pretending	way”.	
		 (6) Participation,	interpretation	
	Ryan’s	“principle	of	minimal	departure”,	developed	from	David	Lewis’s	(1978:	37)	account	of	truth,	counterfactuals	and	fictional	discourse,	says	it	is	the	reader’s	interpretative	behaviour	
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that	designates	truth	from	fiction.	Readers	construct	a	world	in	response	to	the	text	that	is	as	close	to	their	own	reality	as	possible;	‘horses	with	wings’	(1980:	407)	have	the	features	of	real	horses,	plus	the	addition	of	wings,	that	function	as	wings	do.	Ryan	also	attributes	the	“principle	of	minimal	departure,”	to	the	reader’s	ability	to	construct	representations	based	on	experience,	that	allows	not	just	semantic	interpretation	of	the	text,	but	for	pragmatic	inferences	to	be	drawn	between	clauses,	for	example,	‘sometime	after	the	pen	rolled	beneath	the	floorboards,	the	writer	began	to	type’.		In	Wolfgang	Iser’s	(1978:	53-54)	phenomenologically	focused	account	of	reading	he	argues,	that	while	the	category	fiction	denotes	that	words	are	not	to	be	taken	as	a	given	reality	there	is	an	erroneous	assumption	that	fiction	and	reality	are	antonyms.	Iser	advocates	a	functional	account	of	fiction	that	designates	texts	by	do,	rather	than	as	an	ontological	account	of	what	fiction	is	or	what	it	may	mean.	Iser’s	account	examines	the	pragmatics	of	what	fiction	does,	the	use	of	signs,	considering	the	relations	between	text	and	reality	and	between	the	text	and	the	reader,	drawing	upon	John	Searle	(1969:	16),	after	J.	L.	Austin’s,	speech-act	theory.	For	Iser,	(1978:	55)	it	is	the	range	of	contexts	that	the	text	operates	within	that	is	important	for	identifying	a	text	as	fiction.	Iser	(1978:	61)	argues	that	Austin	and	Searle	interpret	literary	language	as	leading	to	real	actions	or	a	real	context.	Iser	(1978:	58)	points	out	that	Austin	(1962:	22)	says	that	“performative”	utterances,	said	by	an	actor	in	a	theatre,	are	“used	not	seriously…[they	are]	parasitic	on	normal	use”.	However,	for	Iser,	literary	language	does	have	real	effects.157	In	fiction,	he	puts,	conventions	are	taken	from	their	usual	context.	The	effects	of	
                                                        
 
157 This is a point that James makes,  
 
“Ether-waves and your anger, for example, are things in which my thoughts will never 
perceptually terminate, but my concepts of them lead me to their very brink, to the 
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language	are	that	it	“depragmatizes	the	conventions	it	has	selected”	(1978:	61).	The	pragmatic	function	of	the	fictional	text	causes	us	to	examine	the	motivations	of	our	actions.	Fictional	utterances	are	performative,	says	Iser,	not	because	they	cause	readers	to	act	but	they	cause	readers	to	examine	the	conventions	that	have	been	selected.				The	reader	(Iser	(1978:	66)	“build[s]”	a	linguistic	“situational	frame”	that	contains	both	the	text	and	themselves	and	is	necessarily	variant	from	the	given	text.	Reading	is	a	process,	a	“dynamic	interaction	between	the	text	and	the	reader”	in	“self-regulating	system”	where	there	is	“constant	feedback”,	a	response	to	the	information	that	contributes	what	is	perceived.	From	Iser’s	1978:	68)	perspective,	reading	“‘happens’	like	an	event”	and	these	events	are	“paradigms	of	reality”,	that	“designate	a	process”.			 “…it	is	paradoxical	in	so	far	as	the	fictional	text	neither	denotes	a	given	reality,	nor	caters	overtly	to	the	possible	range	of	its	reader’s	dispositions.	It	does	not	even	relate	to	a	cultural	code	common	to	itself	and	its	readers,	for	its	reality	arises	from...the	nature	of	reality	itself”	(Iser	1978:	67-68)			Iser	(1978:	68)	says	reading	“has	the	character	of	an	open-ended	situation”	with	the	concreteness	that	arises	from	the	attitude	to	adopt	towards	the	text	and	(1978:	73)	fiction	is	not	the	opposite	of	reality	but	“the	compliment”.		 “Reading	is	characterised	as	something	happening	and	–	and	happening	has	the	hallmark	of	reality…the	text	can	never	be	grasped	as	a	whole-	only	a	series	of	changing	viewpoints,	each	one	restricted	in	itself	and	so	necessitating	further	perspectives.	This	is	the	process	by	which	the	read	‘realises’	an	overall	situation.”	(Iser	1978:	68)		
	
                                                        
chromatic fringes and to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really next effects.” 
(MT 1909: 119)   
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Expanding	from	an	analytical	philosophical	approach	to	the	reader’s	interpretation	of	texts,	Richard	Gerrig’s	(1993:	5-6)	cognitive	framing	of	fiction	moves	the	emphasis	from	talk	of	classes	in	which	propositions	fit	within	narrative,	to	talk	of	the	types	and	function	of	thinking	involved	in	reading	and	the	experience	of	narrative	worlds,	positing	casual	connections	between	experience	and	cognition.	Gerrig	argues	that	psychological	engagement	with	narrative	texts,	in	the	broadest	sense,	that	can	seem	to	“transport”	readers-audiences	into	the	world	of	a	story.	This	affect	is	partially	achieved	through	the	reader’s	construction	of	the	narrative	world	by	drawing	inferences,	logical	conclusions	based	upon	the	propositions	the	text	presents	and	narrative	conventions	“merging”	with	memories	of	prior	real-world	experiences	(1993:	27).			Gerrig	states	that	engagement	with	narrative	shares	common	cognitive	mechanisms	with	every-day	communication,	“narrative	comprehension…a	microcosm	of	processes	and	memory	
representations	that	guide	our	existence”	(1993:27).	The	adoption	of	other	viewpoints	and	timeframes	is	a	feature	of	fictional	and	nonfictional	linguistic	communication;	Logical	reasoning	requires	imaginative	simulation	of	possible	alternative	states	and	causal	relationships	between	states.	“Propositional	representations”	characterise	readers	as	extracting	units	of	meaning	from	narrative.	“Situation	models”	supplement	the	reader’s	interpretation	of	sentences	with	their	“real-world	knowledge”	by	constructing	“coherent	representations	of	the	situation”	in	response	to	narrative	depictions.	It	is	the	construction	of	the	“situation	model”	that	allows	the	reader	to	verify	statements	pertaining	to	the	text	as	true	or	otherwise	(Gerrig	1993:	5-6).		The	experience	of	being	transported	is	not	a	question	of	belief	in	the	particulars	of	a	story	or	the	distinction	between	fiction	and	nonfiction	but	that	transportation	is	“…virtually	inevitable…with	limited	conscious	effort…”	A	reader	constructs	
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inferences	in	response	to	a	text,	based	on	“schematic	expectancies”	(Gerrig	1993:	328)	of	the	
type	of	structure	and	content,	while	anticipating	that	the	particular	utterance	is	unique	(Gerrig	1993:170).			In	Gerrig’s	(1993:	21)	use	of	the	performance	metaphor,	reading	is	characterised	as	“gap-filling	performance”,	denoting	the	reader’s	role	in	creating	the	text	from	the	memory	of	“facts	
and	emotions”	(1993:17).158	Gerrig		(1993:	66)	identifies	two	interrelated	aspects	of	the	performing	metaphor:	the	reader’s	“inferential”	and	“participatory”	construction	of	the	text.	The	‘inferential’	response	denotes	the	act	of	‘filling	in’	the	details	implied	by	the	text,	for	example,	the	reader	may	assume	(erroneously	or	otherwise)	that	characters	eating	dinner	at	a	table	may	be	sitting	on	chairs.	The	‘participatory’	response	denotes	the	reader’s	wish	to	
“intervene”	(1993:66)	in	a	story	by	imagining	causal	consequences	of	situations	within	the	text.	This	desire	may	be	linked	to	the	reader’s	emotional	reaction,	such	as	suspenseful	situation	prompting	feeling	of	hope	that	the	character	will	not	eat	the	poisoned	apple.159	Gerrig’s	term	“replotting”	describes	how	the	reader	considers	alternative	plots	in	response	to	the	outcome	of	a	story	(Gerrig	1993:	90).			Peter	Lamarque	(2010:	6)	distinguishes	between	“explicit	propositional	content”	–	that	which	it	taken	to	be	the	“indicative”	semantic	content	of	sentences	(She	is	drinking	coffee	in	the	café	alone);	and	“derived	propositional	content”	that	which	a	reader	constructs,	derives	or	fills	in”	in	response	to	the	text	(we	infer	that	the	man	didn’t	catch	up	with	her	on	the	bridge	as	she	is	drinking	coffee	alone).	
                                                        
 
158 Arguably the reader is drawing on their memory of other texts in addition to their own experiences. 
 
159 Gerrig’s theory of participatory response is discussed further in chapter X on narrative. 
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I	agree	with	Gerrig	on	Searle’s	neglect	of	the	reader’s	role	in	the	definition	of	fiction	and	concur	broadly	with	the	conclusions	he	draws	from	psychological	studies	of	reading	that	show	reader’s	have	difficulty	in	distinguishing	between	fiction	and	nonfiction	when	texts	are	taken	out	of	context,	indicating	that	the	semantic	content	and	the	act	of	speaking	is	not	sufficient	to	distinguish	fiction	from	nonfiction.	However,	I	would	add	that	in	non-experimental	conditions,	readers’	particular	use	of	the	text	cannot	be	separated	from	the	language-games	in	which	it	operates	and	the	reader’s	broader	contextual	knowledge160	which	affects	their	classifying	statements	as	‘facts’,	obtain	their	status	from	the	world	of	the	reader’s	existence	and	those	internal	to	fictional	world.	There	are	also	the	‘fictional-facts’	that	readers	and	participants	derive	from	other	narratives	that	exert	an	intertextual	influence	on	the	reader’s	interpretation	(Alex	Ryder	is	a	young	‘James	Bond’).	As	Barthes	stated,		“The	text	is	a	tissue	of	quotations	drawn	from	the	innumerable	centres	of	culture”	“…a	‘multi-dimensional	space	in	which	a	variety	of	writings,	none	of	the	original	blend	and	clash...”	(Barthes	1977:	146)			Kendall	Walton’s	(1990:72)	defines	fiction	not	in	terms	of	the	semantic	relations	between	words	or	as	correspondence	between	words	and	the	world	but	as	a	function	of	representations	to	act	as	a	“prop”	in	a	game	of	“make-believe”.	Make-believe	is	a	“cognitive	function”	(1990:	94)	–	what	an	“appreciator”	does.	He	rejects	Searle’s	(1975:	325)	account	that	fiction	is	produced	by	speech	acts,	that	authors	pretend	to	make	assertions	and	perform	illocutionary	acts	through	the	voices’	of	their	characters,	“as-if”	they	were	doing	so,	on	the	grounds	that	this	argument	it	is	not	transferable	to	other	media.	Walton	says	authors,	
                                                        
 
160 This contextual knowledge includes a range of extraneous details: the book’s cover, title, genre etc., and in other 
media: the environment of the cinema, theatre, launching the app etc.  
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painters,	filmmakers,	etc.,	are	not	pretending	to	make	truth	claims	and	what	the	author	imagines	they	think	they	are	doing	is	irrelevant	in	the	appreciator’s	designation	of	a	work	as	fiction	or	non-fiction.	Making	works	is	not	pretending,	rather	it	is	the	production	of	“props”	to	be	used	by	others	in	“imaginative	activities”	(1990:	83).	The	concept	of	story,	he	(1990:	87)	claims,	is	attached	to	it	being	an	object,	whose	use	is	a	prop.		Walton	(1990:	102)	argues	that	while	fiction	is	“entirely	independent”	of	straight	forward	reporting	of	events,	it	has	“nothing	essentially	to	do	with	what	is	real,	true	or	factual”,	or	“serious”	discourse;	what	is	important	in	distinguishing	truth	and	fiction	is	how	the	fictional	world	“generates	fictional	truths”	that	pertain	to	it	(1990:102).	Readers	differentiate	between	fiction	and	nonfiction	by	taking	the	statements	in	nonfiction	-	a	newspaper	report,	scientific	journal,	recipe,	etc.	–	to	be	potentially	verifiable	(1990:	71).	However,	Walton	(1990:102)	argues	that	each	discourse	has	a	reality	outside	of	“itself”	–	the	particular	“culture’s	discourse”,	that	a	truth	must	in	some	way	must	correspond,	however	that	reality	may	be	constructed.	The	fictional	is	subject	to	what	is	understood	as	‘truth’	in	a	particular	cultural	context.	This	point	dovetails	with	Ryan’s	‘principle	of	minimal	departure’,	that	the	fictional	world	is	seen	as	close	as	possible	to	the	reader’s	own	world.		Ryan	(1980:	405),	in	parentheses,	importantly	points	out	that	the	truth-value	of	all	statements	is	interpreted	in	“the	actual	world”.	However,	I	argue	that	it	is	this	point	that	is	of	primary	import	to	this	debate.	It	is	this	actual	world	context	that	James	emphasises;	the	actually	happening	event	of	narrative	interpretation,	that	brings	with	it	and	is	inseparable	from	the	“experienceable	environment”	(MT	1909:	42).	When	we	make	the	distinction	between	fact	and	fiction	it	is	in	the	context	of	the	particular	environment	and	all	the	
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information	that	is	currently	at	our	disposal,	whether	drawing	upon	logical	rules	or	‘intuitive’	responses.	We	have	no	difficulty,	says	James,	conceiving	of	movement	in	lived	reality.	It	is	only	when	it	is	broken	down	and	subjected	to	analysis	that	the	philosophical	puzzle	becomes	conflated	with	lived	reality.	This	has	further	resonance	for	locative	narrative	where	it	is	not	just	the	interpretation	that	is	happening	but	the	fictional	place	in	which	participants	act.				 (7) Difference	between	possible	worlds	and	fictional	worlds			It	is	in	our	happening	experience	there	are	many	worlds	that	our	thoughts	operate	within	(James	1890b:	293).	When	we	read	a	narrative	do	we	assign	our	thoughts	the	categories	of	fiction	or	nonfiction?	Even	when	we	directly	identify	our	thoughts	as	pertaining	to	fictional	truths,	there	may	have	practical	‘real’	consequences	for	us,	such	as	changes	in	our	physiology,	breathing,	salivating,	heart	beat.	We	can	feel	elated	or	anxious	as	the	suspect	disappears	across	the	bridge.	Goodman	(1978:	104)	rejects	that	fiction	creates	possible	worlds,	rather	he	argues	fiction	creates	actual	worlds,	metaphorical	worlds	(Goodman	1978:	104).	The	“merely	possible”	worlds	of	fiction	“lie	within	the	actual	worlds”.	Fiction	and	nonfiction	“operate”	within	actual	worlds.		Ryan	(1980:	404	footnotes)	defines	an	alternative	possible	world,	as	one	that	is	imaginatively	but	“not	materially	possible”.	How	logic	operates	in	fictional	possible	worlds	she	says	is	debatable,	imagined	places	may	not	perform	according	to	laws	of	logic	in	this	world,	circles	may	be	square	in	an	alternative	world,	however,	propositions	that	describe	fictional	possible	worlds	are	not	true	of	all	worlds	and	therefore	they	are	unlike	modal	operators	[if	not,	then:		necessity	and	possibility].	Ryan	defines	a	fictional	“alternative	world”	contains	“at	least	one	
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proposition”	that	has	a	different	truth-value	to	that	of	“this	world	and	reality”.	Ryan	(1980:	419)	says	not	all	utterances	involve	imagining	a	possible	world,	such	as,	‘Socrates	is	mortal’,	but	when	speech	acts	involve	impersonation	there	is	reference	to	another	world.			Kendall	Walton	(1990:	64)	seeks	to	distinguish	between	‘possible	worlds’	that	he	defines	as	cluster	of	propositions	that	are	true	of	that	world,	and	‘fictional	worlds’,	that	unlike	possible	worlds,	can	be	“usually	incomplete”	and	“sometimes	impossible”.	Walton	argues	that	fictional	worlds	can	contain	propositions	that	are	not	true	–	science	fiction	says	time	travel	is	possible,	but	it	is	untrue.			
Conclusions		James’	pragmatist	conception	of	truth	rejects	‘causal’	accounts	and	seeks	to	modify	correspondence	theories,	by	taking	truth	as	a	value	ascribed	in	experience,	a	sequence	of	specifiable	transitions	between	thoughts,	that	potentially	terminate	in	the	objects	to	which	they	refer.	As	such,	James’	account	of	truth	can	be	taken	as	a	process	where	meaning	is	made	within	the	medium	of	the	“experienceable	environment”.	James	characterizes	individuals’	categories	of	experience	as	“worlds”.	These	can	be	described	as	classes	whose	members	share	a	logic	of	acting	and	influencing	one	another,	the	logic	of	physics,	of	ethics,	of	fantasy	and	fiction.	Each	world	is	real	“while	it	is	attended	to”,	reality	is	that	which	we	take	to	be	external	to	us,	yet	it	is	mutable.	In	the	The	Lost	Index,	No.1:		Landscape	with	Figures	the	participant	is	a	museum	visitor,	a	player	of	the	game,	and	if	an	attitude	of	supposition	is	adopted,	a	character	in	the	story.	When	answering	the	phone,	they	do	so	as	a	player	and	as	a	character,	however	if	
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the	call	happens	to	be	from	‘outside	the	game’,	the	relations	to	the	phone	move	from	being	a	prop	to	the	world	of	technology	to	the	communication	of	social	relations	–	a	different	context.			Goodman’s	‘worlds’	are	further	removed	from	a	notion	of	‘contact	with	reality’.	Worlds	can	offer	a	description	whose	frame	of	reference	is	its	self	a	description.	Fiction	and	facts	are	both	descriptions,	made	and	remade.			For	James,	experience	is	always	mediated	by	the	structure	of	the	brain,	our	prior	experience	and	sensations	are	as	close	as	we	get	to	immediate	experience,	although	in	recognizing	them	our	concepts	act	as	substitutes	for	reality	(1909	PU:	271-272).	Putnam’s	reader	of	a	fictional	text	cannot	derive	the	“same	meaning”	as	the	author	or	their	neighbour;	while	their	translations	are	all	interpretations,	there	may	be	correlations	between	them.	For	James,	the	flux	of	experience	always	supersedes	the	translation.161	In	The	Lost	Index:	Landscape	with	
Figures,	some	facts	are	true	only	within	the	story,	that	you	are	a	‘human	drive’,	that	there	exists	a	church	interior,	box	and	contents,	but	they	are	also	potential	actually	imagined	events.	James’	([1878]	1920:	60)	assertion	that	beliefs	occur	in-action	allows	for	the	movement	between	these	contexts	to	be	fluid.	Experientially	worlds	are	nested	within	one	another	with	truth-values	varyingly	assigned.	It	is	our	particular	contextual	relation	to	these	spaces	that	affects	whether	we	take	them	to	be	real	or	imagined.		
                                                        
 
161 “Reality consists of existential particulars as well as of essences and universals and class-names, and of existential 
particulars we become aware only in the perceptual flux. The flux can never be superseded. We must carry it with us 
to the bitter end of our cognitive business, keeping it in the midst of the translation even when the latter proves 
illuminating, and fall back on it alone when the translation gives out. 'The insuperability of sensation' would be a short 
expression of my thesis.” (1911: 78-79)   
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Wittgenstein’s	(2009:	244)	sensations	are	words	learnt	as	children;	names	that	“replace"	tears,	or	a	toe	contacting	with	a	stone.162	In	our	“attitudes”	towards	things,	we	‘see	as’	a	duck	or	a	rabbit.	We	peer	into	the	wardrobe,	as	if	a	portal	to	a	distant	land.	We	can	perhaps	note	too,	that	there	is	a	difference	between	attitudes	that	are	habitual	and	those	that	are	intentional-volitional.	The	painting	in	Landscape	with	Figures	has	a	dual	function	as	a	theatrical	prop	within	the	narrative	and	as	an	aide-memoire	in	the	memory	game,	functioning	as	‘magical’	object	rather	than	a	literal	doorway	to	the	outdoors.	James	(1907:	203)	says	truth	is	a	value	in	experience.	Our	beliefs	about	the	world	are	mostly	unverified	but	hang	together	in	a	concatenated	structure,	from	one	to	another	occurring	in-action.		As	Ryan,	White,	Putnam	and	others	point	out	the	placement	of	personal	pronouns	signal	to	readers	who	is	speaking.	As	Gerrig	(1993:	101)	notes,	if	contextual	information	is	removed	from	the	reader	then	the	content	and	grammatical	structure	alone	is	not	sufficient	to	determine	the	ontological	status	of	the	speaker.	The	act	of	interpretation	of	the	status	of	fiction	involves	semantic	content	in	combination	with	the	particular	instance	of	its	use,	use	that	importantly	brings	with	it	context	in	different	modes	(spatial,	temporal,	social,	subject	specific,	etc.).	Context,	or	what	James	refers	to	as	the	“experienceable	environment”,	is	arguably	what	allows	us	to	make	distinctions,	to	metaphorically	stand	back	from	the	scene	and	see	the	picture	frame,	know	that	we	are	in	our	cinema	seat	and	not	to	run,	even	when	the	
                                                        
162 James makes a similar point: 
 
“…thought proper must have had an exclusively practical use. Men classed their origin of 
sensations, substituting concepts for them, in order to 'work them for utility what they 
were worth,' and to prepare for what might lie ahead. Class-names suggest consequences 
that have attached themselves on other occasions to other members of the class — 
consequences which the present percept will also probably or certainly show.” (1911 SP: 
63)   
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3D	zombie	lunges	at	us.	Playing	with	context	is	a	strategy	that	creators	of	fictional	places	have	long	since	recognised,	as	Greek	trompe	I	‘oil	painters	attempted	to	erase	the	context	of	paint	and	merge	with	existent	building	and	as	James	noted	in	his	account	of	panoramas,			 “…those	cunning	circular	panoramas	that	have	lately	been	exhibited,	where	the	real	foreground	and	the	painted	canvas	join	together.”	(1912	[1904]:	30)					Reality,	in	our	experience,	is	what	we	take	to	be	existent.	While,	the	attribution	of	the	status	of	‘the	real’	can	be	ambiguous	when	there	are	slippages	of	relations	to	context.	We	can	say	an	object	is	‘known-as’	real	because	it	functions	as	a	real	pen,	while	some	ideas	can	have	a	‘reality-feeling’	despite	being	vague	or	‘almost	unimaginable’	(VRE	1902:	58).	Words	can	also	have	a	“feeling	of	familiarity	and	reality”	(James	MT	1909:	31-32),	as	if	we	could	snatch	a	look	at	their	referent,	if	they	weren’t	just	out	of	sight…the	flash	of	her	while	coat	as	it	disappears	
through	a	door…The	context	of	a	sentence	takes	the	word	in	direction	that	a	singular	word	may	not,	meaning	is	dynamic,	there	are	“feelings	of	tendency”	(PP	1890a:	254),	“felt	in	the	fringe”	(PP	1890a:	265),	as	satisfying	or	unsuitable…pushing	the	pen	inside	his	jacket	he	
remembers	that	he’s	seen	it	somewhere	before…	James	(PP1890b:	45)	says	the	difference	between	imagination	and	memory	is	we	attach	a	date	to	those	thoughts.	We	are	constantly	experiencing	things	and	events	not	present	but	their	reality	for	us	is	as	memories	that	happened	to	us,	or	was	it	in	that	book	we	once	read?	James	(WB	1897:	264-265)	takes	the	“continua	of	memory”	to	be	our	“personal	consciousness”,	it	is	what	links	our	experiences	together.	When	we	adopt	the	supposition	–	as-if	–	the	events	narrated	where	existent,	attitudes	can	potentially	to	‘tip-over’	into	belief,	and	representations	can	have	a	“reality-feeling”	(James	1902:	58).			
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What	descriptions	can	be	made	of	the	mechanisms	of	creating	context?	What	points	of	transition	are	there	between	contexts?	Our	reports	can	only	be	descriptions,	other	worlds…	
	
	
	
	
Case	study	3:	The	Lost	Index	-	The	Turning	
	Developing	the	eighth	prototype,	The	Lost	Index:	No.	2,	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt,	with	buttons)	
	
The	Lost	Index:	No.	2,	The	Turning	builds	upon	the	findings	of	case	studies	1	and	2	to	further	explore	the	situating	of	story	worlds	with	existent	locations	and	locative	narrative	modes	of	engagement.	Playing	with	context	and	dramatic	tension	created	by	sound	design	is	considered	in	relation	to	taking	part	in	challenges	embedded	within	the	narrative.		Following	the	science	fiction	narrative	premise	of	Lost	Index,	No.	1:	Landscape	with	Figures,	in	this	scenario	the	museum	has	a	fundamental,	yet	covert,	role	in	the	stability	of	the	universe.	Malevolent	forces	have	removed	an	index	held	in	the	museum,	crucial	for	maintaining	the	order	of	things,	causing	objects	to	become	‘uncertain’.	These	uncertain	objects	have	been	placed	in	the	museum’s	store	in	an	attempt	to	control	their	effects	but	the	pressure	mounting	in	the	museum	can	be	felt	in	the	building	itself.	Those	in	power	hope	that	by	rebuilding	the	index	the	equilibrium	can	be	regained.	It	is	a	race	against	the	clock	to	identify	the	uncertain	objects	by	matching	them	with	those	labelled	in	the	museum.	Participants	have	to	find	the	listed	objects	and	their	numbers,	enter	them	into	an	onscreen	index,	while	avoiding	(unseen)	enemy	agents.			
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Fig. 22 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, for Plymouth City Museum and Art Gallery, version 1, sketch of initial 
interaction design. 	The	back-story	and	the	app’s	instructions	are	introduced	by	the	phone	ringing.	A	recorded	message	informs	the	participant	they	are	under	surveillance,	and	their	help	is	required	to	rebuild	the	lost	index.	As	the	phone	call	ends,	an	on-screen,	military	styled163	index	appears	with	a	list	of	four	objects	that	could	be	found	somewhere	in	the	museum,	accompanied	by	a	number	located	nearby	that	could	be	entered	into	the	index.	These	objects	are	‘randomly’	generated	from	a	potential	twenty-five	objects	listed	in	the	app’s	database.			
                                                        
 
163 The interface design was created by James Brocklehurst in response to the layout designs and requirements 
specified by EW. 
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Participants	begin	their	search	by	pressing	a	button	to	indicate	when	they	entered	a	new	room.	The	on-screen	device	indicates	if	an	object	from	the	list	is	located	nearby.	Selecting	the	room	button	also	triggers	the	crossfade	of	the	room-specific	soundscape.	During	the	‘race’	to	complete	the	task	the	sound	of	someone	whistling	seems	to	emanate	from	nearby	(recorded	spatial	sound	that	is	triggered	at	set	times).	This	acts	as	warning	from	‘friends’	that	participants	are	(apparently)	being	followed	and	that	they	are	required	to	return	to	the	entrance	hall.	This	obstacle	acts	a	little	like	getting	the	‘jail	card’	in	monopoly,	making	the	task	more	challenging	to	complete	within	the	time	limit.	A	selection	of	‘randomly’	generated	phone	calls	also	interrupt	the	search	and	presented	‘further	narrative	content.	The	on-screen	clock	indicates	the	available	time	left	to	complete	the	task.		
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Fig. 23 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 1 ‘treasure hunt with buttons’, screenshots from app prototype 
showing timer and index input fields. 	
		 		 		
Fig. 24 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 1 ‘treasure hunt with buttons’, screenshots from app prototype 
showing simulated phone call from fictional character, and early user interface designs. 
 	The	agent’s	phone	calls,	appear	to	come	from	a	small	office,	in	contrast	to	the	sounds	of	the	museum.	Soundscapes	that	enhances	the	ambient	sounds	in	the	museum	create	atmosphere,	making	the	ordinary	seem	strange.	Binaural	recordings	of	the	different	gallery’s	specific	acoustic	qualities	were	layered	with	key	sounds,	virtually	positioned	in	the	rooms,	such	as,	footsteps,	the	voices	of	museum	visitors	and	the	museum	guards’	walkie-talkies,	using	the	composition	process	evolved	in	The	Letters.	The	museum	store	soundscape	was	composed	from	binaural	and	stereo	recordings	made	in	the	existent	museum	store	featuring	movable	shelving,	heating,	light	switches,	footsteps	on	the	ceiling	and	unwrapped	objects.	The	striking	of	a	metal	bottle	is	looped	to	become	the	‘uncertain	objects’	rhythmic	pulse.	The	store	soundscape	is	heard	simultaneously	with	the	gallery	soundscapes.	At	first	it	is	barely	perceptible	but	as	time	ticks	away	over	fifteen	minutes,	the	volume	increases,	as	does	the	
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complexity	of	layered	sounds.	A	slider	mechanism	was	used	that	begins	with	100%	gallery	sounds	and	decreases	as	the	store	soundscape	increases.	164			See	Appendix	1:	Figs.	22,	23,	24.	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt	with	buttons)	Design	Table		
	
Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis		
	In	the	first	iterations	of	locative	narrative	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning,	the	narrative	scenario	was	delivered	by	a	single	phone	call	that	occurred	within	a	couple	of	minutes	after	the	launch	of	the	app.	Participants165	reported	that	they	felt	the	call	to	be	too	long	but	also	that	the	story	should	develop	beyond	the	initial	premise	and	that	more	narrative	content	was	desirable	during	the	experience.			Now	we	can	make	an	initial	description:	relations	to	the	experience	of	imagining,	relations	to	
imaginary	objects,	relations	to	knowledge,	relations	to	emotions	and	to	aesthetic	values	are	
                                                        
 
164 EW outlined the slider mechanism and James Brocklehurst implemented the code. The idea of a slider mechanism 
was suggested by Shane Myrbeck at Arup, San Francisco, April, 2012, in the context of a different discussion 
concerning Pure Data objects. 
 
165 In addition to EW and JB, fourteen students aged 16-21 and two teachers aged 35-40 tested the second iteration. 
This group was able to understand the narrative premise and game rules without further instruction.  They provided 
feedback via questionnaires this was not as detailed as that recorded using semi-structured interviews. 
 
The third iteration was tested by nine museum staff aged between 36-56 who generally found the narrative confusing, 
the participation mechanism hard to understand and the sounds either too loud or too quiet. A couple of these 
participants found the game “stressful”. These issues are detailed in Appendix 1, figs 25-27. 
Participants in the 16-21 age bracket generally were able to describe the narrative premise and had no difficulty with 
the participation mechanism, in contrast to some participants in the 40-60 age bracket reported the opposite types of 
experiences.  
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aspects	of	the	experience	of	engaging	with	story	in	locative	narrative.	In	order	to	take	the	analysis	beyond	the	labelling	of	different	categories,	the	relations	and	qualities	can	be	specified	with	a	spectra	of	descriptors,	where	a	range	can	indicate	the	extent	to	which	a	descriptor	is	relevant	and	also	a	ratio	between	the	different	relations	(see	chapter	6).	The	aim	of	this	type	of	analysis,	is	not	to	create	a	verifiable	empirical	metric	but	as	a	method	of	articulating	aspects	of	locative	narrative	experience	and	to	make	speculative	interpretations	concerning	of	their	connections,	from	which	hypotheses	can	be	formulated	and	implemented	within	the	design	process	and	create	speculative	narratological	analyses.	
	The	hypotheses	in	this	case	was	that	shorter	but	a	greater	number	of	phone	calls	that	expanded	the	narrative	scenario	into	a	story	might	address	the	comments	of	the	participants.	In	subsequent	iterations	the	introductory	phone	call	was	reduced	in	length	and	further	phone	calls,	‘randomly’	generated	from	a	database	of	nine	possible	fragments	were	interspersed	throughout	that	developed	the	storyline	to	some	extent.			Logging	the	searched	for	items	in	the	on-screen	index	resulted	in	seeing	their	nearing	the	completion	of	the	task	in	relation	to	the	decreasing	time	on	the	on-screen	clock,	consequences	
explicit	to	the	participant.	Some	objects	and	numbers	where	intentionally	difficult	to	find	and	others	were	easier.	Some	‘trick’	items	were	included	such	as	the	mineral	‘fluorite’,	that	appears	numerous	times	in	the	same	cabinet	with	different	numbers,	requiring	participants	to	repeatedly	try	to	enter	the	correct	one.	To	encourage	the	exercise	of	volition	an	on-screen	clock	indicated	how	long	was	left	before	‘structural	damage’	to	the	building,	‘the	turning’,	was	going	to	occur.	Student	participants	and	those	familiar	with	playing	screen-based	games	repeatedly	referred	to	the	time	limit	as	engaging	and	as	contributing	to	the	narrative	tension.	
		
 
 
 
 
273 
While	those	who	declared	themselves	unfamiliar	with	mobile	or	video	games	commented	that	they	found	the	experience	“stressful”,	rather	than	exciting.	The	connections	between	relations	
to	emotions	and	values	such	as	knowledge	and	skills	is	inferred	and	a	potential	starting	point	for	experimentation.			To	indicate	the	(imaginary)	‘turning	effects’	on	the	museum,	participants	were	asked	to	look	up	and	observe	the	movement	above	them.	In	order	for	this	fictional	conceit	to	prompt	
feelings	and	value	of	interest,	an	attitude	of	supposition	(relations	to	the	experience	of	
imagining)	(relations	to	belief)	(relations	to	imaginary	objects)	sufficient	aids	to	imagining	were	required,	such	as	verbal	suggestions,	recorded	sounds	and	the	‘reinterpretation’	of	ambient	sounds	and	the	shaping	of	the	context	in	which	these	strategies	were	experienced.	While	some	participants	adopted	the	supposition	that	structure	of	the	museum	was	moving	and	found	it	intriguing,	there	were	those	who	rejected	the	idea	as	ridiculous,	but	interestingly	enquired	if	there	really	where	problems	with	the	building!	(relations	to	belief).	Those	were	generally	not	engaged	in	the	experience	tended	to	reject	the	suggestions	of	movement.			Moving	from	room	to	room	searching	for	objects,	is	a	change	to	the	customary	experience	of	the	museum.	While	participants	were	aware	of	the	recorded	sounds	and	often	questioned	what	they	took	to	be	the	real	and	the	recorded,	their	attention	was	often	directed	away	from	incongruity	(relations	to	rationality)	(relations	to	knowledge)	(relations	to	belief)	and	towards	completing	the	tasks.	The	focus	of	attention	was	reported	as	changing	over	the	duration	of	the	experience.	The	search,	the	clock	ticking,	the	increasing	intensity	of	the	stores	sounds	signaling	impeding	disaster	and	other	visitors	in	the	museum,	assumed	varying	priority	for	participants.	Engagement	with	the	narrative	world	was	reported	as	transitory	or	sustained.		
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	Some	participants	reported	that	were	became	engrossed	in	the	story	and	that	they	forgot	they	were	‘playing	a	game’.	They	did	attribute	some	sounds	as	real,	which	afterwards	they	realized	were	recorded.	However,	a	greater	degree	of	participant	credulity	is	not	impossible,	as	Jane	McGonigal	(2003:	4)	suggests,	players	of	pervasive	games	“perform”	belief	as-if	they	are	real	because	it	has	particular	benefits	for	them	to	do	so,	such	as	feeling	satisfaction	with	their	ability	to	maintain	immersed	in	the	experience.	They	may	even	further	“fictionalize”	their	reports	of	their	experience	as	believing	it	was	really	happening	because	this	can	extend	the	play	experience,	however	impossible	actually	believing	in	the	“virtual	reality”	is	–	“[it]	feels	real”	(McGonigal	2003:	16).	The	participant’s	attitude	towards	the	experience	can	negate	logical	contradictions	of	being	present	day	and	1925.	Adopting	an	attitude	of	‘imagining’	and	
wanting	to	be	in	a	fictional	place,	distinguished	participants’	responses,	such	as	“I	enjoying	
imagining.”	“I	hate	these	kinds	of	things”.		Different	orders	and	foci	of	engagement	exist	within	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning.	Sounds	that	initially	seemed	prominent	to	the	participant	were	reportedly	less	conspicuous	later,	when	players	were	running	out	of	time	and	trying	to	find	the	object.	Soundscapes	were	frequently	reported	as	“eerie”	and	difficult	to	distinguish	between	recorded	and	non-recorded	sounds,	exhibiting	the	perceptual	aspect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability.	Pressing	an	on	screen	button	to	indicate	which	room	the	participant	had	entered,	while	not	overtly	signalling	that	it	triggered	the	soundscapes,	as	the	cross-fade	on	the	sound	was	very	gradual,	it	was	an	action	that	participants	often	forgot	to	do	when	they	were	searching	for	objects	(relations	to	
attention)	(relations	to	rationality)	(relations	to	volition).	A	couple	of	people	visited	the	same	rooms	repeatedly,	alerting	them	to	the	fact	that	they	were	listening	to	recorded	ambient	
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sounds,	particularly	those	that	contained	distinct	voices	(relations	to	knowledge)	(relations	to	
belief).	Others	worked	out	that	they	could	trigger	sounds	without	going	to	the	rooms	by	pressing	room	buttons	randomly.	This	limitation	of	the	navigation	mechanism	was	addressed	in	subsequent	prototypes166.		Developing	the	ninth	prototype,	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning,	version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth	(version	2,	Bluetooth):	Published,	iTunes		It	was	important	that	the	participant	experienced	a	seamless	transition	between	the	layered	ambient	sounds	as	they	move	between	spaces,	so	that	sounds	seemed	to	be	emitting	from	the	galleries,	rather	than	from	their	mobile	device.	In	order	negate	the	link	between	triggering	sounds	with	pressing	buttons,	as	was	required	in	the	last	iteration,	unobtrusive	Bluetooth	Low	Energy	'iBeacons'	were	positioned	in	the	galleries.	These	small	battery-powered	devices	transmit	a	signal	that	the	participant's	phone	can	detect,	enabling	the	app	to	locate	itself.			
                                                        
 
166 See Appendix 1 fig. 24 for details of this issue. 
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Fig. 25 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, initial plan for  
location of iBeacons in relation to rooms in the museum. 
 
  
 
Fig. 26 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, iBeacons being installed  
in the museum. 
 	The	participant's	phone	was	transformed	into	a	fictional	device,	a	'volatility	meter',	situated	within	the	narrative	as	a	means	for	locating	the	missing	objects.	This	device	was	linked	thematically	to	the	genre	of	the	narrative,	and	drew	stylistically	from	sci-fi	user	interfaces,	
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radar	screens	and	LCD	displays.	The	physical	phone	again	was	a	functional	prop	within	the	story,	indicated	by	app’s	visual	interface,	its	ringing	and	vibrating.	The	radar	screen	identifies	the	participant’s	current	location	if	any	of	the	objects	are	in	range.	The	'Index',	is	accessed	via	button	on	the	‘radar’	screen	that	contains	a	list	of	the	missing	items.		
	 	 		
Fig. 27 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, screenshots from prototype app 
showing early and final user interface designs. 
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Fig. 28 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, app in use. 
 
 
	
Fig. 29 The Lost Index, No. 2: The Turning, version 2 ‘treasure hunt with iBeacons’, still from video demonstrating app 
in use. https://vimeo.com/108626316 
		See	Appendix	1	for	Figs.	25,	26	and	27	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning.	Version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth:	Design	Table		
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Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis			In	contrast	with	LociOscope,	The	Letters,	and	The	Lost	Index	No.1	all	of	the	locations	in	the	story	world	of	The	Lost	Index,	No.2	were	synonymous	with	the	physical	location	of	the	museum;	participants’	relations	of	presence	to	the	‘worlds’	(James	1890b:	293) of	the	‘physical’,	of	‘common	sense’	and	to	the	world’s	of	‘fiction’	occupy	close	spatial	and	categorical	proximity.		This	close	proximity	between	worlds	motivated	the	interaction	mechanism,	the	sound	and	interface	design	and	app	functionality.			It	was	important	that	the	participant	experienced	a	seamless	transition	between	the	layered	ambient	sounds	as	they	move	between	the	museum	rooms,	so	that	sounds	seemed	to	be	emitting	from	the	galleries,	rather	than	from	their	headphones	and	mobile	device	(relations	to	
belief)	(relations	to	perceptual	objects)	(relations	to	imaginary	objects).			In	order	negate	the	link	between	triggering	sounds	with	pressing	buttons,	as	was	required	in	the	last	iteration,	the	unobtrusive	Bluetooth	Low	Energy	'iBeacons'	were	positioned	in	the	galleries	that	transmit	a	signal	that	the	participant's	phone	can	detect,	enabling	the	app	to	locate	itself.	The	functionality	of	the	app	interface	linked	thematically	to	the	genre	of	the	narrative	and	drew	stylistically	from	sci-fi	user	interfaces,	radar	screens	and	LCD	displays.	Building	on	the	ideas	developed	in	the	previous	case	studies,	the	physical	phone	again	was	a	functional	prop	within	the	story,	indicated	by	app’s	visual	interface,	its	ringing	and	vibrating.	The	radar	screen	identified	the	participant’s	current	location	if	any	of	the	objects	were	in	range.		
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Case	study	4:	The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS,	National	Museum	of	Denmark,	Copenhagen	&	
The	Diesel	House		
	
	
	
		
Fig. 30 The Lost Index: NATMUS, for The National Museum of Denmark, exterior of the museum. 		Developing	the	tenth	prototype,	The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS.	Version	1:	Expanded	story.	Published	on	iTunes,	December	2015167	
	What	emerged	from	the	development	of	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	The	Turning	was	that	some	participants	found	the	app	enjoyable,	many	reported	misperceptions	and	engaged	in	
                                                        
 
167 This very recent locative narrative meant limited opportunity for gaining feedback from participants. Re-siting of 
this locative narrative for the purposes of further testing and analysis will form the next stage of the speculative 
development. 
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supposition	and	others	acted	out	those	suppositions.	Participants	frequently	commented	that	they	would	have	liked	more	of	the	story	or	that	they	thought	that	the	premise	was	aimed	at	a	younger	age	group.	The	opportunity	to	focus	on	the	world	of	the	story	and	the	narrative	arc	arose	in	the	development	of	The	Lost	Index:	NATMUS	to	feature	in	the	8th	International	Conference	on	Interactive	Storytelling	in	Copenhagen.	Collaboratively	developed	with	James	Brocklehurst	producing	the	code	and	the	visual	interface,	NATMUS	is	sited	across	two	locations	in	Copenhagen,	The	National	Museum	of	Denmark,	and	The	DieselHouse	museum.			
		
Fig. 31 The Lost Index: NATMUS, for The National Museum of Denmark, interior of the museum. 				
		
 
 
 
 
282 
This	situated	narrative,	experienced	on	headphones,	is	distributed	across	two	locations	in	Copenhagen	at	The	National	Museum	of	Denmark	and	The	Dieselhouse	museum.			
…In	the	near	dystopian	future…privacy	no	longer	exists,	nothing	is	wholly	personal	or	secure,	all	
is	within	the	domain	of	the	state;	monitored	across	multiple	and	intersecting	data	streams.	
Activists	are	pushing	back,	secretly	developing	a	distributed	intelligence	system…traces	of	this	
‘Body-Mapping’	technology	have	been	detected	by	government	agencies	and	other	interested	
parties…		Entering	the	imposing	DieselHouse	museum,	the	former	source	of	the	city’s	power,	your	phone	begins	to	ring.	The	first	of	a	series	of	calls	from	an	old	acquaintance	and	another,	from	someone	whom	its	seems	is	being	held	against	their	will.	What	you	should	you	believe?	You	hear	a	disturbing	truth	about	your	role	in	an	experiment.	You	need	to	rendezvous	with	a	contact	at	The	National	Museum	of	Denmark	to	find	out	the	truth.	You	explore	the	first	floor	of	the	museum	taking	any	route.					
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Fig. 32 The Lost Index: NATMUS, for The National Museum of Denmark, flyer placed in museum (front above). 		The	narrative	structure	has	an	overarching	linear	plot	built	from	a	series	of	‘chapters’	that	are	delivered	via	phone	calls	at	set	points	over	the	twenty-minute	duration	of	the	experience.		
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Each	chapter	is	selected	at	random	from	a	collection	of	possible	recordings,	and	associated	with	a	particular	plot	point,	providing	differing	perspectives	on	the	story	each	time	the	app	is	launched.	‘NATMUS’s	interaction	mechanism,	involves	searching	in	the	museum.	A	tracking	device	appears	on	your	phone	and	you	are	asked	to	locate	numbers	associated	with	objects	and	input	them	into	the	on-screen	index	within	a	time	limit.	Logged	objects	trigger	chapters,	some	of	these	provide	clues	to	locating	the	objects,	while	others	introduce	obstacles	that	slow	you	down,	sending	you	to	different	rooms	in	the	museum.				
	 	 		
Fig. 33 The Lost Index: NATMUS, screenshots of published app.  			
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Fig. 34 (image above and below) The Lost Index: NATMUS, using app in the National Museum of Denmark. 
 
 
 	Low	energy	Bluetooth	beacons	seamlessly	trigger	a	3D	sound	environment	in	each	room	that	emulates	and	enhances	the	ambient	sounds.	As	time	ticks	down	it	is	suggested	that	‘electromagnetic	interference’	occurs	and	the	dimensions	of	the	rooms	seem	to	change.	Binaural	recordings	of	the	ambient	sound	are	gradually	replaced	with	the	spatial	dimensions	
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of	another,	subterranean	environment.	‘NATMUS’	is	not	a	trail	between	two	sites,	rather	it	integrates	two	places	and	their	collections	within	a	story	world	that	may	be	visited	in	any	order,	motivated	by	character	interactions.	
	Both	the	author’s	meaning	and	the	reader’s	acts	of	participation-interpretation	occur	in	‘experienceable	environments’	that	affect	the	particular	referential	acts.	While	linguistic	norms	mean	that	we	can	converse	in	natural	language	to	the	extent	that	our	communication	refers	to	objects	that	we	share,	there	cannot	be	“same	meaning”	as	Putnam	(1992	[1983]:	78)	puts.	We	can	say	that	meaning	is	multi-stable,	that	interpretation	occurs	within	‘an	expected	range’	of	meanings.	Even	in	the	case	of	apparent	certainty,	where	two	people	point	at	the	same	object	and	say	this	what	we	both	mean	by	pen,	there	cannot	be	total	epistemological	certainty,	the	best	we	can	say	is	that	we	are	both	having	an	experience	in	which	we	both	say	we	are	pointing	at	an	object	and	call	it	a	pen	-	it	is	a	temporal	and	context	specific	certainty.			
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Fig. 35 The Lost Index: NATMUS, starting location in the DieselHouse Museum. 	
	
	
	
Summary	and	Jamesian	relational	analysis		
	
	In	response	to	testers	of	Lost	Index,	No.2	requests	for	an	expansion	of	narrative	content,	‘NATMUS’	includes	the	voices	of	three	characters	(in	addition	to	the	participant)	and	story	perspectives,	and	a	more	complex	narrative	arc.	The	story	world	is	extended	into	the	city	of	Copenhagen	with	narrative	events	centred	in	two	museums	that	were	linked	by	participants’	real-time	journeys	between	them,	with	other	locations,	inferred	in	the	phone	calls	background	sounds,	such	as	an	agent	calling	from	a	park.			In	‘NATMUS’,	as	with	the	previous	Lost	Index	apps,	the	story	world	situated	and	spatially	continuous	with	the	museum	location,	with	the	potential	for	perceptual,	linguistic	and	
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narrative	multi-stability,	between	what	is	taken	as	the	real,	the	represented	and	the	imagined.	Existent	and	fictional	objects	incorporated	into	the	narrative	that	are	subject	to	the	logic	of	the	story	world,	its	social	norms,	physical	laws,	histories	and	geography,	etc.	When	answering	the	phone,	they	do	so	as	visitor	and	as	a	character	in	the	fictional	world.	If	phone	call	is	from	‘outside	the	story’,	the	relations	to	the	device	change	to	that	of	the	individual’s	web	of	socio-personal	relations.	James	argues,	that	which	we	designate	as	real,	occupies	real	space	along	with	other	“reals”	(1890b,	296).	What	happens	when	a	fictional	object	occupies	a	“factual	space’?		It	is	suggested	that	the	enemy	agent	is	actually	present	in	the	museum	and	that.	A	phone	call	from	an	agent	in	‘NATMUS’	advises	the	participant	to	look	out	for	someone	in	a	black	shirt.	Wearers	of	black	shirts	are	not	uncommon	occurrences	and	if	real	‘bystanders’	or	objects	can	be	incorporated	into	fictional	scenarios	there	is	the	potential	to	extend	the	narrative	into	the	existent	environment.	The	status	of	‘factual’	and	fictional	oscillates.	If	we	decide	the	black	shirt	is	not	nearby,	that	explanation	seems	more	logically	satisfying	when	we	have	little	evidence	to	support	the	alternative	perspective,	however	we	may	remain	on	our	guard,	poised	to	alter	our	view.	Rational	interpretation	involves	logical	reasoning	but	also	aesthetics	and	sentiment,	we	feel	our	rational	interpretation	to	be	true,	it	fits	satisfactorily	with	our	existing	ideas.		As	with	The	Lost	Index	apps	1	&	2,	walking	seamlessly	triggered	crossfades	between	binaural	soundscapes	when	participants	entered	different	galleries	and	also	phone	calls	delivering	narrative	nodes.	Participants	are	invited	to	feel	the	affects	of	the	fictional	electromagnetic	radiation	by	pressing	their	hand	against	the	museum’s	walls.	In	‘NATMUS’	the	participant	is	a	
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museum	visitor,	a	user	of	the	app,	and	if	they	adopt	an	attitude	of	supposition,	(relations	to	
belief)	(relations	to	imagined	objects)	(relations	to	perceptual	objects)	(relations	to	the	
experience	of	imagining)	a	character	in	the	story.			 	
		
 
 
 
 
291 
Chapter	6	
The	Quality	and	Affects	of	the	Metaphor	of	Multi-Stability	and	Strategies	for	Locative	
Narrative			This	chapter	develops	an	Jamesian	relational	analysis	of	participants’	structure	of	experience	in	response	to	introspective	reports	of	the	prototypes	and	published	apps	presented	as	case	studies.	Throughout	the	research,	participants’	accounts	and	personal	observations	have	had	the	function	as	‘pumps’	for	thinking	around	the	practical-conceptual	issues	raised	by	the	practice	of	locative	narrative.	These	analyses	are	brought	together	here	and	presented	as	four	
speculative	strategies	for	the	development	of	the	affect	of	multi-stability	in	locative	narratives	
smartphone	apps.	These	particular	strategies	have	a	media-specific	remit,	they	also	illustrate	how	multi-stability	can	function	and	so	have	a	wider	application	within	the	family	of	expanded	narrative	practices.		
	
To	talk	of	the	quality	of	multi-stability	is	to	describe	a	value	in	experience	ascribed	to	an	object,	
to	talk	of	the	affect	of	multi-stability	is	to	describe	a	value	in	experience	ascribed	to	the	
experiencing	subject.			
Methods		Locative	narrative	participant	accounts	of	experience	were	central	in	this	research	to	developing	hypotheses	about	the	types	of	technical,	narrative,	sonic,	interaction	and	environmental	variables	that	result	in	the	affect	of	multi-stability.	The	testing	of	hypotheses	through	the	process	of	serial	prototype	development	resulted	in	the	body	of	speculative	
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strategies	for	creating	multi-stability.	These	were	compared	with	the	affect	in	a	range	of	other	locative	narratives	and	expanded	narrative	practices	and	patterns	were	interpreted	and	connections	made	between	the	conditions	under	which	the	affect	of	multi-stability	may	be	experienced.	Introspective	accounts	are	highly	contingent	and	variable;	no	generalised	truth	claims	are	made	here	a	causal	relation	between	the	conditions	and	variables	and	experience.	Beta	testers’	themselves	sometimes	expressed	the	contingent	quantity	of	their	reports,	which	they	prefaced	with	comments	such	as,	“I	was	really	tired	today	and	pretty	grumpy”,	“I	love	
these	types	of	experiences”	“I	don’t	bother	with	instructions”.	When	participants	used	an	app	again	they	sometimes	commented	that	their	experiences	were	different.	The	practical	purpose	of	the	interpretation	of	introspective	reports	was	in	the	development	of	further	hypotheses168	and	to	map	a	temporal	structure	of	locative	narrative	experience.				Extending	from	the	Jamesian	experiential	framework,	discussed	in	chapter	two,	the	concept	of	experience	stands	in	for	an	individual’s	relations	between	thinking	and	acting	in	the	world.	James’	radical	empiricist	approach	to	interpretation	and	meaning	is	to	give	an	account	of	the	
relations	between	things	and	between	things	and	us.	The	ways	in	which	we	think	about	objects,	the	relations	to	thoughts	and	things,	are	equally	important	as	the	objects	or	facts	(ERE	1912	[1904]:	40).	The	experiential	and	relational	approach	to	narrative	interpretation,	presented	here,	focuses	upon	the	relations	between	(1)	the	participant,	their	responses	and	the	
actions	that	result	from	partaking	in	the	narrative	in	the	particular	context	or	‘experienceable	
environment’;	(2)	modes	of	engagement	with	the	narrative	form	or	individual	work,	(3)	drawing	
connections	between	introspective	reports	to	make	speculative	descriptions	of	the	relations	in	
                                                        
 
168 Appendix 1 documents this process in detail. 
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structure	of	experience;	and	(4)	the	interpreter-critic,	the	narrative	and	the	contexts	of	analyses.	It	is	concerned	with	interdependence	of	semantic	sense	and	pragmatic	context	and	use.		Participants’	reports	of	experience	were	analysed	in	terms	of	the	types	of	relations	in	experience.	While	each	report	is	unique,	categories	of	relations	and	values	were	identified	and	used	to	code	the	reports.	Underneath	these	general	headings	of	relations	(see	chapter	2	for	a	taxonomy	of	relations	and	values)	more	details	were	recorded	as	specific	responses	within	a	range	of	descriptors,	for	example,	in	the	category	of	relations	to	emotion	the	specific	types	of	responses	were	identified	in	order	to	capture	the	types	of	emotional	responses	accounted:		
• Pleasure	to	displeasure	
• Excitement	to	boredom		
• Relaxed	to	agitated		In	this	analysis	they	were	correlated	with	the	objects	of	thought,	for	example:		
• Narrative		
• Sound	
• Navigation	
• Usability		The	values	given	to	the	qualities	of	the	objects	were	specified	as	a	range	(some	of	which	overlap	with	the	relations	to	the	objects),	for	example:		
• Usability,	technology:	ease	to	challenge			
• Usability,	navigation:	ease	to	challenge			
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• Narrative,	engagement:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged		
• Narrative,	plot:	dramatic	to	uneventful		
• Narrative,	style:	detail	to	ellipsis	
• Narrative,	taste:	enjoyment	to	displeasure	of	genre	
• Sound,	environmental	similarity	to	disparity	between	real-world	and	the	story	world	
• Sound	representation:	simulation	to	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues		The	range	can	indicate	the	extent	to	which	a	descriptor	is	relevant	and	also	a	ratio	between	the	different	relations:		
	
 
Fig. 3 Diagram of Jamesian relational analysis: example of relation descriptors. 
	 	The	aim	of	this	approach	was	not	the	assertion	of	positivist	empirical	metric.	It	is	a	method	of	articulating	aspects	of	locative	narrative	experience	and	making	speculative	interpretations,	from	which	hypotheses	can	be	formulated	and	implemented	within	the	design	process	and	also	for	the	purpose	of	creating	narratological	analyses.	Individual	reports	were	analysed	in	
Quality or action
acting 'as-if' to disengaged 
Object of thought
Narrative
Descriptor of relation
Pleasure to displeasure
Relation in experience
Relations to emotion 
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terms	of	the	ratio	of	the	particular	relations	and	then	aggregated	with	all	the	participant	reports	across	the	four	case	studies.	The	table	below	summarises	the	types	of	relations	in	experience	that	were	identified	in	participants’	reports	of	experience,	the	range	descriptors	and	the	objects	that	propositions	contained,	for	example	“I	found	searching	for	the	[museum]	
objects	exciting.”	“I	heard	a	baby	crying	and	I	thought	it	was	real.”			
 
 
Fig.3: Table of participant experiences of case studies of locative narrative. 	
Reports	of	experiences	of	the	locative	narrative	case	studies	Co-experienced	elements	of	locative	narrative:		narrative;	participation/movement;	sound	
	
Relations	in	
experience	reported	and	range	of	descriptors	
	
Spectra	objects	and	values	reported	
Relations	to	emotion		Pleasure	to	displeasure	Excitement	to	boredom		Relaxed	to	agitated		[Highly	subjective	and	variable	responses]	
Narrative-engagement:	acting	‘as-if’’	to	disengaged		Narrative-plot:	dramatic	to	uneventful		Narrative-style:	detail	to	ellipsis	Narrative-taste:	enjoyment	to	displeasure	of	genre	Narrative,	interest	and	volition:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged		Sound:	environmental	similarity	to	disparity	between	real-world	and	the	story	world	Sound	representation:	simulation	to	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues	Sound	style:	distaste	to	pleasure	Usability,	technology:	ease	to	challenge			Usability,	navigation:	ease	to	challenge			
Relations	to	rationality	
	Clarity	to	confusion				
Narrative	style:	detail	to	ellipsis	Narrative,	interest	and	volition:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged	Sound	representation:	simulation	to	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues		Usability-technology:	ease	to	challenge			Usability-navigation:	ease	to	challenge			Interaction	mechanism:	apparent	to	oblique		
Relations	to	interest	
and	volition	
	
Role	in	narrative:	observer	to	protagonist		Narrative	plot:	dramatic	to	uneventful		Narrative	style:	detail	to	ellipsis	
		
 
 
 
 
296 
Engagement	to	disengagement	
	
Narrative,	interest	and	volition:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged		Sound	representation:	simulation	–	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues	Sound	identification:	indistinguishable	–	distinction	between	recorded	and	‘local’	sounds	Sound	style:	distaste	to	pleasure	Modes	of	participation:	observing	to	listening,	puzzle/task	solving	to	creating	Usability-technology:	ease	to	challenge			Usability-navigation:	ease	to	challenge		
Relations	to	perceptual	
objects		
	Recorded	and	local	sounds:	difference	to	intermixing	to	replacement	
Narrative	style:	detail	to	ellipsis	Narrative	plot:	dramatic	to	uneventful		Sound	representation:	simulation	–	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues	Sound	identification:	indistinguishable	–	distinction	between	recorded	and	‘local’	sounds	Sound	style:	distaste	to	pleasure	Role	in	narrative:	observer	to	protagonist		Narrative,	interest	and	volition:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged		
Relations	to	imaginary	
objects	
		
Acting	‘as-if’	to	disengagement			
Narrative	plot:	dramatic	to	uneventful		Narrative	style:	detail	to	ellipsis	Role	in	narrative:	observer	to	protagonist		Narrative-taste:	enjoyment	to	displeasure	of	genre	Narrative,	interest	and	volition:	acting	‘as-if’	to	disengaged		Sound	representation:	simulation	to	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues	Sound:	environmental	similarity	to	disparity	between	real-world	and	the	story	world	Sound	representation:	simulation	to	symbolism	of	perceptual	cues	Sound/narrative/interface	representation	of	relations	between	the	narrative	and	location:	identification	to	non-recognition	Usability-technology:	ease	to	challenge			Usability-navigation:	ease	to	challenge		
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The	temporal	structure	of	experience	of	the	
locative	narrative	case	studies:	relations	to	
belief	
	This	description	is	an	aggregate	of	the	the	different	ways	that	participants	behaved	over	the	duration	of	a	locative	narrative	case	study,	in	relation	to	range	of	beliefs	adopted.	
	Temporal	description:		1.	Prior	to	experience	1.	Going	to	location		(downloading	app,	before	or	after	arrival)	1.	Launching	app	1.	Putting	on	headphones	1.	Reading	instructions	1.	Listening	to	opening	‘scene’	2.	Beginning	to	walk	2.	Try	to	make	sense	of	what	to	do	2.	Multiple	elements	occurring	concurrently:	recorded	sounds,	voices,	unscripted	events,	people	and	sounds	in	the	location			3a.	Accepting	the	premise/rejecting	the	premise	
Fig 4. Diagram of locative narrative 
temporal structure of experience: relations 
to belief. 
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3b.	Acting	as	if	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports	3c.	Acting	as	if	the	narrative	premise	is	not	occurring	as	it	purports	–	adopting	a	meta-relationship	to	the	experience	–	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’		4a.	Engaging	in	the	tasks	as	if	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports,	from	the	perspective	of	named	or	unnamed	character	or	as	themselves	in	the	situation	represented	by	the	narrative.	4b.	Engaging	in	the	tasks	from	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’	–	observing	relationship	to	the	experience	4c.	Not	engaging	in	listening	or	tasks,	thinking	about	other	things.	5a.	Attention	primarily	focused	on	the	story	or	the	tasks	and	acting	as	if	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports	5b.	Attention	intermittently	focused	on	the	story	or	the	tasks	and	acting	as	if	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports,	alternating	with	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’		5b.	Attention	predominantly	focused	on	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’	while	listening	and	engaging	in	the	tasks.	6a.	‘Forgetting’,	if	temporally,	the	perspective	of	‘acting	as	if’,	a	single	perspective	of	engaging	in	experience.		6b.	Continuing	to	‘act	as	if’	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports.	6c.	Moving	from	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’,	to	‘acting	as	if’	the	narrative	premise	is	occurring	as	it	purports.	6.d	Maintaining	the	perspective	of	the	‘participant	as	critic.’	7a.	Noticing	perceptual	ambiguity,	in	the	role	of	‘acting	‘as-if’’	7b.	Noticing	perceptual	ambiguity,	from	the	single	perspective	of	engaging	in	experience		7c.	Noticing	perceptual	ambiguity,	from	the	perspective	of	‘participant	as	critic’	
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7d.	No	experience	of	perceptual	ambiguity	8a.	Questioning	the	experience	of	perceptual	ambiguity,	from	the	single	perspective	of	engaging	in	the	experience	8b.	Questioning	the	experience	of	perceptual	ambiguity	‘in	character’	8c.	Questioning	the	experience	of	perceptual	ambiguity	in	the	role	of	the	‘participant	as	critic’,	(the	experience	draws	attention	to	its	mediation)	9a.	Behaving	in	response	to	narrative	events	from	the	‘single	perspective’	of	engaging	in	experience	9b.	Behaving	in	response	to	narrative	events	‘in	character’	9c.	Behaving	in	response	to	narrative	events	from	the	perspective	of	the	‘participant	as	critic.’	10a	end	of	experience	11a	Reflecting	upon	the	experience	and	stances	adopted	
	
	
Summary	of	locative	narrative	strategies	for	evoking	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	
multi-stability:	starting	points	for	further	speculative	practice			In	chapter	two,	antecedents	of	locative	narrative,	I	made	a	case	for	the	experiential	and	formal	complexity	of	the	form	of	locative	narrative,	on	five	interconnected	grounds:	(1)	the	authorial	
intention	is	to	situate-integrate	the	story	world	within	an	existent	location;	(2)	the	structure	of	
the	narrative	is	linked	with	the	mode	of	interaction;	(3)	media	is	experienced	in	relation	to	
surroundings;	(4)	the	reader-audience	becomes	a	participant	whose	actions	take	place	within	
the	fictional	world	and	the	existent	environment;	(5)	the	spatial-temporal	complexity	of	
partaking.	I	went	on	to	add	two	further	arguments,	the	subject	of	which	are	the	particular	focus	of	the	case	studies:	(6)	ontological	ambiguity	may	result	when	perceptual	cues	are	not	
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readily	attributable	to	the	existent	place	or	the	fictional	world	of	the	story;	and	(7)	the	
prompting	of	experiential	and	epistemological	questions,	‘what	does	it	feel	like	to	be	a	
participant	in	a	story?’	and	‘what	is	the	truth-value	we	attach	to	our	experience	when	our	
actions	take	place	in	narrative	worlds?’	Drawing	upon	the	locative	narrative	case	studies,	these	points	are	discussed	below,	together	with	additional	observations	in	support	of	arguments	(1-5).		
	I	argue	that	prompting	the	affect	of	multi-stability	in	participants	of	locative	narrative	is	concerned	with	their	relations	to	perceptual	and	imaginary	objects:	(1)	changing	the	relations	between	objects	in	time	and	space	(strategies	of	representation	and	composing	the	context);	(2)	influencing	the	value	of	belief	(suggestion,	attention	focusing,	misdirection);	(3)	changing	the	relations	to	the	experiences	of	perception	and	misperception	(through	enjoyment	and/or	interest,	promoting	volition,	imagining	and	acting	in	response	to	imaginings	and	beliefs);	and	(4)	Influencing	the	values	of	fiction	and	representation	of	perceptual	objects	(representation/simulation	of	sensory	cues)			
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The	affect	of	multi-stability	involves	creating	contexts	for	beliefs		(1)	Narrative	form,	sentence	structure;	(2)	the	placement	of	spatial	locations	depicted	within	the	narrative	(or	parts	of)	within	the	physical	surroundings	of	the	participation;	and	(3)	directly	inviting	acts	of	belief:	the	supposition	‘as-if’.		The	primary	contexts	for	creating	relations	between	the	participant	and	perceptual	and	
imaginary	objects	with	locative	narrative	is	the	participant,	the	narrative	and	the	existent	environment.	The	material	form	of	the	narrative,	as	text	or	voice,	may	be	internal	or	external	to	the	content	of	the	narrative.	If	the	narrative	is	self	referential,	the	content	of	the	locative	narrative	may	take	the	form	of	a	provocation	or	thought	experiment.	If	the	narrative	is	framed	as	transparent,	the	participant	either	agrees	to	ignore	the	narrative’s	mediation,	or	adopt	a	
Strategies for 
promoting the 
affect of the 
metaphor of 
multi-stability
Changing the relations to 
perceptual and imaginary 
objects (strategies of 
representation and 
composing the context)
Influencing the value of 
belief (suggestion, attention 
focusing, misdirection)
Influencing the values of 
fiction and representation
of perceptual objects 
(representation/simulation 
of sensory cues)
Changing the relations to 
the experiences of 
perception and 
misperception (through 
enjoyment and/or interest, 
promoting volition, to 
imagine, act on imagining 
and belief)
Fig 5. Diagram, strategies for promoting the affect of the metaphor of multi-stability. 
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meta	relation	to	their	act	of	reading-participating.	The	form	of	locative	narrative	makes	many	of	the	givens	of	fictional	and	non-fiction	texts	contingent:	the	participant	may	not	be	silent,	they’re	probably	not	static,	their	attention	may	only	be	directed	towards	the	text	intermittently	and	the	narrative	is	happening	in	relation	to	the	participant’s	environment.	(1)	
The	content	of	the	locative	narrative	defines	the	relationship	of	the	participant	to	the	text,	as	
material	object	and	(2)	and	between	the	participant	to	the	story;	(3)	it	also	sets	up	the	logic	for	
the	relation	of	the	participant	to	the	environment,	and	(4)	the	conceptual	rational	for	the	
existence	of	the	narrative,	(5)	how	the	narrative	comes	into	existence	for	the	participant;	(6)	the	
narrative	structure.	The	form	of	the	narrative,	I	argue,	is	contingent	on	these	elements.	In	locative	narrative	the	Lost	Index:	NATMUS,	for	example,	the	relations	of	the	participant	to	the	narrative	and	the	environment	are:		 (1) The	narrative	as	material	object:	is	transparent,	it	is	not	self-referential.	(2) The	participant	is:	a	gallery	visitor	who	is	responds	to	a	cry	for	help	from	a	captive	(internal	to	the	narrative).	(3) The	participant’s	environment:	is	synonymous	with	the	world	of	the	story	that	takes	place	in	Copenhagen	and	the	museums.	(4) The	logic	of	the	existence	of	the	narrative:	it	is	happening	to	the	participant	because	they	received	a	phone	call.	(5) The	narrative	comes	into	existence:	delivered	to	the	participant	via	phone	calls	to	the	participant,	(6) The	narrative	structure:	in	sections	that	fit	into	of	1-2-minute	phone	calls.		A	locative	narrative	participant	is	not	necessarily	that	of	a	protagonist,	their	role	may	be	oblique,	they	may	be	inside	the	head	of	a	character,	as	in	Missing	Voice	(Cardiff	1999)	
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experiencing	their	internal	monologue	or	have	an	‘over	the	shoulder’	role	as	a	‘friend’,	Ship	
Aground	(Interactive	Places	2010).	Both	these	locative	narratives	are	continuous	and	(predominantly)	structurally	linear.	The	narrative	form	sets	the	frame	for	how	participants	should	regard	their	surroundings,	recommending	the	viewpoint	they	should	adopt.		The	sentence	structure,	first	second	or	third	person	sets	up	the	relations	between	the	text	and	participant,	offering	another	opportunity	to	shape	the	perception	of	the	surroundings:			 1) “The	woman	in	the	white	shirt	has	recognised	me”	(Inside	character’s	head)		2) “You	have	been	spotted	by	the	woman	in	the	white	shirt”	(Directly	addressed	from	the	narrator	or	another	character	(as	a	recorded	voice/phone	call/SMS/letter	etc.)	3) “They	look	nervous,	as	the	woman	in	the	white	shirt	sees	them.”	(The	participant	is	separate	from	the	action.	However,	the	third	person	may	also	be	used	if	the	participant	is	in	the	role	of	an	omnificent	observer,	or	a	listener	overhearing	another	character’s	conversation)		The	fictional	environment	within	the	story	world	may	be	synonymous	with	the	participants’	surroundings,	as	in	The	Lost	Index	apps,	or	the	existent	place	may	be	the	means	of	accessing	the	parts	of	the	story	world	(within	the	narrative	frame)	as	LociOscope,	The	Letters.	Another	approach	is	to	present	fictional	events	as	happening	in	the	participants	‘ordinary	existence’,	as	in	the	pervasive	game	Majestic	(Electronic	Arts	2001)	(Montola	et	al	2009:	11)	where	the	narrative	and	game	play	occurred	across	participants’	devices	in	their	everyday	lives.	In	the	locative	narrative	Journeyer’s	Guidebook	(Whittaker	&	Brocklehurst	2016),	there	is	the	narrativisation	of	‘ordinary	reality’.			
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The	possibilities	for	the	spatial	proximity	of	the	environment	and	narrative	locations	offers	further	opportunities	to	influence	the	participant’s	relations	to	perceptual	and	imaginary	
objects:				 1) If	story	locations	and	the	environment	are	synonymous,	existent	objects,	places	and	people	all	have	potential	significance	for	the	narrative.	The	participant’s	relations	to	the	environment	has	both	the	value	of	reality	and	the	value	of	fiction.		2) If	story	locations	are	happening	elsewhere	or	in	parallel	with	the	environment.	Then	environment	has	the	value	of	reality.	3) If	fictional	events	are	occurring	in	the	environment,	the	environment	has	the	value	of	
reality		4) If	fictional	locations	are	nested	within	the	environment,	such	as	those	inferred	from	the	background	sounds	of	phone	calls,	the	fictional	locations	have	possible	value	of	
reality.		Each,	or	a	combination,	of	these	treatments	of	the	surroundings	offer	different	opportunities	for	framing	beliefs	that	are	in	part	contingent	on	the	participant’s	relations	to	volition.	In	option	one,	the	participant	is	required	to	temporally	adopt	the	belief	that	their	world	has	been	transformed.	They	are	on	the	‘inside’	of	the	world	of	the	story	and	truths	and	fictions	happen	within	this	frame,	in	which	they	are	asked	to	act;	as	‘robbing’	a	bank	in	Machine	to	See	With	(Blast	Theory	2010)	or	rather,	acting	as-if	you	are	robbing	a	bank.	However,	the	locative	narrative	is	stilling	happening	within	the	broader	frame	of	social	and	cultural	norms,	and	while	robbing	a	bank	is	unlikely	to	be	ascribed	the	value	of	reality,	some	imagined	and	fictionalised	existent	objects	do	have	that	potential.		
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In	chapter	1,	I	argued	that	multi-stability	of	language	supervenes	on	the	normative	function	of	language.	In	chapter	4,	I	discussed	the	well	known	cognitive	phenomena	of	perceptual	multistability;	two	similar	objects	in	close	spatial	or	temporal	proximity	can	result	in	the	switching	between	interpretations	of	the	object	perceived.	I	argued	that	the	that	misinterpretations	of	perceptual	objects	may	take	place,	or	the	value	of	reality	may	be	given	to	an	imaginary	object,	if	the	belief	is	congruous	with	the	‘experienceable	environment’,	such	as	the	(recorded)	vehicles	and	(recorded)	footsteps	but	not	(recorded)	bird	calls	in	the	context	of	the	museum.				In	‘NATMUS’	the	story	world	extends	into	the	city	of	Copenhagen,	with	narrative	events	centered	in	two	museums	that	are	linked	by	participants’	real-time	journeys.	Participants	have	a	relation	to	their	experiences	of	perception,	they	feel	themselves	moving	through	the	locations	represented	in	the	story.	The	value	of	reality	is	assigned	to	the	act	of	walking	through	the	city,	the	narrative	rationale	piggy	backs	on	the	feeling	of	movements	happening	to	‘me’.			
	
Suggestion		Strategies	of	suggestion:	(1)	linguistic	and	auditory	suggestions	that	state	the	target	emotions,	i.e.	the	qualities	and	values	you	wish	participants	to	experience;	(2)	the	narrative	can	draw	participants’	attention	towards	existent	and	represented	sensory	cues;	(3)	statements	that	guide	imagining	that	may	come	from	outside	or	inside	of	a	narrative	depiction	of	a	world	of	the	story;	(4)	assigning	that	which	is	taken	as	existent	objects	with	different	meanings;	the	
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mobile	devise	has	new	(fictional)	capabilities,	for	example,	the	app	that	allows	the	phone	to	‘detect	emotional	resonance’.		In	‘NATMUS’	the	status	of	‘you’	is	important.	It	turns	fictional	statements	into	declarative	performative	utterances,	“You	are	observed”,	“The	entrance	is	just	ahead”,	and	priming	the	participant	for	emotional	responses,	“You	are	feeling	a	little	anxious”,	or	directing	attention	away	or	towards	perceptual	or	imaginary	objects,	“Look	towards	the	stairs”,	“You	notice	a	figure	in	the	distance”.	In	The	Lost	Index,	No.2:	Landscape	with	Figures,	attention	focusing	techniques	were	used	first	to	promote	concentration,	prior	to	guiding	the	participants’	thoughts	through	an	imaginative	journey.	Addressing	the	participant	in	the	second	person,	directly	brings	them	into	the	story.	Simple	sentence	structures,	with	a	limited	use	of	adjectives	creates	ellipses	for	‘filling	in	gaps’	with	participants’	own	experiences.	The	tension	and	release	that	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	sets	up	comes	into	play	again	here;	guiding,	leading	and	suggesting,	while	leaving	the	detail	and	precise	nature	of	the	imaging	open.	Acting	
‘as-if’	you	are	on	a	journey,	can	‘tip	over’	into	belief,	“I	did	see	something	in	the	box”.	Belief	has,	after	James	(VRE	1902:	56-58),	a	‘reality-feeling’.	That	reality	is,	on	the	one	hand	existent,	but	on	the	other,	reality	is	a	value	that	we	ascribe	to	experience.	A	‘reality-feeling’	is	like,	but	not	identical	with	the	existent	world.		Existent	‘bystanders’	or	objects	can	be	incorporated	into	fictional	scenarios	as	Cardiff	did	in	
Missing	Voice	(1999).	Labelling	people	or	objects	within	the	narrative,	‘a	man	in	the	gift	shop	is	a	spy’	or	‘the	marks	on	the	tree	are	a	sign’,	has	the	potential	to	extend	the	narrative	into	the	environment.			
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Misdirection		Strategies	for	misdirection:	(1)	engagement	in	a	tasks	that	are	related	to	the	narrative;	(2)	attention	directed	towards	an	existent,	or	apparently	existent	objects	in	the	environment;	(3)	directing	attention	towards	story	events;	and	(4)	playing	with	causal	relations	between	story	fragments	and	narrative	structure.		Tasks	embedded	within	the	narrative,	such	as	walking	to	a	location	and	searching	for	people	or	objects	can	keep	the	participant	focused	on	the	world	of	the	narrative,	actively	cementing	fictional	premises	to	existent	objects	and	locations.	However,	there	is	the	potential	that	value	of	successfully	completing	a	challenge	takes	on	greater	relevance	to	the	participant	than	the	story.	
	Alternative	interpretations	applied	to	functioning	objects	in	the	world,	such	as	in	‘The	Lost	
Index’	the	participant’s	phone	is	a	‘volatility	metre’,	co-opting	the	object’s	quality	of	liveness;	the	value	of	reality	is	hijacked	for	fictional	purposes.	The	‘volatility	metre’	detects	proximity	to	objects169.	While	it’s	an	object	in	a	fiction,	the	app	does	really	perform	the	fictional	function,	detecting	objects,	however	the	actual	cause	of	its	functionality	(the	proximity	to	Bluetooth	beacons),	is	suppressed.	Its	value	of	reality	is	metaphorically	multi-stable,	moving	between	the	factual	and	the	fictional.			Existent	and	fictional	objects	are	subject	to	the	logic	of	the	story	world,	its	social	norms,	physical	laws,	histories	and	geography,	etc.	What	is	given	the	value	of	reality	inside	the	world	
                                                        
 
169 We could relate this to Roland Barthes (1957) sematic function of “myth”. 
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of	the	story	may	not	be	the	same	as	outside.	If	participants	are	motivated	to	adopt	suppositions,	there	can	be	consequences	for	how	they	act.	Actions	may	result	from	the	belief	that	a	sound	has	the	value	of	reality,	tuning	around	to	see	if	someone	is	following	you	when	you	hear	footsteps.	Actions	may	also	be	motivated	by	other	factors	such	as,	relations	to	
emotions,	if	it	is	a	pleasurable	to	imagine	a	particular	scenario,	and	relations	to	volition,	the	desire	to	successfully	complete	a	task,	set	within	the	narrative.	Rational	interpretation	involves	logical	reasoning	but	also	aesthetics	and	sentiment,	we	feel	our	rational	interpretation	to	be	true,	it	fits	satisfactorily	with	our	existing	ideas.		
	
Relations	to	representations	
	The	use	of	recorded	sound	to	represent	fictional	objects	or	events	and	the	attribution	within	the	narrative	of	to	alternative	interpretations	to	existent	sounds,	are	strategies	that	can	suggest	the	presence	of	fictional	places.	Recorded	sound	may	be	given	the	value	of	reality,	particularly	if	the	sound	sources	are	occluded	or	there	no	possibility	of	verifying	sound	source,	or	it	may	be	falsely	attributed	to	an	existent	object.	Recorded	sounds	of	seagulls	are	potentially	attributed	to	seagulls	flying	overhead.	In	accounts	of	‘LociOscope,	The	Letters’,	participants’	classifications	of	the	existent,	the	represented	and	the	imagined	was	often	‘unsettled’.	“I	heard	footsteps	coming	up	behind	me	and	thought	there	was	someone	there”,	“There	were	a	few	moments	where	I	jumped,	I	couldn’t	distinguish	between	which	sounds	were	
and	weren’t	recorded,	like	the	birds	and	the	motorbike”.	Listening	to	locative	narrative	on	headphones	in	the	context	of	the	existent	location	has	the	potential	to	heighten	sensory	cues,	create	a	sense	of	‘strangeness’	and	misperceptions.	The	composition	can	employ	techniques	from	simulation	of	perceptual	cues	to	symbolic	representation.	Recorded	and	synthesized	
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binaural	sound	can	give	the	illusion	that	sound	sources	are	spatially	situated	in	the	environment	around	the	participant.	A	dog’s	padding	feet	on	a	boardwalk	audibly	in	
LociOscope,	The	Letters’	seemed	to	be	few	metres	away,	evoking	the	sonic	qualities	of	the	fictional	place,	however	the	dog	was	invisible,	drawing	attention	to	its	mediation.			Recorded	sounds	don’t	necessarily	need	to	simulate	all	the	qualities	of	existent	objects	for	them	to	be	described	as	having	a	‘reality	feeling’.	Using	familiar	film	or	radio	representational	conventions,	recorded	sounds	function	symbolically	as	“sound	marks”	(Schafer’s	(1994	[1977]:	6)	signifying	the	type	of	environment	while	apparently	transparent.	Other	sounds	such	as	voices	talking	in	the	background	or	the	vibrate	sound	on	the	mobile	phone	ringing	in	the	app,	create	the	illusion	that	the	call	is	non-fictional,	can	add	detail	and	specificity	to	the	world	of	the	story.			The	context	of	the	particular	environment	can	affect	the	perception	of	sounds;	the	same	recording	can	be	interpreted	differently	depending	upon	its	congruence	with	the	listening	situation.	The	recorded	sound	of	the	blackbird	heard	on	the	headphones	appears	to	be	issuing	from	a	blackbird	on	a	nearby	branch	but	the	value	of	reality	was	not	given	to	the	same	recording	in	the	city	environment.	Recorded	sounds	may	exist	concurrently,	sequentially,	blend	or	mask	existent	sound	in	the	location.			
	
Summary	
	The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	describes	a	potential	quality	of	expanded	narrative	practices,	and	in	particular,	I	argue	captures	an	aspect	of	the	experiential	and	formal	narrative	
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complexity	of	locative	narrative.	We	generally	accept	the	phenomenal	presentation	of	our	surroundings,	however	ontological	ambiguity	may	result	when	perceptual	cues	are	not	readily	
attributable	to	the	existent	place	or	the	fictional	world	of	the	story;	the	prompting	of	
experiential	and	epistemological	questions,	‘what	does	it	feel	like	to	be	a	participant	in	a	story?’	
and;	‘what	is	the	truth-value	we	attach	to	our	experience	when	our	actions	take	place	in	
narrative	worlds?’		
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Conclusion		In	this	thesis	I	have	argued	for	the	new	field	of	expanded	narrative	on	the	grounds	that	it	represents	practices	not	captured	by	single	disciplinary	categories,	such	as	‘art’,	or	‘game	studies’,	or	by	media-specific	labels	such	as	‘digital’	or	‘interactive’.	Expanded	narrative	is	defined	those	practices	that	present	a	challenge	their	particular	form	of	storytelling,	fiction	or	
nonfiction.	Whether	that	challenge	is	to	spectatorship,	made	by	promenade	theatre,	or	locative	narrative’s	challenge	to	the	site	of	reading,	the	potential	affect	is	that	of	experientially	
unsettling	the	ontological	status	of	what	the	participant	takes	to	be	‘real’,	represented	or	
imagined.	This	affect	I	have	expressed	with	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability.		
		The	metaphor	of	multi-stability	is	analogous	with	the	term	perceptual	multistability,	that	refers	to	switching	between	interpretations	that	we	may	experience	when	we	look	at	an	ambiguous	figure	like	the	Necker	cube	or	the	duck-rabbit	illustration.170	Extending	and	elaborating	upon	this	term,	and	descriptions	of	ambiguity,	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability	has	three	parts:	perception,	language	and	belief.	I	have	argued	that	giving	an	account	of	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-stability,	rests	upon	the	framing	of	experience.	The	Jamesian	experiential	framework,	introduced	here,	delineates	four	intersecting	thematics	to	describe	the	environmentally	situated	relations	between	thoughts	and	things:	(1)	Action,	habit,	thinking-perceiving;	(2)	The	intentional	content	of	thoughts;	(3)	Truth	and	believing;	(4)	Feeling,	affect	and	sentiment.			
                                                        
 
170 Denham and Winker (2015: 601) multi-stability is described as taking place in perceptual processes within and 
beneath the level of awareness, discussed further in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Experience,	for	James,	is	being	happening.	Being	requires	an	“experienceable	environment…a	vehicle	or	medium	connecting	knower	with	known	and	yielding	the	cognitive	relation;”	(James	1909,	41).	It	is	the	context	in	which	its	and	other	entities’	qualities	can	be	individuated	and	identifiable	(James	1909,	18-19).	In	our	experiential	awareness,	the	meanings	attributed	to	perceptions	and	conceptions	are	what	they	are	known-as.	They	are	constructed	and	context	dependent,	spatial,	temporal,	social,	personal	relations	to	ourselves.	While	an	idea	or	perception	is	not	contradicted,	it	is	potentially	or	virtually	true	(1909,	115-11).	Our	beliefs	about	how	the	world	is	may	seem	to	have	a	rational	basis,	perhaps	supported	by	evidence,	but	they	are	first	a	hypothesis,	our	faith	or	hope	in	which	is	driven	by	feelings	or	sentiment	(1897,	62).	The	truth	of	an	idea	is	determined	by	the	actions	(1907,	45),	conceptual	or	physical,	that	follow	from	it,	leading	to	further	thoughts	or	physical	activities.	Beliefs	become	true	when	they	are	verified	(1907,	206)	as	such.			In	diagramming	the	field	of	expanded	narrative,	locative	narrative	is	situated	as	one	of	its	genera.	I	define	locative	narrative	in	terms	of	its	experiential	and	formal	complexity,	that	results	from	the	active	participation	of	the	audience	within	the	location	in	which	the	narrative	is	situated,	that	has	the	potential	to	prompt	the	affect	of	multi-stability.	This	thesis	has	put	forward	a	collection	of	speculative	strategies	for	evoking	the	affect	of	the	metaphor	of	multi-
stability.	Participant	introspective	accounts	of	experience	have	been	central	to	the	process	of	serial	hypothesis	forming	and	the	iterative	development	of	prototypes	and	locative	narrative	case	studies.	While	these	accounts	are	highly	variable,	the	use	of	the	relational	analysis	to	code	accounts	has	created	speculative	descriptions,	informing	on-going	hypotheses.			
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The	Jamesian	relational	analysis,	developed	in	this	thesis,	sets	out	a	taxonomy	of	relations	and	values.	It	articulates,	(1)	relations	between	the	participant,	their	responses	and	the	actions	that	result	from	partaking	in	the	narrative	in	the	particular	context	or	‘experienceable	environment’;	(2)	modes	of	engagement	with	the	narrative	form	or	individual	work,	and	(3)	the	interpreter-critic,	the	narrative	and	the	contexts	of	analyses	(secondary	analyses).	Producing	an	account	of	the	ratio	of	relations	between	thoughts	and	things	and	‘playing’	with	these	variables	has	been	be	used	to	develop	the	collection	of	speculative	strategies	for	creating	the	affect	of	multi-stability	in	locative	narratives.	Their	value	and	significance	is	as	starting	points	for	situated	narratives	and	for	the	wider	field	of	expanded	narrative	practices.		Locative	narratives	can	be	interrogated	as	a	site	where	the	fallibility	of	perception	becomes	evident.	The	introduction	of	conflicting	sensory	stimuli	and	suggestions	may	prompt	misperceptions	and	a	belief	that	the	represented	or	the	imagined	has	occurred	in	the	surrounding	world.	The	malleability	of	our	beliefs	is	what	I	argue,	narratives,	fiction	or	otherwise,	trade	on;	creating	contexts	for	supposition	and	directing	us	to	adopt	suppositions,	
as-if	narrated	events	are	existent.	We	‘see-as-if’	the	imagined	place	was	existent,	at	least	while	our	attention	is	focused	on	that	world.	When	representations	have	the	“reality-feeling”	(James	1902,	58)	our	doubts	may	‘tip-over’	into	belief.		The	pen	he	picked	up	on	the	bridge	now	lies	on	the	table	in	the	next	room.	It	does	not	mark	my	paper.	Thoughts	or	movements	towards	it	are	‘ambulatory’	([1878]	1920:	60)	relations;	they	occur	in-action,	in	the	space	and	time	that	separates	my	concept	from	its	terminus,	the	existent	pen	I	pick	up.	My	perception	‘hangs’	off	my	concept	in	‘a	concatenated	or	continuous	structure’	(1909:	xii–xiii)	of	concrete	transitions.	Picking	it	up	and	pressing	down,	it	functions	
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for	me.	In	the	domain	of	my	daydream,	I	tip	the	Eiffel	Tower	pen	I	once	owned	and	tiny	snow	falls	slowly	in	its	miniature	snowglobe	world.	Scooping	up	the	snow	and	hurling	it	against	the	glass.	Looking	down,	the	page	is	blank.	Many	times	our	thoughts	do	not	make	contact	with	the	objects	to	which	they	refer;	they	remain	in	transit,	flowing	towards	their	next	affects…			 	
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Appendices			
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Appendix	1	
	
Locative	narrative	case	studies	design	process	tables	
 
 
Fig. 1, The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 (‘scattered voice points) 
 
Narrative Design Table 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1: scattered voice points. 
What is the narrative content and structure? The related questions/issues. 
The correspondence is transcribed from original 
letters in the Dartington Hall Trust archive.  
Which parts of the letters should be 
selected?  
 
The letters are coded by reoccurring themes: 
names, places, friends, dates and ‘the 
experiment’. 
How should the story be constructed 
(writer, date, travel destination, topic)? 
The letters are divided into voices, and 
reoccurring themes are ordered by the date 
letters were sent. A partially linear story 
emerges that at times goes out of chronological 
sequence because of actual delays in the 
receipt of the post by the recipients. The story 
can be divided into sections with separate 
sound files heard in particular points within the 
location.  
In what order should the participant 
encounter elements of the story? 
 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The story can be developed using a branching 
path mechanism punctuated by questions such 
as, “what were Dorothy’s friends in Rome 
saying…?”  
What is the effect of the requirement to 
press multiple-buttons on the engagement 
with the narrative? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussionè 
Using questions to motivate the selection of 
narrative sections requires a rationale that 
is integrated into the story. What is the 
participant’s role in the story? How does 
their role relate to the genre of the story? 
‘Who’ within the narrative is generating the 
questions? 
What are the implications for the choices 
made? How does the selection this affect 
the narrative? 
Alternative mechanisms for triggering story 
sections can be tested:  
• Rules can define how the story world 
operates.  
• Descriptions of the story-world, 
environment, characteristics and 
occupants. 
• Vignettes of situations or characters, 
lifted from the letters. 
• Stories framed within stories. 
• The narrative structure can be 
organized into zones associated with 
the different travel locations, to create 
a story world. 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion. 
 
How are the different locations 
communicated to the participant? 
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The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe. 
How can the destinations be simulated?  
See sound design table fig. 2 for concurrent 
discussion.  
What is the role of the participant in the 
story? 
The destinations can be simulated in spatial 
sound using historically accurate sounds. 
See sound design table fig. 2 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The order of the narrative is determined by the 
order that the different zones are encountered. 
The zones can be liked to entering a re-
enactment of an historical location. The 
participant has accidently discovered this access 
to the past. 
How do the participant’s make sense of the 
story? 
The story is fragmentary, reflecting the 
experience of the recipients of the letters. 
Participants can wander freely or work out 
themes or the chronology of the letters and visit 
the zones accordingly. 
How do participants know where to walk? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion  
How are the relationships between the voices 
and the travel destinations established? 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussionè 
What are the relationships between the real-
world locations and zones? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
 
Fig. 2 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 ‘scattered voice points’: Participation Design Table 
 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1: scattered voice points. 
Participation Design 
How can participation be developed? The related questions/issues. 
Dartington Hall Gardens will be the initial 
location for the story because of its factual basis 
for part of the story.  
How does the participation with the story 
relate to participation in the location? 
The story could be heard on headphones as a 
single sound file while walking in the location.  
Should the sound file have an 
accompanying map? What are the 
implications for the route? 
 
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion of the implications 
for the narrative structure è 
In order to bring the story world into the real 
world, story locations could make visual and 
auditory connections with points within the 
garden. 
A predefined route can be fairly prescriptive 
and passive experience. How can the 
participant be given more agency within the 
story and the experience? 
The story can be divided into sections with 
separate sound files heard in particular points 
within the location.  
 
In what order should the sections be heard? 
What participation mechanism could 
determine how the files are heard? 
What is the relationship of the points with 
the separate sound files?  
 
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
The story can be developed using a branching 
path mechanism punctuated by questions – “do 
you want to hear letter from Rome or discover 
What is the effect of the requirement to 
press multiple-buttons on the engagement 
with the narrative? 
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who…?” Choices are correlated with a point in 
space in locative narrative. Using GPS sufficient 
space between ‘choices’ is required or multiple 
triggering occurs. 
 
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Using questions to motivate the selection of 
narrative sections requires a rationale that is 
integrated into the story. This can lead to many 
potential choices that require a rationale within 
the story.  
See narrative design table fig. 1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Alternative mechanisms for triggering story 
sections tested. Story sections, heard as sound 
files, can be ‘discovered’ - triggered by the 
participant’s physical position via GPS. 
How does the participant discover the 
sound files?  
 
 
How does the discovery affect the narrative 
structure? See narrative design table fig. 1 
for concurrent discussion è 
A model of a story world a predefined world 
with its own logic, rules and attributes could be 
an appropriate model to explore. The narrative 
structure can be organized into zones 
associated with the different travel locations. 
The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe. 
How does the participant know where the 
fictional places are? 
 
 
 
The app can include a map that overlays the 
garden with the fictional places. Areas of the 
garden become, the San Franciscan Hills, New 
York, Yosemite National Park, Dartington, San 
Francisco Harbour and Rome of 1925. The 
participant uses the map to find the fictional 
place. 
Where are the edges of the zones? How are 
the voices and locations heard together?  
See sound design table fig. 3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
GPS data has been collected for 58 voice point 
locations within the fictional places. ‘Narrative 
voice points’ identified with the zones that 
utilize the existing features of the garden 
design, such as benches, sculptures, focal points 
etc. Basic prototype made that triggers generic 
sounds that identify the zones. The aim is that 
these fictional places are experienced as 
soundscapes and voice (exerts from the letters). 
At the edges of zones adjacent zones can be 
heard faintly, this could be an interesting in 
terms of hearing the distance sounds of a town 
as you approach. 
Multiple zones and voices are erroneously 
triggering at the same time. This makes the 
voices repetitive and confusing. How can 
the affects of ‘drifting’ GPS points be 
overcome? 
 
The sound sources can appear to issue from 
sources in the location. The veridicality could be 
increased by the sounds responding 
dynamically to the participant’s position, in 
terms of volume and intensity. Experimentation 
with combining the hardware of the 
smartphone: the gyroscope and accelerometer. 
Sufficient accuracy could not be achieved to 
binaurally synthesize the files dynamically 
because of the variation in the GPS accuracy. 
There are also issues surrounding the direction 
How could this be achieved using the 
hardware of the smartphone without 
external sensors or head-mounted devices? 
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of the head that cannot necessarily be equated 
with the direction that the phone is held. 
Participants’ speed of walking can effect the 
alignment of the sound files (voices and 
represented environments) with the specific 
points in the garden. A zone can be walked 
through and into another while the first sound 
file is still playing? 
How can the sound environments and 
associated letter fragments be ‘tethered’ to 
specific areas of the garden though 
participation and/or by sound design? How 
does a participant know when they have 
entered or exited a zone? 
 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
How do participants interact and make 
sense of the fragments? 
 
As the participant walks the GPS that is used to 
trigger the sounds in the sound zones drift 
around, turning on and off. Zones also drift into 
each other and are heard simultaneously 
making them incomprehensible. Zones trigger 
multiple times, making the experience 
incomprehensible and irritating.  
 
EW suggests different preconditions, such 
as, zones not triggering for 10 minutes after 
they have initially triggered. When zones 
retrigger, the question emerges should they 
start from the beginning or resume where 
they the participant exited the sound. JB 
implements zones resuming where they last 
left off unless completed after 10 min and 
then they start from the beginning.   
This alleviates some problems but does not 
stop zones overlapping. EW suggests 
precondition that no zones can play 
simultaneously and zones play to the end 
even if the participant is no longer in the 
zone. 
There are long gaps between zones and voices 
that suggest that the software has stopped 
working and disrupt the experience. 
EW suggests a background track that plays 
throughout the experience. JB suggests 
treating the background a large zone with a 
GPS radius that sits behind the other zones. 
 
The map can indicate when the participant has 
entered or exited the zone. Discussion with 
James Brocklehurst regarding changing the 
colour or texture of the zone on the map? 
How should the map be designed? How can 
the real world and the represented travel 
destinations be overlaid? What colour 
scheme, icons, landmarks should be 
included? 
A simplistic map that uses a plan with shaded 
colour areas overlaid to indicate the fictional 
places. 
Should the fictional places be labeled? 
When should the label appear, before or 
after it has been found? How can the map 
indicate that a fictional place has been 
visited or that the participant is in the 
fictional place when they revisit it? Should 
there be a change of colour to indicate the 
two different states? 
Participants could choose different sense 
making approaches, such as, walking within a 
specified area, following particular characters, 
or subjects. Each mode of participation reveals 
different narrative configurations of the letter 
fragments. 
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Fig. 3 The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1 - ‘scattered voice points’: Sound Design Table 
 
The Letters, for Dartington Hall Gardens, version 1, scattered voice points.  
Sound Design Table 
How can the sound be designed? The related questions/issues. 
How can the letters be communicated in 
sound? The letters are divided into voices of 
the writers, Dorothy and Leonard (referred to 
as Jerry) and soundscapes of seven of the travel 
destinations featured in the letters during 
January to end of March. 
What tone should the voices take? How 
should participants relate to the characters?   
 
In what order should the participant 
encounter elements of the story? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
What is the role of the participant in the 
story? 
See narrative design table fig.1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
Initial voice recordings of thirty exerts from the 
letters. Experiments with whispered fragments 
and voices overheard, stumbled across. The 
voices need to be clearer enough to covey the 
story elements. 
Which voice actors should record the 
voices? 
 
How should the voices be heard in the 
location? 
See participation design table fig. 2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
The locations can simulate the actual places 
where the letters where written or that they 
describe using spatial sound recorded 
binaurally and synthesized in postproduction.  
Should the soundscapes be made with 
historically accurate material?  
 
Historically accurate sounds may make the 
representated environments more believable. 
Development of an inventory of sounds of the 
period pertaining to each of the representated 
environments. Films of the period provide a 
source of information about the types of 
sounds hear the cityscapes of the period – 
regarding London, Rome and New York and the 
quality of the voices. Jack Benny in Taxi Tangle 
(1925)  
How can the recorded sounds appear to be 
naturalistic?  
 
Historically accurate sounds can be used as key 
sounds or Soundmarks (Schafer 1994 [1977]: 6) 
to evoke the locations of 1925, in compositions 
with ahistorical sounds.  
How many sounds make up a sound zone? 
Can stereo and binaural sounds be 
combined? 
The fictional places are in effect are short films 
without the visuals that require Soundmarks 
(Schafer) and layers of sound that are 
appropriate to the environments of 1925.  
 
The veridicality of sounds could be increased by 
the sounds responding dynamically to the 
participant’s position, in terms of volume and 
intensity. 
How could this be achieved using the 
hardware of the smartphone without 
external sensors or head-mounted devices? 
See participation design table fig.1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
The order of the narrative is determined by the 
order that the different zones are encountered. 
How do the participant’s make sense of the 
story? See narrative design table fig.1 for 
concurrent discussion è 
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The zones can be liked to entering a re-
enactment of an historical location. The 
participant has accidently discovered this 
access to the past. 
 
How do participants know where to walk? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
How are the relationships between the voices 
and the travel destinations established? 
See sound design table fig.3 for concurrent 
discussion è 
What are the relationships between the real-
world locations and zones? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
The spatial sound has been created using in-ear 
binaural mics that encodes my morphology into 
the recordings. Binaural sounds produced in 
post-production use averaged head related 
transfer function (HRTF) data. 
Is it necessary to use HRTF data, create a 
different version for different head sizes (as 
used in Papa Sangre (2010) smartphone 
game)? 
While HRTF tailored more to individual 
participants would offer a more precise spatial 
rendering of the sounds, it seems there is 
sufficient information in the two types of 
binaural sounds incorporated into the 
soundscapes for many of the sounds to seem 
like they occupy space. 
How can the interactive be experienced by 
moving body in space with as little sense of 
mediation as possible to encourage 
immersion in story worlds and the 
suspension of disbelief? 
See participation design table fig.2 for 
concurrent discussion è 
 
What are the effects of listening to spatial 
sound on headphones in a real-world 
environment? 
 
 
Fig.	4,	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2	‘button	selection’:	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2,	‘button	selection’	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	
structure?	
The	related	questions/issues.	The	narrative	is	constructed	from	letter	fragments	that	need	to	be	aurally	distinct	yet	still	relate	meaningfully	to	one	another.	Grouping	fragments	together	that	come	from	a	particular	letter	seems	necessary	for	the	story	to	hold	together.	Mixing	letters	fragments	from	different	letters	together	reduces	sense.					
How	can	the	voice	exerts	be	experienced	in	ways	that	maintain	narrative	coherence	despite	the	effects	of	drift?	See	participation	design	table	fig.	5	for	concurrent	discussionè		
Maintaining	the	link	between	the	travel	locations	and	the	letter	fragments	helps	to	develop	the	narrative	diegesis.	 How	can	the	letter	fragments	be	aligned	with	the	soundscapes	despite	the	effects	of	drift?	See	participation	design	table	fig.	5	for	concurrent	discussion	è		See	sound	design	table	fig.	6	for	concurrent	discussion	è	Narrative	conventions	have	the	potential	for	imaginative	construction	of	the	story	world.	 In	what	ways	can	the	story	world	seem	to	occupy	the	real	world	environment?	Jo	Reid	et	al	(Ref)	suggest	integrating	physical	attributes	of	the	real	world	into	the	script.	
	
	
Fig.	5,	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2,	‘button	selection’:	Participation	Design	Table		
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2:	button	selection’	
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Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed?	 The	related	questions/issues.	Participation	developed	that	turns	the	map	into	buttons	that	trigger	sound	files	of	fictional	places	and	the	letter	fragments.	Participants	can	walk	to	the	areas	of	the	fictional	places	press	the	map	to	manually	trigger	the	voices	and	soundscapes.			This	loads	another	screen	with	an	historical	image	that	depicts	the	actual	travel	destination	of	the	writer.	The	participant	can	then	press	the	screen	and	play	the	sound	files,	pause	and	listen	again,	as	required.	
The	new	participation	design	generally	functions	as	designed	but	it	is	not	successful	in	terms	of	the	aims	of	developing	an	immersive	experience.	The	sound	zones	now	seem	disconnected	from	the	voices.	A	precondition	is	introduced	that	the	soundscapes	can	only	be	heard	with	the	associated	voices	but	the	experience	seems	more	like	an	audio	guide	because	of	the	focus	on	pressing	buttons.		There	is	little	connection	between	the	participant’s	movement	and	the	soundscape.	The	sounds	continue	even	if	you	walk	into	another	zone	and	therefore	little	connection	is	made	between	the	environment,	movements	and	sounds.	Environmental	sounds	used	to	indicate	that	the	application	was	still	working,	even	when	a	zone	was	not	triggered,	linking	together	the	zones	and	situating	the	zones	within	the	gardens.	
How	does	the	participant	know	the	app	is	still	working	if	nothing	is	happening	between	pressing	the	buttons?	The	on-screen	map	to	use	stylistic	characteristics	of	the	period	1925	to	make	further	connections	between	the	geographic	location	and	the	past.	Photographs	from	the	period	found	of	all	the	locations	can	be	integrated	into	the	interface.	James	Brocklehurst	to	develop	some	initial	designs.	
How	will	the	participant’s	presence	in	a	fictional	place	be	indicated?	
The	onscreen	map	first	indicates	that	there	is	a	fictional	place	by	using	a	dashed	graphic	that	changes	colour	when	participants	have	visited	the	area.		
Participants	interpret	the	shaded	map	areas	and	labels	as	buttons,	resulting	in	pressing	the	screen.	Participants	also	confused	about	where	they	are	in	relation	to	the	shaded	areas.		
		
Fig.	6,	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2:	‘button	selection’:	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	2:	button	selection’	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	sound	be	designed?	 The	related	questions/issues.	In	response	to	the	issues	of	the	fictional	places	and	voice	points	drifting	of	alignment	with	plotted	positions	due	to	GPS	inaccuracy	a	static	binaural	Rome	and	San	Francisco	habour	zones	have	been	made	by	placing	the	sound	sources	along	a	timeline	as	a	soundscape	and	layering	the	associated	voices	at	specific	points.	This	enables	control	over	when	voices	are	heard	and	how	they	sit	within	the	fictional	place.	
Do	static	sound	locations	make	the	experience	predictable?	
There	seem	to	be	sufficient	variables	in	the	location	so	that	the	static	sound	files	do	not	 	
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seem	too	contrived	and	also	mitigate	issues	of	drift.	A	number	of	sounds	were	first	thought	to	issue	from	the	real-world.	Some	commented	that	they	still	did	not	know	which	of	these	sounds	were	recorded.	
The	simulation	of	sensory	cues	has	potential	for	creating	illusions	and	misperceptions.	
There	have	been	four	sets	of	recordings	for	each	character	in	order	to	find	the	most	appropriate	voice.	Feedback	from	people	who	knew	the	people,	actual	recordings	of	their	voices	(although	much	older)	and	recordings	of	actors	from	the	1920’s	with	relevant	nationalities	and	backgrounds	have	been	used	to	inform	the	last	voice	recordings.		
Jane	Grant	asks	how	will	the	weight	of	the	body	be	in	the	character?	Previous	work	has	used	footsteps	or	rustling	of	clothing/keys	but	there	are	difficulties	here	as	these	sounds	can	become	repetitive	and	draw	attention	to	the	artifice	of	the	work.	Further	experimentation	is	required	to	understand	to	what	degree	it	is	necessary	to	directly	signify	the	physicality	of	the	character	as	occupying	the	physical	space.		See	sound	design	table	fig.12	for	further	development	of	how	the	characters	become	present.	
	
		
Fig.	7	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Messages:	Narrative	Design	Table 
	 	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Messages.	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	A	new	story	is	written	in	response	to	the	archive	that	contextualizes	the	letters	as	secret	encoded	documents.	A	friend	sends	you	a	message	about	finding	some	mysterious	GPS	coordinates.	They	ask	you	to	track	them	down	and	they	lead	you	to	the	gardens	at	Dartington	Hall.	By	aligning	the	GPS	coordinates	you	discover	the	secret	messages	encoded	as	historic	letters.	Was	this	a	genuine	discovery	or	are	you	being	used	for	a	covert	mission?	Are	they	friendly	or	enemy	forces?	
See	participation	design	table	fig.8	for	concurrent	discussionè	
	
		
Fig.	8	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Messages:	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Messages.	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	story	creates	a	new	rationale	for	discovering	the	letters	and	a	mystery	to	solve.	A	series	of	clues	lead	you	to	find	more	coordinates	and	ask	the	participant	to	solve	the	mystery.	
	
The	new	narrative	seeks	to	overcome	issues	of	GPS	drift	and	contexualises	the	letters	differently	and	allowing	for	a	new	participation	mechanism.	It	works	by	the	participant	receiving	a	series	of	apparently	real	text	messages	that	suggest	that	secret	
This	mechanism	works	but	the	relationship	with	the	letters	is	complicated	and	requires	further	integration	into	the	experience,	how	can	this	be	done?	
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organization	has	hidden	data	in	the	cloud	as	audio	files,	disguised	as	voice	recordings.	Going	to	a	location	specified	by	GPS	coordinates	allows	you	to	pick	the	secret	messages	encoded	in	the	audio	letters.		Rather	that	pressing	buttons	or	waiting	for	the	participant’s	position	to	be	recognized	the	participant	actively	hunts	for	the	GPS	co-ordinates.	James	Brocklehurst	has	coded	the	participation	mechanism	and	with	the	text	message	screen.	
		
Fig.	9	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Message:	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	3,	Text	Message.		
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	sound	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Using	text	messaging	sounds	and	the	vibrate	function	adds	realism	to	the	premise	that	the	participant	is	really	receiving	a	text.	 The	recordings	of	the	existing	letters	make	sense	within	the	new	narrative	framework	but	the	soundscapes	lose	their	original	rationale.	
	
	
Fig.	10	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	LociOscope:	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	Locioscope,	
Published.	iTunes.	iTunes.	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	GPS	drift	cannot	be	overcome	technically	but	it	could	be	integrated	into	the	experience.	The	phone	becomes	a	device	for	‘tuning’	into	the	past.	This	also	gives	a	rationale	for	why	participants	are	engaging	in	the	activity.		
How	can	this	idea	be	communicated?		
The	instructions	at	the	beginning	of	the	experience	can	contextualise	the	app	as	tuning/time	travel	device,	via	an	instruction	manual.	The	instructions	also	provide	more	of	the	back	story	of	the	app.	
Some	participants	said	they	would	like	more	historical	information	and	the	ability	to	access	more	of	the	archive.	There	are	issues	here	for	the	app	to	have	multiple	purposes	that	potentially	dilute	each	other.		See	participation	design	table	fig.11	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
	
	
Fig.	11	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	LociOscope:	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	LociOscope,	
Published.	iTunes.	iTunes	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Participants	expect	the	same	kind	of	functionality	as	Google	maps,	such	their	position	appearing	on	the	map	and	zooming	in	for	more	detail.	
Some	participants,	especially	those	unfamiliar	with	the	location	get	lost	in	the	garden	or	can	not	place	themselves	on	the	map,	how	can	this	be	overcome?	
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Including	landmarks	on	the	map	that	can	be	zoomed	in	on,	such	as	sculptures	and	architectural	features	may	help	navigation.		The	map	requires	greater	colour	contrast	in	order	to	overcome	issues	of	sunlight	on	the	screen.		
	
Indicating	the	participant’s	position	with	a	symbol/avatar	would	help	to	indicate	the	position.	 	GPS	drift	is	still	an	issue.	Represented	environments	do	not	necessarily	appear	where	they	are	depicted	on	the	map,	affected	by	weather	and	weak	coverage.	
How	can	the	issues	of	drift	be	overcome?	
Drift	cannot	be	overcome	technically	but	it	could	be	integrated	into	the	experience	as	a	feature.	Participants	have	to	‘tune’	into	the	zones,	using	their	device.	
How	can	‘tuning’	be	integrated	into	the	narrative	and	the	sound	design?		See	narrative	design	table	fig.10	for	concurrent	discussion	è		See	sound	design	table	fig.12	for	concurrent	discussion	è		The	‘tuning’	participation	mechanism	can	also	be	used	to	stop	people	walking	through	the	fictional	places.	Parameters	can	be	introduced	that	mean	the	tuning	sounds	occur	if	they	move	out	of	zone.	
See	sound	design	table	fig.12	for	concurrent	discussion	è	See	narrative	design	table	fig.10	for	concurrent	discussion	è		Unseen	tuning	clouds	(not	on	the	participant’s	map)	can	be	sit	between	the	fictional	places	so	the	tuning	sounds	can	be	‘picked-up’	without	always	finding	a	fictional	place,	to	create	more	game	play.	
Even	while	standing	still	listening	can	still	occasionally	be	affected	by	drift	and	the	fictional	places	‘tune	out’.	Some	participants	commented	negatively	about	this.	Although	it	can	be	annoying	it	is	still	congruent	with	the	narrative	rationale	of	the	tuning	device.			JB	implemented	the	agreed	fixes	to	the	last	iteration.	The	preconditions	for	retriggering	work	and	mean	that	zones	do	not	overlap	or	retrigger	before	specified	time	and	restart	from	the	point	last	listened	to.	If	the	participant	leaves	the	zone,	then	they	only	listen	to	some	of	the	letters.	The	other	option	is	that	the	sound	file	continues	playing	to	the	end	but	then	as	the	participant	continues	to	walk	it	is	not	aligned	with	correct	location.		Possible	solutions	include	that	the	participant	is	instructed	to	listen	to	the	end.	
	
	
Participants’	say	they	require	more	detailed	instructions.	 How	can	the	instructions	be	integrated	into	the	experience?	The	styling	of	the	app	can	maintain	the	1920’s	aesthetic	of	machinery	from	the	era.	Explanation	and	instructions	can	be	contained	within	a	manual.	
Do	these	detailed	instructions	now	seem	too	long?	Should	there	be	the	potential	to	skip	or	for	summaries	while	playing?	Participants	would	like	a	restart	button	in	the	event	that	they	receive	a	phone	call,	text	or	any	other	interruptions	to	their	experience.		
However	engaged	in	the	experience,	make	believe	seems	always	couched	within	the	prosaic	requirements	of	real-life	
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Fig.12	The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	LociOscope:		Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Dartington	Hall	Gardens,	version	4,	Locioscope,	Published.	
iTunes.	iTunes	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	sounds	of	radio	tuning	are	introduced	at	the	ends	of	soundscapes	to	indicate	that	the	link	with	the	past	has	been	broken.	Tuning	in	of	the	radio	is	a	device	for	allowing	access	to	the	past	but	it	also	allows	the	listener	to	witness	the	transformation	of	signification	between	sound	as	static	that	fills	and	flattens	space	and	static	that	becomes	a	recognizable	object.	We	enter	the	revolving	door	and	arrive	in	another	place.		
How	can	the	effect	of	tuning-in	be	created,	rather	than	just	signaling	the	beginning	or	end	of	fictional	places?		See	participation	design	table	fig.11	for	concurrent	discussion	è		
Clouds	of	‘tuning’	sounds	of	various	radio	frequencies	sit	in	between	the	fictional	places	and	voices.	These	clouds	blend	with	the	fictional	places	that	have	similar	sounds	at	the	beginning	and	ends	of	the	files.	
See	participation	design	table	fig.11	for	concurrent	discussion	è		
The	soundscapes	provide	the	spatial	dimensions	and	characteristics	of	the	story	world	through	the	depicted	sound	sources.	The	visual	is	augmented	with	binaural	sounds	that	may	begin	to	become	indistinct	from	sounds	in	the	surrounding	world.	Certain	sounds	may	also	seem	incongruous	or	impossible.	This	addition	of	spatial	cues	can	unsettle	the	relationship	of	the	body	in	the	environment.	It	brings	into	question	that	which	exists	just	between	your	ears	and	which	exists	outside.	There	is	ambiguity.	
Both	the	recorded	binaural	sound	and	that	occurring	in	the	environment	offer	perceptual	cues.	Recorded	sound	does	not	escape	the	materiality	required	for	its	propagation.	But	how	does	interpretation	occur?						
Although	fully	dynamic	binaural	sound	is	not	possible	without	other	hardware	some	dynamic	elements	have	been	implemented.	 Developed	with	JB	aligning	proximity	of	the	participant	to	a	point	with	volume	of	the	sound	node.	
		
	
Fig.	13	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	4,	LociOscope:	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	5,	LociOscope	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	Re-situating	the	existing	narrative	structure	into	an	urban	environment.	There	are	no	direct	connections	between	the	story	and	the	location.	Arguably	the	act	of	‘tuning	into’	the	past	could	conceivably	occur	anywhere.	
How	is	the	story’s	interpretation	affected	participation	by	this	location?	See	participation	design	table	fig.14	for	concurrent	discussion	è		How	is	the	story’s	interpretation	affected	by	sounds	in	the	location?	See	sound	design	table	fig.15	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
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Fig.	14	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	5,	LociOscope:	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	5,	Locioscope		
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	participation	mechanism	of	‘tuning	into’	voices	and	locations	from	the	past	is	situated	over	the	campus	in	places	that	have	a	visual	connection	with	the	soundscapes	such	as	by	water	or	in	the	park	or	streets	with	Victorian	buildings.	City	zones	are	situated	where	there	are	crowds	and	traffic.	
How	is	the	participation	mechanism	affected	by	sounds	in	the	location?	See	sound	design	table	fig.15	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
The	acts	of	stopping	standing	and	listening	can	seem	unusual	in	this	environment	and	can	make	participants	feel	self-conscious.	In	the	garden	this	was	not	seen	to	be	out	of	the	ordinary.		
What	participations	feel	permissible	depends	on	the	environment.	Breaking	with	conventions	is	possible	but	more	acceptable	to	some	user	groups	than	others.			See	participation	design	table	fig.23	for	subsequent	discussion	in	museum	setting 	
	
Fig.	15	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	5,	LociOscope:	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	University,	version	5,	Locioscope	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Ambient	sounds	in	this	location	have	a	markedly	different	affect	on	the	perception	of	soundscapes	and	voices.		Volume	and	proximity	of	ambient	sounds	can	mask	recorded	sounds.	The	veridicality	and	spatial	qualities	of	recorded	binaural	sounds	can	also	be	enhanced	having	visual	and/or	auditory	connections	with	the	real-world	location.	
	
Recorded	sounds	can	have	symbolic	visual	or	auditory	connections	with	the	location	but	the	real-world	location	as	a	conduit	for	a	conducive	atmosphere	for	imagining	is	perhaps	more	important.		
What	are	the	properties	of	conducive	atmosphere	of	imagining?	
The	presence	of	many	people	in	the	location	can	mask	recorded	sounds	and	affect	participation	in	the	space.	 See	participation	design	table	fig.14	for	concurrent	discussion	è		
	
Fig.	16	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(test)	version:	Narrative	Design		
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(tested	with	EW	&	
JB)	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	Experimentation	in	the	museum	was	designed	to	experiment	with	the	sound	environmentss	and	indoor	navigation	for	a	forthcoming	Dartington	exhibition.		
What	are	the	affects	of	the	layering	of	sound	in	the	museum	that	was	designed	for	the	gardens?	What	are	the	affects	on	the	listening	experience?	See	sound	design	table	fig.18	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
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	What	are	the	affects	on	the	participation?	See	participation	design	table	fig.17	for	concurrent	discussion	è		The	fictional	places	are	places	in	rooms	that	have	a	thematic	connection	with	the	space.	San	Francisco	harbour	is	located	in	the	maritime	section,	Rome	in	the	neo-classical	entrance	hall.	
Some	zones	have	a	closer	connection	than	others	with	the	fictional	places.	This	could	be	problematic	in	terms	of	making	sense	of	the	narrative.	How	can	these	issues	be	overcome?		
	
Fig.	17	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(test)	version:	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	version	(tested	
with	EW	&	JB)	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	fictional	places	are	plotted	over	the	building	plan	of	the	museum.	Each	room	becomes	a	fictional	place.	 How	can	the	sound	files	be	triggered	in	the	museum?		What	is	the	listening	experience	of	the	fictional	places	in	the	museum?	See	sound	design	table	fig.18	for	concurrent	discussion	è		How	can	the	participant’s	position	be	monitored?	Experimentation	with	indoor	navigation	techniques	for	plotting	the	participant’s	position.	Trialing	the	NavIndoors	API,	developed	by	SenionLabs	
Insufficient	Wi-Fi	strength	for	accuracy	of	the	NavIndoors	API.	The	Wi-Fi	SLAM	agreed	to	use	of	their	application	but	was	bought	shortly	after	by	Apple	and	became	unavailable.	A	button	room	selection	version	possible	but	logical	integration	into	the	narrative	and	sound	is	required	to	avoid	previous	issues	of	button	selection.		
See	participation	design	table	fig.5	for	previous	discussion	è	
	
Fig.	18	The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(test)	version:	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Letters,	for	Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery	(tested	with	EW	&	
JB)	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	sound	be	designed?	 The	related	questions/issues.	How	are	The	Letters	soundscapes	experienced	in	the	museum?	 Visitors,	groups	and	individuals	speaking,	audio	playing	within	the	galleries	(mostly	in	temporary	exhibitions)	and	music	instruments	available	for	visitors	to	play	in	the	world	histories	room	are	the	main	sounds	that	can	mask	recorded	sound.		Each	room	has	different	sonic	qualities,	in	terms	of	reverb,	flooring,	room	height,	hard	surfaces	and	heating	system.	How	can	soundscape	compositions	be	developed	in	response	to	the	findings	from	the	campus	version?		 Perception	of	recorded	sounds	varies	according	to	the	listening	environment.		 How	can	soundscapes	be	developed	that	have	greater	relevance	to	the	museum?	
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Fig.	19	The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1	–	Suggestion.	Published.	iTunes:	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1:	Suggestion.	Published.	
iTunes.		
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	Further	experimentation	with	integrating	the	real	world	into	the	story.	In	this	experiment	the	museum	becomes	the	setting	for	the	story	and	a	painting	as	a	visual	connection	between	the	real	and	the	imaginary.	
There	are	different	layers	of	representation	–	the	story	taking	place	within	the	museum,	that	of	the	painting	and	the	imagined	story	world.	How	can	the	participant	bring	these	together?			See	sound	design	table	fig.21	for	concurrent	discussion	è	Using	conventions	from	familiar	genre	can	potentially	prompt	an	attitude	of	make-believe.	 How	can	the	sci-fi	genre	be	utilized	in	the	real-world	environment?		Initial	testing	with	museum	staff	indicated	a	general	enthusiasm	for	the	novelty	of	introducing	the	sci-fi	premise	into	the	museum	but	also	some	dislike.	
This	seems	to	be	a	matter	of	taste	rather	than	cogency.	One	person	mentioned	that	they	thought	the	wording	and	premise	of	the	human	hard-drives	required	more	clarification.	How	can	a	feeling	of	presence	in	the	story	world	be	evoked?	The	participant	can	be	the	protagonist	in	the	narrative.	Developing	on	the	findings	of	The	Letters,	physical	movement	in	the	story	world	can	occur	concurrently	with	movement	in	the	story	world.	
How	can	participation	be	integrated	into	the	narrative?	See	participation	design	table	fig.20	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
The	language	used	in	hypnotic	inductions	is	generalized	in	order	that	the	participant	can	fill	in	the	‘gaps’	with	their	own	particular	experience,	“Whatever	you	see	is	all	right”	(Weitzenhoffer,	Hilgard	&	Kihlstrom	1996:8)	and	encouraging	participants	to	“think	of”	feeling	relaxed	or	“Imagine	that	you	are	holding	something	heavy	in	your	hand”	(1996:21).	The	app	will	not	be	used	to	hypnotise	participants	but	prompt	focused	attention	so	that	suggestion	can	be	used	enhance	imagining	and	potentially	affect	the	perception	of	recorded	sounds	as	a	real	world	sounds.	Looking	at	the	painting	can	be	used	as	a	structure	for	the	narrative.	 Participants	commented	that	it	was	easier	to	imagine	the	more	distinct	elements	in	the	foreground	than	inside	the	church	that	is	a	minor	element	of	the	picture	in	the	foreground.	Does	asking	participants	to	image	what	can’t	be	seen	in	the	image	while	also	asking	to	imagine	what	can	be	seen	in	the	painting	highlight	the	potential	discrepancy	between	the	different	types	of	engagement?				The	initial	introduction	introduces	narrative	tension	in	terms	of	the	museum	being	under	threat	but	this	is	not	maintained	during	the	imaginative	engagement	with	the	painting.	How	can	the	narrative	tension	be	reestablished	in	the	final	part	of	the	game?	
The	game	completed	screen	relates	to	the	narrative	at	the	beginning	but	more	narrative	tension	could	be	reintroduced	in	the	number	entering	section	if	the	game	is	not	completed.	
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Fig.	20	The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1	–	Suggestion.	Published.	iTunes:	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1:	Suggestion.	Published.	
iTunes.	iTunes.	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed?	 The	related	questions/issues.	A	simple	mechanism	that	integrates	the	phone	into	the	narrative	is	required.	 The	narrative	delivered	via	a	phone	call.	See	narrative	design	table	fig.19	for	concurrent	discussion	è		See	sound	design	table	fig.21	for	concurrent	discussion	è	How	can	navigating	between	rooms	and	triggering	sound	files	be	integrated	into	the	story?	 In	response	to	instructions	in	the	phone	call	participation	with	the	phone,	for	example,	pressing	buttons	can	indicate	that	the	participant	is	in	a	particular	room.	How	can	you	stop	participants	just	clicking	through?	Moving	to	particular	rooms	needs	to	be	integral	to	the	story.		 See	narrative	design	table	fig.19	for	concurrent	discussion	è	In	what	ways	can	focused	attention	on	the	painting	and	imaginative	engagement	be	achieved?	 Techniques	from	hypnotic	induction	can	be	used	to	encourage	focused	attention	and	imagining.	See	narrative	design	table	fig.19	for	concurrent	discussion	è		See	sound	design	table	fig.21	for	concurrent	discussion	è	The	participant’s	reflection	becoming	the	drawing	of	a	face	on	the	screen	was	too	faint	to	be	really	effective	and	perhaps	a	moving	or	blinking	face	or	eye	may	have	focused	attention	more	successfully.	
Redesign	of	the	face	on	the	screen	may	make	this	more	effective.	
How	can	attention	be	maintained?	 Introducing	a	game	element	while	engaging	with	the	painting	could	further	engage	participants.	Participants	commented	that	they	liked	the	game	but	most	found	the	memory	task	either	confusing,	not	sufficiently	explained	or	too	difficult.	Participants	wanted	more	to	happen	in	relation	to	the	data	that	they	input.			
Simplifying	the	memory	task	and	developing	the	conclusion	to	the	narrative	would	potentially	make	the	experience	engaging.	Participants	commented	that	they	required	a	pause	button	for	when	they	were	interrupted.	 Interruptions,	predominantly	in	the	form	of	other	visitors,	presents	a	problem	for	the	general	premise	of	using	focused	attention	to	evoke	a	sense	of	presence	in	imagined	environments	within	the	museum.	Ideally	these	techniques	are	most	effective	when	there	is	one	person	participating	at	a	time	or	if	a	group	is	taking	part	they	do	not	converse	with	one	another.	This	kind	of	behaviour	would	need	to	be	integrated	into	the	narrative	and	participation	mechanism,	as	museum	engagement	is	often	a	social	activity.		
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Some	participants	found	it	difficult	to	concentrate	on	the	painting	for	almost	ten	minutes,	while	others	did	not	find	the	length	a	difficulty.	
The	experience	continuing	across	different	paintings	in	the	room	was	suggested	by	participants.	Further	testing	is	required	to	explore	these	issues	further.		There	is	an	error	with	the	replay	button	at	the	end,	triggering	two	sounds	at	once.	 	
	
	
Fig.	21	The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1,	Suggestion.	Published.	iTunes:	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	Landscape	with	Figures,	version	1:	Suggestion.	Published.	
iTunes.	iTunes	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Building	on	the	findings	of	The	Letters,	binaural	recordings	of	museum	rooms	were	where	layered	with	the	fictional	soundscapes	to	acoustically	integrate	the	narrative	with	the	‘real	world’	experience.		
Acoustic	integration	was	coupled	with	the	participant’s	movement.			See	participation	design	table	fig.20	for	concurrent	discussion	è	A	spatial	soundscape	of	the	painting	was	created	using	techniques	developed	in	The	
Letters,	using	key	sounds	plotted	at	various	distances	from	the	imagined	position	of	the	participant	on	the	depicted	path,	as	indicated	by	the	narrative.	
This	technique	seems	to	be	fairly	affective	with	participant’s	commenting	that	the	sounds	surrounded	them.		See	participation	design	table	fig.20	for	concurrent	discussion	è		There	is	some	contradiction	as	the	sounds	surround	the	participant	but	the	visual	correlate	only	extends	in	front	of	the	participant,	this	however	was	not	commented	upon	and	does	not	seem	to	be	a	distraction	to	the	experience.		The	sounds	of	walking	up	stone	steps	were	omitted	in	the	first	version	of	the	app	as	the	inclusion	of	continuous	footsteps	can	seem	incongruous	when	the	participant	is	standing	still.	
One	participant	commented	that	the	lack	of	footsteps	going	up	the	tower	spoiled	the	realism	of	the	sound.	A	number	of	participants	found	imagining	inside	the	church	move	difficult	because	the	sounds	did	not	correlate	with	the	picture	as	only	the	church’s	spire	is	depicted	in	the	painting.	Basing	the	narrative	and	sound	purely	on	what	is	depicted	in	the	painting	may	be	more	effective	in	terms	of	evoking	a	sense	of	presence	in	the	hybrid	environment.	See	narrative	design	table	fig.19	for	concurrent	discussion	è		The	use	of	the	phone	ring	tone	and	hang-up	sounds	added	realism	to	receiving	the	phone	call.		 Sounds	which	move	between	the	real-world	and	the	story	world	can	help	to	evoke	a	sense	of	presence	in	the	environment.	See	narrative	design	table	fig.19	for	concurrent	discussion	è		
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Fig.	22	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt	with	buttons)	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt,	with	buttons)	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	narrative	concept	extends	the	first	Lost	
Index	plot.	Now	the	effects	can	be	felt	in	the	museum	building,	as	it	begins	to	turn	inside	out.	The	threat	must	be	stopped	but	unseen	enemy	spies	are	following	you	and	sometimes	prevent	from	completing	your	task,	will	you	be	able	to	stop	the	turning?	
How	will	the	narrative	be	communicated?	
In	the	first	iterations	the	narrative	was	given	in	the	beginning	phone	call.	Participants	commented	that	they	found	the	introduction	too	long	and	wanted	more	narrative	development	during	the	game.	
The	subsequent	iterations	additional	phone	calls	introduced	more	narrative	content	during	the	game	and	less	at	the	beginning.	Initially	the	museum	guards	were	framed	as	imposters	to	be	avoided.	The	museum	rejected	this	premise	and	the	imposters	become	unseen	with	the	museum	guards’	whistling	used	to	signal	that	danger	was	present.	
How	can	obstacles	and	narrative	threats	be	introduced?	See	participation	design	table	fig.23	for	concurrent	discussion	è		How	can	narrative	tension	be	increased	and	how	can	the	participant	experience	the	effects	of	the	lost	index?	 See	sound	design	table	fig.24	for	concurrent	discussion	è		
	
	
Fig.	23	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt	with	buttons)	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt,	with	buttons)	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	The	participation	takes	the	form	of	a	‘treasure	hunt’.	Initial	iterations	had	one	set	of	objects	to	find.		 How	can	re-playability	be	introduced?	Twenty-five	objects	were	assigned	different	categories	and	a	random	selection	of	five	was	generated.	James	Brocklehurst	implemented	the	code.	
Looking	for	the	objects	took	considerable	time	in	the	initial	iterations,	particularly	if	participants	were	not	familiar	with	the	museum.	In	the	next	iteration	a	message	on	screen	indicated	if	an	object	from	the	list	was	present	in	a	particular	room,	in	order	to	reduce	the	time	searching	for	objects.	
Participants	often	worked	out	that	they	could	press	the	room	buttons	without	actually	going	to	the	room	in	order	to	work	out	more	quickly	where	to	search.	As	a	result,	incorrect	soundscapes	trigger	that	are	not	related	to	where	participants	are	standing.			See	sound	design	table	fig.24	for	concurrent	discussion	è	An	on	screen	message	reminds	participants	to	press	the	room	button	 Participants	often	forget	to	press	the	room	button.		Alternative	navigation	mechanisms	are	required	to	identify	the	location	of	the	participant	and	trigger	the	audio.	Bluetooth	will	be	used	in	the	next	prototype.	
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The	third	iteration	was	tested	with	a	range	of	age	groups,	some	found	the	objects	easy	to	find,	others	very	difficult.	A	range	of	difficulty	of	objects	was	introduced	in	terms	of	the	obscurity	of	the	objects,	introducing	confusion	with	identical	objects,	and	numbers	that	are	not	self	evident	as	they	may	be	dates	or	index	numbers.		Familiarity	with	the	museum	may	be	a	factor	in	the	level	difficulty	experienced.	
How	does	the	level	of	difficultly	affect	the	experience	of	engagement	with	the	narrative?		Participants	said	that	they	could	not	remember	the	objects.	An	inventory	was	implemented	that	could	be	accessed	from	a	link	from	the	main	screen.			Randomly	generated	whistling	was	used	to	signal	that	danger	was	present.	This	was	accompanied	by	an	onscreen	message	requesting	that	the	participant	returns	to	the	entrance	hall.	Some	chose	to	ignore	the	message	and	concentrate	on	finding	the	objects.	
See	narrative	design	table	fig.22	for	concurrent	discussion	è	
	How	can	the	participants	be	compelled	to	acknowledge	the	obstacles	that	make	the	game	less	straightforward?	Introducing	narrative	content	via	further	phone	calls	can	also	be	combined	with	game	obstacles.	 See	narrative	design	table	fig.22	for	concurrent	discussion	è		The	initial	phone	call	uses	suggestion	to	attempt	to	influence	the	user’s	perception	of	the	environment	as	moving.	 What	are	the	boundaries	between	pretending	to	see	something	move	and	actually	perceiving	movement?		Some	participants	in	the	older	age	group	requested	clearer	instructions	and	an	indication	that	playing	again	would	be	a	new	experience.	
There	was	a	significant	disparity	in	understanding	of	the	game	and	the	narrative	between	participants	who	were	familiar	with	playing	screen-based	games	and	those	who	were	not.		Some	participants	from	the	35-	55	age	group	found	the	experience	stressful	and	did	not	wish	to	engage	in	the	behaviours	prescribed	by	the	narrative	(looking	out	for	impostors,	not	drawing	attention	to	yourself,	etc.)	
	
	
Fig.	24	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt	with	buttons)	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning,	version	1	(treasure	hunt,	with	buttons)	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Creating	represented	environments	by	audibly	transforming	the	ambient	sound	in	the	location.		 What	is	the	phenomenal	experience	of	incrementally	transforming	the	environment?			The	aims	of	the	composition	for	the	‘encroaching’	store	were	not	to	superimpose	its	spatial	qualities	but	its	atmosphere.	Key	sounds	were	overlaid		(shelving,	lights,	heating	system,	packaging,	boxes,	etc.)	
In	order	that	a	sense	of	presence	in	a	story	world	may	be	experienced,	to	what	extent	do	the	physical	particulars	of	an	environment	need	to	be	phenomenally	available,	either	through	simulation	or	suggestion?		The	store	sounds	are	increasingly	audible	but	they	do	not	have	the	effect	of	superimposing	a	different	environment	but	add	another	layer	and	subtly	changing	how	the	real-world	environment	is	perceived.		
What	are	the	relationships	between	the	phenomenal	experience	of	a	story	world	altering,	adding	to	or	becoming	superimposing	on	a	real-world	location?		
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The	time	limit	for	completion	of	the	task	and	the	emphasis	on	game	play	become	participant’s	main	focus.		
How	does	game	play	affect	perception	of	sound?	See	participation	design	table	fig.23	for	concurrent	discussion	è	Participants	commented	that	they	found	that	the	recorded	sounds	often	blended	into	real-world	sounds	whereby	they	could	not	tell	which	was	recorded.	
If	a	recorded	sound	blends	seamlessly	with	the	‘real-world’	location	they	may	not	be	attributed	to	the	story	world.	Is	a	sense	of	difference	or	acknowledgment	of	the	particulars	of	the	story	world	necessary	for	a	sense	of	presence?	Participants	commented,	“the	sound	made	
the	game	seem	more	real”.	Some	participants,	unfamiliar	with	playing	screen-based	games,	said	that	they	found	the	sound	stressful.		
When	the	game	mechanism	is	the	main	focus	of	participants’	attention	does	the	sound	function	more	to	augment	the	real-world?	Does	acting	in	particular	ways	bring	the	story	world	into	the	real-world	location?	
	
	
Developing	the	ninth	prototype,	The	Turning,	version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth		
	
	In	order	negate	the	link	between	triggering	sounds	with	pressing	buttons	an	optimally	positioned	Bluetooth	beacon	was	positioned	in	each	of	the	rooms	to	automatically	trigger	the	soundscapes.	This	meant	that	soundscapes	could	only	be	heard	in	the	rooms	they	were	designed	for	and	simplified	the	game	mechanism.				
	
	
Fig.25	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	Narrative	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning		(version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	
Narrative	Design	Table	
What	is	the	narrative	content	and	structure?	 The	related	questions/issues.	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning,	used	with	Bluetooth	beacons.			 	Script	changes	made	to	the	instructions	reflect	the	development	of	the	interface	that	indicates	if	the	participant	is	in	a	particular	room.	Participants	are	told	that	the	app	is	picking	up	environmental	volatility	readings	and	encouraged	to	check	if	there	are	any	objects	in	range.	
	
	
	
Fig.	26	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	Participation	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	
Participation	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	Bluetooth	beacons	are	situated	in	the	centre	of	each	room.	The	sensitivity	fluctuates	so	they	cannot	be	used	in	the	museum	environment	as	sensors	for	dynamically	responsive	sound.	They	can	be	used	to	indicate	if	a	participant	is	in	the	room	or	not,	switching	the	soundscapes	on	and	off.		
How	soundscapes	triggered	by	these	Bluetooth	beacons	stop	soundscapes	repeating	if	a	participant	re-enters	a	room?	
Drawing	from	the	navigation	experiments	of	
The	Letters	the	soundscapes	should	continue	from	the	point	where	the	participant	left	the	 	
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room	rather	than	restarting	each	time	they	enter,	to	avoid	repetition.	
	 	
	
	
Fig.	27	The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	1,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	Sound	Design	Table	
	
The	Lost	Index	–	The	Turning	(version	2,	treasure	hunt,	with	Bluetooth)	
Sound	Design	Table	
How	can	the	participation	be	designed	 The	related	questions/issues.	A	crossfade	of	10	seconds	is	used	to	minimize	between	room	soundscapes	to	minimize	the	participant’s	awareness	of	an	abrupt	change	in	the	recordings	
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Appendix	2	
	
	
	
Peirce’s	Pragmatism	in	Five	Papers	
 
 This	supplement	considers	James’	pragmatism	in	relation	to	that	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce,	particularly	focusing	upon	five	of	Peirce’s	published	articles171	that	identify	a	number	of	points	of	divergence	with	James.	The	ideas	of	truth	and	doubt,	rational	thought	and	the	feeling	of	rational	thought,	time	and	presence	and	introspection	will	be	considered	here.	Peirce	focuses	on	the	idea	of	general	terms	that	emphasizes	the	normative	function	of	language	that	takes	place	within	a	community	of	uses.	Peirce	also	formalizes	a	modal	conception	of	the	applicability	of	beliefs,	that	he	refers	to	as	the	“Modality	of	the	possible”	(1905b:	494)	and	the	nature	of	thought	as	linguistic	sign.		
	James	(1898)172	attributed	the	term	pragmatism	to	Charles	Sanders	Peirce’s	article	‘How	to	Make	Our	Ideas	Clear’	(1878).	However,	as	John	Dewey	(1916:	709)	later	commented,	the	word	itself	does	not	appear	in	this	essay.	Peirce	notes,	in	a	letter173	to	his	former	student	and	mathematician	at	Harvard,	Christine	Ladd-Franklin,	he	makes	no	mention	of	the	term	pragmatism	itself	until	the	entry	in	Baldwin’s	Dictionary	of	Philosophy	and	Psychology	(1902)	Vol.	2.	It	is	here	that	Peirce,	citing	his	seminal	article	‘How	to	Make	Our	Ideas	Clear’,	defines	pragmatism.	
                                                        
 
171 Peirce, C. S. (1877)‘The Fixation of Belief  
Peirce, C. S. (1878) ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1905) ‘What Pragmatism Is’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1905b) ‘‘Issues of Pragmaticism’ 
Peirce, C. S. (1906) Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ 
 
172 As described in chapter 1, the word pragmatism was given its first public expression by James at the California 
Union address172 given in New York in 1898. 
 
173 In an article by Christine Ladd-Franklin, a former student of Peirce, ‘Charles S. Peirce at the Johns Hopkins’ Journal 
of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (1916) Vol.13, No.26, p.715-722, Ladd-Franklin cites a letter from 
Peirce to herself, circa 1902. Peirce’s letter describes that he introduced his doctrine of pragmatism, at ‘The 
Metaphysical Club’ he claims he initiated in the 1860’s with members including Chauncey Wright, Nicholas St. John 
Green, William James, and others, usually with half a dozen members present at a time. “It was there that the name 
and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light.”(1916: 719) Peirce says a paper he had written “was much admired” by 
the members. It was later written up and printed as, ‘The Fixation of Belief ’ and printed in (1877) Popular Science 
Monthly, November. 
“I should say that the word pragmatism does not appear in that article, nor did I insert it in the 
Century Dictionary or ever use it in print previous to the article in Baldwin's Dictionary [1902: 322].” 
(1916: 719) 
“Pragmatism is one of the results of my study of the formal laws of signs, a study guided by 
mathematics and by the familiar facts of every-day experience and by no other science whatever. It is 
a maxim of logic from which issues a metaphysics very easily. It solves almost all problems of 
metaphysics in short metre and it solves them in such a way as never to bar the way of any positive 
inquiry. It also has the gratifying effect of encouraging the simplest ideas of religion and 
anthropomorphic conceptions of the Absolute.” (1916: 720) 
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	 “The	opinion	that	metaphysics	is	to	be	largely	cleared	up	by	the	application	of	the	following	maxim	for	attaining	clearness	of	apprehension:	‘Consider	what	effects,	that	might	conceivably	have	practical	bearings,	conceive	the	object	of	our	conception	to	have.	Then,	our	conception	of	these	effects	is	the	whole	of	our	conception	of	the	object.’”	(1902:321)		Peirce’s	pragmatism174	is	an	approach	to	establishing	the	truth	of	an	idea.	Ideas	express	beliefs.	Peirce	puts	forward	that	thought	is	one	system	of	relations175	whose	sole	function	is	to	resolve	doubt	and	to	produce	belief;	“belief	is	a	rule	for	action”	(1923	[1878]:	41).	Peirce	(1923	[1887]:	41)	defines	three	properties	of	belief:	first	there	is	awareness;	then	there	is	doubt	(caused	by	something	sensibly	external	or	by	an	abstract	system	such	as	mathematics);	then	belief	assuages	doubt.	Belief	becomes	established	as	a	rule	for	action	or	habit176.	Peirce	illustrates	the	idea	with	a	simple	example:	a	man	with	various	coins	in	his	pocket	could	pay	for	his	fare	with	a	five-cent	nickel	or	five	coppers;	there	is	a	moment	of	doubt	(unless	already	decided	by	a	previous	habit)	before	he	fixes	upon	a	belief	about	the	coins	he	will	select	–	the	action	that	shall	follow.	Thought	“melting”	(1923	[1887]:	39)	from	doubt	to	belief,	belief	determines	our	actions.		Doubt,	for	Perice,	may	arise	from	an	irritation	or	a	question	but	it	can	also	be	“feigned”	(1923	[1887]:	39)	and	plays	an	essential	role	in	the	production	of	scientific	enquiry.		Doubt	can	be	“feigned”	in	the	sense	of	thinking	about	possible	outcomes	to	a	theoretical	problem,	such	as	considering	the	advantages	of	different	routes	while	in	a	station	waiting	room	and	working	out	how	we	should	act,	he	suggests.		A	comparison,	although	not	one	that	Peirce	would	draw	himself,	would	be	with	James’	idea	of	a	‘will	to	believe’,	our	choice	to	assert	beliefs.		For	Peirce	the	same	belief	can	be	expressed	in	different	ways,	however,	if	the	distinction	does	not	appease	a	different	doubt	and	produce	a	different	“rule	for	action”,	then	there	is	no	difference	in	belief177.	A	tune	played	in	a	different	key	is	still	the	same	tune,	analogizes	Peirce	
                                                        
 
174 Peirce announces his renaming pragmatism to pragmaticism in his essay ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (1905a: 165) in 
order to distinguish his doctrine from ideas that pragmatisim had become associated with, as expressed by James, 
Schiller and unspecified others that were at variance with his own theory.    
 
175 Thought is one system of relations, sensations are another. (1923 [1878]: 40). 
 
176 Scottish empirical philosopher and psychologist Alexander Bain’s writings on habit, in Emotions and the Will (1876) 
and Senses and the Intellect (1879) influenced both Peirce and James (1890a: 122-123). James (1890b: 6, 12) cites 
Bain’s view that sensations do not have knowledge of things and that as concurring with his own view. James (1890a: 
245) praises Bain’s notion of the stream of thought in Emotions and the Will with reference to his own formulation of 
the stream of thought. He critiques Bain’s limited account of the self (1890a: 306, 313, 330, 345) and is highly critical 
of his account of the association of thoughts (1890a: 2, 569, 589, 593, 598, 600-601). James critiques Bain’s accounts 
of attention (1890a: 402) discrimination and comparison (1890a: 485, 530), memory (1890a: 653) and imagination 
(1890b: 69) perception of space (1890b: 186, 271-272, 281) reality (1890b: 295-296, 319, 322-323) reasoning (1890b: 
348, 361), movement (1890b: 372 -373) instinct  (1890b: 406, 411, 419, 429, 432) emotions (1890b: 458, 463, 466, 
472, 474, 476, 484-485, 681) and criticism of his views on the will (1890b: 493, 525, 551-555, 580) 
 
177 This view is expressed by James in Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902) Vol. 2, p.321 and again 
in James’ discussion of the pragmatic method in his Pragmatism. (1907:45) 
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(1923	[1887]:	41-42).	Belief	is	a	rule	for	action	that	results	in	the	exercise	of	“volition”.	It	is	a	“stopping-place”	and	also	a	“starting-place”	for	further	thought	and	further	doubt	(1923	[1887]:	41).	Beliefs	are	also	subject	to	deception,	for	example,	perceptual	illusions,	or	our	unclear	thinking	may	cause	us	to	attribute	subjective	appearances	to	objective	characteristics	of	an	object.	Grammatical	structure	(1923	[1887]:	43)	may	also	cause	us	to	erroneously	suppose	that	a	word	is	expressing	two	different	ideas,	he	says.			In	Baldwin’s	Dictionary	of	Philosophy	and	Psychology,	Vol.	2	(1902:	322)	James’	description	of	pragmatism	puts	that	a	concept	expresses	practical	consequences,	if	the	concept’s	meaning	is	“recommended	or	expected”	to	be	true.	Peirce	in	the	same	entry	critiques178	and	seeks	to	distinguish	his	maxim	from	that	of	William	James,	by	saying	that	the	truth	of	a	concept	directs	us	to	practical	facts	that	“contribute”	to	reasoned	thought,	and	the	meaning	of	thought	essentially	does	not	privilege	an	individual’s	particular	reaction	but	directs	us	towards	general	ideas.		 “If	it	be	admitted,	on	the	contrary,	that	action	wants	an	end,	and	that	that	end	must	be	something	of	a	general	description,	then	the	spirit	of	the	maxim	itself,	which	is	that	we	must	look	to	the	upshot	of	our	concepts	in	order	rightly	to	apprehend	them,	would	direct	us	towards	something	different	from	practical	facts,	namely,	to	general	ideas,	as	the	true	interpreters	of	our	thought…	the	only	ultimate	good	which	the	practical	facts	to	which	it	directs	attention	can	subserve	is	to	further	the	development	of	concrete	reasonableness;	so	that	the	meaning	of	the	concept	does	not	lie	in	any	individual	reaction	at	all,	but	in	the	manner	in	which	those	reactions	contribute	to	that	development.”	(1902:	322)		In	contrast	James’	emphasis	is	upon	determining	the	meaning	of	proposition	in	terms	of	its	
particular	future	experience179.	
                                                        
 
 
178 Peirce rejects what he sees as James’ interpretation of pragmatism expressed in Will to Believe (1896) (although 
the word pragmatism is not mentioned in this book) and Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898). 
Peirce’s criticism is that James’ expression of the maxim, taken as the end of belief is action, has the potential idealist 
implications (1902:322). Peirce’s later pragmaticism (1905a: 174-176) emphasizes “generals” (truths) rather than 
“conduct” as outcomes to of clear idea ideas. The Peirce’s aforementioned letter (circa 1902) to Christine Ladd-
Franklin, later published Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods Peirce continues to outlines his 
views on the differences between William James’ formulation of pragmatism and his own. Exerts from the letter cited 
in the 1916 article:  
“Although James calls himself a pragmatist, and no doubt he derived his ideas on the subject from me, yet there is a 
most essential difference between his pragmatism and mine. My point is that the meaning of a concept...lies in the 
manner in which it could conceivably modify purposive action, and in this alone. James, on the contrary, whose 
natural turn of mind is away from generals, and who is besides so soaked in ultra-sensationalist psychology that like 
most modern psychologists he has almost lost the power of regarding matters from the logical point of view, in 
defining pragmatism, speaks of it as referring ideas to experiences, meaning evidently the sensational side of 
experience, while I regard concepts as affairs of habit or disposition, and of how we should react.” (1916: 718) 
Peirce’s argument “…concepts as affairs of habit…” dovetails with Brandom’s (2011) linguistic pragmatic account of 
rationality.  
 
179 John Dewey (1916: 711) makes the point that a key difference between Peirce’s doctrine of pragmatism (later re-
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In	the	1905	article	in	The	Monist,	‘What	Pragmatism	Is’	Peirce	develops	his	explanation	of	doubt	and	general	ideas.	He	asserts	that	philosophy	should	be	based	on	the	experimental	method	and	refines	his	definition	of	pragmatism	as	method	of	testing	the	truth	of	propositions.	The	rational	meaning	of	a	word	or	other	expression	has	“a	conceivable	bearing	on	life”	(1905a:	162-164).	Only	practical	outcomes	can	result	from	experiment,	therefore	if	phenomena	are	defined	accurately,	experiment	can	affirm	or	deny	of	the	meaning	of	a	word	or	concept.			 “…	a	conception,	that	is,	the	rational	purport	of	a	word	or	other	expression,	lies	exclusively	in	its	conceivable	bearing	upon	the	conduct	of	life;	so	that,	since	obviously	nothing	that	might	not	result	from	experiment	can	have	any	direct	bearing	upon	conduct,	if	one	can	define	accurately	all	the	conceivable	experimental	phenomena	which	the	affirmation	or	denial	of	a	concept	could	imply,	one	will	have	therein	a	complete	definition	of	the	concept,	and	there	is	absolutely	nothing	more	in	it.	For	this	doctrine	he180	invented	the	name	pragmatism.”	(1905a:	162-164)		When	Peirce	refers	to	experiment	he	is	using	the	language	and	method	of	empirical	science	and	applying	it	to	thought	and	practical	engagement	with	the	world.	In	rational	life	“…an	experiment	shall	be	an	operation	of	thought”	(1905a:	170).	This	is	an	idea	that	James	(1909b:	59)	also	concurs	with	taking	our	engagement	with	the	world	as	serial	hypothesis	testing.		Peirce	(1905a:	167-68)	says	there	are	many	things	that	you	do	not	doubt,	that	“you	must	regard	as	absolutely	truth”,	at	least	until	something	causes	you	to	believe	otherwise.	While	you	may	think	that	some	of	your	beliefs181	may	not	be	true	this	only	shows	that	doubt	is	a	“limen”	(a	threshold	or	boundary)	that	is	only	activated	by	a	“finite	stimulus”.182	Through	the	course	of	experience	you	tend	towards	belief	or	certainty	that	persists	overtime	as	habit,	the	opposite	of	which	is	doubt.			 “Belief	is	not	a	momentary	mode	of	consciousness;	it	is	a	habit	of	mind	essentially	enduring	for	some	time,	and	mostly	(at	least)	unconscious;	and	like	other	habits,	it	is,	(until	it	meets	with	some	surprise	that	begins	its	dissolution,)	perfectly	self-satisfied.	Doubt	is	of	an	altogether	contrary	genus.	It	is	not	a	habit,	but	the	privation	of	a	habit.”	(1905a:	168)		
                                                        
named as Pragmaticism) and James’ principle of pragmatism is James’ emphasis in determining the meaning of 
proposition in terms of its particular future experience and Peirce’s emphasis on future conduct (action) generally. 
 
 
180 Peirce is writing about himself in the third person here (1905a: 162-164). Here Peirce seems to be distancing 
himself from the provisional value of truth asserted by James, although Peirce (1905a: 177) says that while ultimate 
truth is attainable we would probably not recognise it to be so. 
 
181 Peirce (1905a: 168 foot notes) makes clear he is using the word truth in opposition to the word doubt and not to 
qualify degrees of truth. 
 
182 Peirce (1905a: 167-68) does not define here exactly what he means by “finite stimulus”, we can perhaps infer that 
doubting my belief that there will be bad weather this summer, is produced by my conception of weather as 
unpredictable.  
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Peirce	emphasizes	that	an	important	aspect	of	rational	thought	is	“self-control”	(1905a:	169).	The	rational	person	is	not	controlled	by	habits	but	can	exert	some	self-control	over	future	actions.	It	should	not	be	inferred	that	any	arbitrary	characteristics	could	be	assigned	to	a	concept	but	that	“a	process	of	self-preparation”	will	tend	towards	an	action.	Self-control	can	be	measured	by	the	absence	of	self-reproach,	or	a	slight	feeling	of	self-reproach,	that	comes	with	reflection	upon	the	act.	If	actions	are	repeated	many	times	they	become	a	tendency,	where	self-control	is	more	difficult	to	exert.	Peirce	describes	tendency	as	a	lack	of	reflection	or	habit.	For	Peirce	an	aspect	of	rational	thought	is	“self-control”	suggesting	that	without	which,	habits	or	feelings	may	guide	us.	James	(1897:	63)	gives	a	different	emphasis	saying	the	basis	of	rational	thought	may	not	necessarily	be	logical,	however	ideally	framed,	and	what	we	take	to	be	rational	is	identified	by	“subjective	marks”,	an	aesthetic	sense	by	which	we	recognize	rationality.			 “The	only	answer	can	be	that	he	will	recognize	its	rationality	as	he	recognizes	everything	else,	by	certain	subjective	marks	with	which	it	affects	him.	When	he	gets	the	marks,	he	may	know	that	he	has	got	the	rationality…A	strong	feeling	of	ease,	peace,	rest,	is	one	of	them.	The	transition	from	a	state	of	puzzle	and	perplexity	to	rational	comprehension	is	full	of	lively	relief	and	pleasure.”	(James	1897:	63)		The	relief	of	moving	from	a	state	of	perplexity	to	rational	comprehension	can	be	said	to	be	the	
feeling	of	rationality.	James	(1897:	64)	seeks	to	naturalize	his	claims,	reporting	that	recent	psychological	speculations	suggest	that	physical	conditions	occur	not	only	when	“nerve-currents”	are	discharged,	but	also	when	there	is	resistance.	James	makes	the	analogy	with	physical	conditions:	we	feel	no	particular	pleasure	in	breathing	normally	but	distress	if	we	find	ourselves	unable	to	breath;	when	performing	an	action	easily	no	particular	thought	seems	to	accompany	it	as	opposed	to	when	it	whereas	the	physical	or	mental	task	proves	difficult,	“we	experience	distress.”		 “This	feeling	of	the	sufficiency	of	the	present	moment,	of	its	absoluteness,	—this	absence	of	all	need	to	explain	it,	account	for	it,	or	justify	it,—is	what	I	call	the	Sentiment		of	Rationality.”	(James	1897:	64)		How	do	you	distinguish	between	absolute	truth	–	perfect	knowledge,	and	what	you	not	doubt?	Peirce	in	his	essay	‘What	Pragmatism	Is’	(1905)	asserts	that	it	is	possible	in	two	ways:	Firstly,	rational	thought	is	self-conscious	awareness	that	attempts	to	persuade	the	emerging	temporal	sense	of	self.	The	nature	of	thought	is	largely	that	of	a	linguistic	sign.	In	Peirce’s	words:		 “His	thoughts	are	what	he	is	"saying	to	himself,"	that	is,	is	saying	to	that	other	self	that	is	just	coming	into	life	in	the	flow	of	time…When	one	reasons,	it	is	that	critical	self	that	one	is	trying	to	persuade;	and	all	thought	whatsoever	is	a	sign,	and	is	mostly	of	the	nature	of	language.”	(1905a:	170)		
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Secondly,	"the	person	is	not	absolutely	an	individual"(1905a:	170);	the	intellectual,	societal	context183	of	an	individual	is	that	is	more	significant	than	the	particular	person,		“…the	man’s	circle	of	society,	(however	widely	or	narrowly	this	phrase	may	be	understood,)	is	a	sort	of	loosely	compacted	person)”	(1905a:	170).			These	two	parts	of	the	individual,	the	critical	self-consciousness	and	the	‘social	self’	enable	the	discernment	of	perfect	knowledge	from	a	belief	which	is	not	in	doubt	–	through	a	process	of	rational	thought	in	relation	to	sensory	experience	in	the	flow	of	life,	and	the	ideas	and	beliefs	held	by	others	(currently	or	historically)	within	social	context.	Peirce	says,	when	the	pragmatist	talks	of	truth	resulting	from	experiment,	he	means	experiments	are	considered	not	as	events	isolated	from	life	but	part	of	“a	single	collective	experiment”	(1905a:	172)184.			However,	its	is	not	in	the	experiment	but	in	“experimental	phenomena”	that	rational	meaning	consists,	whose	effects	are	not	of	the	past	but	in	the	future.			 “The	rational	meaning	of	every	proposition	lies	in	the	future.	How	so?	The	meaning	of	a	proposition	is	itself	a	proposition…”	(1905a:	173)185			Meaning	is	a	translation	of	a	proposition	in	the	forward	flow	of	translations	and	propositions.	But	of	the	many	possible	meanings,	Peirce	rhetorically	asks,	which	is	the	true	meaning?	From	pragmaticist186	position,	it	is	the	meaning	most	applicable	to	“human	conduct”	and	subject	to	rational	thought	(1905a:	174),	not	special	circumstances	but	in	every	situation	and	purpose187.	Therefore	the	true	meaning	is	a	generally	applicable	description	of	phenomena,	while	allowing	that	future	experiments	may	replace	the	current	general	description188.		What	does	it	mean	to	be	general?	Peirce	says	there	are	two	ways	for	the	pragmaticist	of	being	general.	A	statue	of	a	solider	represents	individual	men	“it	is	objectively	general”.	The	word	
                                                        
 
183 Arguably the difference between Peirce’s view – the framing of the individual as operating within the context of 
society – and James’ emphasis on the relevance of “the experienceable environment” as the context for meaning in 
‘The Function of Cognition’ [1887] The Meaning of Truth (1909: 42-43) is that of terminology. 
 
184 James uses the idea of hypothesis testing in the context of individual’s experience, emphasizing that truth is a 
relation experience. James (ref) also refers to the value of the empirical method in epistemological inquiry in various 
disciplines. Peirce identifies how the individual negotiates between these two axes of the individual and societal 
knowledge. 
 
185 James (1912) makes the point that the meaning of concepts leads to further concepts.  
 
186 See previous note 3 regarding Peirce’s change in name from pragmatism to Pragmaticism. 
 
187 This is a key difference between James and Peirce’s positions, as John Dewey (1923) has pointed out. James 
emphasizes the particular situation of a propositions occurrence for its meaning, whereas Peirce frames the 
argument differently saying that signs function because their meaning is that which is shared by the community of 
users. Comparisons can be drawn with Wittgenstein’s notion of language-games on this point.  
 
188 For James the meaning of truth is not a static relation applicable in every situation. The real difference between 
Peirce and James’ positions here is that Peirce is arguing that the term truth is not empty it has content in itself.  
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‘solider’	is	general	in	the	same	way.	While	the	name	“George	Washington”189	is	specific	and	not	general.	‘Subjective	generality’	of	a	spoken	or	written	noun	is	a	type	or	form	to	which	externally	existent	or	imagined	objects	conform,	“but	cannot	exactly	be.”	(1905a:	176)			 “…it	may	be	admitted	that	the	very	meaning	of	a	word	or	significant	object	ought	to	be	the	very	essence	of	reality	of	what	it	signifies.”	(1905a:	176)		What	is	real?190	For	the	pragmaticist	Peirce	(1905a:	176)	says,	ethical	beliefs,	for	example,	fix	habits	of	how	one	should	behave,	irrespective	of	individual	circumstances.	The	concept	of	the	‘real’	and	‘reality’	are	also	general	in	that	they	are	not	subject	to	individual	interpretation	[the	concept	of	the	real	can	be	thought	of	as	benchmark]	“That	is	real	which	has	such	and	such	characters,	whether	anybody	thinks	it	to	have	those	characters	or	not”	(1905a:	176).	We	“virtually	assume”	that	the	truth	of	every	matter	taken	seriously	is	that	of	“the	adopted	definition	of	the	real”	–	what	is	real	is	the	belief	that	truth	will	be	obtained	about	matters	eventually,	“in	that	the	ultimate	opinion	is	real”	(1905a:	177).	While	opinion	concerning	some	ideas	may	change	gradually	over	generations	postponing	the	ultimate	fixing	of	meaning.191			Peirce	(1905a:	177)	challenges	the	common	assumption	that	what	is	relative,	such	as	the	properties	of	an	object,	cannot	be	real.	When	we	see	an	individual	object	being	the	colour	‘red’	it	is	not	relative,	“…being	red	is	not	itself	relative	to	sight;	it	is	a	real	fact”	(1905a:	177).192	Generals	can	be	real	and	“physically	efficient”,	in	the	commonsense	way	that	for	human	purposes	things	function.	There	is	a	difference	between	the	idea	of	‘the	real’	as	a	general	meaning	whose	ultimate	meaning	is	postponed	but	toward	which	humanity	is	heading,	and	the	categorization	of	individual	instance	of	objects	or	properties	that	are	assigned	the	general	category	of	real	or	not	real.193		 	“Generality	is,	indeed,	an	indispensable	ingredient	of	reality;	for	mere	individual	existence	or	actuality	with	out	any	regularity	whatever	is	a	nullity.	Chaos	is	pure	nothing.”	(1905a:	178).194	
                                                        
 
189 Peirce says, the pragmaticist acknowledges that proper names are common to propositions, but says that rational 
meaning does not support their individual relation to a particular person, for example. Proper names are not treated 
as exceptions to the principle of generality, instead ‘proper names’ are treated as a general category whose function is 
denotative, to “point-out” the name and what it is equivalent to (1905a: 176). 
 
190 James’ discussion of the perception of reality in Principles of Psychology Volume 2: 283 offers a similar analysis with 
different emphasis. 
 
191 Peirce’s ‘adopted consensus’ is akin to James’ function of belief as satisfactory fitting with existing beliefs, within a 
particular context, be it within science, mathematics or personal beliefs.  
 
192 James’ view concurs with Peirce’s emphasis here on the value of experiential facts. 
 
193 Peirce makes the point that truths are generally believed more often than falsities and if this wasn’t the case every 
step towards genuine knowledge would seem like a miracle! (1905a: 178). 
 
194 Chaos is nothing for Peirce in that it is undifferentiated by attention and concepts. For James however ‘pure 
experience’ is undifferentiated sensation but it is not empty it is full, poised potential. James says in Some Problems of 
Philosophy,   
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	This	categorical	distinction	between	reality	and	nothing	also	serves	to	highlight	Peirce’s	view	that	there	are	physically	extended	objects.195		A	true	proposition	asserts	what	is	real	regardless	of	what	is	thought	about	it.	A	general	conditional	proposition	is	“real	generally”,	in	that	it	“influences”	future	human	conduct.	This	is	the	pragmaticist	meaning	of	every	concept,	says	Peirce196.	However,	the	pragmaticist	does	not	take	exiting	forms	or	established	meanings	of	words	to	be	the	only	realities	in	the	world	(1905a:	179).	The	essential	difference	in	being	between	an	act	in	the	future	and	an	act	in	the	past	“…is	the	practical	attitude	of	the	thinker	towards	the	two	is	different.”	(1905a:	178-179).	Continuity197	is	an	essential	part	of	reality	and	central	to	thought198.	Continuity	is	an	essential	part	of	reality	and	what	generality	becomes	“in	the	“logic	of	relatives”199.	Generality	is	thought	and	continuity	“is	the	essence	thought”	(1905a:	180).		 “…[the]	theory	involved	the	recognition	that	continuity	is	an	indispensable	element	of	reality,	and	that	continuity	is	simply	what	generality	becomes	in	the	logic	of	relatives,	and	thus,	like	generality,	and	more	than	generality,	is	an	affair	of	thought,	and	is	the	essence	of	thought.”	(1905a:	180)		Peirce	(1905a:	175)	makes	the	qualification	that	while	phenomenalism	may	be	“kind	of”	pragmatism,	the	empirical	experimentation	that	pragmaticism	puts	forward	does	not	privilege	phenomenal	sensory	experience	or	consider	experiential	equivalents	to	words	and	general	ideas	but	excludes	the	sensory	experience,	and	pursues	meaning	through	rational	propositions.	Pragmaticism	does	not	hold	that	meaning	ends	in	the	practical	action,	even	if	explained	as	being	the	result	of	a	thought	process,	because	this	would	put	an	end	to	rational	explanation	that	follows	action.	For	the	(Peircian)	pragmaticist	the	highest	order	is	not	action	but	a	“process	of	evolution”,	where	what	exists	comes	to	“embody”	the	general	meanings	to	which	they	are	destined	and	will	be	arrived	at	by	rational	thought.	In	the	“higher	stages”	of	
                                                        
“The perceptual flux as such, on the contrary, means nothing, and is but what it immediately is. No matter how small a 
tract of it be taken, it is always a much-at-once, and contains innumerable aspects and characters which conception 
can pick out, isolate, and thereafter always intend…It shows duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, 
interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites.” (1911:49) 
James’ explanation of the flux shows the difference between the rationalist approach that is reductive and the 
experiential approach that includes the thickness of lived experience. 
 
195 James says he asserts that there is an external reality but ultimately we cannot be sure of this fact. 
 
196 This is a matter of context for James (1909MT) If someone believed that the world is flat, that may be true for them 
but it would not make it necessarily true for others. 
 
197 Peirce’s use of the word continuity here seems to be used as a synonym for his term ‘synechism’ that is briefly 
mentioned at the beginning of the article: if the doctrine of pragmatism (pragmaticism) is proved true, “…it would 
essentially involve the establishment of the truth of synechism” (1905a: 167-168). 
 
198 Peirce’s continuity of thought has resonances with James’ discussion of what it means for ideas to ‘satisfactorily’ 
‘fit’ with existing ideas and only modify them slightly in order that may be accepted as true. 
 
199 The ‘logic of relatives’ is the subject of an earlier article by Peirce (1887: 162) of the same name. The expression 
refers to a particular logic of relationships between terms in a proposition when terms fixed to an object become 
general. Peirce gives the example of the word “slayer” becomes general when fixed to its object – “slayer of giants”.  
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evolution	this	takes	place	more	and	more	through	“self-control”,	which	Peirce	says	(1905a:	178)	is	the	rationale	for	calling	meaning	general.		In	the	essay	‘Issues	of	Pragmaticism’	(1905b),	Peirce	revises	and	develops	his	doctrine	of	pragmatism	expressed	in	his	earlier	articles.	The	reiteration	of	the	maxim	put	forward	in	‘How	
To	Make	Our	Ideas	Clear’	(cited	above)	is	qualified	with	an	“indicative”	example	that	encapsulates	the	discussion	put	forward	in	‘What	Pragmatism	Is’	(1905a),	published	in	The	
Monist	six	months	earlier.	It	puts	that	the	meaning	of	a	concept	is	the	practical	consequences	that	would	result;	that	the	consequences	are	rational;	they	are	conditional	upon	the	circumstances	and	desires	that	would	occur	if	the	concept	–	“symbol”	(standing	in	for	terms	and	variety	of	notational	systems)	–	is	accepted.		 “The	entire	intellectual	purport	of	any	symbol	consists	in	the	total	of	all	general	modes	of	rational	conduct	which,	conditionally	upon	all	the	possible	different	circumstances	and	desires,	would	ensue	upon	the	acceptance	of	the	symbol.”	(1905b:	481)		Peirce	further	defines	belief;	there	are	not	only	indubitable	propositions	–	statements	of	truth	that	are	not	doubted	–	but	there	are	also	indubitable	inferences	(1905b:	481),	beliefs	that	can	be	rationally	inferred200	from	propositions.	Peirce	says,			 “…the	term	"reasoning"	ought	to	be	confined	to	such	fixation	of	one	belief	by	another	as	is	reasonable,	deliberate,	self-controlled.”	(1905b:	482)		The	“ultimate	nature”201	of	reasoning	is	being	conscious,	not	conscious	simply	in	terms	immediate	consciousness	or	the	awareness	of	feeling	something,	but	a	tendency	to	respond	towards	a	particular	stimulus	in	a	particular	way,	a	habit	of	thought	(1905b:	482).			Rational	consciousness	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	one	of	its	processes	but	only	in	“the	process	of	self-control	in	its	entirety”	(1905b:	482).	The	operation	of	rational	self-control	takes	various	forms	but	two	parts	can	be	distinguished:	the	regulation	of	irrational	energy	and	the	free	will	to	choose	and	avoid	the	consequences	of	indecision.	Imaginary	actions,202	the	analysis	of	actions	that	should	result	if	a	particular	belief	should	be	adopted,	is	a	vital	element	
                                                        
 
200 Peirce seems to be referring here to the form of inference he calls Abduction and defined in a following paper in his 
series on Pragmaticism, ‘Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism’ (1906: 511), in where he defines Abduction as,  
“Abduction, in the sense I give the word, is any reasoning of a large class of which the provisional adoption of an 
explanatory hypothesis is the type. But it includes processes of thought which lead only to the suggestion of questions 
to be considered, and includes much besides.”  
N.B. Peirce had already discussed abduction in earlier papers including, ‘Hume on Miracles and Laws of Nature’ 
(1901). In. Peirce, C., & Wiener, Philip P. (1966). Selected writings: (Values in a Universe of Chance). New York: Dover, 
p. pp. 289-321.   
 
201 Peirce defines his use of “ultimate nature” here, “meaning in that characteristic element of it that is not reducible 
to anything simpler” (1905b: 482). 
 
202 An earlier formulation of this idea by Peirce seems to that of “feigned doubt” (1923 [1887]: 39). See above for 
discussion. (This idea is close to what contemporary psychology and analytical philosophy would refer to as 
counterfactual reasoning, Byrne, R. M. J. (2005) The Rational Imagination. Mass.: MIT  
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of	both	these	operations.	Peirce	differentiates	between,	“the	formation	of	habits	under	imaginary	action”,	(1905b:	482)	in	moral	life	that	are	concerned	with	our	motivations,	and	conduct	in	applicable	situations	and	imaginary	action	in	intellectual	life	where	thinking	is	“the	vehicle	of	forms”	for	possible	actions,	only	limited	by	its	own	powers.203				Peirce	(1905b:	483)	says,	based	on	current	scientific	knowledge	consciousness	is	not	something	separate	from	the	body.	Reasoning	is	a	class	of	mental	operations	that	if	the	person	is	aware,	even	vaguely,	of	its	principle	as	well	as	its	conclusion	then	it	is	a	logical	argument,	Peirce	refers	to	as	‘logical	argumentation’	204;	in	cases	of	reasoning	where	the	principle	is	accepted	but	its	basis	is	not	known,	Peirce	calls	these	acritical	inferences,	and	as	“associational	
suggestions	of	belief”205	where	one	belief	informed	by	a	belief	of	which	the	reasoned	is	unaware.			In	matters	of	science,	beliefs	are	open	to	reasonable	doubt	and	challenged	by	experiment.	In	practical	life	our	beliefs	may	be	dominated	by	indubitable	beliefs	that	are	uncritical	and	can	be	said	to	have	a	resemblance	to	instincts	(1905b:	485).	These	beliefs	are	“invariably	vague”	(1905b:	486)	in	terms	of	their	principle,	however	those	that	are	dominated	by	sentiment,	such	as	a	mother’s	love	for	a	child,	rational	argument	finds	difficult	to	shake.206	These	
indubitable	beliefs	can	be	separated	from	“paper”	beliefs,	such	as	the	superiority	of	the	intellect	of	men,	that	when	exposed	to	reasoning	move	from	belief	to	doubt	(1905b:	486).	Peirce	makes	a	distinction	between	the	definite	and	the	determinate	(1905b:	486).	If	a	belief	is	
determinate	its	characteristics	inhere	within	it	or	is	predicated	of	it	or	its	negative.		Exertion	of	self-control	over	habits	requires	rational	judgment:	perceptual	judgment,	
indubitable	beliefs	that	are	recurrent,	indubitable	beliefs	and	indubitable	inferences.	Peirce	(1905b:	484)	says	pragmatism		“…is	a	study	of	that	experience	of	the	phenomena	of	self-control207	which	is	common	to	all	grown	men	and	women…”	–	rational	belief	that	result	in	deliberate	conduct	is	the	basis	for	symbols.	A	sign	refers	to	external	things	and	to	every	kind	of	thought.	Thoughts	are	objectively	indeterminate.	A	thought	is	objectively	“general”	in	that	it	is	up	to	the	interpreter	to	carry	the	interpretation	further	to	another	sign	(1905b:	486).		
                                                        
 
203 James’ discussion of the role of belief in rationality is discussed in ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ and ‘Will to 
Believe’ in Will to Believe (1896) 
 
204 “…if the reasoner is conscious, even vaguely, of what his guiding principle is, his reasoning should be called a logical 
argumentation” (1905b: 483). 
 
205 Indirect connections can be made here between Peirce’s ‘associational suggestions of belief’ between an 
individual’s ideas and James’ analysis of hypnotic suggestion by one person to another in Principles of Psychology 
(1890b) 
 
206 Peirce acknowledges that some beliefs are based on sentiment whereas James seems to suggest that sentiment is 
the instigator of many of our beliefs,  ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ Will to Believe (1896) 
 
207 Peirce acknowledges that the criticism could be leveled here concerning a potential infinite regression of causes of 
effort that precede deliberate conduct but he counters this with a rhetorical response - who seriously considers that 
effort has infinite beginnings or endings? (1905b: 484). 
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“Every	utterance	naturally	leaves	the	right	of	further	exposition	in	the	utterer;	therefore,	in	so	far	as	a	sign	is	indeterminate,	it	is	vague,	unless	it	is	expressly	or	by	a	well-understood	convention	rendered	general.”	(1905b:	487-488).		When	an	affirmative	predication	is	rendered	general,	every	essential	character	of	the	predicate	is	affirmed	whereas	a	negative	predication	“vaguely	denies	some	essential	character”	(1905b:	488).	Peirce	says	honest	people	try	to	make	the	meaning	of	their	words	determinate,	with	little	room	for	alternative	interpretation.	However,	unless	they	are	dealing	with	precise	and	abstract	languages,	like	mathematics,	“their	meaning	consists	in	the	implications	and	non-implications	of	their	words”	(1905b:	488).	Implications	are	indeterminate.		 “That	is	to	say,	the	character	of	their	meaning	consists	in	the	implications	and	non-implications	of	their	words;	and	they	intend	to	fix	what	is	implied	and	what	is	not	implied.”	(1905b:	488)		Something	is	“general”	as	long	as	the	proposition	is	not	either	true	or	false	and	something	is	“vague”	as	long	as	the	principle	of	contradiction208	does	not	apply	to	it.	Nor	can	two	opposite	propositions	can	be	true	simultaneously	(1905b:	488).	A	sign	is	definite209	if	it	is	not	vague	and	has	been	determined.		The	formal	conception	of	propositions	Peirce	divides	into	three	terms:	determination,	
generality,	and	vagueness210	after	Kant’s211	“functions	of	judgment”	(1905b:	490).			 “It	is	a	curious	fact	that	in	the	logic	of	relations	it	is	the	first	and	last	quantifiers	of	a	proposition	that	are	of	chief	importance.”	(1905b:	490)		Peirce	offers	the	example:	to	affirm	that	something	is	a	horse	is	to	confirm	all	the	particulars	of	a	horse.	To	deny	that	something	is	a	horse	is	to	“vaguely”	deny	some,	or	all,	particulars	of	a	horse.	When	a	predicate	is	unanalyzable,	for	example	when	knowledge	or	experience	does	not	permit	it	(the	horse	often	frolics),	it	does	not	affect	whether	the	predicate	is	affirmed	or	
                                                        
 
208 Principle of contradiction - an idea cannot be true and not true simultaneously. 
 
209 Peirce (1905b: 488-489) differentiates between definite and precise, with precise reserved for signs such as 
numbers and dates.  
 
210 In formal logic Peirce says (1905b: 490) these concepts will be referred to as, singular (determinate), universal 
(general), particular (vague or indefinite). 
 
211 Peirce affirms the basis of Pragmaticism in Kant’s Critique of Reason, with Peirce’s removal of Kant’s idea of the a 
priori transcendental basis of knowing things. 
“The Kantist has only to abjure [renounce the belief] from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself 
can, how ever indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find 
himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist.” (1905b: 491) 
Peirce refers to a “Critical Common-sensist” as one who upholds his the first maxim of Pragmaticism (1905b: 481) - 
There are not only indubitable propositions (unquestionable) but there are also indubitable inferences. For James 
there are not indubitable propositions, truth is a value in experience (1909) 
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denied,	except	in	cases	where	there	is	a	definite	division	“or	borderline”	between	the	two,	and	then	the	concepts	of	determination,	generality,	and	vagueness,	“re-appear”.				“Thus,	a	point	of	a	surface	may	be	in	a	region	of	that	surface,	or	out	of	it,	or	on	its	boundary.	This	gives	us	an	indirect	and	vague	conception	of	an	intermediary	between	affirmation	and	denial	in	general,	and	consequently	of	an	intermediate,	or	nascent	state,	between	determination	and	indetermination.	There	must	be	a	similar	intermediacy	between	generality	and	vagueness…	there	lies	just	beneath	the	surface	of	what	is	explicitly	said,	the	idea	of	an	endless	series	of	such	intermediaries.”	212(1905b:	490-491)		Peirce	(1905b:	492)	defines	pragmaticism	as	agreeing	with	the	scholastic	doctrine	of	realism,	he	interprets	this	as	meaning	there	are	real	objects	that	are	general	and	among	these	there	are	“existent	singulars”	in	whose	qualities	inhere	or	are	predicated	of.	But	there	are	also	“real	
vagues	and	possibilities”,	both	of	which	are	contradictory	terms	that	reject	the	general	meaning.	Peirce	(1905b:	494)	says	in	order	to	understand	this	we	need	to	analyse	modality.	In	the	simplest	case	of	a	subjective	meaning,	if	someone	does	not	know	if	it	is	true	it	is	called	“possible.”	To	understand	the	ultimate	nature	of	meaning	you	need	to	understand	modality	and	what	it	consists.	Words	used	according	to	their	characteristic	applicability	have	the	“Modality	of	the	possible”	(1905b:	494)	in	relation	to	what	is	known.	If	something	is	not	known	to	be	false	then	it	is	“possible”,	if	it	is	known	to	be	“true”	“it	is	more	possible”.	Merely	possible	has	a	vague	possibility.	Direct	recollection	of	the	state	of	things	is	the	most	subjective	modality,	that	of	the	“mode	of	Actuality”.	If	there	is	only	one	meaning	that	“accords”	with	alternatives	this	is	the	“mode	of	“Necessity”	(something	has	to	be	the	case).	If	there	is	indeterminate	between	possibilities	this	is	the	“mode	of	Possibility.”213		The	proposition	that	something	can	happen	has	objective	Modality,	Peirce	says.	The	position,	‘I	can	go	to	the	beach	if	I	like’,	is	not	reliant	on	the	act	having	already	have	happened.	Imaginary	objects	with	imaginary	qualities	have	the	“mode	of	objective	possibility”	(1905b:	495)	of	the	real:	an	object	is	imagined	whose	properties	conform	to	the	laws	of	gravity.	The	properties	of	the	proposition	are	real	(in	that	real	has	a	general	meaning)	because	they	belong	to	the	substance	of	the	proposition.		
	To	identify	an	object	is	not	merely	a	matter	of	its	name,	a	diamond	is	identified	as	such	because	of	the	real	properties	it	possesses,	“…since	the	real	is	that	which	is	such	as	it	is	regardless	of	how	it	is,	at	any	time,	thought	to	be”	(1905b:	495).	The	property	of	hardness	is	a	“real	relation”	between	diamonds.	However,	to	determine	the	diamond’s	molecular	structure	certain	tests	would	need	to	be	administered	–	“exposed	to	agency	of	some	kind”	from	which	“a	
                                                        
 
212 Thematic connections can be made here with James’ description of the edges experience “chromatic fringes” 
(1890) expressed as a subjective experience, rather than within a formal logical framework. 
 
213 Peirce (1905b: 493-494) identifies other types of subjective modality that refer to “Signs or Representamen” 
(Peirce (1906) renames Representamen as the category Sign) where the “Utterer” does not possess total knowledge, 
such as an act of hypostatic abstraction (the predicate is turned into a relation – wool is warm is transformed by an act 
of hypostatic abstraction to wool possesses warmth. The adjective or predicate is transformed into an extra subject 
from warm to warmth). Peirce gives the example if thinking of the possibility that something may happen where there 
is no evidence, while it may not violate logic it can give the meaning “variableness” and the appearance of “Chance”. 
This can make meaning seem as if it is as vague as the person’s thought that it reflects. In the opposite case some one 
may affirm a belief for which there is no evidence or is contrary to the evidence. 
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sensible	result	would	ensure”	that	practical	experiment	to	date	has	resulted	in.	The	reality	of	the	properties	of	an	object	can	be	considered	as	“the	truth	of	a	general	conditional	proposition”	–	The	stone	is	a	diamond	if	it	has	x	molecular	structure.	There	is	no	such	thing	as	an	isolated	fact,	therefore,	says	Peirce,	for	a	pragmaticist,	to	say	an	object	possesses	a	particular	property	is	to	“subscribe	to	the	doctrine	of	Modality”	where	“real”:	Actuality,	
Necessity	or	Possibility	is	assigned	to	the	meaning	of	a	proposition.	The	interaction	between	a	subject	and	an	agency	that	results	in	potential	or	actual	behaviours,	Peirce	says	is	what	is	meant	an	object	“possessing”	a	character	(1905b:	496).214		For	the	doctrine	of	Pragmaticism	what	is	the	ultimate	nature	of	meaning	is	the	conceived	
hypothetical	consequences215	of	conditional	propositions,	that	are	able	to	be	true	as	a	result	of	sufficient	investigation	thus	far,	independent	of	any	other	judgment,	representation	or	symbol	(1905b:	492-493).		
	
	
Time	
	Time,	taken	as	an	objectively	real	reality,	is	an	accomplishment	of	facts.	The	past	acts	upon	us	in	the	same	way	that	existent	objects	act	upon	us.	Peirce	distinguishes	between	propositions	that	express	“pseudo-beliefs”,	things	that	may	happen	in	the	future,	and	real	truths	(1905b:	496-497).	The	future	is	neither	“Necessary”	or	“Possible”	and	therefore	as	a	“Negation”	it	cannot	change	the	“Modality”	of	a	proposition.	The	Present	instant	is	“so	inscrutable”	(1905b:	497)	that	its	reality	is	brought	into	question.		 “It	is	plainly	that	Nascent	State	between	the	Determinate	and	the	Indeterminate	that	was	noticed	above.”	(1905b:	498)		The	Pragmaticist	analysis	of	time	asks	what	bearing	does	it	have	on	conduct.	Whereas	our	memory	of	the	past,	as	“our	storehouse	of	knowledge”	(1905b:	498)	is	what	we	base	our	actions.	Even	the	results	of	new	experiments	only	become	applicable	to	conduct	when	they	are	reduced	to	a	principle	already	known.	When	we	say	we	know	the	state	of	something	in	the	
                                                        
 
214 John Dewey (1935: 703-704) identifies this argument as one of Peirce’s most important contributions,  
“What in my opinion is Peirce's most characteristic philosophical contribution, namely, his original theory of the 
relation between the existential and the logical, is wholly meaningless if it is not seen that he is speaking of possibility 
and generality as ways or modes that with respect to actualization are potential and general, being actualized only 
under individualized conditions of interaction with other things.” Dewey’s emphasis in own philosophy of the 
importance of the “situation” for meaning perhaps is reflected in his choice of Peirce’s most important contributions. 
Dewey, D. (1935) ‘Peirce’s Theory of Quality’. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 32, No.26. (Dec. 19, 1935), pp. 701-708. 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2016281 Accessed: 09-03-2015 11:10 UTC 
 
215 In Peirce’s 1878 article ‘How to Make Ideas Clear’, Peirce critiques his example of the diamond in cotton wool that 
sought to illustrate the idea that if a diamond was embedded in cotton wool then it could not practically be said to 
have the qualities of hardness, the quality of hardness being merely a question of nomenclature. Peirce says his use of 
the word merely was wrong because the qualities of an object are not just names by which they are known but 
categories that are either true or false. These generals are either real qualities or imaginary qualities. Peirce reminds 
us that the original maxim of Pragmaticism is based not on what did happen but whether the conclusion reached that 
the success of future practical or logical conduct would lead to that classification, of hardness in this case, based on 
“…the belief which alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far.” (1905b: 492). 
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present,	we	know	how	it	used	to	exist,	either	a	few	seconds	ago	or	further	back,	“Thus,	from	whatever	point	of	view	we	contemplate	the	Past,	it	appears	as	the	Existential	Mode	of	Time.”	(1905b:	498)		The	future	has	a	bearing	on	our	conduct	and	is	the	only	conduct	we	can	control.	Some	may	argue	all	future	conduct	is	possible,	but	with	real	questions,	Peirce	(1905b:	498)	says,	we	shall	or	should	be	able	to	infer	certain	conduct	if	particular	circumstances	are	favourable.	In	drawing	conclusions	or	inferring	consequences	conditionals	express	the	future	in	propositions,	such	as,	‘I	can	go	to	the	beach	if	I	like’.		The	present	is	a	nascent	state	between	Determinate	and	the	Indeterminate	states;	our	knowledge	of	the	present	is	based	on	what	has	past,	from	which	we	can	or	should,	be	able	to	infer	facts.	Pragmaticist	doctrine	says	that	the	meaning	of	belief	in	concepts	of	the	past,	even	of	that	outside	of	our	memory,	exists	in	terms	of	how	we	act	in	the	future	(1905b:	498).		
	
Presence	and	Introspection		“Introspection	is	wholly	a	matter	of	inference”	from	what	has	past.	Peirce	(1905b:	499)	says	that	we	are	immediately	conscious	of	feelings	in	the	present	moment,	however	these	feelings	are	not	of	an	ego.	We	infer	‘a	self’	from	feelings	that	have	past.216	The	present	moment	is	too	fleeting	for	objective	reference	to	itself	therefore	the	Present	is	an	external	object.	Peirce	(1905b:	499)	invites	us	to	suppose	that	the	Attitude	of	the	Present	is	either	perceptive	or	conative	–	involving	effort-resistance217	(1905b:	499).	As	a	perception,	the	Present	is	known	to	the	percipient	immediately,	as	external218	–	not	subject	to	the	perceiver’s	will.	But	if	the	Present	moment	is	known	externally,	it	entails	inferring	the	Present	from	feelings	that	are	in	the	past,	therefore	the	consciousness	of	the	present	instant	from	a	Pragmaticist	perspective,	“can	only	be	a	conative	Attitude”;	an	effort-resistance	of	the	becoming	of	the	memory	of	what	is	about	to	have	happened.		 “The	consciousness	of	the	present	is	then	that	of	a	struggle	over	what	shall	be;	and	thus	we	emerge	from	the	study	with	a	confirmed	belief	that	it	is	the	Nascent	State	of	the	Actual.219”	(1905b:	499)		Experimental	enquiry	leading	to	“characters	independent	of	what	anybody	may	think	them	to	be.”			
                                                        
 
216 This conception of the present as retrospective is an argument is central to James’ explanation of time self, 
perception and conception of things in Principles (1890a 606)  
 
217 “since involving effort-resistance” is John Dewey’s definition of Peirce’s use of the word conative. Dewey, D. (1935) 
‘Peirce’s Theory of Quality’. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 32, No.26. (Dec. 19, 1935), pp. 707 
 
218 Peirce says known externally in that it is “not a hallucination” (1905b: 499). 
 
219 ‘The Actual’ refers to the subjective memory of what has past (1905b: 492).  
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For	James	the	meaning	of	truth	is	the	difference	a	belief	makes	to	action	-	what	works	in	a	particular	context.	For	Peirce,	truth	is	what	difference	a	belief	makes	to	conduct	but	conduct	as	a	“stopping	place”	(1923	[1887]:	41)	leading	to	further	concepts	and	beliefs.	Belief	for	Peirce	is	a	rational	process.	Pierce	discusses	belief	in	terms	of	ideas	that	are	general	-	the	focus	is	upon	the	shared	meaning	between	communities	of	users.	For	James	belief	(1897	Will)	in	some	cases	may	be	rational	but	if	there	is	a	choice	between	rational	decisions	the	choice	comprises	aesthetics	and	sentiment.	We	feel	our	rational	interpretation	to	be	true	but	if	examined	closely	will	reveal	that	those	reasons	are	largely	unsupported	by	evidence	and	rest	on	feelings	and	supposition	that	may	be	influenced.			
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